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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I will present and defend Ontological Monism: the thesis which states 
that there is only a single concrete object in existence – the world itself. According to this 
view, the world is mereologically simple; it has no proper parts. Because of this, monism 
may initially strike one as being absurd, for it may be thought that it is simply obvious that 
there is a plurality of concrete objects. There are trees, rocks, cats and larks; there are 
galaxies, planets, leptons and quarks. If monism denies this then it is blatantly false and, 
worse, patently absurd, or so one may think. It is true, I concede, that monism denies the 
existence of all these things. But it is false, I claim, that this renders it absurd. It is the 
purpose of this thesis to show that monism is actually a coherent, plausible and attractive 
metaphysical view. Indeed, it is the purpose of this thesis to convince the reader that 
monism is true. 
 The thesis will progress in a number of stages. I will begin in §1 by looking at the 
metaphysics of composite objects. Specifically, I will be revisiting Peter van Inwagen’s 
Special Composition Question; the question which asks when two or more material objects 
compose a further material object. In §2, §3, and §4, I will consider various responses to this 
question, and conclude that the correct answer to the SCQ is ‘never’. That is, I will argue for 
compositional nihilism, the view that there are no composite objects at all. In §5 I will 
present a number of arguments to show that monism represents the best form of nihilism. If 
you’re a nihilist, you should also be a monist, or so I will claim. In §6 I will provide some 
independent support for the possibility of there being spatially extended, yet mereologically 
simple objects. In §7 I will explain, in detail, how the monist can explain the appearance of 
plurality given that there is, in fact, only singularity. I will introduce, explain, and defend a 
new type of property: irreducible structured distributional properties. Armed with this type 
of property, the monist can provide a satisfying explanation of why it seems as though there 
are many things, when there is in fact only one. In §8 I will address some objections that 
have been presented against monism, and show how they are best overcome.    
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§1. Framing the Debate 
 
§1.1. The Special Composition Question 
 
Suppose that you have five bits of wood: four lengths of, say, one metre each, and one flat, 
square board of, let’s say, one metre-squared. Now suppose that you arrange these bits in 
such a way that the board is horizontal (parallel to the ground) and is being supported in 
each corner by one of the four lengths, each of which is standing vertically upright on the 
(level) ground. Now add the further supposition that, due to your excellent carpentry skills, 
the structure has a good degree of rigidity and stability. Now consider the following 
question: 
 
1) Do your five pieces of wood compose a new object – let’s call it a table? 
 
Now suppose that you have a number of grains of rice, let’s say it’s precisely one thousand. 
You place these grains, keeping them as close together as possible, on top of the wooden 
structure you have just assembled. Now consider the following question: 
 
2) Do your one thousand grains of rice compose a new object – let’s call it a heap? 
 
Standing back, you admire your morning’s work. In front of you there are five pieces of 
wood, arranged in a certain way, and one thousand grains of rice, grouped together on top. 
Now consider the following, and final, question: 
 
3) Do all these objects (the five bits of wood and the one thousand grains of rice) 
compose a new object – let’s call it a heap-table?  
 
These questions are perfectly straightforward to understand and, on the face of it at least, 
perfectly straightforward to answer. The answer to question one would appear to be an 
obvious ‘yes’. A wooden structure with four legs and a flat, horizontal top, sturdy enough to 
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put things on just is a table. So of course our five bits of wood compose a table. Question two 
may not be quite so clear-cut, but one would normally, I assume, be inclined to say that the 
one thousand grains of rice do compose a heap of rice. We would certainly call it a heap, after 
all. So if it weren’t a heap, why would we call it so? Common sense, then, tells us that the 
rice does compose a heap. So according to common sense, both questions one and two would 
be answered in the affirmative. The bits of wood compose a table; the grains of rice compose 
a heap. Question three, however, is quite different. The answer is just as obvious, it seems, 
yet it is quite the opposite. That is to say, according to common sense or intuition, we would 
surely want to say ‘no’. There is no object composed of the bits of wood and the rice – there 
is no such thing as a heap-table! Instead, I will assume, we would normally be inclined to 
say there are two separate objects, a heap of rice and a table. It is simply that the former 
object is on the latter.  
 So far I have not said anything controversial, or so I will assume. In fact, all I have 
said so far seems quite obvious. Yet surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly, depending on 
your view of philosophers) the vast majority of philosophers who have turned their 
attention to this subject disagree with at least some of these statements. The reason for 
disagreeing is usually grounded in a complete disability to answer a crucial question: why? 
Why do the pieces of wood compose a new object, and the grains of rice compose a new 
object, yet the wood and the rice taken together do not compose a new object? Is there 
something special about the way these objects are arranged, or grouped, that makes it such 
that there is a table and a heap, but no heap-table? Is there some systematic and general rule 
which we can apply in order to determine when certain objects do compose a further object, 
and when they do not? If so, what is it? If not, then why do questions of material 
composition seem, on the face of it at least, so easy to answer? And indeed, just how do we 
arrive at these answers which seem so obviously apparent? 
 In his 1987 article and, at greater length, his 1990 book, Peter van Inwagen grapples 
with questions of exactly this sort.1 His research makes it apparent that questions about 
material composition, such as those mentioned above, are much more problematic and 
difficult to answer than they may initially seem. In pursuit of a solution, he proposes what 
he calls the Special Composition Question (SCQ): 
                                                 
1 van Inwagen (1987; 1990) 
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(SCQ): Under what conditions does composition occur?2 
 
A satisfactory answer to this question should tell us why our five bits of wood compose a 
table, and our grains of rice compose a heap, yet why the rice and wood taken together do 
not compose a heap-table. Indeed a satisfactory answer to the SCQ should give us a general 
and universal rule, which would be applicable in any case where there are two or more 
material objects, to tell us whether those objects compose a further object or not.3 What van 
Inwagen’s work shows is that it is actually very difficult to provide an answer to the SCQ 
that accommodates our common sense intuitions about material composition. That is to say, 
it is very difficult to justify and defend an answer to the SCQ which allows that our pieces of 
wood compose a table, and that our grains of rice compose a heap, yet which at the same 
time denies that the wood and rice taken together compose a heap-table. Indeed van 
Inwagen finds it so difficult to defend such an answer, that he concludes that our intuitions 
must in fact be mistaken. Instead, he provides an answer to the SCQ that runs completely 
counter to common sense; for he claims that the only cases where composition occurs are 
those in which the object composed is a living organism. According to this answer, our five 
pieces of wood do not compose a table, and our grains of rice do not compose a heap. 
According to van Inwagen there are no tables or heaps – indeed there are no inanimate 
composite objects at all. Van Inwagen calls this somewhat startling conclusion “the denial”.4  
 In the following four chapters (including this one), I will provide a thorough 
evaluation of the SCQ and its potential answers. First off, I will make a brief attempt to 
motivate the SCQ. That is, I will outline why I think it is an important question in the first 
place. I will then assess and evaluate a number of candidate answers that could be (and have 
been) given to the SCQ. Since van Inwagen formulated the SCQ just over twenty years ago, 
there has been a growing body of literature (which is now vast) dedicated to answering it. 
Because of this, not much of what I will say in the next few sections will be entirely new, but 
rather, will be going over ground that has already been covered. It is still necessary that this 
                                                 
2 van Inwagen (1990), 39 
3 It has been suggested that there is no systematic and general answer to the SCQ (see Markosian 1998b; 2008). 
This approach will be considered, and dismissed, in §2.5. 
4 Van Inwagen (1990), 1 
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is done, however, for two main reasons. Firstly, since my chosen answer to the SCQ will 
play a big part in shaping the metaphysic to be fleshed out in this thesis, it is important that I 
show why I have chosen that particular answer and rejected others. I will do this by showing 
which arguments in this debate are strongest, and why, and explaining why I give more 
weight to some considerations than I do to others. Secondly, despite there being a wealth of 
literature on the SCQ, there is not (to my knowledge) a complete, thorough, and up-to-date 
review of all the significant extant positions, arguments and counter-arguments. A 
comprehensive review of this type would, I think, be of benefit to the philosophical 
landscape, and so in what follows, that is what I will aim to provide.  
 
 
§1.2. Why is the SCQ Important? 
 
In the following few sections I will be dedicating a significant amount of time to the SCQ. I 
will be considering a variety of candidate answers, pushing them to their logical 
conclusions, and weighing up the costs and benefits of each in turn. The hope is to find an 
answer which I – and hopefully the reader too – will find satisfactory. Moreover, the answer 
on which I shall settle will play a significant role in determining not only the shape of this 
thesis, but also the shape of my metaphysical view of the world in general. It would be fair 
to say, then, that I consider the SCQ to be an important question, and one that is in need of 
an answer.  
Not everyone shares this view. Firstly, for the philosophically uninclined – those 
who are often referred to by philosophers, as ‘the folk’5 – the SCQ may have never even been 
considered. Your standard member of the non-philosophical community is unlikely to have 
ever considered whether heap-tables exist or not. But even if the SCQ were brought to the 
attention of such a person, I suspect it would not be taken too seriously. Indeed I suspect 
that it may well be met with an incredulous stare. Secondly, even within the philosophical 
community there are those who dismiss the SCQ. For a variety of reasons, these 
philosophers claim the SCQ (as well as certain other ontological questions) to be either 
                                                 
5 I can’t help but feel that the term ‘the folk’ is distastefully patronizing, so I won’t be employing it in what 
follows.  
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unimportant, unanswerable, or even incoherent.6 I will not be tackling these deflationary 
views in this thesis, since it would take the discussion too far afield from where I want it to 
go. However, the mere presence of dissenting views suggests that a defence of the 
importance of the SCQ is required. In what follows, I will sketch out such a defence, and 
thus justify why I think the SCQ is worth grappling with. My comments will be quite loose 
at this stage, and I certainly don’t expect them to pacify the concerns of the deflationist 
philosophers. However, whether one agrees with my remarks or not, they should make 
clear, or at least understandable, to philosophers and non-philosophers alike, my motivation 
for treating the SCQ seriously. 
 My motivation ultimately consists of the conjunction of two fundamental beliefs. The 
first is my conviction in a robust realism about ontology. I am very much committed to the 
view that the external world exists mind-independently. If rocks exist, then they would 
continue to exist if there were no minds, and they would have existed if there had never 
been any minds. I am in agreement with van Inwagen, when he says: “what there is, is never 
a matter of stipulation or convention”.7 The second belief is about the goal of metaphysics 
itself. I firmly believe that the ultimate goal of metaphysics is to discover what the world is 
really like. In a recent paper, Ted Sider says “the central task of metaphysics is illuminating 
the fundamental structure of reality”.8 Whilst the phrasing may sound a little grandiose, I 
think Sider is bang on the money. The world has an objective structure and character; it is 
the job of the metaphysician to discover what it is.  
With that in mind, then, we could say that in an ideal world, the ultimate fruit of 
metaphysical inquiry would be a perfect theory of the world. A theory that explained 
completely and exhaustively the nature of reality; a theory such that if you understood it in 
its entirety, there would be nothing left for you to know, and nothing left for you to 
understand, about what the world is like.  Such a theory is, of course, a thing of fantasy.9 But 
                                                 
6 Hirsch (2002; 2005; 2009) and Schaffer (2009), 358-359, for example, both attempt to deflate the importance of the 
SCQ; Hirsch does so by claiming it reduces to a merely verbal dispute rather than representing a genuine 
ontological one; Schaffer does so by claiming it to have a trivial and obvious answer. Chalmers (2009) claims that 
there may well be no determinate answer to the SCQ, whereas Thomasson (2009) suggests that the SCQ (and 
other related questions) may be defective, and thus entirely unanswerable. These are just but a few of the current 
crop of ‘ontological deflationists’. 
7 Van Inwagen (1990), 7 
8 Sider (2009), 401 
9 I mean it is unobtainable from our humble human perspective. It may be possible that some God-like being 
could be omniscient in the way described.  
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this does not mean that we can’t strive towards it. Furthermore, even if the perfect theory is 
unobtainable, we can still speculate about what sort of features it should have and what sort 
of phenomena it should explain. And it seems quite obvious to me that a crucial part of the 
perfect theory must be a list of what there is; a complete and exhaustive inventory of all the 
things that exist. After all, how could one profess to have a perfect knowledge of the world if 
one did not even know what was in it? I cannot argue for these claims other than to say 
simply that they form part of the bedrock of my basic philosophical beliefs. I merely hope 
that they do not sound unreasonable. 
In light of this, then, the import of the SCQ should be apparent. A complete 
inventory of all the constituents of the world would include all composite material objects 
(should there be any such things at all). Thus if we were ever to compile such a list we 
would need to know exactly how to identify those composites. (Imagine trying to count all 
the sheep in a field, for example, if you did not know how to identify a sheep). And this is 
exactly what the SCQ purports to do; it aims to establish the necessary and sufficient 
conditions under which some things are to be considered a composite object. Answering the 
SCQ, then, is a pre-requisite for compiling an inventory of what there is. And that is why the 
SCQ is important. Although highly theoretical and abstract, it is a fundamental and 
substantive question which must be answered if we are to get any closer to our ultimate goal 
of understanding what the world is really like.  
 
 
§1.3. Technicalities and Terminology 
 
The SCQ is inextricably bound up with the concepts of mereology. Mereology is the study of 
parthood, or the study of the relation(s) between parts and the wholes they compose, and 
indeed of the relation(s) between parts themselves. (The word derives from the Greek 
‘meros’ (μερος) meaning ‘part’ or ‘portion’). The fact that mereology is central to this debate 
should be fairly clear, for another way of formulating the SCQ would be to ask: under what 
conditions do two or more objects compose a whole of which they are the (only) parts? Or 
perhaps even: when should a material object be considered a part of another material object?  
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 Mereology has long been of interest to philosophers, but in the last century in 
particular, it has been developed into a precise and technical field of metaphysical inquiry.10 
Before we begin the nitty-gritty of evaluating answers to the SCQ, then, it should be 
worthwhile to clarify and define some of the central mereological terms and concepts that 
will be employed in so doing. This should reduce the possibility of any ambiguity and/or 
misinterpretation in the subsequent discussion. For the reader who is already 
metaphysically inclined, these concepts should be fairly familiar, and for the reader already 
au fait with the SCQ, they will probably be more like second nature. It will do no harm, 
however, to go over them again here. I should note that what follows is by no means 
intended to be a complete and exhaustive overview of mereology per se. That would take an 
entire thesis in itself.11 Rather, I will just outline some of the central mereological concepts 
that will be useful for the purpose of this thesis. 
 I take parthood to be a primitive relation, in that it is a relation not receptive to 
reductive analysis. I don’t take this to be at all problematic, however, since I am assuming 
that it is very easy to get an intuitive grip on what it means to say that something is a part of 
something else. Furthermore, despite it being a primitive relation, one can still lay down 
some precise constraints on the way the term ‘part’ (or ‘is a part of’, etc.) is to be applied. 
Indeed that is just what I shall do.  
 Firstly, in this thesis I will be using the term ‘part’ in a much narrower sense than one 
may use it per se. For there are, in fact, many different ways in which the term ‘part’ can be 
employed in the English language. Consider, for example, the following sentences: 
 
(1) The steering wheel is a part of the car 
(2) The ship is a part of the fleet 
(3) The first movement is a part of the symphony 
(4) Learning to give and take is a part of growing up 
  
                                                 
10 The formalising of mereology is largely due to the work Lesniewski (1916) and then later, Leonard and 
Goodman (1940). But interest in the part-whole relation stretches right back to ancient Greece. In particular, see 
Plato’s Parmenides, and Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Δ, 1023-24. 
11 For an excellent, and in depth study, into mereology, see Simons (1987) 
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All these sentences seem to express mereological relations of some sort or other, for they all 
refer to some thing as being a part of something else. But the term ‘thing’ here is clearly 
being used quite loosely. In (1), for instance, we have two material objects flanking either 
side of the ‘is a part of’ relation. Sentence (1), then, refers to a case of what I shall call the 
material parthood relation. The other sentences are different. In (2), whilst a ship certainly is a 
material object, it is not so clear that the fleet is too. One may, for instance, prefer to think of 
the fleet as being a class or set of objects, rather than being a material object in its own right. 
In (3), the objects related by ‘is a part of’ are almost certainly not material.12 They are, if they 
exist at all, most likely to be considered abstract. And with regard to (4), whilst a 
mereological relation does seem to be being expressed, it would be with great reluctance that 
I would admit that the things it purports to relate are actually things at all. At the very most, 
it seems to express a relation between concepts.  
 So there are many and varied applications of the parthood relation, and many 
different kinds of thing which it can take as its relata. But I do not want to get drawn into a 
debate of how best they should be classified, for that is not really of present concern.13 What 
I will say, however, is that in this thesis, I am concerned only with what I have called the 
material parthood relation.  That is, I am only concerned with the mereology of material objects 
(indeed that is why I have called this section ‘Material Composition’ rather than just 
‘Mereological Composition’). It is important that this distinction is made, because as will 
become clear, there are differences (albeit subtle ones) between the material parthood 
relation and the parthood relation per se. From here on, then, when I refer to ‘parthood’, I am 
referring to ‘material parthood’, unless otherwise stated.  
 So now we are in a position to make the parthood relation a little more formal. 
Firstly, I will assume that the parthood relation is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. 
So if we let ‘P’ denote the two-place parthood predicate, such that Pxy can be taken to stand 
for ‘x is a part of y’, we have: 
 
 Reflexivity: x(Pxx) 
                                                 
12 This view is not universally accepted, of course, as there are some who believe that musical works are in fact 
material objects. See, for example, Caplan & Matheson (2006). I take it, however, that this is very much a minority 
view, and a controversial one at that.  
13 See Winston, Chaffin & Herrmann (1987) for an attempt to classify a taxonomy of the varying types of part-
whole relation. 
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 Transitivity: (Pxy & Pyz)  Pxz 
 Anti-Symmetry: (Pxy & Pyx)  x = y 
 
The reflexivity condition shows that my understanding of parthood is somewhat different 
from what you might call the common sense understanding of parthood, for it means that 
every object is a part of itself. This is probably at odds with the ordinary conception of 
parthood. After all, if you asked someone to make an inventory of all the parts of a car, for 
instance, it is unlikely that they would include the car itself on the list. The common sense 
understanding of parthood concords better with what is known technically as ‘proper 
parthood’, which I will define in due course. 
A brief note about transitivity is in order. Although it is often assumed that parthood 
is transitive (van Inwagen assumes so, for instance, claiming transitivity to be “a non-
negotiable feature of parthood”14), it is not universally accepted. And one may be right not 
to accept it if one is concerned with parthood in its widest possible sense (as opposed to the 
restricted sense of material parthood). An example from David Sanford shows this nicely. He 
says: “My spleen is a part of me, and I am a part of this Book Symposium, but my spleen is 
not a part of this Book Symposium”.15 Sanford is surely correct; I for one would not want to 
admit that Book Symposiums are the types of things that could have spleens as parts. 
However, it also seems clear that Book Symposiums are not material objects.16 So whilst 
parthood, taken in its widest possible sense, may be non-transitive, it seems much more 
plausible to insist that it is transitive when restricted solely to the domain of material objects. 
And this is precisely what I shall do.17 
                                                 
14 Van Inwagen (1990), 65 
15 Sanford (1993), 221 
16 And if one disagrees, here, and thinks that book symposiums are material objects, then I would have no 
hesitation in changing tack and admitting that spleens could be parts of them. 
17 There have been attempts to show that even the material parthood relation is non-transitive. Rescher (1955), for 
example, suggests that “a part (i.e. a biological sub-unit) of a cell is not said to be a part of the organ of which that 
cell is a part” (p.10). I don’t find this example at all convincing. Whether or not it is ‘said’ to be a part of the organ 
is a matter of classification for biologists to dispute, but whether it actually is a part (I mean physically a part) does 
not even seem to be up for debate. Having said that, I do actually think that some more plausible examples could 
be given. Consider: ‘the tuning peg is a part of the violin and the violin is a part of the orchestra, but the tuning 
peg is not a part of the orchestra’. Whilst this example may have some degree of plausibility, it is not enough for 
me to reject the transitivity of material parthood. As such, I am prepared to simply bite the bullet and admit that 
the tuning peg is a part of the orchestra.  
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 So with (material) parthood as our primitive, we can now define some further 
relevant mereological relations in terms of that primitive: 
 
Proper Parthood (PP): PPxy =df Pxy & Pyx 
In other words: x is a proper part of y just in case x is a part of y and y is not a part of x. 
(Another way of defining proper parthood would be: PPxy =df Pxy & (x = y)) 
 
Overlap (O): Oxy =df  z(Pzx & Pzy) 
In other words: x overlaps y just in case they share a part in common. 
 
Disjointedness (D): Dxy =df  Oxy & x ≠ y 
In other words: x and y are disjoint just in case they are distinct and do not overlap.  
 
The following definitions will help clarify some mereological concepts which are specific to, 
and indeed central to, the debate over material composition. I will follow van Inwagen by 
making use of “plurally referring expressions” such as ‘the xs’ to refer to a given plurality of 
objects:18 
 
Composition: the xs compose y =df  (i) the xs are all parts of y, (ii) no two of the xs overlap, and 
(iii) every part of y overlaps at least one of the xs.  
  
Fusion: y is a fusion of the xs =df  the xs compose y. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to provide some precise definitions of the various terms I will be 
employing to describe various types of objects. I am using the term ‘object’ in its widest 
sense, such that it refers to any ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ you care to think of. ‘Object’, then, like 
‘parthood’, is taken to be primitive: 
                                                 
18 These are taken from van Inwagen (1990), 23-29. The use of plurally referring expressions is to increase clarity 
and neutrality. For instance, if we had some objects, and we wondered whether they composed a further object, 
we could simply ask “does this plurality of objects compose?” But the term ‘plurality’ is a noun, a singularly 
referring term, which would seem to suggest that there is some single object to which it refers. But that is the 
very thing that is up for debate! And the same goes for other possible terms such as ‘set’ or ‘aggregate’ and so on. 
By using plurally referring expressions, such as ‘the xs’, the terminology is much more neutral.   
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x is an abstract object =df  x is an object which exists neither spatially nor temporally 
 
x is a material object =df  x is not an abstract object 
 
x is a material simple =df x is a material object that has no proper parts 
 
x is a material composite =df  x is a material object and is not a material simple. 
 
x is an ordinary composite =df  x is a material composite that is ordinarily recognised 
by common sense, e.g. tables, chairs, trees, cars, people, etc.  
 
x is an exotic composite =df  x is a material composite and is not an ordinary 
composite, e.g. a heap-table, or the object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great 
Pyramid at Giza, etc. 
 
 
With these definitions at hand, we are now in a position to formulate a precise version of the 
SCQ: 
 
(SCQ): For any xs, where those xs are material objects, what are the jointly necessary 
and sufficient conditions under which there is some further material object, y, which 
those xs compose?   
 
Furthermore, we can now specify exactly what form our desired answer needs to take. It 
needs to be as follows: 
 
(ANSWER): for any xs (where those xs are material objects) there is a further material 
object, y, composed of those xs if and only if ________________________. 
 
Importantly, for any purported answer to be deemed satisfactory, it must not make use of 
mereological terms on the right-hand side of the biconditional, for fear of circularity. To see 
why this is important, consider the futility of completing the right-hand side of the 
biconditional with ‘there is a y such that y is a composite object of which the xs are the 
proper parts’. Such a response would be entirely trivial, and would illuminate no interesting 
principles about material composition.  
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 With all the relevant concepts and terminology having been precisely and formally 
defined, we are now in a position to tackle the Special Composition Question. The following 
three chapters will be devoted to doing just that.  
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§2. Compositional Restrictivism 
 
There is a tripartite division among candidate answers to the SCQ. There are those answers 
which say composition never occurs (i.e. there are no composite objects), those answers 
which say composition always occurs (i.e. for any two or more material objects whatsoever, 
there is always a further object which they compose), and those answers which say 
composition only sometimes occurs (i.e. some material objects compose further objects, and 
others don’t). This triumvirate is complete and exhaustive; no matter what answer you give 
to the SCQ it will fall under one of these heads.19 I will use the following terminology to refer 
to these three types of position on composition20: 
 
 Compositional Nihilism is the view that composition never occurs. According to 
this view there are no composite material objects; the only material objects in 
existence are material simples (i.e. objects without proper parts).21 
 Compositional Universalism is the view that composition always occurs. 
According to this view, for any two (or more) material objects, there is always a 
further material object which they compose.22 
 Compositional Restrictivism covers a variety of views, all of which say that 
composition sometimes, but not always, occurs. restrictivist views can be fleshed 
out in many different ways, depending on what conditions are stipulated as being 
necessary and sufficient for composition to occur.23  
 
                                                 
19 That is, of course, so long as you take the question seriously in the first place. If, for some reason, you thought 
the question defective, for example, then you most likely won’t settle on any of these three answers. But then to 
say the question is defective is not really to answer it at all.   
20 The term ‘nihilism’ was first used in this context by Peter Unger (1979a; 1979b). ‘Universalism’ was coined by 
van Inwagen (1990), 74. Both terms have now become accepted in the literature, so I seen no reason to use 
different terminology here. It is unclear exactly where the term ‘restrictivism’ was first used in this context, but I 
will stick with it since it too is widely used in the literature on this topic.  
21 Examples of nihilists are: Cameron (2010b); Dorr (2005); Horgan & Potrč (2000; 2008); Sider (forthcoming); 
Unger (1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1980a; 1980b). 
22 Examples of universalists are: Armstrong (1997); Hudson (2001); Leonard & Goodman (1940); Lewis (1986a); 
Rea (1998); van Cleve (1986; 2008); to name but a few. 
23 Examples of restrictivists are: Markosian (1998b; 2008); Merricks (2001); van Inwagen (1990). 
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It is often claimed that common sense points to the fact that composition is restricted. This 
was hopefully highlighted by the earlier example about the table and the heap of rice, in that 
we are (pre-theoretically at least) inclined to accept the existence of ordinary composites, like 
tables and heaps, but not exotic composites, like heap-tables. It is because of this fact that I 
will begin my evaluation of composition with an investigation into restrictivist answers to 
the SCQ. For if our common sense intuitions suggest that composition is restricted, then it 
would be quite satisfying, I will assume, if we could formulate an answer to the SCQ that 
tallies up with those intuitions. More specifically, therefore, I will begin not by just looking 
at any old restrictivist answers, but those restrictivist answers which aim to preserve our 
common sense intuitions about which composite objects do, and do not, exist. I will call any 
answer to the SCQ that does preserve these intuitions, (a variant of) Common Sense 
restrictivism. 
 
 
§2.1. Common Sense Restrictivism (CSR) 
 
It is widely agreed that common sense points towards a restrictivist stance on composition - 
and perhaps for good reason. For it appears that one does not need to engage in any serious 
philosophical reflection to realise that the great pyramid of Giza, for instance, is composed 
of limestone blocks and that the Eiffel Tower is composed of iron girders. Yet equally 
obvious is the fact that there is no object which these two great edifices together compose. So 
since it is plainly evident that there are both cases where objects do compose a further object, 
and cases where they do not, it may also be thought plainly evident that composition is 
restricted. This line of thinking commonly crops up in the literature on composition. More 
often than not, however, it is merely assumed, rather than explicitly argued for.24 In the 
interests of maximum clarity, then, it may be worth explicitly formulating this line of 
thought into an argument for restricted composition. Let’s call it the argument from 
obviousness. 
                                                 
24 Trenton Merricks, for instance, claims that restrictivism results from the conjunction of “two common sense 
claims”, those claims being that some objects clearly compose (i.e. my atoms compose me) and that some objects 
clearly do not compose (i.e. my atoms and your atoms do not compose any further object). See Merricks (2005), 
615. Similar sentiments are echoed in Markosian (1998b; 2008), and many others. (Note that Merricks himself 
does not actually endorse common sense restrictivism). 
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§2.1.1 The Argument from Obviousness (AFO) 
 
1. It is obvious that composition occurs in some cases, e.g. it is obvious that the Eiffel 
Tower exists and is composed of smaller parts.  
2. It is obvious that composition does not occur in some cases, e.g. it is obvious that 
there is no object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid of Giza.  
3. Therefore, it is obvious that composition is restricted. 
 
AFO is deductively valid.25 Despite this, however, I do not consider it particularly 
illuminating. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is that even if the 
argument is sound (which is doubtful)26, the truth of the conclusion does not entail the truth 
of the claim that composition is restricted. The conclusion tells us only what we find to be 
obvious; it says nothing whatsoever about what is actually the case. So if we were to draw 
any objective conclusion about composition from this argument, we would need a further 
premise stating that obviousness entails truth. Yet I am assuming that such a premise would 
be dubious to say the very least, on the basis that many things that have at one time 
appeared obvious have turned out to be false. After all, at one time people presumably 
thought it perfectly obvious that the earth was flat, and indeed, stationary. (Indeed if 
obviousness did entail truth, then the whole discipline of philosophy would be largely 
redundant, as there would be little or no call for reflection about anything; instead we would 
simply accept what immediately seems to be the case)!  
 This is not to say, of course, that there is no correlation whatsoever between what 
appears obvious and what is actually the case. I am not for a minute suggesting we should 
treat the obviously apparent and the patently absurd on a perfectly equal footing. If it 
appears obvious that p, then that may well be a good indication that it is actually the case that 
p (and likewise, if it appears absurd to suggest that p, this may well be an indication that it is 
                                                 
25 Actually, this could be resisted, because of the part played in the argument by the word ‘obvious’. Since 
‘obvious’ is very much a psychological, or intentional, predicate, it might be thought to complicate the logical 
structure of the argument. I will ignore this technicality here. 
26 I say it is doubtful because the deeper one reflects on questions of composition, the less obvious it becomes as 
to which cases (if any) of composition are clear-cut, to the extent that both premises 1 and 2 may reasonably be 
rejected as false.  
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not the case that p). But this is very different from obviousness entailing truth. With this in 
mind, then, we may reasonably concede that AFO gives an initial indication that composition 
is restricted, but we should probably be careful not to read much more into it than that. 
 There is a second reason why AFO is not particularly illuminating, and that is that 
even if we accept that it gives an indication that composition is restricted, it doesn’t tell us 
nearly enough. That is to say, it certainly doesn’t constitute an answer to the SCQ. Yes, it 
indicates that composition is restricted, in that it sometimes occurs and sometimes doesn’t, 
but it doesn’t tell us under what circumstances composition occurs. The SCQ, recall, asks for 
the necessary and sufficient conditions under which some xs compose a further object. AFO 
does not provide us with these conditions; it does not constitute an answer to the SCQ.  
All we have then, if common sense is anything to go by, is a hunch; a hunch that 
composition is restricted. But at this early stage of investigation, a hunch is not a bad thing 
to go on. Indeed it gives us a good place to start. The challenge now, then, is to formulate a 
full answer to the SCQ on the basis of this hunch. That is to say, we need to precisely specify 
the necessary and sufficient conditions under which composition occurs, such that they are 
satisfied by ordinary composites, yet not satisfied by exotic composites.  As will soon 
become clear, this is no easy task. 
 
 
§2.1.2 Simple Bonding Answers 
In his book, Peter van Inwagen followed a similar chain of reasoning to that given above, 
and likewise, he too began his attempt to answer the SCQ by looking at answers that 
attempt to preserve the intuitions of common sense.27 Ultimately, however, he found all such 
answers to be entirely unacceptable, as have most philosophers who have subsequently 
taken on the same challenge.28 I will not spend too much time considering these common 
sense answers, partly because van Inwagen’s excellent treatment of them is still readily 
available to the reader who may be interested, and partly because it simply doesn’t take 
much analysis to show that they are all hopeless. But they do need at least a cursory 
mention, however, in order to demonstrate that whenever we do pursue the common sense 
                                                 
27 Van Inwagen (1990), 33-38 and 56-61 
28 The one exception I know of is Markosian (1998b). I will come to Markosian’s view later.   
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view on composition, we will inevitably run into some serious metaphysical problems, and 
as such, when answering the SCQ, we may be forced to look elsewhere. 
 The first few common sense answers that van Inwagen considers all have one thing 
in common: they are all based on the strong intuition that in order for any material objects to 
compose a further material object they must, somehow or other, be bonded together, or at 
the very least be in contact with one another. For it is surely this intuition, or something very 
similar to it, that makes one baulk at the idea that there may be an object composed of the 
Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid at Giza. These two objects are separated by a distance of 
over two thousand miles – how on earth could they be considered the sole parts of a further 
material object? Spurred by this thought, van Inwagen’s first formulation of an answer to the 
SCQ, which he calls ‘contact’, is as follows: 
 
CONTACT: for any xs (where the xs are material objects), there is a further material 
object, y, composed of those xs iff those xs are in contact.29 
 
Before we can subject CONTACT to any scrutiny, a little clarification is in order, for one may 
wonder what exactly we mean when we say that the xs are in contact. Van Inwagen defines 
the notion of ‘being in contact’ as follows: 
 
The xs are ‘in contact’ if they do not spatially overlap and are ‘clumped together’. 
That is, the xs are in contact if (1) no two of them overlap spatially, and (2) if y and z 
are among the xs, then y is in contact with z, or y is in contact with w, which is one of 
the xs, and w is in contact with z – and so on.30 
 
 
All paradigm examples of ordinary composites seem to have inter-connected parts in this 
sense.  Take a car, for example, the tyres are in contact with the wheels which are in contact 
with the hubs which are in contact with the axles which are in contact with the drive-shaft, 
and so on and so forth. For any two parts of the car, if they are not themselves in direct 
contact, they will be linked together via a chain of directly connected objects, all of which are 
themselves parts of the car.  Objects with parts that are not in contact (or perhaps we should 
                                                 
29 Van Inwagen (1990), 33. This is not van Inwagen’s precise wording, but it expresses the same thesis.  
30 Van Inwagen (1990), 33 
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say alleged objects), by contrast, just don’t seem to be the kinds of thing that the ordinary 
person on the street would recognise, as demonstrated by the supposition that there is an 
object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid at Giza. Scattered objects, to use 
the philosophical jargon, just don’t seem to tally up with the ontology of common sense.31 
 Despite this, however, CONTACT is a most unsatisfactory answer to the SCQ – 
particularly if it is an answer that is aiming to preserve the ontology of common sense. For it 
only takes a minimal amount of reflection to realise that CONTACT, if true, would have us 
countenance a whole host of exotic composites that are not recognised by common sense. 
Heap-tables, for instance, should be regarded as existing objects if CONTACT were true, for 
all their parts are in contact. Worse still, to use van Inwagen’s popular example, if 
CONTACT were true, it would have the most undesirable consequence that whenever two 
people shook hands (or indeed came into contact of any sort), a new object would 
instantaneously come into existence, only to annihilate once the greeting ended and their 
hands parted.32 
 But not only would CONTACT have us countenance many exotic composites we 
may not want to, on the flip-side, it would also rule out the existence of certain ordinary 
composites that we are generally quite fond of. Consider some examples. A copy of the 
Oxford English Dictionary seems to be an example of a perfectly ordinary composite. Yet its 
parts are not in contact. It comes in a number of volumes, each disconnected (spatially) from 
the next.33 Or take the landmass we call the United States of America. This too seems to be a 
perfectly ordinary composite. Yet it too is scattered, for Hawaii is separated from the 
mainland by a distance of over two thousand miles. If CONTACT were true, then, it would 
turn out that there are no existing copies of the Oxford English Dictionary, and even worse, 
that approximately 312 million Americans would have no country of residence. And these 
facts certainly don’t sit well with our common sense intuitions – the very things that we are 
trying to preserve.  
 Perhaps even more damaging is the fact that modern physics tells us that at the sub-
atomic level, the particles which are said to ‘make up’ atoms (i.e. leptons and quarks, etc.) 
                                                 
31 The term ‘scattered object’ was, I believe, first introduced by Richard Cartwright (1975), who said: “let us say 
that a material object is scattered just in case the region of space it occupies is disconnected” (p.157). 
32 Van Inwagen (1990), 35 
33 This example is taken from Cartwright (1975), 157.  
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never actually come into direct contact at all. Indeed the vast majority of an average atom is 
empty space. So according to CONTACT, these sub-atomic particles do not compose atoms 
after all. And by extension, if, as we are often led to believe, all material things are made of 
atoms, then CONTACT would have us conclude there are no composite material objects at 
all. For if sub-atomic particles are not inter-connected, and ordinary composites are nothing 
but collections of sub-atomic particles, then it follows that the (alleged) parts of all ordinary 
composites are not in contact after all. Thus if CONTACT is true, there are no ordinary 
composites at all, which is a conclusion that could hardly be further removed from our 
common sense intuitions.  
After rejecting CONTACT, van Inwagen went on to consider three other types of 
‘simple bonding answers’ to the SCQ: FASTENING, COHESION, and FUSION.34 All three 
answers are based on the principle that for any objects to compose a further object, they 
must be bonded together somehow or other (fastened together, bonded in such a way that the 
parts cohere, and fused together, respectively). Each proposed answer can be seen as a 
progression of the last in that it demands a stronger type of bond in order for composition to 
occur (FUSION, for instance, the most demanding of the three answers, states that for two 
objects to be fused together, they must be “melt[ed] into each other in a way that leaves no 
discernible boundary”).35 In light of the above comments, however, it shouldn’t take long to 
realise that they are all entirely unsatisfactory as variants of CSR. For one thing, there are 
certain examples in which it just doesn’t seem to matter how strongly bonded the objects in 
question may be. Take two human beings, for instance. You could bond them together as 
strongly as physically possible, but it still doesn’t seem (according to common sense at least) 
that you would have brought a new object into existence.  
 But the real problem with these answers, and indeed with any type of bonding 
answer, is that they cannot account for scattered objects. If common sense recognises the 
existence of scattered objects (and it would appear, in light of the above examples, that it 
does), then bonding answers to the SCQ are all doomed to failure. For scattered objects, by 
definition, have parts that are not in contact with one another (let alone bonded together). 
With bonding answers, then, we have reached a dead-end.  
                                                 
34 Van Inwagen (1990), 56-60 
35 Van Inwagen (1990), 59 
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§2.1.3 Some Other Simple Answers: Quickly Considered, Quickly Dismissed 
Perhaps we could find an answer to the SCQ not in terms of physical bonding, but in terms 
of functionality? That is to say, for any material objects, those objects compose a further 
material object iff they collectively perform some discernible function. The thought behind 
this answer is that ordinary composite objects do seem to perform functions: chairs function 
to support us and stop us falling to the ground; clothes function to keep us warm and dry; 
trees function to reproduce and maintain the continuation of their species; and so on and so 
forth. Furthermore, exotic composites seem not to have any discernible function. Take our 
example of the object composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid at Giza. If there 
were such an object, what would it do; what would it be for? It would appear to have no 
discernible function or purpose whatsoever, and so perhaps, on this view, that is why there 
is no such object. Let us call such an answer, functionality: 
 
FUNCTIONALITY: For any xs (where the xs are material objects) there is a further 
material object, y, that those xs compose iff the xs perform, collectively, a discernible 
function.  
 
Functionality has some intuitive pull about it. Yet unfortunately, there are three reasons why 
it simply won’t do.36 Firstly, the notion of a ‘discernible function’ is particularly vague. For 
FUNCTIONALITY to constitute a satisfactory and precise answer to the SCQ, one would 
need to give a precise definition of what it is to perform a discernible function, and that may 
prove difficult. Secondly, just as with the simple bonding answers, there are numerous 
counter-examples available. That is, for many of the ordinary composites that are recognised 
by common sense, it is very difficult say what their function actually is. Take our heap of 
rice, for instance. We may want to allow that the grains of rice do compose a heap, but what 
function is the heap performing? It seems hard to say. The same goes for countless other 
ordinary composites too: works of art; mountains; the planet Mars; to name just but a few 
examples that come to mind. 
                                                 
36 It is quite possible, of course, that there are a great deal more than three reasons why this answer fails. I will 
consider only three.  
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 Finally, and most fatally, there is a further problem with FUNCTIONALITY. For it 
strikes me that the function various objects perform is purely a matter of stipulation or 
convention. Objects (or at least, the vast majority of objects) don’t have functions intrinsically, 
but rather, we impose functions upon them. I can sit on a rock, and thus state that it functions 
as a seat, but it only functions as such because I have chosen to sit on it and impose this 
purpose upon it. Performing this function is not part of the rock’s intrinsic nature. And 
indeed it is hard to see how performing any function could be part of its intrinsic nature. 
And the same surely goes for all inanimate objects. But this presents a serious problem for 
FUNCTIONALITY. For if material composition is determined by the collective functionality 
of material objects, and the functionality of objects is a matter of convention, then it follows 
that composition too must be a matter of convention (or at the very least, that compositional 
facts must supervene on conventional facts). But that contradicts one of the fundamental 
assumptions made at the outset: that what there is is never a matter of convention – what 
there is just is. This contradiction is enough, in my view, to render FUNCTIONALITY 
completely untenable.  
  Another feature of ordinary composites seems to be their unity. That is to say that 
the parts of the (alleged) composite objects that are usually recognised by common sense 
seem to form, in some sense or other, a unified whole. Furthermore, scattered objects too 
appear to be able to be unified in this sense, thus saving this type of answer from the 
counter-examples that ruined the simple bonding answers. We recognise the Oxford English 
Dictionary to be a single object, for instance, despite its volumes being spatially separated, 
because the volumes taken together, form a unified whole. Likewise, when I take the lid off 
my pen, I still recognise the two spatially separated parts to compose the one and the same 
pen, because the parts are unified in some sense or other. So perhaps here we have a 
potential answer to the SCQ: 
 
UNITY: for any xs (where the xs are material objects) there is a further material 
object, y, that those xs compose iff the xs display, collectively, a sufficient degree of 
unity. 
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As it stands, UNITY is far from being a satisfactory answer to the SCQ. For we do not yet 
have a clear and precise understanding of what it is for some xs to display a sufficient 
degree of unity. In fact, it seems very difficult to define ‘unity’ in this sense in a non-
question-begging manner. What is it about ordinary composites that makes them appear 
unified that exotic composites lack? It can’t be to do with the spatial relations that hold 
between parts. Because no matter how far I separate the volumes of the OED, it doesn’t 
affect the perceived unity of the whole. Perhaps it may be to do with the actual stuff that 
objects are made of? That is to say, perhaps there needs to be a certain homogeneity of parts 
to effect a unity of the whole? But this can’t be right. Some ordinary composites are made of 
a complete mish-mash of substances and materials, yet we still recognise them as wholes. 
Think of the vast array of metals, plastics, fabrics and liquids that make up an average car, 
for instance, these can hardly be said to be homogenous. Conversely, being made of the 
same stuff is often not enough for us to recognise a unified whole. For example, one could 
stack some bricks against the wall of a house, and even if the house is made of the very same 
batch of bricks, we don’t consider the loose bricks a part of the house. So material 
homogeneity is clearly not the source of unity we recognise in ordinary composites.  
 It strikes me that what we are actually referring to when we speak of the ‘unity of 
wholes’, is a type of conceptual unity. That is, the reason we take a copy of the OED to be a 
unified whole (along with tables, chairs, people, and all other ordinary composites) is that 
we conceive of it as a unified whole. But if this is so, it immediately invites the Euthyphro-style 
question: do we conceive of an object as unified because it is unified, or is it unified because 
we conceive it so? If it is the latter, then it seems that we will end up facing the same 
problem that faced FUNCTIONALITY. That is, if being a unified whole is purely a matter of 
being conceived to be a unified whole, then it looks like being a unified whole comes down to 
mere convention. But that would again imply that what composite objects there are is a 
matter of mere convention, which is unacceptable. If we take the former option, however, 
we face a different problem. For if certain objects (i.e. ordinary composites) are genuinely 
(i.e. objectively) unified wholes, and it is this genuine, objective unity that makes us conceive 
of them as unified wholes, then we now face the question of what grounds their unity? In 
other words, why are unified wholes unified? But this question seems just as difficult as the 
SCQ! Indeed it looks as though by answering the SCQ with UNITY, we have simply pushed 
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the question back a level rather than answer it in any informative fashion. For we now need 
to fill in the right-hand side of the following biconditional: 
 
UNITY: the xs form a unified whole iff ___________________. 
 
The candidate explanations that could be used to complete this biconditional look to be just 
the same as those which could complete the original SCQ biconditional. Is it, for instance, 
the way in which the xs are bonded together that suffices for their unity? Or is it the fact that 
they collectively perform a discernible function? Thus it seems that we are back to where we 
started. It may well be the case that ordinary objects display some kind of unity, but the 
mere recognition of that fact will not help us answer the SCQ unless we can explain why 
they display that unity. And explaining that looks to be no easier than the initial challenge of 
answering the SCQ. UNITY, then, gets us nowhere. 
 
 
§2.2. The First Charge against Restrictivism: Arbitrariness 
 
From the above discussion, I hope to have shown that CSR, in any form, is a very difficult 
position to defend. The reason for this is that there is seemingly no principled way in which 
to distinguish ordinary composites from exotic composites. We have seen that it can’t be the 
way in which objects are bonded that determines whether they compose; nor can it be to do 
with the function that objects collectively perform, or whether they exhibit a particular 
degree of unity. Of course, these considerations do not exhaust the possible CSR answers to 
the SCQ, but I for one cannot think of any other plausible candidates, and neither am I 
aware of any others in the existing literature.37 Moreover, it seems likely, albeit not certain, 
that any other purported CSR answers would be subject to similar difficulties to those 
considered above. In particular, it is hard to image a restriction on composition that 
preserves common sense intuitions, and that is not subject to at least one significant counter-
example. The upshot of all this is that restrictivism is in big trouble. For if there is no 
principled way in which to distinguish those collections of objects that do compose from 
                                                 
37 Excluding Markosian (1998b), of course, to whom we shall come in §2.5 
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those which don’t, then it looks like any such distinction that one does hold on to must be 
entirely arbitrary. If you can’t explain, for instance, why some limestone blocks compose a 
pyramid and some iron girders compose a tower, yet at the same time why the blocks and 
the girders taken together compose nothing, then your assertion that this is in fact the case 
looks entirely unjustified. 
 I am assuming that unjustified arbitrariness is a big problem for CSR. And that is 
because I am assuming that to draw a line arbitrarily between cases in which composition 
does occur and cases in which it does not is, philosophically speaking, intolerable. The 
underlying thought here is that if we are to assert that some objects do compose a further 
object and other objects don’t, then we need a reason for so asserting. If we don’t have such a 
reason, then our assertion reveals itself as being entirely arbitrary and completely lacking in 
justification. And in philosophy at least, arbitrary and unjustified assertions are surely to be 
avoided. Terry Horgan has clearly articulated this point, elucidating what he calls the 
principle of the non-arbitrariness of composition (NAOC): “Even though explanation must 
presumably bottom out somewhere, it is just not credible – or even intelligible – that it 
should bottom out with specific compositional facts which themselves are utterly 
unexplainable and which do not conform to any systematic and general principles”.38  
I think Horgan probably pushes it a little far to suggest that it is not even intelligible 
that compositional facts should be unexplained, for I think I could at least conceive of such a 
scenario. But he is surely right to suggest it is incredible. However, it should be noted that 
no argument is provided in support of NAOC; it is merely asserted. In fact, arguing for the 
truth of NAOC proves particularly difficult.39 However, it is surely a most plausible 
principle. Indeed it may be fair to say it is overwhelmingly plausible when compared to its 
negation. In light of this, then, we can reasonably say of anyone wishing to defend CSR, that 
the burden of proof lies with them to provide a satisfactory reason for restricting 
composition where they do. And since it does not look as though any such reason is 
forthcoming, the prospects for CSR look bleak.  
 
                                                 
38 Horgan (1993), 695 
39 In §2.5 I consider this in more detail, and provide an argument (of sorts) that supports NAOC. Not wanting to 
be misleading, I should point out that it is not a direct argument for NAOC (I’m not sure if such an argument is 
actually possible), but rather, an argument against the only extant restrictivist position that violates NAOC (Ned 
Markosian’s). 
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§2.3. Non-Common Sense Variants of Restrictivism 
 
There are other variants of restrictivism in the extant literature that are not in line with the 
ontology of common sense. Most notable among these theories are those of van Inwagen 
himself, and Trenton Merricks.40 Van Inwagen is quick to recognise the consequences of the 
arguments I have considered above, and he has no hesitation in following his philosophical 
convictions, no matter how unintuitive they may be, into denying the existence of the vast 
majority of ordinary composites. This is his famous “denial” mentioned in the introduction 
of his book. He does not, however, deny the existence of all composite objects; he allows that 
material objects can compose if their collective activities constitute a life. This, then, is van 
Inwagen’s answer to the SCQ: 
 
(VI): for any xs (where those xs are material objects) there is a further material object, 
y, which those xs compose iff the activity of the xs constitutes a life (or if there is only 
one of the xs).41 
 
The implications of this answer are that the only material objects in existence are material 
simples and living organisms. Trenton Merricks has adopted a similar position to this, 
although his reasons for adopting it are quite different from those of van Inwagen.42 Thus 
although both views are restrictivist, they are both very much at odds with common sense. 
According to both van Inwagen and Merricks there are no rocks or planets, tables or chairs; 
there are, in fact, no inanimate composite objects whatsoever. 
 Despite the significance that these two views have in the literature on composition, 
and despite the impact that they have had on the overall debate, I will not be considering 
them in any more detail here. The reason for this will become clear in the next section, where 
I will set out an argument that undermines virtually all species of restrictivism, Merricks’s 
and van Inwagen’s included.43 Because I think that this argument is strong enough to reject 
the restrictivist views of van Inwagen and Merricks, there seems little point in weighing up 
                                                 
40 Van Inwagen (1990); Merricks (2001) 
41 Van Inwagen (1990), 82.  
42 Merricks (2001) 
43 The only restrictivist theory which may not succumb to the argument is Markosian’s. I will consider his view 
later.  
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the various merits and demerits of those views. Instead, I shall press right on with the 
argument.   
 
 
§2.4. The Second Charge against Restrictivism: Vagueness 
 
We have seen already that restrictivist answers to the SCQ are problematic. This is 
particularly so when trying to formulate an answer that preserves our common sense 
intuitions about what exists. Indeed it seems that there is no way of formulating such an 
answer without endorsing some kind of intolerably arbitrary line-drawing. Even van 
Inwagen’s proposed answer, whilst striking a startling contrast with the ontology of 
common sense, cannot totally evade accusations of arbitrariness. However, whilst charges of 
arbitrariness may severely diminish the credibility of restrictivist answers to the SCQ, there 
is a stronger species of argument which warrants, in my view at least, their outright 
rejection: arguments from vagueness. In what follows I will show how this species of argument 
works, how it can take many different guises, and why it is so damaging to the restrictivist 
cause.   
 
§2.4.1 Simple Sorites Arguments 
Arguments from vagueness directed against restrictivism usually begin by appeal to the 
ancient puzzle of the sorites.44 Sorites paradoxes, or sorites series, are a form of chain-
argument which draw utterly absurd conclusions from the most innocuous and reasonable 
of premises. The classic example of a sorites argument is based on the concept of a heap (in 
fact the word ‘sorites’ derives from the Greek ‘soros’ which means ‘heap’), and could be 
formulated as follows: 
 
1. 1 grain of rice does not make a heap of rice. 
2. 2 grains of rice do not make a heap of rice. 
3. 3 grains of rice do not make a heap of rice. 
                                                 
44 And it is indeed and ancient puzzle, believed to be originally formulated by Eubulides of Miletus, a 
contemporary of Aristotle.   
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4. In general, if x grains of rice do not make a heap, then x + 1 grains do not make a 
heap.  
5. Therefore, (by extension) 1 million grains of rice do not make a heap.   
The argument can also be formulated in reverse, with perhaps even more startling 
conclusions: 
1. 1 million grains of rice make a heap.  
2. 999,999 grains of rice make a heap.  
3. 999,998 grains of rice make a heap.  
4. In general, if x grains of rice make a heap, then x – 1 grains also make a heap.  
5. Therefore, (by extension) zero grains of rice make a heap.  
The sorites series are so puzzling because in each case, the individual premises strike us as 
perfectly reasonable, yet the conclusions they collectively entail strike us as patently absurd. 
For it seems perfectly reasonable – indeed, obvious – to think that the addition a single grain 
of rice would not be enough to turn a non-heap into a heap, or conversely that the 
subtraction of a single grain would not be enough to turn a heap into a non-heap. In other 
words, it seems implausible to suggest that there is an abrupt cut-off point between 
heaphood and non-heaphood. Yet if there is no abrupt cut-off point, then it seems we must 
say that either every member of the series either is a heap or is not a heap, which brings us 
back to our absurd conclusion.  
 These sorites-style arguments can be extended such that they have consequences not 
just for the existence of heaps, but for the existence of any macroscopic material objects 
whatsoever. Take any ordinary composite you want, and you will find that it is susceptible 
to the challenge of the sorites. An average cat, for instance, according to modern science at 
least, is composed of approximately 3 x 1026 atoms.45 That is a simply colossal number. But 
the astronomical number of microscopic parts that this hypothetical feline is purported to 
have, and indeed the truly miniscule size of each one, actually increases her susceptibility to 
the sorites argument. For one could imagine that if we had some incredibly high-precision 
tool, we could begin the laborious task of removing atoms from this unfortunate moggy, one 
by one. (The fact that no such tool actually exists is of no consequence, for it is the possibility 
                                                 
45 This is, of course, very approximate. But it is, if anything, an underestimate.  
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of such a tool on which the force of the argument rests, and there is no obvious reason to 
think that such a tool is an impossibility). We would eventually reach a point where we had 
only a single atom left, and of course, a single atom is clearly not a cat. The problem for the 
restrictivist, then, is clear. If one wants to insist that composition is restricted, then one 
would need to draw a line somewhere in our feline-sorites series, such that the atoms on one 
side of the line compose a cat and those on the other side do not. But such an idea is surely 
preposterous! The very idea that the removal of a single atom -an object so incredibly small 
that to even conceive of it in isolation is almost impossible – could make the difference 
between there being a cat and there not being a cat is quite ludicrous. And the same goes for 
any material objects supposedly made up of many atoms: chairs, tables, trees, rocks, cats, 
and even people.  
 Peter Unger is perhaps the best known proponent of using sorites arguments in 
support of some startling conclusions. He did not use them to argue against restrictivism per 
se, but rather, on the basis of sorites arguments he claimed that “there are no ordinary 
things”, and even more controversially, that “I do not exist”.46 But the fact that sorites 
arguments spell trouble specifically for the restrictivist is manifest. In addition, it should be 
noted that the more extreme answers to the SCQ (i.e. universalism and nihilism) are not 
obviously affected by these arguments, since neither of them is required to posit a cut-off 
point between composition and non-composition. That is because in one case (that of the 
nihilist) composition is said never to occur, and in the other (that of the Universalist) 
composition is said always to occur. The sorites arguments, then, represent a formidable foe 
for any friend of restrictivism.  
 
§2.4.2 Introducing Ontic Vagueness 
One may be wondering at this point, what all of this has to do with vagueness. For as yet, 
there has been no mention of such a phenomenon. The strength of these Ungerian sorites 
arguments, as formulated above, lies purely in the fact that they force the restrictivist into 
the rather embarrassing (in fact, worse than embarrassing; untenable) position of having to 
specify exact cut-off points – down to the very last atom – between cases of composition and 
                                                 
46 See Unger (1979a; 1979b; 1979c; 1980a; 1980b). Wheeler (1979) also presented similar arguments in support of 
similar conclusions. 
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cases of non-composition. But this conclusion rests on a significant assumption: that whether 
some xs compose or not is always a determinate matter. Perhaps, then, the restrictivist could 
reject this assumption, and maintain that (i) composition is restricted, (ii) there are no exact 
cut-off points between cases of composition and cases of non-composition, and (iii) it is 
sometimes simply indeterminate whether some xs compose a further object or not.  
 If we return to our previous example about the cat, then the thought here is that 
whilst the original 3 x 1026 atoms definitely do compose a cat, and whilst a single atom 
definitely does not compose a cat, there will be a phase somewhere during the atom removal 
process where it is genuinely indeterminate as to whether the remaining atoms compose a 
cat or not; a phase in which it is a vague matter as to whether there is a cat present or not. It 
must be made absolutely clear here that we are not talking about linguistic vagueness. That 
is to say, we are not suggesting that it is the extension of our sortal term ‘cat’ which is vague, 
and as such that there will be a phase during the atom removal process during which it will 
be unclear whether our sortal term ‘cat’ does or does not apply to the present collection of 
atoms. (Such a phase would inevitably arise, but it would be of little consequence to this 
debate). Instead, we are talking about something much more controversial: genuine 
vagueness in the world. What I mean by that is that even if we were able to tighten up our 
definition of the term ‘cat’ such that it had a perfectly exact and precise extension - down to 
the very last atom – we still wouldn’t be know whether it applies to the present collection of 
atoms. The reason for that would be, that on this view, there is genuinely no fact of the matter 
as to whether the atoms compose a cat or not. Let us call this species of vagueness, if indeed 
it is even possible, ontic vagueness.  
 Ontic vagueness is problematic to say the least. For a start, it is quite difficult to 
actually conceive of what it would mean for the world to be vague. For some, the claim that 
there can genuinely be no fact of the matter as to whether some purported object exists or 
not, just makes no sense. For it has rightly been said that “the claim that there is some thing 
such that it is indeterminate whether that thing exists, is hard, if not impossible, to make 
sense of”.47 The thought here is that either we are quantifying over something or we are not. 
                                                 
47 Barnes (2010b), 960. It should be noted that Barnes herself does not take ontic vagueness to be unintelligible – 
far from it. Barnes is one of the leading defenders of ontic vagueness. See Barnes (2005; 2009; 2010a) and Barnes & 
Williams (2009; 2011a; 2011b) 
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If we are, then it must determinately exist, and if we are not, then it does not. For this reason, 
the very idea of ontic vagueness is sometimes dismissed as an incoherent impossibility.48 
 But it is not just an instinctive distaste for ontic vagueness that makes it 
controversial. Some have presented arguments in an attempt to show that it just cannot 
occur. Ted Sider has provided just such an argument.49 In a nutshell, Sider’s claim is that if 
composition can be vague, then it would be also vague as to how many objects there were in 
the world. So suppose, for sake of argument, you had to count all the material objects in 
existence. That would include all composite objects, if indeed there were any such things. 
But suppose now we had some xs such that it was indeterminate as to whether they 
composed a further object. All the xs would be counted; they would go down on the list. But 
it would be indeterminate as to whether there was an extra object: the fusion of the xs in 
question. As Sider points out: “that would mean that some numerical sentence – a sentence 
asserting that there are exactly n concrete objects, for some finite n – would be 
indeterminate... [but] numerical sentences can never be indeterminate in truth value”.50  The 
reason for thinking that numerical sentences cannot be vague is that they contain only 
logical apparatus, and logical apparatus is supposed to be perfectly precise.  
 With all this in mind, then, sorites-style arguments put the restrictivist on the horns 
of very nasty dilemma. Either she accepts that there are exact cut-off points in sorites series, 
such that a single atom can make the difference between composition and non-composition, 
or she must accept that there is an abundance of ontic vagueness. Neither of these options 
looks good. Neither are necessarily impossible, but both are extremely controversial, so to 
endorse either one would represent a significant cost to the original restrictivist theory.  
 
 
§2.4.3 The Final Charge against Restrictivism 
The preceding comments on vagueness are quite brief. And it would be far too quick if I 
were to simply conclude here that the ‘arguments from vagueness’ signify the death knell 
for any species of restrictivism. For it should be noted that in recent years much work has 
                                                 
48 See Dummett (1975), 260, and Lewis (1986a), 212-13 for explicit views of this type. A similar view can even be 
found in Russell (1923) 
49 Sider (2001), 127 
50 Sider (2001), 127 
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gone into the defence of ontic vagueness. So much so, that it is now a fairly widely held view 
that ontic vagueness (or to use the more popular jargon ‘metaphysical indeterminacy’) is not 
only possible, but indeed most likely.51 So one may think, then, that the restrictivist can once 
again breathe a sigh of relief, for it may seem that entailing ontic vagueness is not such a 
significant theoretical cost after all.  
 Unfortunately, however, I think this can be shown not to be the case. For even if one 
allows that ontic vagueness is a genuine possibility (and I for one would not want to rule it 
out), by positing ontic vagueness the restrictivist does not, I claim, overcome the destructive 
force of the sorites arguments. To sum up briefly, the reason is this. Consider once more our 
sorites series concerning the average cat. Indeed let’s specify, for ease of reference, a 
particular cat: my own cat, Brian. The original sorites argument accused the restrictivist of 
having to demarcate an exact cut-off point in the atom-removal process, whereby there is a 
point at which the present atoms do compose Brian, yet if just a single atom were removed, 
those remaining would fail to compose Brian. It was supposed wildly implausible that such 
a cut-off point exists, and as such, restrictivism was supposed to have fallen by the wayside. 
But now, in light of the above comments, one can imagine the restrictivist defiantly 
responding: ‘but there is no exact cut-off point! Rather, there is a phase of indeterminacy; a 
phase in which there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether the remaining atoms 
compose Brian or not. Of course you start off with a cat; and of course when you get down to a 
single atom you definitely have no cat, but that doesn’t mean that there must be a precise 
cut-off point’. 
 I do not accept this response. I think it can be shown that even if one endorses some 
kind of ontic vagueness, and posits a phase in the sorites series in which it is indeterminate 
whether composition occurs or not, one still has to posit exact cut-off points which would be 
arbitrary and objectionable to the extreme. The difference between the restrictivist who does 
endorse ontic vagueness and the restrictivist who doesn’t is actually minimal. For both have 
to posit exact cut-off points in a given sorites series, it is just that the latter is drawing the 
line between determinate composition and determinate non-composition, and the former is 
drawing the line between determinate composition and indeterminate composition. And 
                                                 
51 In addition to the work of Barnes and Williams cited above, see Akiba (2004); Parsons & Woodruff (1995); 
Rosen & Smith (2004) for varying defences of ontic vagueness. 
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there seems no reason to suppose that one of these line-drawings is any more palatable than 
the other.  
 This type of objection, appealing to what is known as higher-order vagueness, has 
been noted elsewhere.52 Perhaps the most lucid exposition of the problem is provided by 
Mark Heller, who imagines himself in the rather unusual situation of being atop Mt Everest, 
accompanied by God, playing ‘the vagueness game’.53 Below I have taken the liberty of 
paraphrasing Heller’s example, altering the context somewhat, such that it is specific to the 
debate over material composition. So let me begin, like Heller, by setting a somewhat 
improbable scene.  Imagine that you (the reader) are playing a game with God; the 
vagueness game. Also involved in the game (although not strictly participating in it) is Brian 
the cat. How the game works is this: God begins to remove atoms, one by one, from the 
unsuspecting Brian (God can do this – he is God, after all). After the removal of each atom, 
the game stops, and you ask Him: ‘do the remaining atoms compose Brian?’ God, playing 
the game in good spirit, will answer each question to the very best of his omniscient ability.  
So the game begins with God’s answering ‘yes’ to your question, for all the atoms 
present do compose Brian. And presumably, the game will continue for quite some time 
with God making this same assertion each time, for it will take the removal of a large 
number of atoms, one would assume, before they no longer compose a cat. But what should 
be clear, however, is that at some point, His assertion will change. Now the crucial point is that 
it does not matter what his assertion changes to, rather, it matters only that it change at all. 
For instance, it could be the case that after the removal of a particular atom, let’s say it’s the 
1,348,946,627th, God answers ‘no’ to your question. He may even go on to assert: ‘the 
remaining atoms do not compose Brian’. Such an assertion would imply that, contrary to our 
earlier misgivings, there is in fact a sharp cut-off point – down to the very last atom – 
between cat-hood and non-cat-hood. But alternatively, suppose that there was no such cut-
off point, and instead there was a phase of indeterminacy between cat-hood and non-cat-
hood. Even in that case there would be an exact point, after the removal of a specific atom, 
where God’s assertion would change. It may change to, ‘it is now indeterminate whether the 
                                                 
52 See Horgan (1994), 173-4; Heller (1996); Hudson (2001). All three of these examples actually use their 
arguments to claim that ontic vagueness itself is impossible. I do not wish to argue for such a strong claim (I will 
remain neutral on that for the time being), but merely to claim that restrictivism is false.  
53 Heller (1996) 
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remaining atoms compose Brian’, or perhaps, ‘it is neither true nor false that the remaining 
atoms compose Brian’, or perhaps, ‘it is true to degree x that the remaining atoms compose 
Brian’, or even, ‘it is true according to only some precisifications of ‘cat-hood’ that the 
remaining atoms compose Brian’. Importantly, however, whatever God’s changed assertion 
may be, it still has the consequence that the difference of a single atom can make a 
significant difference to the status of Brian’s cat-hood.  Now remember that the number of 
atoms that supposedly make up an average cat such as Brian is 3 x 1026. Just try to consider, 
if you can, how unimaginably small each atom must be for that titanic number of them to be 
able to fit in the area of space occupied by an average cat. And now seriously try to entertain 
the idea that the removal of a single atom could make any difference whatsoever to the 
truth-value of the assertion ‘these atoms compose a cat’. I defy anyone to maintain that such 
a situation could obtain. To suppose that a single, nugatory atom could make such a 
significant difference on the macroscopic scale would be to suppose nothing short of what 
Unger appropriately calls “a miracle of metaphysical illusion”.54 It is for this reason that I 
claim that, even if ontic vagueness is a genuine metaphysical possibility, material 
composition still cannot be restricted.  
 
 
§2.5. One Last Try: Brutal Composition 
 
Throughout all the extant literature on this subject there has been only one (as far as I know) 
serious attempt to flesh out an answer to the SCQ that preserves our common sense 
intuitions about material composition. That attempt was made by Ned Markosian in his 
1998 paper entitled ‘Brutal Composition’.55 Markosian labels his position ‘Brutal’, because it 
states that there is no true and interesting answer to the SCQ. Rather, whenever composition 
does or does not occur is, on this view, simply a brute fact. As will soon become clear, I do 
not think Brutal Composition is at all plausible, mainly because there are few good reasons, 
if any, to endorse it, whilst there are a number of good reasons to reject it. However, since it 
is the only genuine formulation of a common sense restrictivist position, it deserves to be 
                                                 
54 Unger (1979b), 246 
55 Markosian (1998b). See also Markosian (2008). 
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taken seriously at the very least. This is particularly true in light of the reception that 
Markosian’s thesis has had from the philosophical community. It is routinely dismissed as 
false, yet its falsity seems always to be assumed rather than argued for. Horgan and Potrč, 
for instance, say: “if one bunch of physical simples compose a genuine physical object, but 
another bunch of simples do not compose any genuine object, then there must be some 
reason why; it couldn’t be that these two facts are themselves at the explanatory bedrock of 
being”.56 But alas no argument is given to support this conclusion, it is merely asserted. (I 
agree with Horgan & Potrč that their claim is immensely plausible, but we have already seen 
that when concerned with material composition, plausible claims can often lead up blind 
alleys). Indeed it seems that the vast majority of those who have contributed to the 
composition debate agree with Horgan & Potrč. Hud Hudson seems to be the only 
philosopher to have objected to Markosian’s thesis by way of reasoned argument, and even 
his treatment is fairly brief.57 James van Cleve, too, at least takes Brutal Composition 
seriously, as he admits it to be “respectable and not easily refutable”.58 Eventually, however, 
van Cleve’s dismissal of Brutal Composition consists only of him finding it “pretty hard to 
swallow”.59   
I too think Brutal Composition is a respectable thesis, yet I also think it is refutable 
(although perhaps not easily refutable). But claiming it too be hard to swallow, or simply 
asserting it as false, clearly doesn’t count as a refutation. In what follows, then, I will provide 
a refutation of Brutal Composition, and argue for it. I will set out exactly what Markosian’s 
position is, why he endorses it, and ultimately, why it should be rejected.  
 
 
§2.5.1 What is Brutal Composition? 
Markosian formulates Brutal Composition as follows: 
 
 (BC): There is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to the SCQ.60 
                                                 
56 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 19 
57 Hudson (2001), p.22-24  
58 Van Cleve (2008), 333 
59 Van Cleve (2008), 333 
60 Markosian (1998b), 213 
37 | P a g e  
 
Instead, whenever composition does (or doesn’t) occur is just a brute fact, where a brute fact 
is defined as follows: 
 
F is a brute fact =df F is a fact, and it is not the case that F obtains in virtue of any other 
fact or facts. 
 
BC is based on a number of assumptions, some of which are more reasonable than others. 
Firstly, Markosian assumes that any satisfactory answer to the SCQ should take the 
following form (or at least, should be able to be put in the following form): 
 
 Necessarily, for any xs, there is an object composed of those xs iff _________.61 
 
This seems a perfectly reasonable assumption to make, since any answer that was of this 
form would give us exactly what we want: the necessary and sufficient conditions under 
which composition occurs.  
Secondly, Markosian assumes that any satisfactory answer to the SCQ must be non-
trivial. This too seems perfectly acceptable, indeed it seems most advisable, since a trivial 
answer to the SCQ would not tell us anything of any interest (that is, after all, why we 
would call it trivial). For example, one could give the following answer to the SCQ: 
 
(Triv): Necessarily, for any xs, there is an object composed of those xs iff the xs 
compose. 
 
Triv is clearly true, and since it is of the required biconditional form, it does constitute an 
answer (of sorts) to the SCQ. It is clearly trivial however, as it tells us nothing of any interest, 
and illuminates no principles pertaining to composition.62 So Markosian is right, in my view, 
to assume that any satisfactory answer to the SCQ will be non-trivial.  
                                                 
61 Markosian (1998b), 214  
62 The reason it provides no illumination is that it contravenes van Inwagen’s stipulation that the right-hand side 
of the biconditional should not contain any mereological terms. Essentially, then, Triv tries to explain 
‘composition’ in terms of ‘composition’.  
38 | P a g e  
 
 Markosian’s final assumption, however, is not so obviously true. Firstly, he rightly 
points out that even if compositional facts were brute we could, if we had the relevant 
knowledge, fill in the right flank of the biconditional by simply listing each and every 
individual case of composition. However, he then assumes that such a list would be 
infinitely long: “Such a sentence would have to be long indeed. In fact, even if the number of 
cases of composition in our world is finite, it seems clear that any sentence that expressed a 
necessary truth about composition in such an enumerative fashion would have to be 
infinitely long”.63 It is not at all clear to me why this should be the case. After all, suppose for 
sake of argument that compositional facts were brute. In that case it would be perfectly 
possible that there was only a single case of composition, for instance, the set of simples {S1, 
S2, ... Sn} (call it set A) composing object O. In that case, it seems we could provide an 
instance of the above biconditional schema with not only a finite right-hand side, but a 
positively short right-hand side: 
 
Necessarily, for any xs, there is an object composed of those xs iff each of the xs 
is identical to a distinct member of set A, and there are the same number of xs 
as there are members of Set A.  
 
With this in mind, then, it is somewhat strange that Markosian assumes that any such 
enumeration must be infinitely long. However, this is probably of little consequence, since I 
am in agreement with Markosian that any such enumeration that was infinitely long should 
not be considered an informative answer to the SCQ. Whether or not a body of brute 
compositional facts could or could not be enumerated in a finite list may be up for debate, 
but either way, Markosian’s position is relatively unaffected. For if they couldn’t be listed 
finitely then BC would be correct, and if they could be finitely listed then although BC would 
be incorrect, Markosian’s position would be even stronger, since the finite list would 
constitute an informative, non-trivial answer to the SCQ: the very thing we have been 
looking for since the start. So despite the fact that I disagree with Markosian over this 
particular point, it does nothing to undermine his central claim that compositional facts are 
brute. 
                                                 
63 Markosian (1998b), 5 
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§2.5.2 Why Should One Believe in Brutal Composition? 
Markosian gives only one argument to support BC: the argument from elimination. 
Essentially, Markosian’s line of thought is that all other candidate answers to the SCQ are 
implausible to the point of being untenable, resulting in the conclusion that composition 
must be brute. He formulates the argument as follows: 
 
(1) [Compositional] nihilism is false 
(2) [Compositional] universalism is false 
(3) There is no true moderate64 answer to the SCQ 
(4) If (1) – (3), then BC is true 
(5) Therefore, BC is true65 
The argument from elimination is deductively valid. (Provided, that is, that one agrees with 
Markosian that an infinitely long disjunction enumerating each and every case of 
composition does not constitute an informative answer to the SCQ. As stated earlier, I see no 
reason to disagree over this point, so I am happy to concede that the argument is valid). 
Whether it is convincing or not, however, is a very different matter. This will depend on 
how plausible one takes the first three premises to be.   
 I will not take issue with premise (3) here. It should hopefully have been 
demonstrated in the preceding sections that restrictivist answers of all stripes (excluding BC 
of course) are subject to so many difficulties that they should be rejected as false. Markosian 
points to similar difficulties in his defence of (3), placing a particular emphasis on the 
argument from vagueness. Since I agree that these difficulties represent fatal flaws in 
restrictivist theories of composition, I will also agree that (3) is true. (Indeed it is a strength 
of BC that it is unaffected by the vagueness and sorites arguments considered in the last 
section. It remains unaffected because the BCer endorses exactly what the sorites arguments 
suggest: that there is a sharp cut-off point between composition and non-composition. Sharp 
cut-off points have so far been the thorn in the side of restrictivist s, because there is 
seemingly no non-arbitrary way of determining where they should lie. But the proponent of 
                                                 
64 According to Markosian, a moderate answer is any restrictivist answer that can be expressed in a finitely long 
sentence, or sentences.   
65 Markosian (1998b), 27 
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BC is unruffled by such a worry. As Markosian notes, “she can just shrug and say ‘there is 
no reason. It is a brute fact’”).66 
 Markosian’s defence of (1) and (2) are much less convincing, however. Indeed he 
does not provide any arguments to show the falsity of nihilism or universalism at all. Rather, 
they are rejected on purely intuitive grounds. For example, here is Markosian’s rejection of 
nihilism:  
 “according to my intuitions there are far more composite objects in the world than 
nihilism allows. This seems to me to be a fatal objection to nihilism, and I conclude, on the 
basis of this objection, that nihilism is not the correct answer to the SCQ”.67 
 Universalism, too, is dispensed with in a similarly confident, and cursory, manner: 
 “there is what seems to me to be a fatal objection to universalism: universalism 
entails that there are far more composite objects than common sense intuitions allow. [...] On 
the basis of this objection I reject universalism”.68 
What should have been made clear in the preceding sections is that I place little importance 
on common sense intuitions when trying to answer the SCQ. Or perhaps to be a little more 
cautious, I should say that it seems that the more one reflects on composition, the more it 
seems that our intuitions about it are mistaken, and so perhaps they should not be given all 
that much credence. To be sure, our intuitions may give us a good place to start, but it only 
takes a little serious reflection to realise that they bring with them some serious 
metaphysical problems. For this reason, then, one will not be surprised to discover that I am 
unconvinced by Markosian’s rejection of both nihilism and universalism. Markosian, 
however, is unlikely to be concerned by this. What it boils down to is a base disagreement 
between us over how much of a part common sense should play in our metaphysical 
theorising. Whilst I am of the view it should play only a cameo role at most, Markosian 
would no doubt take the Moorean line that our common sense intuitions about what things 
exist are so strong as to overrule any philosophical arguments that may contradict them. I 
don’t want to get drawn in to a discussion of the merits and demerits of Mooreanism here, 
so I will say only that I recognise it a serious philosophical stance to adopt, albeit one I 
                                                 
66 Markosian (1998b), 37. It will be argued later that the acceptance of sharp cut-off points does present a problem 
for the BCer, in spite of Markosian’s claims to the contrary.  
67 Markosian (1998b), 14 
68 Markosian (1998b), 22-23 
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generally disagree with, and as such, on this point at least, I am willing to agree to disagree 
with Markosian. However, herein lies a problem: if it is common sense that is driving 
Markosian’s approval of BC, then upon closer inspection, his position begins to look 
somewhat confused. For there are a number of reasons to think that BC is, in fact, in great 
conflict with common sense. I will list these reasons below. 
 
 
§2.5.3 Three Reasons to Disbelieve Brutal Composition 
REASON 1: Think back to when I set out the vagueness game, involving you, God, and 
Brian the cat. Now suppose that BC is true and, as Markosian suggests, that whatever the 
brute compositional facts are, they preserve our common sense intuitions about 
composition. In that case, it would seem that at the very beginning of the vagueness game, 
when all Brian’s atoms are untouched, it must be a fact that those atoms compose – they 
compose Brian. Moreover, near the very end of the game, when there are, say, only two 
atoms remaining, then if common sense is anything to go by at least, it must be a fact that 
those two atoms do not compose a cat. The conjunction of these two facts entails that there 
must be a sharp cut-off point, somewhere during the game, at which the removal of a single 
atom makes it the case that Brian ceases to be. But Markosian would be quite happy to 
accept this. Recall, he thinks that the defender of BC can just shrug her shoulders about 
sharp cut-off points, and say “it’s a brute fact”.  
But God, of course, would know the precise location of this cut-off point, due to his 
omniscience. So let’s suppose he removed all the atoms he could from Brian until he reached 
that cut-off point, i.e. the stage at which, if just one more atom were removed, the remaining 
atoms would no longer compose anything. Now I presume that the collection of atoms in 
front of you at this stage would look remarkably like a cat. After all, they do compose a cat, 
and the compositional facts are, ex hypothesi, supposed to preserve our common sense 
intuitions about what composite object there are. But now suppose that God removed one 
more atom. I will presume that there would be absolutely no perceptible difference 
whatsoever between the collection of atoms in front of you now, and the previous collection 
that included the single atom that God has just removed. If he had removed the atom while 
your back was turned, for instance, you would have had no way of recognising that 
42 | P a g e  
 
anything had changed once you returned your gaze upon Brian. But despite this entirely 
negligible, completely imperceptible difference, you are now being told, by God, that there 
is no longer a cat in front of you; you are being told that Brian has ceased to be. But this does 
not sit well with our intuitions! Indeed, such a claim would fly in the very face of common 
sense. Any normal observer would surely resist this claim. “Of course Brian has not ceased 
to be”, one can reasonably envisage them proclaim, “he is still right there in front of me”! So 
the fact that BC entails that there are sharp cut-off points between cases of composition and 
cases of non-composition is the first reason to suspect that it does not do what it says on the 
tin; it does not preserve our common sense intuitions.  
 
REASON 2: Common sense may well point towards the fact that composition is restricted, 
but, as James van Cleve has rightly noted, it surely also points towards the fact that there is a 
reason why it is restricted.69 According to common sense, for instance, there is a collection of 
iron girders on the Champs du Mars in Paris that do compose; they compose the Eiffel Tower. 
But there is surely a reason why they compose, or at least, that is what our common sense 
suggests, i.e. it is because the girders are fixed together in a particular way, or that they form 
a unified, purpose-built whole, or whatever. And it is for a similar reason that common 
sense suggests that a collection of limestone blocks in Giza compose a great pyramid. 
Likewise, it is the conspicuous lack of such a reason that the iron girders in Paris and the 
limestone blocks in Giza do not compose an object when taken together, or so our common 
sense would have it. So it would surely run completely counter to common sense to suggest 
that we are in fact mistaken about this, and there is in fact, no explanation whatsoever as to 
why these compositional facts obtain. But that is, of course, what the defender of BC has to 
maintain.  
 
REASON 3: The final reason why BC clashes with intuition is that it would, if true, leave us 
completely in the dark as to what the compositional facts actually are. How would one go 
about establishing what composite objects exist if there was no explanatory principle 
underlying composition in general? Markosian, I think, would suggest that the answer is in 
fact easy. He presents his thesis of brutal composition as one which is “consistent with 
                                                 
69 Van Cleve (2008), 333  
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standard, pre-philosophical intuitions about the universe’s composite objects”.70 So I 
imagine he would say that we have a very simple way of establishing what composite 
objects exist: if intuition says a certain composite object exists, then we should accept that it 
really does exist. What could be simpler than that? But, unfortunately, this just won’t work. 
As I have previously made clear, our intuitions about composite objects are nowhere near 
fine-tuned enough to detect the fine divisions between composites and non-composites that 
BC entails there must be. Consider Brian, in the vagueness game, right on the cut-off point of 
composition. Call Brian on the right side of the cut-off point (i.e. an existent composite 
object) ‘Real Brian’, and call the atoms on the wrong side of the cut-off point (i.e. one atom 
short of composing a cat) ‘Faux Brian’. Common sense and/or intuition would have 
absolutely no way of distinguishing Real Brian from Faux Brian. Either both would seem like 
a composite object (a cat) or neither would. It is beyond any stretch of the imagination to 
suppose that we could distinguish, intuitively, between the two. Thus in either case, our 
intuitions about composition would be mistaken. Either we would take Faux Brian to be a 
cat (which he is not), or we would take Real Brian to not be a cat (which he is). But, of course, 
if our intuitions can be mistaken in this case, then what reason do we have to suppose that 
they are right in other cases? What reason do we have to suppose that they are right in any 
cases? I would suggest that there is no such reason, other than pure optimism on the part of 
the Brutal Composition Theorist.  
It is for these three reasons that the motivation for BC disappears. We are told that 
BC is the only candidate answer to the SCQ that preserves our pre-theoretical intuitions 
about composition. Moreover, it is because of this very fact that Markosian suggests that we 
should believe that BC is true. But as I have just shown, BC does not preserve our intuitions 
about composition. And what is more, it actually violates what is a strong and central 
intuition about composition that the other candidate answers to the SCQ successfully 
preserve, namely, that whatever the compositional facts are, there must be a reason as to why 
they obtain. So in light of this, then, there is simply no motivation for believing BC in the 
first place.  
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§2.5.4 A Brief Digression about Intuition 
Before concluding, I just want to say one more thing about the intuitions that are the driving 
force behind Markosian’s thesis. Markosian’s starting point is that it is just obviously apparent 
that ordinary composites, like tables, chairs, people, stars, etc., exist, and that exotic 
composites, like heap-tables, do not exist. However, I simply disagree that this intuition is as 
strong as he claims, and I believe that this can be shown with just a minimal amount of 
reflection. Sure, if you ask the average person on the street, “do tables exist?” they will 
unthinkingly answer “yes” (if they grace your question with an answer at all!), and likewise, 
if you ask “is there an object composed of your dining table and the moon?” they will, more 
than likely, say “no”. But it would normally take only a few more simple questions to make 
their conviction in these answers wane, or so I claim. The best way I can demonstrate this is 
by recounting a conversation I have had a number of times with first-year philosophy 
undergraduates whom, incidentally, constitute perhaps the best representation of common 
sense intuitions. I say this because they are willing to take philosophical questions seriously 
(usually), yet at the same time their philosophical views are fairly undeveloped. The 
conversation tends to go a little like this:  
 
Me: Do crowds of people exist? 
Them: Yes 
Me: Okay, well suppose there is a crowd of 100 people in front of you, and suppose for sake of 
argument that people are mereologically simple. How many objects are in front of you, 100 or 101? 
Them: What do you mean? 
Me: I repeat: how many objects are in front of you? 100 (i.e. just the people), or 101 (i.e. the people 
and the crowd)?  
Them: Aah, I see. Well now you come to mention it, I’m not so sure.  
Me: Now look at that table in front of you. Now suppose, for sake of argument, it is made of 100 
mereological simples. Now tell me how many objects are in front of you: 100 (i.e. just the simples) or 
101 (i.e. the simples and the table)?  
 
The conversation usually goes one of three ways at this point. Either, they will plump for 
there being 101 objects, in order to preserve the table, or they will tentatively opt for there 
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being only 100 objects, unwittingly starting along the road to nihilism. Or sometimes they 
maintain that whilst there are definitely only 100 objects, the table still exists because the 
table just is the simples taken together, thus unwittingly endorsing that controversial thesis 
that composition is identity. It strikes me that at this early stage of investigation, each of 
these three answers has something going for it, and what’s more, each of the three answers 
is perfectly understandable for them to settle on. But what this surely shows is that our 
intuitions about what exists are not as strong as they may initially seem, and certainly not as 
strong as Markosian takes them to be. Whilst one’s initial reaction may be a complete 
conviction in the claim that tables exist, under only gentle questioning that conviction will 
often dissipate significantly. The intuition that tables exist is only strong when taken 
completely uncritically, and it seems that this is the way Markosian takes it when forming his 
views about composition.  
 As a final point on this, it seems that the conclusions of nihilism and universalism (in 
fact, of nihilism in particular) only seem so counter-intuitive because they too are taken 
completely uncritically. For instance, nihilists are regularly reminded (often in a derogatory 
tone) that their stance on composition entails that there are no tables and chairs. This is quite 
true. But the conclusion is only seriously counter-intuitive when taken uncritically. For the 
claim ‘there are no tables and chairs’, when taken uncritically, would have us believe that 
we have no surfaces to put things on and nowhere to sit down. But of course it doesn’t mean 
that! If it did then we would be right to reject it as absurd. As we well know, the nihilist can 
sit down just as comfortably as anyone else; she merely maintains that what she is sitting on 
is not a single composite object (a chair), but rather a plurality of little objects (i.e. simples 
arranged chair-wise). When this is understood, the conflict between nihilism and common 
sense starts to lose its bite and look more of a pseudo-conflict. The conflict only looks 
damaging when our intuitions are taken completely uncritically. In light of this, then, I 
would suggest that it may be somewhat misguided to build a philosophical theory of 
material composition upon intuitive foundations that appear to have been subjected to little 
or no reflective scrutiny. 
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§2.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
I hope to have shown that restrictivism, in any of its guises, is false. The vast majority of 
restrictivist theories involve theoretically intolerable arbitrariness, since they fail to provide 
a justified and principled reason to restrict composition in the way they do. But even those 
restrictivist theories which claim to have such a principled reason are subject to the 
destructive force of the sorites. If composition is restricted, then there must be sharp cut-off 
points between cases of composition and cases of non-composition, and this is regardless of 
whether or not one endorses the possibility of ontic vagueness. Such cut-off points are 
implausible and objectionable to the extreme, and thus any theories which entail that there 
are such things should be rejected. Finally, I have shown that Brutal Composition, the one 
version of restrictivism that is markedly different from the rest, should also be rejected. It 
too endorses the existence of implausible and objectionable sharp cut-off points. Moreover, 
despite Markosian’s claims to the contrary, there is no good reason to believe in BC in the 
first place, since the claim that it preserves our common sense intuitions about composition 
is entirely false. It is for these reasons that I conclude that material composition is not 
restricted. 
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§3. Universalism 
 
If restrictivist theories of composition are untenable, and in light of comments made in the 
preceding chapter I will assume that they are, then one is left only with what have been 
called the “extreme answers” to the SCQ.71 That is, one must say either that composition 
always occurs (i.e. endorse universalism) or say that composition never occurs (i.e. endorse 
nihilism). Of these two options it is the former that has proved by far the most popular 
among contemporary philosophers; indeed it would probably fair to say it is the default 
view.72 Universalism, recall, is defined as follows: 
 
Universalism: for any two or more xs, where the xs are material objects, there is 
always a further material object which those xs compose.  
 
I should point out here that universalism is quite distinct from, yet often conflated with, the 
somewhat stronger thesis of Unrestricted Mereological Composition (UMC). Universalism is 
a thesis concerned only with material objects, whereas UMC states that for any objects 
whatsoever (material or not) there is a further object that they compose. Thus UMC entails 
the existence of many strange and unusual objects which universalism does not. Armstrong, 
for instance, a famous advocate of UMC, recognises that his view commits him to objects 
such as that composed of “the number 42 and the Murrumbidgee River”.73 It may be thought 
(indeed, until recently I myself thought) that UMC entails universalism, since the set of all 
material composites is just a subset of the set of all composites recognised by UMC, but this 
is not actually the case.74 This is because although UMC says that for any objects there is 
always a further object they compose, it does not - or need not - insist that the object which 
they compose is a material object. The defender of UMC can remain neutral on the nature of 
composite fusions. This is, however, a technicality which is probably safe to ignore. For it 
                                                 
71 Van Inwagen (1990), 72 
72 Defenders of universalism include, Armstrong (1989, 92; 1997, 13), Heller (1990, 49-51), Hudson (2000; 2001, 
107-112), Leonard & Goodman (1940), Lesniewski (1916), Lewis (1986a, 211-213; 1991, 7), McGrath (1998), Rea 
(1998), Sider (2001, 121-32), and many others. 
73 Armstrong (1997), 13 
74 This point was brought to my attention by reading Effingham (2007), 57 
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would be a most unusual thesis which states that the fusion of two material objects was itself 
not a material object – I certainly know of no one who defends such a thought. So whilst 
some of the philosophers I will refer to as defenders of universalism are actually defenders 
of UMC, one should not worry that I am misrepresenting their positions by doing so. For 
despite the fact that UMC does not entail universalism, these particular philosophers do 
endorse universalism. As a final point on this, it should be noted that universalism does not 
entail UMC, thus while any observations I make about universalism may carry over to UMC, 
it should not be assumed that they will.  
  To the reader who is unfamiliar with the debate on composition it may come as 
something of a surprise to learn that the view of the informed majority is that material 
composition is unrestricted. This is because the truth of universalism implies the existence of 
a plethora of exotic composites. There would be a veritable abundance of heap-tables, for 
instance. And it would turn out that there is, after all, an object composed of the Eiffel Tower 
and the Great Pyramid at Giza. Universalism is entirely indiscriminate; it matters not how 
disparate or incontiguous any two objects may be, according to universalism they will 
compose. Despite this, however, universalism remains very much the majority view.  
In what follows I will build a case against universalism. The case will consist of two 
parts. In the first part, I shall consider some of the key arguments that are often given in 
support of universalism, and expose them to be flawed and unconvincing. In the second 
part I shall present a number of arguments against universalism. I don’t think that any of 
these should be considered as knock-down arguments when taken on their own, but when 
taken together, they constitute a battery of reasons to reject universalism. Coupled with the 
fact that there is little motivation to believe universalism in the first place, I will conclude 
that it is false. 
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§3.1. Arguments for Universalism 
 
§3.1.1 Initial (Naive) Advantages 
Universalism has some clear advantages over restrictivism. Firstly, unlike most restrictivist 
theories, universalism is completely unaffected by sorites arguments and arguments from 
vagueness. The reason for this is that since composition occurs in all cases, there is no need 
to posit any sharp cut-off points, or phases of indeterminacy, between cases of composition 
and cases of non-composition. According to universalism, there are no cases of non-
composition! Secondly, and also unlike most restrictivist theories, universalism cannot be 
accused of unjustified arbitrariness, for it is perfectly consistent across the board. 
Universalism is uniform and indiscriminate: material objects always compose! Thirdly, and 
perhaps following on from the last point, universalism is often touted as being simple and 
elegant.75 Since simplicity and elegance are widely regarded as theoretical virtues, this is 
supposed to count in universalism’s favour.  
 I am perfectly willing to concede all these points in favour of universalism. Indeed it 
seems quite clear to me that universalism is a much better answer to the SCQ than 
restrictivism (in any of its many guises). However, by now we have already eliminated 
restrictivism, so touting advantages a theory has over restrictivism is not going be of great 
consequence at this stage. As stated above, with restrictivism out of the picture, we are left 
with a straight battle between universalism and nihilism. So for universalism to win the day, 
its proponents need to provide advantages it wields over nihilism, not over restrictivism. 
Yet, the three initial advantages mentioned above can also be forwarded by the nihilist. For 
nihilism is also perfectly unaffected by sorites or vagueness arguments. It can never be 
vague as to whether composition occurs, for composition never occurs. And neither is there 
any need to posit sharp cut-off points between cases of composition and cases of non-
composition, for according to nihilism, there are no cases of composition. Neither can 
nihilism be accused of unjustified arbitrariness, since it too is consistent across the board: 
composition never occurs. And because of this nihilism is just as simple and elegant a theory 
                                                 
75 For example, see Markosian (2008), 345 
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as universalism.76 So although the universalist certainly can lay claim to the three 
advantages set out above, since the nihilist can do the same, these factors will provide no 
help when it comes to deciding between the two.  
 
 
§3.1.2 The Argument from Elimination 
There is an argument for universalism which seems to hold considerable sway with a great 
many philosophers, yet it is an argument which is rarely explicitly stated (let alone 
defended!) but usually just implied, or even assumed. It is an argument from elimination. 
The argument consists of the conjunction of two claims: firstly, that composition is not 
restricted (usually based on the types of consideration covered in the last chapter), and 
secondly, that composition clearly occurs in some cases (e.g. I exist, and I am composed of 
parts). The conjunction of these two claims is taken to entail the truth of universalism. Let’s 
call this the Argument from Elimination (AFE), and formulate it as follows: 
 
1. Composition is not restricted 
2. Therefore, composition must either always occur or never occur 
3. Composition definitely occurs in some cases 
4. Therefore, composition must occur in all cases 
5. Therefore, composition is unrestricted 
David Lewis has endorsed this type of argument in favour of universalism. He says: “no 
restrictions on composition can serve the intuitions that motivate it. So restriction would be 
gratuitous. Composition is unrestricted”.77 Notice how quickly Lewis jumps from the 
premise that composition is not restricted to the conclusion that it must be unrestricted.  It is 
surely far too quick! Lewis jumps straight from premise (1) in AFE to the conclusion (5). This 
is, of course, an invalid inference. The extra premises (and in particular, premise 3) are 
needed in order for one to legitimately infer that composition is unrestricted. Lewis, I would 
suggest, simply assumes that these extra premises are obviously true – indeed this must 
                                                 
76 In fact it could be argued that nihilism is more simple and elegant than universalism, for nihilism only posits 
one type of material object (simples), whereas universalism posits two (simples and composites), but not much 
will hang on this point.  
77 Lewis (1986a), 213 
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have been so obvious to him that it wasn’t worth mentioning. (The other alternative, of 
course, is that Lewis did in fact make an invalid inference, but I am assuming that this is 
unlikely).  
 Ted Sider, too, has presented an argument similar to AFE.78 I am referring here to his 
well-known ‘Argument from Vagueness’; the very same argument that was considered in 
the last chapter. Sider’s argument is directly influenced by Lewis’s comments, yet it is 
formulated in more detail. The argument essentially states that composition can’t be 
restricted (because of the concerns about vagueness and sharp cut-off points that were 
considered in the last chapter), therefore composition must be unrestricted. Unlike Lewis, 
however, Sider does recognise that his argument needs an extra premise in order to be valid. 
More precisely, Sider recognises that if nihilism were true, or even just possible, his 
argument would not go through. Sider’s solution is to simply reject nihilism on independent 
grounds, and thus conclude that composition is unrestricted.  
 I will later argue that Sider’s rejection of nihilism is unfounded, and thus by 
extension, that his endorsement of universalism is too. But that is for later. Now it just 
remains to be clarified that without a valid reason to reject nihilism, the argument from 
elimination does not support universalism. AFE, really, is just a reiteration that composition 
is not restricted, and that as a result, either universalism or nihilism must be true. Thus in an 
attempt to answer the SCQ it gets us no further than we were already. To decide between 
universalism and nihilism, we will need new, independent, arguments. 
 
 
§3.1.3 The Argument from CAI 
It has been suggested that composite objects may be identical to their parts taken together. 
The rough idea here is that if you’ve got the parts, you’ve got the whole. The whole, 
although existent in its own right, is not anything additional to the parts. To use the often 
used parlance, the whole is nothing over and above its parts. This thesis is known as 
Composition as Identity (CAI).79 It has also been claimed that CAI entails universalism, thus if 
                                                 
78 Sider (2001), 120-132 
79 Defenders of this rough view include Lewis (1991), Baxter (1988a; 1988b), Sider (2007), Armstrong (1997) 
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the former is true, then so is the latter.80 As such, any arguments in favour of CAI can be 
seen as being indirect arguments for universalism. In what follows I aim to show that CAI 
does not, in fact, entail universalism, and is perfectly compatible with other stances on 
material composition. More importantly, however, I think it can also be shown that there is 
no good reason to believe in CAI in the first place (in fact, I think there is good reason to 
reject it outright). But before I do this, it would be worthwhile to get a little clearer of what 
the thesis of CAI actually claims, in detail.  
 First and foremost, let me clarify what CAI is not. CAI is not the thesis that composite 
objects are identical to the sum of their parts, or the aggregate of their parts. For this would 
be to claim only that composites, if they exist, are self-identical, which would be a fairly 
trivial claim. Rather, the defender of CAI claims that for any composite object, O, composed 
of parts, the xs, O just is the xs. CAI, then, stretches the standard conception of identity. 
Identity, ordinarily conceived, is a one-one relation, i.e. a relation that holds between one 
single object and another single object (e.g. Phosphorus = Hesperus, or Elton John = Reginald 
Dwight). But according to CAI, identity can also be a many-one relation, i.e. a relation 
linking a plurality of objects (some parts) to a single object (a whole). Because of this, CAI is 
quite hard to express. One is tempted to say something like, ‘according to CAI, for any 
composite, O, composed of parts, the xs, then the xs are identical to O’. But this could quite 
easily be misinterpreted; for taken at face value, it seems to suggest that each of the xs is 
identical to O, and that is obviously not what we are trying to say. In fact, Ross Cameron has 
suggested that discussing CAI forces one to be either ungrammatical or misleading.81 One 
risks being misleading if one expresses it in the way just done, but in order to express it 
more precisely, one may need to sacrifice one’s grammar and say something like, ‘the xs is 
identical to O’. Not being completely satisfied with either of these terminological choices, I 
will, in what follows, use the slightly more cumbersome, yet less grammatically 
objectionable phrase, ‘the xs taken together are identical to O’. For brevity, I will denote this 
symbolically by: ‘the xs = O’. 
 CAI certainly has an appeal of sorts. For when we think of any given composite 
object, it seems that, materially speaking, the totality of its parts constitute the entire whole. 
                                                 
80 E.g. Merricks (2005); Sider (2007) 
81 Cameron, (2012), 531n 
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There is no extra material in the whole - no extra stuff - that is not accounted for by all the 
parts taken together. (If you recall the example in the last chapter about the crowd of 100 
people, it would seem that even for one who believes in the existence of crowds, one may 
hesitate to say that the crowd is an extra object, such that there are 101 objects present 
instead of just 100. The intuitive thought is: if you’ve got the people, you’ve got the crowd). 
This is the driving intuition behind CAI, and has perhaps been best expressed by Donald 
Baxter.82 Consider some of his examples: 
 
Someone with a six-pack of orange juice may reflect on how many items he 
has when entering a ‘six items or less’ line in a grocery store. He may think he 
has one item, or six, but he would be astonished if the cashier said ‘Go to the 
next line please, you have seven items’. We do not ordinarily think of a six-
pack as seven items, six parts plus one whole.83 
 
To reinforce the point, another example: 
Suppose a man owned some land which he divided into six parcels. 
Overcome with enthusiasm for the non-identity view [of composition] he 
might try to perpetrate the following scam. He sells off the six parcels while 
retaining ownership of the whole. That way he gets some cash while hanging 
on to his land. Suppose the six buyers of the parcels argue that they jointly 
own the whole and that the original owner now owns nothing. Their 
argument seems right. But it suggests that the whole was not a seventh thing.84  
 
There is little doubt that these examples are powerful. After all, one certainly would be 
astonished if refused entry to the ‘six items or less’ queue, and one would rightly be 
aggrieved if a land-owner continued to lay claim to a plot of land you had just bought from 
him in the circumstances set out above. But there is equally little doubt that these examples 
do not constitute arguments to show that composition is identity. For they could, I think, 
just as forcefully be used to support nihilism. For the examples seem to demonstrate that if 
you have the parts, you have everything there is to have. If you have the six bottles of juice, 
you have all the juice. There is no six-pack over and above the bottles because there is no six-
pack at all – there is just the six bottles! Of course, the examples don’t show conclusively 
                                                 
82 Baxter (1988a) 
83 Baxter (1988a), 579 
84 Baxter (1988a), 579 
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either way. What they do, however, is highlight the fact that, perhaps, the relationship 
between parts and whole is not quite as straightforward as we may ordinarily assume.  
Many have thought that the truth of CAI entails the truth of universalism.85 The 
general idea is that if composition is identity, then the fusion of any objects just is those 
objects taken together. So for any objects whatsoever, you automatically get their fusion, 
because their fusion just is those objects. Trenton Merricks forwards just such a proposal, 
making the seemingly plausible claim that “it seems nonsensical to deny the existence of 
something that would, if it existed, be (identical with) things whose existence one already 
affirms”.86 But that is precisely what someone would be doing if they endorsed CAI but did 
not endorse universalism, or so the argument goes. Therefore, we are led to conclude that if 
CAI is true, universalism must be true also. Consider a six-pack of orange juice, for example. 
First, suppose that you accept, unremittingly, the existence of the six individual bottles of 
juice. Now according to CAI, the six-pack (the whole) just is the six bottles taken together, 
nothing more, and nothing less. So given the fact that you accept the existence of the six 
bottles, you already accept the existence of the six-pack. And the same goes for any collection 
of objects you can think of. It’s as simple as that; CAI entails universalism. 
Whilst this argument may appear to be quite powerful, there are reasons to believe 
that its power is only superficial. In a recent paper, Ross Cameron argues that the argument 
is not valid. Cameron’s central point is that CAI is a thesis about the nature of composition 
(i.e. it tells us what composition is - identity), but it doesn’t necessarily tell us when 
composition does and does not occur. For CAI tells us that when there is a composite object, 
that object is identical to its parts taken together. Furthermore, it tells us that when some 
objects are, taken together, identical to some single object, then they compose that object. 
Crucially, however, it doesn’t tell us when some objects are identical to a single object and 
when they are not. As Cameron says: “[CAI] does not tell us whether, given some xs, they in 
fact compose; it only settles the biconditional: they compose iff there is some one to which 
they are identical”.87 In order for CAI to entail universalism, one must already assume that 
given any xs whatsoever, there is a single object to which those xs are identical – in other 
                                                 
85 E.g. Merricks (2005), 629; Sider (2007)  
86 Merricks (2005), 629. Merricks does not endorse universalism, however. Whilst he does claim that CAI entails 
universalism, he does not believe that CAI is true.  
87 Cameron (2012), 534 
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words, that there is a single object which those xs compose. But that is just to beg the 
question in favour of universalism!  
Cameron’s argument is a strong one. For it exposes the argument from CAI to be 
indubitably invalid. The argument from CAI attempts to argue straight from p to q: 
 
p: There are some xs 
q: there is a y, such that the xs = y. 
 
In order for it to be valid, it of course needs an extra premise of pq. But one cannot assume 
that! For that would be to assume the truth of universalism and thus beg the question in an 
objectionable way.  
What we can deduce from all this is that while CAI is clearly compatible with 
universalism, it certainly doesn’t entail it; for it is compatible with many other stances on 
composition too. The restrictivist, for example, could say ‘of course composition is identity! 
It just so happens that composition only sometimes occurs, but when it does, the composite 
object is identical to its parts’. There is no contradiction in such a claim. Even the nihilist 
could endorse CAI, but simply add the caveat that composition never actually occurs.  
I am of the belief that Cameron’s argument conclusively defeats the argument from 
CAI, and this is because I simply cannot see any way of showing that universalism follows 
from CAI without begging the question. But for those who remain unconvinced, there is 
another line of attack that threatens to undermine the argument from CAI. For it can be 
claimed – indeed it often is claimed – that CAI is simply not true, or worse, is incoherent. 
And of course, if CAI is not true, or is incoherent, then it is quite irrelevant as to whether it 
would entail universalism or not if it were true.  Firstly, it may be the case that one simply 
cannot make sense of CAI. That is to say, given a classical conception of identity, it may be 
just incoherent to suggest that a single thing can be identical to many things taken together.88 
It is often supposed that CAI fails because it violates Leibniz’s Law. For according to 
Leibniz’s law, or more precisely, according to the principle of the indiscernibility of 
identicals, if x = y, then any property of x must also be a property of y, and likewise, any 
property of y must also be a property of x. So the thought is that CAI clearly violates this 
                                                 
88 Van Inwagen (1994), for instance, claims not to be able to make sense of CAI.  
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principle because it supposes that many things (the parts) can be identical to one thing (the 
whole), but the parts have the property of being many, whereas the whole does not (it has 
the property of being one). Because of this, CAI is taken to be false. This kind of argument 
has been presented by a number of different philosophers.89 
I don’t accept this argument, for I think it misunderstands what the thesis of CAI 
actually states. I think that CAI, when properly understood, does not violate the 
indiscernibility of identicals.90 To illustrate, consider our six-pack of orange juice again. 
What CAI states is that the parts are identical to the whole; the six bottles are the six-pack, 
and the six-pack is the six bottles. But this is surely just to state that the six bottles have the 
property of being one six-pack! (And of course, the converse holds: the six-pack has the 
property of being six bottles). But if this were the case then the indiscernibility of identicals 
would not have been contravened, since both the whole and the parts share all the same 
properties (i.e. the properties of being one six-pack and being six bottles). So to suggest that 
CAI is in conflict with Leibniz’s Law is a mistake, and rests on a misconception of the thesis 
of CAI. Unfortunately for the defender of CAI, however, this does not make their view any 
more palatable. For whilst Leibniz’s Law remains unscathed, CAI, when viewed this way, 
involves the claim that composite objects (and their parts) have incompatible properties. A 
six-pack of orange juice, for instance, simultaneously has the property of being one thing 
and the property of being six things! If anything, I would suggest that this consequence of 
CAI is even more troubling than the consequence that it contravenes Leibniz’s Law. For it is 
surely impossible for an object to simultaneously have the property of being one thing and 
the property of being many things! But that, of course, would entail the impossibility of CAI. 
But many defenders of CAI accept this conclusion. To overcome the problem, they 
simply insist that whilst composition is not strictly identity, it is something very similar to 
identity.91 This notion of ‘near-identity’ or ‘almost-identity’ has been endorsed by both 
David Lewis and D. M. Armstrong.92 But it is Ted Sider who has taken the most effort to 
explain what it actually is.93 Sider claims the parthood relation to be uniquely intimate, and 
                                                 
89 Lewis (1991), 87, and McKay (2006), 38, have both presented arguments of this type.  
90 I thank Ross Cameron for making this clear to me. 
91 See Sider (2007), and Lewis (1991). Baxter is the only philosopher I know of who maintains that CAI uses the 
strict classical notion of identity 
92 Lewis (1991), 84-5; Armstrong (1978), 36-80.  
93 Sider (2007) 
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then goes on to say: “The intimacy of this connection must be explained. The best 
explanation is a conception of parthood that renders the connection between parts and 
wholes as intimate and identity-like as possible”.94 These words make it clear that Sider does 
not take composition to literally be identity, but only very similar to it. He aims to highlight 
this similarity by making a number of claims, which I shall paraphrase below: 
 
1. Just as everything is identical to something, so too any xs compose something 
(this is just universalism). 
2. Just as nothing can be identical to two distinct things, so too no xs can compose 
distinct things.  
3. Just as identity does not hold relative to place, location, or sortal, so too 
composition does not hold relative to place, location, or sortal (i.e. composition is 
absolute). 
4. Just as a single identity relation applies to all objects regardless of ontological 
category, so too a single composition relation applies to all objects regardless of 
ontological category.  
5. Just as identity is never vague, composition is never vague.95 
 
These claims are meant to strengthen the case for the claim that composition is ‘nearly-
identity’. As Sider says, “these theses draw composition as close to identity as possible, 
without going so far as to identify composition with identity”.96 Despite Sider’s insistence, I 
remain unconvinced. First off, many of the five theses are independently controversial. 1, for 
instance, is simply an assertion that universalism is true, which is certainly not an 
uncontroversial claim. 2 could also be disputed, for some philosophers believe that statues, 
for example, are distinct objects from the lumps of clay/metal/etc that they are made of, but 
they would not deny that both objects are composed of the same xs.97 4, too, is dubious to 
say the least. For as was pointed out in chapter 1, it is quite possible that the relation of 
                                                 
94 Sider (2007), 25 
95 These five claims appear in Sider (2007, 27), and are clearly heavily influenced by four claims made by Lewis 
(1991), 85. 
96 Sider (2007), 27 
97 See, for instance, Wiggins (1968a) 
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parthood may behave differently when relating abstract objects to how it behaves when 
relating material objects. For there is good reason to believe (indeed I have already assumed 
that this is the case) that material parthood is a transitive relation, whereas parthood per se is 
not. (Recall the example that Sanford’s Spleen is a part of him, and he is a part of the book 
Symposium, but his spleen is not a part of the book Symposium?) And this suggests that 
there isn’t a single relation of parthood that holds among all objects, regardless of 
ontological category, but rather, that there is one relation that holds among material objects 
and another, different, relation that holds when abstract objects are brought into play. So 
unless you already happen to believe the five controversial theses that Sider puts forward, it 
is unlikely, I would suggest, you would be persuaded that they show anything at all 
substantive about composition and the parthood relation.     
 But there is, I think, a more pressing problem with the claim that composition is 
nearly identity. The problem is that it is not entirely clear what such a claim is supposed to 
achieve. The initial advantage of suggesting that composition is identity was that its 
proponent could claim that composite objects are nothing over and above their parts. In slogan 
fashion: if you’ve got the parts, you’ve got the whole. But then it was seen that composition 
couldn’t be identity, strictly speaking, because such a claim is incoherent (or maybe even 
impossible). So the next move was to suggest that composition, whilst not the same as 
identity, is virtually the same as identity. This is the step with which I wish to take issue. For 
it strikes me that the notion of identity is a particularly clear and precise one. Not many 
things in philosophy are black and white, but if anything is, surely identity is a prime 
candidate. Either a and b are identical, or they are not. There is no middle ground here, or so 
it seems to me. And surely the same goes for composition; either composition is identity or it 
is not. And if it is not, then composite objects are not identical to their parts. But if composite 
objects are not identical to their parts, then what reason is there to think that they are 
nothing over and above their parts? What justifies such a claim? I do not know the answer, 
and I am yet to encounter anyone who does. And this is surely a big problem for the 
composition-as-nearly-identity theorist.  
 At this stage, I envisage that the defender of composition-as-nearly-identity would 
accuse me of being obtuse, or at least uncharitable, in my interpretation of their position. 
This may well be so, but so far I am yet to encounter any good reason why I should be more 
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charitable, or, in response to the obtuseness charge, it has yet to be explained to me what 
more there is to understand. Simply put, identity is a precise notion. It does not come in 
degrees. Similarity comes in degrees for sure, and perhaps identity is a limiting case of 
similarity, but identity is just not the sort of thing to vary by degree. So it is of little 
importance how similar composition may be to identity; if it’s not identity it’s not identity, 
and that is that. So consider again David Lewis’s claim that “composition is not identity, but 
it is analogous to it in many important respects”, and ask yourself what such a claim 
achieves. My response would be that it achieves very little. For composition may well be 
analogous to identity in many respects, but it is not analogous in the most crucial respect of 
all: it is not identity.  
 To sum up, then, the argument from CAI is entirely unconvincing. First and 
foremost, CAI in its strictest sense (i.e. when it employs a classical notion of identity) is 
incoherent, for it would involve objects simultaneously instantiating incompatible 
properties. The more popular versions of CAI which claim that composition is nearly 
identity are much more plausible, inasmuch as they have the potential to be true. But they 
produce results that conflict with the very thought that motivated CAI in the first place: that 
composites are nothing over and above their parts. But most important of all is the fact that 
CAI does not, contrary to what some have thought, entail universalism. So even if we can 
make sense of it – even if we have reason to believe it may be true – we would still have no 
extra motivation to believe in universalism, because CAI is quite compatible with other 
theories of composition, nihilism included. 
 
 
 
§3.2. Arguments against Universalism 
 
In what follows I will present four arguments against universalism. I don’t think that any of 
these arguments, when taken individually, is enough to refute universalism outright. 
Rather, each argument is designed to show that universalism entails some consequence or 
other that is objectionable or unpalatable. When taken together, however, a number of 
arguments that may be individually quite weak, have the potential to form a conjunctive 
argument of much greater strength. I think that is the case here. 
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§3.2.1 The Gratuitousness of Universalism 
It is likely to be noted as a drawback of universalism – indeed it often is noted – that it posits 
too many objects. The ontology of the universalist will, for obvious reasons, be vast. To 
illustrate, consider once more our afore-mentioned heap-table. According to universalism, 
not only is there a heap-table composed of the table and the 1000 grains of rice, but there will 
also be one composed of the table and 999 of the grains of rice, and another composed of the 
table and 998 of the grains of rice, and so on and so forth. And what about our object 
composed of the Eiffel Tower and the Great Pyramid at Giza? Well that too will exist. And 
so will an object composed of the Pyramid and all of the Eiffel Tower bar a single bolt, and 
so on. And we haven’t even begun to consider the countless objects made up of the heap-
table (and its constituent parts) and the pyramid, and the tower. Now I may be labouring the 
point somewhat here, but the import should be very clear: if universalism is true, there will 
be a simply astronomical amount of material objects in existence. And this may well put 
people off - remember Markosian’s “fatal objection” to universalism, that it “entails that 
there are far more composite objects that common sense intuitions allow”?98 Markosian may 
be a little premature in suggesting this represents a fatal objection, but one thing is for sure: 
if parsimony is to be considered a theoretical virtue, and it often is amongst philosophers, 
then all the worse for universalism. Universalism can make no claims of parsimony – quite 
the opposite; it is gratuitously extravagant, or so the objector may say.  
 There are two ways (I can think of) that the universalist could respond to this charge. 
The first strategy I will mention is the one that most universalists do in fact employ, but it is 
also, in my view, by far the weaker of the two. This strategy is to claim that although 
Universalism does posit a huge number of objects, most of those objects are, to use the 
popular terminology, ontologically innocent. We have already encountered this kind of idea in 
§3.1.3 when considering the thesis that composition is identity. Needless to say, then, I am 
somewhat sceptical of this strategy. The idea is that if some objects compose a composite 
object, let’s say, some atoms compose a table, then the table does not contain any extra 
matter over and above the atoms that compose it. Therefore, although the table exists, it in 
some sense comes for free. This kind of idea is commonly endorsed. D. M Armstrong, for 
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instance, tells us that “mereological wholes are not ontologically additional to their parts”.99 
Similarly, Varzi has said: “the whole and the parts encompass the same amount of reality and 
should not, therefore, be listed separately in an inventory of the world”.100 David Lewis, too, 
echoes these sentiments by saying “it would be double counting to list the cats and then list 
their fusion”.101 Espoused by the likes of Lewis and Armstrong, then, the claim that 
composites are ontologically innocent is certainly backed by philosophical authority. But 
that does not mean, of course, it is correct.  
 In fact, it is not immediately clear to me exactly how one is meant to take such a 
claim. My concern is that if an object is ontologically innocent, then I am unclear as to what 
sense it is supposed to exist in at all? If a table, for instance, is ontologically innocent, yet one 
of the atoms (mereological atoms, I mean) that make it up is not (what the opposite of 
‘innocent’ here is not obvious; to call an atom ontologically guilty does not seem quite right), 
then are we to say that these two entities exist in one and the same sense? For if they do, then 
what is actually meant by the term ‘ontologically innocent’? But if they do not, then what 
exactly does the difference consist in? These are difficult questions and their answers not 
obvious. And it suggests to me that these slogan-like catchphrases such as ‘ontologically 
innocent’ or ‘no ontological addition’ are perhaps not informative to the degree which one 
really requires. I think one should require a better explanation of what it is to be 
ontologically innocent before one should accept that there is such a status at all.  
 Particularly revealing, I think, is this mention of ‘double counting’. The thought 
seems to be that if you were making a list of everything there was, then you would only list 
the mereological simples; you would not list their fusions, because to list the fusions would 
be to count things twice. This is explicitly expressed in the quotes from Lewis and Varzi 
above. But it seems to deny the very thing that universalists want to affirm: that composite 
objects exist. Call me old-fashioned if you will, but I believe that if something exists, then it 
should be included on a list of what there is. Because that is just what such a list is: a list of 
what exists! To say that there are certain things, yet those things shouldn’t appear on a list of 
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what there is just seems bizarre, if not plain contradictory.102 (Imagine saying, ‘that apple is 
red, but it’s not making my list of all red things’ for example). Now it may be claimed that 
this is too simplistic a way of looking at it, but in response I could only say that I cannot see 
any other way of looking at it. If something exists then it makes up part of your ontology; 
and if something makes up part of your ontology, then I am not sure how it can be 
considered ontologically innocent. (Or if it was still claimed to be ontologically innocent, 
then I would need an explanation of what that means). Perhaps, however, being 
ontologically innocent means not making up part of your ontology, but then it also must 
mean non-existent. What else could it mean? This is not clear. 
Furthermore, if the universalist were not to include composite objects in her 
inventory of what there is, for fear of double-counting, then it seems that her inventory 
would be indistinguishable from that of the nihilist, in that it would include only 
mereological simples. But this cannot be right! The whole dispute between universalists and 
nihilists is precisely about what does and doesn’t exist. If it turns out that their ontological 
inventories are indistinguishable then it is not clear that there is a disagreement here at all!103 
This is surely not the result the universalist envisaged when claiming that composites are 
ontologically innocent. But to avoid it, much more explanation is required. To insist that 
composites exist, yet are ontologically innocent, is the metaphysical equivalent of having 
one’s cake and eating it. Armstrong has said that the innocence of composite objects is like 
an “ontological free lunch”.104 And I think he sums it up perfectly, for as we all know, there 
ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.  
 The more promising strategy for the universalist, I would suggest, is to simply bite 
the bullet. Admit that universalism is not very parsimonious in terms of the number of 
entities it posits, but then deny that parsimony in that regard is particularly important. It is a 
fairly common thought in metaphysics that ontological parsimony should only come into 
                                                 
102 Unless you adopt a Meinongian-type position whereby you concede that there are things that do not exist. 
This is a particularly controversial position, however, and I am pretty sure it is not what Armstrong et al had in 
mind when they said that composite objects are ontologically innocent.  
103 Perhaps an even worse scenario for the universalist would be if the world was gunky, i.e. made of matter 
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double counting to count the composites.   
104 Armstrong (1997), 12. To be a little more precise, the free lunch concerns any cases of supervenience. If a 
supervenes on b, then a comes for free. This applies to composite objects, however, because Armstrong believes 
they supervene on their parts.  
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play when one is considering types of entity, not merely tokens.105 So it may well be thought 
that once universalism allows that there are composite objects at all, it should not be overly 
concerned about the number of them. This seems a fairly reasonable thought. To give an 
example, consider Rutherford’s postulation that there were sub-atomic particles. Imagine 
how absurd it would have been if his postulation had been rejected on the grounds that if it 
were true, then there would be far too many sub-atomic particles! It is merely a consequence 
of his theory that since there are a lot of atoms, there will of course be a lot of sub-atomic 
particles. And so it could be said for universalism. It is merely a consequence of the theory 
that since there are a lot of material objects, there will of course be a lot of fusions of those 
objects. This is the route that I think the universalist should take. It should be conceded that 
the ontology of the universalist will be vast, and this ontological profligacy should be taken 
on the chin. This represents a cost of the theory, but how much of a cost is up for debate. I 
think it is going too far to insist, as Markosian does, that it represents a fatal cost, but it has to 
be recognised as a cost of some sort nonetheless.  
 
 
§3.2.2 The Counter-Intuitiveness of Universalism 
Let’s suppose, for sake of argument, that our hypothetical objector is satisfied that 
universalism is not gratuitously extravagant in its ontological posits, either because many of 
the posits are seen as ‘ontologically innocent’, or because she is not much bothered by 
quantitative parsimony, or perhaps for some other reason I have not considered. She still 
may be concerned, however, that many of the objects countenanced by the universalist – 
ontologically innocent or not – are just not the type of things that exist. Common sense, she 
may say, just doesn’t have room for heap-tables or any other gerrymandered objects that the 
universalist is committed to. Universalism is simply too counter-intuitive to be true. One 
could certainly imagine an objection of this sort being levelled at the universalist, and one 
would hope, for the sake of universalism, that a response would be forthcoming  
 Universalists, of course, are well prepared for this sort of objection, and they do 
usually come armed with a response. A popular strategy is to suggest that in ordinary 
thought and talk we tacitly restrict the domain our quantifiers such that they range only 
                                                 
105 I am somewhat sceptical of the value of ontological parsimony per se. I will say more about this in chapter 5. 
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over ordinary objects. For we often use quantifiers in a restricted sense in ordinary discourse, 
even if we don’t realise we are doing it. To illustrate this, consider an example: if a mugger 
steals your wallet, you may tell the police that he stole all your money. But you would not 
literally mean all your money – for presumably the mugger did not also empty your bank 
accounts as well as gather all the loose change from the back of your sofa. What you would 
have meant, of course, is that he stole all the money you had with you at the time. So you 
would have been tacitly restricting the domain of your quantifiers such that they ranged 
only over the contents of your wallet, or perhaps, over whatever you had on your person. 
Indeed when you think about it, it seems that in ordinary talk and thought we restrict the 
domain of our quantifiers all the time (note that I don’t really mean all the time). So perhaps 
this is what happens when we talk about composite objects? We tacitly restrict the domain 
of our quantifiers such that they exclude any exotic composites. So this is why there seems to 
be a conflict between universalism and common sense – because common sense employs 
restricted quantification. When faced with a table on which there are just two apples, for 
example, an ordinary speaker may say there are just two things on the table, whereas the 
universalist will say there are three (the two apples and their fusion).106 But this conflict is 
merely apparent, because the ordinary speaker is using restricted quantifiers. As such, it 
should not count against universalism as a theory, or so the response goes. This line of 
thought can be found in the writings of many philosophers sympathetic to the universalist’s 
cause, and can perhaps be summed up best by the following passage from David Lewis: 
 
Restrict quantifiers not composition. [...] We have no name for the mereological 
sum of the right half of my left shoe plus the moon plus the sum of all her 
Majesty’s ear-rings, except for the long and clumsy name I just gave it; we have 
no predicates under which such entities fall, except for technical terms like 
‘physical object’ (in a special sense known to philosophers) or blanket terms like 
‘entity’ and maybe ‘thing’; we seldom admit it to our domains of restricted 
quantification. It is very sensible to ignore such a thing in our ordinary thought 
and language. But ignoring it won’t make it go away.107 
 
                                                 
106 Technically speaking, the universalist will say there are a lot more than three things on the table, like the 
fusion of the top half of one apple and the bottom half of the other, and so on (presuming, of course, that the 
apples are not mereologically simple). But this is of little importance, what matters is that the two speakers 
disagreed at all about how many things there are on the table.  
107 Lewis (1986a), 213.  
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Now despite the fact that this kind of strategy is quite popular amongst universalists, there 
are reasons why one should be suspicious of it. In fact there are reasons to believe that it is 
simply not true. Most obvious is the fact that it is prima facie implausible; it is very difficult to 
believe that we actually do restrict our domain of quantification in such a way. Undoubtedly 
we do regularly place restrictions on our quantifiers, but it is not at all obvious that we do so 
in order to exclude exotic material composites. To illustrate this, consider once more the 
above example about the mugger. One could imagine a scenario where, on reporting the 
incident to the authorities, a particularly meticulous officer arched an eyebrow and 
remarked: “you really mean he stole all your money sir; every last penny you owned?” Now 
whilst you may well be exasperated by such a response, you would at least understand what 
the policeman meant; you would simply have to reiterate more precisely, that you meant 
only that the mugger stole all the money that was in your wallet. But now suppose that on 
telling the officer that there were exactly two items in the wallet – two twenty pound notes, 
say – he were to respond: “Only two items you say? But what about the object which those 
two notes compose? And what about the fusion of the left half of the first note and the right 
half of the second? Were you forgetting these items Sir?” Such a question would not 
exasperate but completely befuddle! It is wildly implausible to suppose that one would 
casually respond “Oh, I didn’t realise you were counting those types of object too!”  
 What these observations show is that whilst we certainly do restrict our quantifiers 
in certain circumstances, it usually only takes minimal reflection (or perhaps for someone - 
like a fussy police officer - to point it out to us) for us to realise, and to accept, that we are 
doing so. But there is no controversy there – it is just something that we do. In contrast, it is 
most controversial to suggest that we regularly restrict our quantifiers to exclude exotic 
composites. For if you tried to point out to someone that they were doing that, it is unlikely 
that they would even understand what you were talking about, let alone accept that what 
you said was true. Moreover, once you had explained what you meant, it is still very 
unlikely that they would accept what you have said. Much more likely is that they would 
insist that the exotic composites you were attempting to refer to simply didn’t exist. Seen in 
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this light, it simply stretches the limits of credibility to suggest that, in ordinary thought and 
talk, we restrict our quantifiers so as to exclude exotic composites.108 
It is for this reason that I do not consider the restricted quantifier strategy that is so 
often employed by universalists to be at all convincing. I think that the counter-intuitiveness 
of universalism is yet another pill that universalists have to swallow. However, I have to 
confess that I don’t think it is an overly bitter pill. The counter-intuitiveness of universalism 
is certainly a cost, but it is not a truly exorbitant one. This is for two reasons. Firstly, as I 
have now mentioned numerous times, there are many reasons to believe that our intuitions 
about composition are mistaken, as all attempts to reinforce our intuitions with theory seem 
to end in catastrophic failure. And, of course, if our intuitions about composition are 
mistaken, then it doesn’t seem to be much of a problem if a theory conflicts with them. 
Secondly, one should remember that at this stage in the dialectic, having eliminated 
restrictivism as a possible candidate answer to the SCQ, we are left only with a choice 
between universalism and nihilism. But nihilism has consequences that conflict with our 
intuitions as well. For universalism may countenance many exotic composites, but nihilism 
countenances virtually nothing at all. For the nihilist, there are no exotic composites, but 
there are no ordinary composites either. There are no trees or rocks or cats or dogs, or even 
people.109 So it would be unfairly biased to accuse the universalist of counter-intuitiveness 
whilst not recognising that same accusation could reasonably be levelled at the nihilist. 
Nonetheless, it still has to be conceded that universalism does entail some counter-intuitive 
consequences, and this constitutes yet another cost of the theory.  
  
 
§3.2.3 The Argument from Primitive Cardinality 
A recent argument has been presented against universalism, by Juan Comesana, which 
claims that universalism places unacceptable restrictions on the number of material objects 
                                                 
108 Korman (2007) investigates this strategy at much greater length than I do here, and should be the first place 
to look for anyone interested.  
109 Unless, of course, the nihilist takes trees and rocks and so on to be mereological simples, but that would be a 
rare and exotic version of nihilism indeed. 
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that a world could contain.110 Comesana claims that universalism is incompatible with the 
thesis he calls Primitive Cardinality (PC): 
 
(PC): For any n there could have been exactly n material things.111 
 
According to PC, then, there is a possible world consisting of just one material thing, a 
possible world consisting of just two material things, and so on and so forth. More generally, 
according to PC, the set whose members are the numbers of material objects at a world, 
across all possible worlds, in ascending order, would exactly mirror the set of natural 
numbers. I.e. it would be {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...}.  
 According to universalism, however, PC is false. To illustrate this, consider a world 
consisting of exactly two material simples, call it w1. According to universalism, these two 
simples will compose a further object, call it O. Therefore, at w1 there are three material 
things, the two simples and O. Now suppose that one of the simples was annihilated. Now 
at w1 there would be only one thing. Because by annihilating one of the simples, you also 
annihilate O, and you are left with just a single simple, which does not have a fusion. Now 
suppose that another simple was added back to w1. The number of material things the world 
then contained would immediately go back up to three, because as soon as you have two 
simples, you also get their fusion. So no matter what you do, you can’t have a world with 
only two things. There is no intermediate world between worlds of three things and worlds 
of just one thing. Two-thing worlds are, according to universalism, impossible!  
 Furthermore, universalism does not only rule out the possibility of two-thing worlds, 
but it also rules out the possibility of four-thing worlds, five-thing worlds, six-thing worlds, 
eight-thing worlds, and countless more. The reason for this is that with the addition of each 
individual simple, there will also be the automatic addition of numerous fusions composed 
of the previously existing simples and the newly added simple. More precisely, for any 
particular number of simples, n, the total number of material things (i.e. simples and fusions) 
will be 2n-1. So, universalism is incompatible with PC. Instead, the universalist must adhere 
to a different principle; let’s call it Universalist Cardinality (UC): 
                                                 
110 Comesana (2008) 
111 Comesana (2008), 32 
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(UC): For any n, there could only be worlds where the number of material things is 
2n-1. 
 
According to UC, then, the set whose members are the numbers of material objects at a 
world, across all possible worlds, in ascending order, would be {0, 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, ...}.  
 In light of this, then, we can explicitly formulate Comesana’s argument as follows: 
 
1. Universalism is incompatible with PC 
2. PC is true 
3. Therefore, universalism is false 
How forceful one finds this argument will depend entirely on the strength of one’s 
conviction in PC. Comesana claims that intuition supports the truth of PC. He claims that we 
have “particular pre-theoretical judgments that there could have been exactly two things, 
and exactly three things, and...”, whereas universalism is supported purely by abstract and 
theoretical principles.112 Moreover, he claims that it is “standard methodological procedure” 
in many areas of philosophy to give precedence to pre-theoretical judgments over general 
theoretical principles, when they conflict. Because of this, he claims that this constitutes 
prima facie evidence in favour of PC. 
 I think there is a lot to be said for Comesana’s argument. For it does seem perfectly 
reasonable to suppose that there could be a world consisting of just two material objects. I 
mean, why couldn’t there be such a world? When taken in isolation, there is nothing 
logically, epistemically, or metaphysically, objectionable about such a supposition at all. 
Because of this, I think that once again the universalist will have to simply take it on the chin 
that her theory entails a somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion. However, I do think that 
the universalist can soften the blow of the argument somewhat. Firstly, she can point out 
that whilst universalism is incompatible with PC, it is perfectly compatible with what we 
could call ‘Primitive Simple Cardinality’: 
 
(PSC): For any n, there could have been exactly n simples. 
                                                 
112 Comesana (2008), 2 
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PSC is perfectly acceptable by universalist lights. Moreover, the universalist might be able to 
tell some kind of story to the effect that it is actually PSC which our pre-theoretical 
judgments are driving at, not PC. How plausible such a story could be made to be, however, 
I am not sure.  
 Finally, I think that the universalist would be free to remind us that when reflecting 
on matters of composition and the metaphysics of ordinary objects, it is an unavoidable fact 
that some of our intuitions will be violated. I have already shown in the previous chapter 
that there is no plausible way of answering the SCQ in a way that preserves our intuitions 
about what composite objects do and don’t exist. So the universalist can simply say that this 
argument serves merely to add another entry onto the long list of violated intuitions that 
accumulates when one concerns oneself with answering this particular metaphysical 
question. So, the argument from PC does not strike a fatal blow against universalism, but it 
strikes a blow nonetheless. It highlights yet another counter-intuitive conclusion that the 
universalist must stomach. Moreover, it should be noted that the nihilist is unaffected by the 
argument, since nihilism is perfectly compatible with PC. So in the ongoing cost-benefit 
analysis of answers to the SCQ, this strikes another black mark against universalism. 
 
 
§3.2.4 The Identity Argument 
Perhaps the most well-known argument against universalism is that presented by Peter van 
Inwagen.113 I won’t be presenting van Inwagen’s argument here, since it rests on some 
assumptions which I find questionable.114 However, what I will be presenting is an 
argument that has been greatly inspired by van Inwagen’s, and one that is similar to it in 
many respects. I have taken some of the key premises in van Inwagen’s argument and 
reformulated them into an argument which I feel is more neutral and, hopefully, more 
compelling. The thrust of the argument is that the universalist owes us answers to some 
particularly tricky questions concerning the identity of ordinary composite objects. If my 
                                                 
113 Van Inwagen (1990), 75 
114 Specifically, van Inwagen makes some assumptions that simply beg the question which is up for debate. He 
assumes, for instance, that he exists and is a composite object. Given that we are currently in the process of trying 
to answer the SCQ (the question which asks when objects compose), I think it is objectionably biased to assume 
the existence of any composite objects, regardless of how convinced you may be that they exist.  
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argument goes through, then the universalist may not be able to countenance that there are 
any ordinary objects at all. It will be seen that whilst there are ways to get around these 
conclusions, none of them come without significant theoretical costs. 
 The argument rests on two crucial theses: 
 
1) If universalism is true, then whether some objects compose has nothing whatsoever 
to do with the spatial or causal relations that may or may not hold between those 
objects. 
2) If universalism is true, then some particular set of objects, the xs, can never compose 
more than a single object, either simultaneously or successively.  
I believe that one has to accept these theses if one endorses universalism. I will say a little bit 
more about why I believe this in due course, but first, let me present the argument. 
Let us begin by assuming that universalism is true. Now consider a typical ordinary 
composite object, let’s say, a tree – call it ‘Sycamore’. According to universalism, Sycamore is 
a composite object, and more precisely, Sycamore is the fusion of a particular set of simples 
that are, currently, arranged tree-wise.115 Let us call this particular set of simples ‘S’, and call 
the fusion of all its members ‘F’. At this point, then, call it t, I am assuming that our 
universalist would uncontroversially endorse the statement ‘Sycamore exists at t’. Moreover, 
I am assuming that Sycamore just is the fusion of simples in S, i.e. Sycamore = F.116 But now 
suppose, that in an act of divine rage, a thunderbolt was sent to earth and poor Sycamore 
was completely vaporised. That is to say, she was completely destroyed such that all her 
constituent parts (i.e. all the simples that are the members of S) were separated far and wide 
throughout the surrounding area. Let us call this point t’. Now this is where things begin to 
get a little peculiar. For at t’, I am assuming that Sycamore no longer exists, i.e. the statement 
‘Sycamore exists at t’’ is false. And I am assuming that this is uncontroversial since the 
simples that once composed her are no longer arranged tree-wise, and are no longer 
collectively engaged in any tree-like activity. (In other words, there is no tree standing where 
                                                 
115 This is not necessarily true, since universalism is compatible with gunk; it could be the case that Sycamore 
was gunky, and therefore not composed of simples. I will continue as though Sycamore were composed of 
simples, however, purely for sake of simplicity. The possibility that Sycamore could be gunky does not affect the 
argument.   
116 I mean, what else could Sycamore be? Sycamore just is a fusion of simples that are arranged tree-wise. 
Likewise, F is a fusion of simples that are arranged tree-wise. It seems quite straightforward: Sycamore = F. 
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Sycamore once stood). But F, however, still exists, since all the simples that are members of S 
still exist, and so long as they exist, they automatically compose a fusion (i.e. F). But earlier 
we stated, quite in accordance with universalism, that Sycamore = F. And this seems to 
introduce a worrying contradiction. For if Sycamore = F, then it is clear that if one of the two 
does not exist, then neither can the other. But here we are at t’ in that very situation: F exists, 
yet Sycamore is no more. So the conclusion seems to be that we must have been wrong in 
initially stating that the simples arranged tree-wise composed a tree. For they still compose F 
at time t’, but at t’, F is definitely not a tree. So those simples can never have composed a tree, 
because according to (2) the same set of simples can never compose two (or more) distinct 
objects, either simultaneously or successively.  
So what is the upshot of this argument? Well, considering that it is possible that any 
tree could suffer the same fate as Sycamore, it seems that we have to conclude that if 
universalism is true, then there are no trees at all. But, of course, it is not only trees that the 
argument affects. It could be set up with any type of ordinary object you care to mention. But 
seeing as though it is possible for any ordinary object to be vaporised and destroyed, it 
seems that we have no option but to conclude that if universalism is true, there are no 
ordinary objects at all! There are no trees, no cats or dogs, no planets or stars. Indeed, there 
are no composite objects at all that are capable of being destroyed, and that would even 
include human beings like you or me. There are, of course, mereological fusions like F. There 
will be a whole host of indestructible mereological fusions, composed of all manner of 
disparate material objects. But these cannot be the ordinary objects of common sense! 
Because fusions like F can survive vaporisation; you can separate their parts to all corners of 
the universe and they will be entirely unaffected. No ordinary object could withstand such a 
fate. So universalism, it seems, is a most peculiar thesis indeed. If true, then it would have us 
believe that the world is populated by a vast number of indestructible composite fusions, yet 
at the same time, is quite empty of all the composite objects which we would normally 
suppose there to be. But why would one ever believe such a theory? Surely one of the main 
reasons that defenders of universalism are so keen to preserve composition is that in so 
doing they can preserve all the ordinary composite objects of common sense. But if this 
cannot actually be done, as this argument purports to demonstrate, then why bother 
preserving composition at all?  
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I will consider some possible responses to this argument in the next section. But first, 
if one is to be convinced by it at all, I need to say something in support of the two theses that 
were assumed at the outset. Let’s consider (1) first. If universalism is true, then for any 
material objects whatsoever there is a fusion of those objects. If you have the objects then 
you automatically have their fusion. This is merely a statement of what universalism is. But 
already, then, it suggests that whether objects compose or not has nothing to do with where 
those objects are, or how they are interacting with one another. Moreover, if the spatial 
arrangement of objects did have something to do with whether they composed or not, then 
that would imply that there are some spatial arrangements of those objects which would not 
be sufficient for them to compose. But we know that is not true. As far as the universalist is 
concerned, the objects merely have to exist in order to compose. Spatial and/or causal 
relations never come into it. (1), therefore, is true.  
(2) is not quite so obvious, but nonetheless, it is something the universalist must 
accept. Since universalism is indiscriminate as to which objects compose (they all compose), 
it is also indiscriminate as to when they compose, and what they compose. In this respect, 
universalism is very similar to Set Theory. For any objects whatsoever, there will always be a 
set which has just those objects as members. As long as those objects exist, the set will also 
exist. And moreover, the very identity of that set is determined purely by the identity of its 
members. In other words, it is impossible to have two distinct sets which have exactly the 
same members. The same is the case for universalism.117 For any objects whatsoever, there 
will always be a fusion which has those members as parts. As longs as those objects exist, 
the fusion will also exist. And moreover, the very identity of that fusion is determined by the 
identity of its parts. In other words, it is impossible to have two distinct fusions that have 
exactly the same parts. (2), therefore, is true.  
 Given the truth of these assumptions, the conclusion of the argument clearly follows. 
For if ordinary composite objects are taken to be fusions of other material objects, then since 
those fusions would be able to survive the complete scattering of their parts, the ordinary 
objects with which they are identified should also be able to survive such scatterings. 
                                                 
117 Indeed it is common for proponents of universalism to argue for their thesis on the grounds that it can 
underpin, or explain, set theory. For example, see Armstrong (1997; 2004) or Lewis (1991) 
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Ordinary objects clearly cannot survive their parts being scattered far and wide, so the 
conclusion is clear, ordinary composite objects cannot be mere mereological fusions.  
At this point, one may have noted that the argument just presented has a number of 
similarities to the well-known problem of material constitution.118 Indeed, one may just think 
that I am merely rehashing that problem, by exposing the fact that an object has different 
persistence conditions from the stuff it is made of (e.g. a statue cannot survive being 
squashed, whereas the lump of clay it is made from can). And if the argument is just a 
restatement of the problem of the statue and the lump, then why can’t the universalist just 
endorse one of the many responses that have been given to that case?  
 The first thing I would say to this response is that even if the argument were the very 
same problem as the statue and the lump, then it is still a problem nonetheless. Just because 
the problem has been noted before doesn’t make it any less problematic. However, whilst I 
can see that the argument does have its similarities to the problem of the statue and the 
lump, it is not, in fact, the same problem. Actually, I think it is a problem that cuts much 
deeper than the statue and the lump. For according to this argument, the universalist could 
not even allow that there are lumps of clay, let alone any statues that they constitute. For if 
the fusion, F, of some simples arranged lump-wise is taken to be a lump of clay, then the 
same problem arises. For the fusion would survive even if its atoms were scattered to the 
furthest corners of the universe, but the lump of clay would not. So contrary to our initial 
suggestion, F is not actually a lump of clay, but something else entirely. And if fusions of 
simples arranged lump-wise are not lumps of clay, then what are lumps of clay? And, 
indeed, what on earth are these mysterious fusions?  
So the argument is in fact much more severe than the problem of the statue and the 
lump. It shows that if universalism is true, it cannot explain what ordinary composite objects 
are. They cannot be the ubiquitous mereological fusions that the universalist posits, since 
they have vastly different properties. So what are ordinary composite objects, if they are not 
mereological fusions, and moreover, what are these mysterious, indestructible fusions that 
allegedly populate our world?  
 
 
                                                 
118 For those not familiar with this problem, I will be going over it in more detail in the next chapter.  
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§3.2.5 A Response to the Identity Argument: Constitution 
There are a various ways in which one could respond to the identity argument. Whilst some 
of these responses are more successful than others, I think that all of them come at some sort 
of cost, as I shall presently show. 
 Firstly, one could endorse what has been called the constitution view.119 This view 
would employ a technical relation of constitution. Constitution is taken to be a particularly 
intimate relation that holds between spatially coincident objects. Crucially, however, 
although this relation is taken to be intimate, it is not taken to be identity. This view is often 
adopted in response to the problem of the statue and the lump, such that the statue and the 
lump are taken to be distinct (albeit spatially coincident) objects, and the latter constitutes 
the former.120 In response to the identity argument, then, the response would be that 
ordinary objects are constituted by mereological fusions, but are not identical to them.  
 This view would overcome the identity argument. The reason for this is that it would 
render a crucial premise in the argument false. The premise in question is that which states 
that Sycamore = F at t. According to the constitution view, Sycamore is not identical to F, at 
any time. Rather, F constitutes Sycamore at t, and no longer constitutes F at t’. This means 
that there is no problem of a single object having incompatible properties, because there are 
actually two distinct objects. One of those objects (F) can survive its parts being scattered far 
and wide, whereas the other (Sycamore) cannot.  
 I am not at all convinced by this response, for I think that it is problematic in many 
ways. First of all, there are all the traditional problems that go with the view, such as the fact 
that it entails the rather unsettling conclusion that two distinct material objects can be in the 
same place at the same time. In fact it entails the ubiquitous co-location of material objects.121 
But I think there are some much more damaging problems with the view than that. To draw 
these problems out, I want to pose a question about constitution that is closely analogous to 
the SCQ. I will call it the Special Constitution Question (SCNQ): 
                                                 
119 This term is taken from Wasserman (2004), 693 
120 For defences of this view see Wiggins (1968a); Doepke (1982; 1996); Thompson (1998); Simons (1987); among 
others.  
121 Interestingly, according to this view, the traditional problem of the statue and the lump would involve not two 
objects occupying the same place at the same time, but three: a mereological fusion of simples, a lump of clay, 
and a statue. But I imagine the constitution theorist would not be all that worried. After all, if two objects can 
happily be co-located, then why not three?  
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(SCNQ): For any mereological fusion, F, what are the jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions required for F to constitute another object, O. 
 
The precise way in which one answers this question will hinge significantly on the analysis 
one provides of the constitution relation itself. There have been a number of attempts to 
provide such an analysis, none of which are entirely without faults.122 However, what seems 
pretty clear is that, regardless of the specific analysis of constitution one gives, to give the 
constitution view as a response to the identity argument at all, one must accept that 
constitution is restricted. To see why, just consider our previous example. The constitution 
view gets around the problem by saying that at t, F constitutes Sycamore, but at t’, F doesn’t 
constitute Sycamore. Furthermore, it seems fair to say that at t’, when the parts of F are 
scattered far and wide, F doesn’t constitute anything at all.123 But that shows that 
constitution is restricted, since there are cases when constitution does occur and cases when 
it does not. Because the constitution view entails that constitution is restricted, I think that it 
suffers from many of the same problems that afflict restrictivism about composition. For 
instance, it will be difficult, I assume, to give any principled answer to the SCNQ that does 
not admit of any troublesome counter-examples. Most significantly, however, I think that 
restricted constitution, just like restricted composition, will feel the full force of the sorites.  
 To illustrate why this is so, let us revisit the vagueness game that was setup in the 
previous chapter. This time, involved in the game will be you, God, and our tree, Sycamore. 
When the game begins, God will take one of the many simples that compose F (which is the 
fusion that constitutes Sycamore) and place it in a far corner of the universe, millions of 
miles from where your game is taking place. After He does this, you ask Him: ‘does F 
constitute Sycamore?’, and God, playing the game in good spirit, will answer to the best of 
His omniscient ability. The game will continue, and after each question He answers, God 
will then take another simple from F and move it to a different location, that is also millions 
of miles from where you are. At the beginning of the game, F clearly constitutes Sycamore, 
so God’s answer to your first question will be ‘yes’. But if the game were to be played to its 
                                                 
122 See Wasserman (2004) for a good survey of some of the most significant attempts.  
123 At least I cannot see what on earth such a fusion would constitute. Certainly not a tree. 
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conclusion, then it is fair to say that F will not constitute Sycamore at the end, since the parts 
of F will be scattered in all corners of the universe. So the dilemma should be fairly clear. 
There must reach a stage in the game at which God’s answer to the question will change. It 
may simply change to ‘no’, which would indicate a sharp cut-off point between cases of 
constitution and non-constitution (or, perhaps, ‘nonstitution’). Or maybe his answer will 
change to something less definite, indicating that there is a phase of indeterminacy, during 
which it is a vague matter as to whether constitution occurs. But either way, the conclusion 
is clear: the difference of a single simple, a truly miniscule existent, can supposedly make the 
difference between there being a tree there or not. And just as it was in the restricted 
composition case, this conclusion is surely unacceptable. It is simply absurd to suggest that 
the displacement of a single simple, an object so small that 
3,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,00 of them can fit in a space the size of an average cat, 
could make any significant difference to the ontological status of a tree.124 It is for this reason, 
then, that the constitution response should be rejected. 
 
 
§3.2.6 Another Response to the Identity Argument: 4–Dimensionalism 
There is another, and much better, response to the identity argument than the constitution 
view.  The response is to endorse a particular view of how objects persist through time: four-
dimensionalism. Very roughly, four-dimensionalism is the view that material objects extend 
through time in very much the same way in which they extend through space. As such, in 
the same way that material objects are taken to have spatial parts at the different regions of 
space they occupy, they are also taken to have temporal parts for each of the different times at 
which they exist. On this view, then, material objects are not three-dimensional, as we may 
ordinarily think of them, but rather, four-dimensional hunks of matter.125  
 A consequence of four-dimensionalism is that objects are not wholly present at any 
particular moment of time. Rather, they merely have a temporal part that is wholly present 
at each moment of their existence. At first, this seems to clash a little with intuition. For as I 
                                                 
124 And this is only if one identifies simples with the fundamental particles of physics. One could take them to 
be even smaller, or even point-sized. In that case, each simple would be even less significant, and the argument 
even more forceful.  
125 The term ‘four-dimensional hunks of matter’ is taken from Heller (1990).  
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sit here writing these very words, it seems as though it is the whole of me that is so doing, not 
merely a part of me. But this clash with intuition is fairly superficial. To see why, consider an 
analogy. Take the river Thames. The source of this river is somewhere near Cirencester, in 
South Gloucestershire. From there it meanders its way eastwards until it finally reaches the 
North Sea near Southend. On its way it flows through numerous villages and towns. But, of 
course, the river is not wholly present in any of these places, but merely partly so. It would be 
plain wrong to insist that the whole river was present at, say, Sunbury-on-Thames. Similarly, 
claims the four-dimensionalist, it would be plain wrong to insist that the whole river is 
present at any particular time. Rather, only a part of the river is present. The whole river is 
the sum of all its parts, both spatial and temporal.  
 So how does Four-Dimensionalism overcome the argument? Interestingly, just like 
the constitution theorist, the four-dimensionalist will deny the premise which claims 
Sycamore = F at t. Instead, Sycamore and F are taken to be distinct, four-dimensional objects 
that merely share a temporal part. Specifically, they share the temporal part at which all the 
parts of F are arranged tree-wise. So according to this view, there are not two distinct objects 
located in the same place at the same time. Rather, at t, there is a single object present, which 
is a (temporal) part of two distinct objects, Sycamore and F. Ted Sider sums it up nicely: 
 
Whenever distinct material objects coincide, they are never at that time 
wholly present, but rather overlap in a shared temporal slice or segment. 
Coincident objects are therefore no more mysterious or objectionable than 
overlapping roads.126   
 
I concede that this response is enough to overcome the argument. But it comes at a cost. For 
what the argument shows is that if the universalist wants to hang on to the ordinary objects 
of common sense (and I am assuming that most universalists will), then she will also be 
forced into accepting some version of four-dimensionalism. This is not fatal to her thesis, of 
course, for four-dimensionalism is independently interesting in its own right. Indeed it is a 
thesis endorsed by a number of eminent philosophers.127 However, it is certainly 
controversial. The debate over how objects persist through time is one of the most hotly 
                                                 
126 Sider (2001), 152 
127 See, for instance, Heller (1990); Lewis (1986a), 218-220; Le Poidevin (1991); Sider (2001). And these are just a 
few from a much longer list.  
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contested in contemporary metaphysics, so for universalism to force one into a particular 
position regarding this debate must be viewed as a significant theoretical cost. If you are 
already sympathetic to four-dimensionalism, then this cost may not worry you a great deal. 
On the other hand, however, if you are inclined to disbelieve four-dimensionalism then you 
may see this argument as a reason to reject universalism outright. I will not go into the 
relative merits and demerits of four-dimensionalism here. That would be a different and 
lengthy project.128 I will simply conclude by saying that if any metaphysical view to forces 
one to take sides on an unrelated and controversial debate, then regardless of your 
predisposition towards the side it forces one towards,  it should be viewed as a cost of that 
metaphysical view. That universalism comes with such a cost is undeniable. 
 
 
§3.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
I hope to have made a strong case against universalism. I have shown that a number of the 
key arguments that are often presented in support of universalism are unconvincing. And in 
the absence of any supporting arguments, of course, there is little motivation for endorsing a 
theory. I then went on to present a number of arguments against universalism. As I said at 
the outset, I don’t envisage any of these arguments to be entirely conclusive when taken 
alone, but when taken together, they show that universalism comes replete with significant, 
and costly, baggage. Firstly, it is ontologically gratuitous. Secondly, it is seriously counter-
intuitive. Thirdly, it forces one to endorse a controversial metaphysical view concerning the 
persistence of objects through time. Overall, then, the case against universalism is a strong 
one. And I hope it to get even stronger in the next chapter, when I will present arguments in 
support of one of universalism’s rival views: compositional nihilism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
128 Although I should perhaps note that I do not endorse four-dimensionalism. One may not be surprised to 
learn that one as sceptical as I am about parts is even more sceptical about the possibility of temporal parts. 
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§4. Compositional Nihilism 
 
Having given a fair amount of consideration to both restrictivism and universalism, it is 
now time to consider the remaining candidate answer to the SCQ: nihilism. We can define it 
as follows: 
 
Nihilism: for any two or more xs, where the xs are material objects, there is never a 
further object which those xs compose. 
 
Perhaps more simply put, according to nihilism, there are no material composite objects at 
all; all material objects are mereologically simple.  
 I believe that nihilism is true. In this chapter I will try to explain why I think it is true 
by providing arguments in its favour, and in so doing, I also hope to convince you, the 
reader, that it is true. Some of these arguments will be somewhat negative, in that rather 
than presenting a positive case for nihilism, they will argue against its alternatives. Some 
arguments will be indirect, in that they will argue against arguments against nihilism. 
Others will be more straightforward; arguments that make a positive case for nihilism being 
true. But before I get to the arguments, I want to clarify, more precisely, what the thesis of 
nihilism is, and how it admits of different variants.  
 
 
§4.1. Varieties of Nihilism 
Nihilism is a very broad thesis; there are many different nihilisms. It states solely that 
material objects are mereologically simple. It says nothing more than that. But, of course, 
there is much more to a material object than its mereological structure. There are all sorts of 
other features that material objects may have, or may lack. And so it is that there are many 
different varieties of nihilism. All varieties of nihilism posit only material simples, but they 
can vary significantly as to what those simples they posit are like. Specifically, I want to 
draw a distinction between varieties of nihilism that vary in terms of the size of the simples 
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they posit. At one end of the spectrum, a nihilist could posit material simples that are 
minimally small, i.e. point-sized. I will call this view ‘Punctal Nihilism’. At the other end of 
the spectrum, a nihilist could posit a single simple that is maximally large, i.e. world-sized. I 
will call this view ‘Monistic Nihilism’ (or just ‘Monism’). In between these extremes there 
lies a whole host of possible varieties of nihilism, all of which that posit simples which are 
neither minimally small, nor maximally large. I will group all of these possible varieties 
under the heading of ‘Intermediate Nihilism’.129  
 As one can see, then, nihilistic views can vary significantly. The difference between 
punctal nihilism and monistic nihilism, for instance, is stark. For the former will posit, 
presumably, a simply astronomical number of simples, whereas the latter will posit only one 
– the world itself. And intermediate nihilism could range from a variety which posits a vast 
amount of relatively small simples, to one which posits just a handful of relatively large 
simples, or it could even posit simples of all manner of different shapes and sizes. These 
would all represent vastly different ontologies, yet they are all nihilistic. In the following 
chapter, and indeed in the remainder of the thesis, I will argue that it is monistic nihilism 
that should be endorsed, but that is for later. For now it will suffice that we merely recognise 
that there is such a diverse taxonomy of nihilisms to choose from. 
 
 
 
§4.2. The Argument from Elimination 
As I hopefully made clear in Chapter Two, restrictivism, universalism, and nihilism 
represent an exhaustive list of responses to the SCQ. Whatever answer you give to the SCQ, 
it must fall under one of these headings. When faced with a complete and exhaustive list of 
solutions to a problem, one always has the option of arriving at an answer to that problem 
through a process of elimination. If one knows that the list is exhaustive, and one can 
eliminate certain entries on that list, then one will also know that the correct answer must lie 
among those entries that remain. I think that if one follows this type of process when 
tackling the SCQ, one should arrive at the conclusion that nihilism is true. I have shown in 
                                                 
129 Schaffer (2007) identifies a similar triumvirate of varieties of nihilism, although the terminology he uses is 
different from mine.  
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the last two chapters that there are a number of reasons why both restrictivism and 
universalism are problematic; so problematic, in my view, that they should be rejected as 
false. If I am right about this, then we have a very simple, yet very persuasive argument for 
Compositional Nihilism; an argument from elimination:  
 
1. Either restrictivism, universalism, or nihilism is true. 
2. Restrictivism is false. 
3. Universalism is false. 
4. Therefore, nihilism is true. 
In my view, this is the strongest argument there is for nihilism. But that is because I have a 
very strong conviction in the truth of premises 2 and 3, and I think that nihilism is an 
independently plausible thesis. However, I anticipate that the reader may not be 
immediately convinced, and that is even if they agree with me that both restrictivism and 
universalism are, in many ways, problematic. The reason for this is that nihilism, too, is 
often seen to be problematic. And if the problems that face nihilism are seen to be equally 
troubling, or even more troubling, than those which face restrictivism and/or universalism, 
then the argument from elimination is unlikely to carry much weight. 
 Nihilism is commonly seen to be a problematic thesis. Many philosophers have 
rejected it out of hand as being not only false, but patently false.130 The main reason for this 
seems to be that nihilism denies the existence of many things which obviously do exist. It is 
simply obvious that there are composite objects, like cats and dogs and tables and chairs, and 
so on. But nihilism denies this, so it must be false, or so the common objection goes. 
Nihilism, on this view, clashes with evident fact; but the facts are facts, so it must be nihilism 
that is wrong. This, then, represents the first challenge for the nihilist. In order for her thesis 
to be even taken seriously, she needs to overcome this objection. In the proceeding section 
that is precisely what I shall do.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 See, for example, Rea (1998); Markosian (1998b); Schaffer (2009), 358.  
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§4.3. Defeating the Common Sense Objection 
If nihilism is true, then there are no composite objects, there are only mereological simples. 
But there are composite objects! There are cats, dogs, trees and rocks; there are mats, logs, 
bees and socks. The world is populated by ordinary objects like this, yet they are all 
composite – they all have parts. Because of this, it is often said, nihilism is clearly false. We 
have already encountered this kind of objection from Markosian, who considered it a “fatal 
flaw” in nihilism. But the view is shared by many eminent thinkers, and is perhaps best 
summed up by Michael Rea: “It is just obvious that there are tables, chairs, computers and 
cars. The fact that some philosophical arguments suggest otherwise seems simply an 
indication that something has gone wrong with those arguments”.131 Nihilism, on this view, 
clashes with evident fact; but the facts are facts, so it must be nihilism that is wrong. 
 If I am honest, the level of credence that this view is often given never ceases to 
amaze me. For it is so uncritical; so uncharitable; so naive. Such a view blankly fails to see 
exactly what it is that the nihilist is proposing. As I said in chapter 2, just because nihilism 
denies that there are composite objects, like chairs, for instance, this does not entail that we 
have nowhere to sit down! If it did entail that then it would be absurd, and the common sense 
view set out above would be perfectly reasonable. But, of course, this is not what the nihilist 
claims. The nihilist agrees with the objector that there is plenty of matter in the world; she 
merely insists that there is no compositional structure to that matter. Certain consequences 
of nihilism, when stated bluntly, such as “there are no chairs”, certainly seem a little peculiar, 
but they seem a whole lot less peculiar once one goes beyond their mere surface appearance 
and begins to see exactly what this thesis is that the nihilist is proposing.  
 To make the point more clearly, consider an analogy. A significant dispute in 
contemporary metaphysics concerns the existence of mathematical objects. Very roughly, 
some say they exist (we’ll call them ‘Platonists’) and others say they don’t (we’ll call them 
‘Nominalists’). So according to the Nominalist, there is no such thing as the number three. 
But imagine the naivety of a Platonist who claimed, “But I have three children! And I am 
more than three feet tall! And I had three Weetabix for breakfast! So your view is obviously 
false”. This objection fails to get to the heart of the matter. It is to conceive of the debate far 
                                                 
131 Rea (1998), 348 
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too simplistically. For even if the Nominalist’s view is correct, then she will still be able to 
have her Weetabix in the morning; she will still be the same height; she will still be able to 
count! Her view does not entail that she is unable to recognise, or quantify, different 
amounts of things. If it did, then it would be an absurd view, and the Platonist’s objection 
would be perfectly valid. But it doesn’t, and for her opponent not to recognise this is to be 
unreasonably obtuse. Of course, the nominalist must have some kind of way of making 
sense of statements that seem to refer to numbers, in a way that does not involve the actual 
existence of numbers, but there are ways of doing that.132 In fact, we all do that kind of thing, 
in all sorts of circumstances, very often. When the weather forecaster tells you that the sun 
will rise at 5.46am tomorrow morning, you don’t brand him a fool. You can make perfect 
sense of what he says, despite the fact that you know that the sun, in reality, will not rise at 
all.133 
  In fact, the ‘rising’ sun example serves to illustrate the problem nicely. Suppose you 
were transported back to a time at which science had not uncovered any of the true facts 
about planetary motion. For the people at that time, it was taken to be the case that the Earth 
beneath them was fixed and stationary, and that the sun moved around them through the 
sky.134 As far as they were concerned, the sun did, quite literally, rise each morning and set 
each evening. Now suppose that you were to baldly assert to these people, “the sun does not 
rise”. They would not believe you. And rightly so; they would have no reason to believe 
you, for what you said was so clearly at odds with the facts. Just wait until morning, they 
would say, and you will see it rise. But then suppose that you were to explain to them some 
rudimentary facts about the orbits of the planets around the sun, and the rotation of the 
Earth upon its axis. You could give them a perfectly good explanation of why it seems like 
the sun rises, even though it does not rise. Your initial assertion, when coupled with this 
explanation, no longer seems so contrary to the facts. In fact, it is perfectly compatible with 
the facts. For if what you said was true, then the experience of seeing the sun ‘rise’ would 
remain exactly the same. Now here is the point. Whether these ancient people would be 
                                                 
132 Field (1980) provides what is probably the most well-known attempt to do just that. He claims to show how 
one can make sense of modern physics without positing mathematical objects.   
133 That is, the sun doesn’t literally rise. It remains stationary whilst the rotation of the Earth makes it look as 
though it rises from the perspective of Earth-bound observers.  
134 I am presuming that there was a time when this was the case. But even if people did not think this, at any time, 
it really doesn’t matter, just imagine that there was such a time, and there were such a people.  
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convinced by your explanation is up for debate. But what is clear is that if these people were 
at all rational, then they could not simply and flatly deny your assertion in the same way 
that they did before. They could not simply say, “you’re wrong; wait until morning, and 
you’ll see the sun rise”. That would be an objectionably obtuse response, since as your 
explanation made clear, your story about the sun being stationary is equally as compatible 
with the facts as their story about the sun rising. Their initial objection (of course the sun 
rises!) has lost all of its bite, and it would be unreasonable for them to keep faith in it.  
 I think that the common sense objection to nihilism is almost perfectly analogous to 
the rising sun objection (i.e. the objection “of course the sun rises, I saw it rise this 
morning!”). If a nihilist were to flatly assert, “there are no composite objects: no chairs, no 
tables, no cats or dogs”, and simply leave it at that, then one should expect, and accept, the 
common sense response: “you’re wrong! There is a cat, and there is a chair”, and so on. But if 
the nihilist were to give some coherent explanation of why it seems like there is a chair and a 
cat, when in fact there are no such things, then the common sense objection just won’t do. 
One doesn’t have to accept that the nihilist’s explanation is true, of course, but one does have 
to accept that since their explanation is compatible with experience, it is no longer a 
reasonable objection to simply say, “you’re wrong! There is a cat!” To continue with such an 
objection would be unreasonably obtuse, in the very same way that it would be overly 
obtuse to insist that the sun does rise, in light of a satisfactory explanation of planetary 
motion. Crucially, I think that the nihilist can provide such an explanation, as I shall shortly 
show. Because of this, the common sense objection should be forgotten. It no longer poses 
any threat to the nihilist. 
 The most well-known explanation that the nihilist could give would be that provided 
by van Inwagen.135 The idea is that whilst there are no composite objects, like chairs, tables, 
cats and dogs, there are simples, and those simples are arranged in particular ways (to use 
van Inwagen’s terminology, they can be arranged chair-wise, table-wise, cat-wise and dog-
wise, and so on). The reason why this explanation works is because simples arranged x-wise 
would surely be sufficient to account for the appearance of there being an x. Suppose that 
you accept that macroscopic objects are made up of microscopic atoms. Therefore, you 
                                                 
135 Van Inwagen (1990), 109. Of course, van Inwagen is not a nihilist, but he does reject the existence of most 
ordinary composites, which is why he needed to come up with the explanation. 
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would accept that a chair, for instance, is made up of lots of tiny atoms arranged in a 
particular way. But the nihilist, on this view at least, allows that there are those atoms, and 
allows that they can be arranged in that particular way. She simply denies that they compose 
a chair. Now suppose that the nihilist is right, and that those atoms exist, and they are 
arranged in that precise way, yet they do not compose a chair. It would surely still seem as 
though there was a chair in front of you, would it not? The atoms are surely sufficient to 
give the appearance of a chair, even if they don’t in fact compose a chair? It seems very difficult 
to find any reason to suppose otherwise. But if this is right, then the nihilist’s explanation 
should be taken seriously at the very least. For in light of this explanation, it should no 
longer seem absurd that the nihilist denies there is a chair, for she admits that there are 
atoms arranged chair-wise. Denying the existence of the chair is, as Ted Sider says, “no more 
absurd than denying holes exist in addition to perforated donuts, or denying that smirks 
exist in addition to smirking faces”.136  
 This nihilistic explanation has enjoyed a certain degree of success in recent years.137 
But it is important to note that if one endorses it, then it forces one to accept a particular 
variety of nihilism (or, more precisely, it forces one to rule out certain varieties of nihilism). 
If, for example, the appearance of a chair is to be explained in terms of there being simples 
arranged chair-wise, then that entails that there must be a plurality of simples. So this type of 
explanation is not available to the monistic nihilist, since she posits only a single simple – the 
world itself. Moreover, this explanation entails that the simples arranged chair-wise must be 
fairly small. At least, they must be smaller than the alleged chair which they are taken to be 
arranged like. (At least, I think this must be the case. For I don’t see how a number of objects, 
the xs, could be arranged y-wise, if each of the xs was bigger than y. I will simply assume 
that would be impossible). So this van Inwagen style explanation forces the nihilist into 
accepting a fairly specific variant of nihilism: one which posits a plurality of small simples.  
 But what about other varieties of nihilism? What about varieties that posit a small 
number of very large simples? What explanation can they provide to account for the 
                                                 
136 Sider (forthcoming), 2 
137 The vast majority of philosophers who endorse nihilism in print, also endorse this explanation for the 
appearance of composite objects. For instance, see Sider (forthcoming); Dorr (2005); Cameron (2008a; 2010b). 
Even those who argue against nihilism seem to accept that it is an explanatory strategy that should at least be 
taken seriously. See for instance, van Cleve (2008), 330; Schaffer (2007), 176. However, see Uzquiano (2004) for 
reasons to object.  
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appearance of composite objects? For ease of exposition, I will focus purely on monism in 
what follows, but I think that the monistic explanation will carry over to any variant of 
nihilism which posits very large simples. Very roughly, I think that the monist can explain 
the appearance of composite objects (chairs and tables and so on) through an appeal to ways 
the world is. But this is very rough, so let me try to explain a little more precisely.  
 If monism is true, then the world is a single giant simple. It is a maximally large 
lump of matter that has no proper parts. But it seems like it has parts. For it seems like there 
are cats and dogs and chairs and tables, and so on, and that these are parts of the world. So the 
monist has to be able to explain these appearances. In later chapters I will go into a lot more 
detail about how, precisely, the monist should do this. But for now it should suffice to give a 
brief summary. Firstly, if you take monism to be a serious possibility, then it follows that 
you also take it to be a serious possibility that spatially extended, yet mereologically simple 
objects can exhibit qualitative variation. For if monism is true, then the world is a spatially 
extended simple, and the world clearly exhibits qualitative variation. But if you accept this, 
then it should be fairly easy to see how a monistic world could give rise to the appearance of 
its having parts. To illustrate, consider an extended simple that looks like the object depicted 
in fig. 1. 
   
 
Fig. 1 
.  
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If you were to come across an object like this, it would be quite natural for you to think that 
it had parts. If you were to describe it to someone, for instance, you may say something like, 
“it is grey, and it has red spots”. This description would seem to imply that it has parts 
which are grey, and parts which are red. But it doesn’t. By stipulation, it is a mereologically 
simple object, with no parts whatsoever. However, the way that object is, or perhaps more 
precisely, the properties or features that it exhibits, give rise to the appearance that it does 
have parts. The object, as a whole, exhibits certain qualities which make it such that it is 
perfectly reasonable for us to presume that it is made of parts, despite the fact that it is not 
made of parts. You may say that it has a certain colour variation property, for instance. Or you 
may simply say it has the property of being spotty. But what we call these qualities is not 
really that important. What is important is that an extended simple object can exhibit 
properties that make it seem as though it has parts when it does not.  
If you accept that this explanation is possible, then there seems no reason why the 
same explanation could not be applied on the grandest of scales – to the world itself.138 Thus 
the world, on this view, would be a giant extended simple that exhibits certain properties 
which give rise to the appearance that it has parts, when in reality it does not. Thus where 
you think you see a chair, for instance, you do not, but the world does instantiate properties 
that suffice to account for the appearance of a chair. You might say that the world is chair-ish 
at that particular location, for example. Or you might say that whilst there is no chair, there 
is a chair-like thickening in the world-substance, or something like that. But however you 
choose to describe it, the important fact is that the world’s exhibiting these particular 
properties is sufficient to account for the appearance of a chair (and of course, for all manner 
of sub-world objects that it may seem like one perceives). And thus once again, in light of 
this explanation, it is no longer justified for the objector to bang his fist and say “but there is a 
chair”. Such an objection is obtuse. Of course, it could be a chair. But as has just been shown, 
it could also be some simples arranged chair-wise, or, indeed, it could be a chair-like 
thickening in the world-substance. Because of this, then, the common sense objection has no 
                                                 
138 I envisage that certain readers will not agree that such an explanation is possible. For there is a fairly 
widespread opposition to the claim that extended simples are possible at all, let alone ones that exhibit 
qualitative variation. For these sceptical readers, I would simply ask you to withhold your incredulity for the 
time being. I will provide independent arguments for the possibility of extended simples in chapter 6, and I will 
go into greater detail about the properties required for such objects to exhibit qualitative variation in chapters 6 
and 7.  
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force. In light of there being alternative, and coherent, nihilist explanations for the appearance 
of composite objects, the common sense objector can no longer flatly assert that nihilism is at 
odds with the evident facts. Quite simply, it is not.  
 
 
§4.4. Who Needs Composite Objects Anyway? 
According to the standard scientific picture, the world is one of many layers. The 
macroscopic objects that we interact with from day to day are actually made up of much 
smaller parts: microscopic particles so small as to be far beyond the perceptual range of the 
naked eye. Moreover, according to this picture, accurate and complete explanations of 
phenomena at the macroscopic level can be given solely in terms of these microphysical 
particles and their interactions. To illustrate, consider that philosophers’ favourite example 
of a macroscopic event: one billiard ball striking another. When describing such an event, we 
may commonly say things such as “the first billiard ball caused the second to move” or “the 
impact of the first ball with the second caused the ‘click’ sound”. But these are not entirely 
perspicuous descriptions. An accurate scientific description of this event would make no 
reference to macroscopic objects like billiard balls. Rather, it would be framed in terms of a 
certain number of microscopic particles, exemplifying certain physical properties, 
interacting with a certain number of other microscopic particles, or something along those 
lines.139 More generally, if we can explain, precisely, the activity and interaction of the 
particles, then we have explained all there is to explain. Moreover, we can even explain 
one’s experience of the event, without once having to appeal to macroscopic objects like 
billiard balls. Such an explanation would consist of a story about how photons of light 
interact with the particles, and then reflect back into your range of vision, or something 
along those lines. 
 If this is right, then the full causal story behind all events at the macroscopic level does 
not involve any macroscopic objects. But this invites a question: what role, precisely, are 
macroscopic objects supposed to play in the evolution of the physical world? If the 
microphysical particles do all the work on their own, so to speak, then why should we 
                                                 
139 It is likely to be a lot more complex that this, of course. But the central import should be clear: whatever the 
precise scientific explanation is, it will not involve any macroscopic objects like billiard balls. 
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suppose that there are any macrophysical objects that they compose at all? What would the 
point of such objects be? Let me put that another way. Consider the billiard balls again. Let’s 
call the event of one of them striking the other, E. If, as the scientific picture supposes, the 
full causal story behind E, including your perceptual experience of E, is explainable entirely 
in terms of the activity of microphysical particles, then it is surely fair to assume that E 
would be exactly the same, as would your perceptual experience of E, whether or not the 
particles involved did compose macroscopic objects, like billiard balls, or not. For if they did 
not compose billiard balls, then E and your experience of E, would be just the same, since, ex 
hypothesi, the particles alone are all that are needed to explain E and your experience of it. 
And if they did compose billiard balls, then those balls would not change, in any way, E or 
your experience of E, for if they did, then we would have been wrong to say that the full 
story could be told in terms of the particles alone.  
 This suggests that ordinary composite objects, if indeed there are any such things, are 
not quite as ordinary as we may have thought. For if the above reasoning is right, it looks as 
though composite objects have no causal powers; they have no causal impact on the physical 
world whatsoever. They are, to use the technical jargon, epiphenomena. In the next section I 
will talk at greater length about the severe problems that arise if one views composite objects 
to be epiphenomena, but for now I just want to question the motivation for positing such 
things in the first place. For if ordinary composite objects have no causal impact on us at all, 
and if events and appearances can be explained perfectly well in terms of only 
microphysical particles, then why should we bother positing such objects at all? There just 
doesn’t seem to be any good reason why we should. Cian Dorr effectively summarises this 
view: 
 
If all the plates in my kitchen dresser were to cease to exist, but all the 
molecules in my dresser were to stay arranged exactly as they are, I 
wouldn’t care very much. My guests would have no new reason to worry 
about their food getting all over the tablecloth. In fact, they would never 
know unless I told them – but come to think of it, I would never know 
either.140 
 
                                                 
140 Dorr (2002), 42-3 
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Once this is recognised, it really seems quite straightforward. There is just no need to posit 
the particles and the billiard balls. Or more generally, there is no need to posit parts and 
wholes. Since the activity and interaction of microphysical particles is enough to adequately 
explain all macrophysical phenomena, it would be nothing short of gratuitous to posit 
epiphenomenal macroscopic objects as well.  
 These thoughts form the beginnings of what are generally known as ‘causal 
redundancy arguments’, and variations of them have been advanced by a number of 
thinkers over recent years.141 Even in a mere rough outline, as I have sketched above, I think 
these types of arguments very powerful. In the next section, however, I will follow Trenton 
Merricks, and show how appeals to causal redundancy, and causal overdetermination, can 
be used to create a fatal argument against the existence of composite objects.  
 
 
 
§4.5. The Causal Overdetermination Argument 
In most instances, causal redundancy arguments have been used to show merely that there is 
no need to posit composite objects.142 But in his 2001 book Objects and Persons, Trenton 
Merricks, uses a similar style of argument to argue for a much stronger conclusion: that there 
can’t be any composite objects.143  Merricks’s argument represents one of the most persuasive 
reasons to endorse nihilism. I will set out the argument below. Whilst I will stick fairly 
closely to Merricks’s original formulation of the argument, I will alter it somewhat. This is 
for increased clarity and will, I hope, make the argument even more compelling. To begin, 
consider a standard causal event: a baseball hitting a window and causing it to smash. Now 
let me set out the argument. 
 
 
                                                 
141 See Dorr (2002), 41-45; Schaffer (2007), 176-178; van Inwagen (1990), 122; Merricks (2001), 56. This style of 
argument is much more well-known within the philosophy of mind to make the case for physicalism, by arguing 
that non-physical mental states, if there were any such things, would be causally redundant. 
142 E.g. Dorr (2002), van Inwagen (1990) 
143 Merricks (2001), 56. This is not strictly true. Merricks actually endorses a similar view to that of van Inwagen, 
such that there are some composite objects, namely, those which are not causally redundant. Among the 
composite objects he admits are human beings. However, he eschews the existence of the vast majority of 
composite objects, and his argument could be extended to argue for full-blooded nihilism. 
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The Causal Overdetermination Argument (COA): 
 
1. The baseball – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms144, 
acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window.  
2. The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. 
3. The shattering of the window is not causally overdetermined.  
4. Therefore, if the baseball exists, it does not cause the shattering of the window.145  
5. Therefore, if the baseball exists, it is causally inert; it has no causal powers.  
 
So far, Merricks’s argument looks pretty much the same, albeit a little more formally 
structured, as the argument considered in the previous section. For it leads to the same 
conclusion that if there were any composite macroscopic objects, like baseballs, then they 
would be causally inert; they would be mere epiphenomena. And that is because all the 
causal powers we normally ascribe to (alleged) composite objects, like baseballs, are in fact 
sufficiently accounted for by those objects’ constituent atoms acting in concert.  
But it is at this point that Merricks begins to turn the screw. For he claims that if one 
accepts that inanimate, composite objects have no causal powers, then one cannot accept 
that such objects even exist, on pain of inconsistency. For if baseballs (and other inanimate, 
composite objects) did exist, then they would have causal powers – or so Merricks insists. I.e. 
they would cause windows to shatter; they would cause visual, tactile sensations; etc. Thus if 
one accepts that baseballs exist, and one accepts the overdetermination argument, one must 
also accept the contradictory position that baseballs (and other inanimate, composite objects) 
simultaneously do have causal powers and don’t have causal powers. Since that is clearly 
absurd, we must conclude that baseballs et al do not exist. So we have an extra premise or 
two now being added to the argument. Let me make those premises a little more explicit: 
 
6. If baseballs (and by extension, any inanimate composite objects) did exist, they 
would have causal powers (i.e. they would cause windows to smash, etc.). 
                                                 
144 It should be noted that we are not talking about the atoms of modern physics here, but rather, mereologically 
simple minima, whatever they may be. 
145 Merricks (2001), 56 
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7. Therefore, from 5 and 6, it follows that if there were composite objects like 
baseballs, they would have to be, simultaneously, causally inert and causally 
efficacious.  
8. Nothing can be causally inert and causally efficacious. 
9. Therefore, there can be no baseballs (and by extension, there can be no inanimate 
composite objects) 
 
So this is Merricks’s argument in full. The argument is valid, but as is normally the case, a 
number of the premises require some independent support in order for it to be convincing. 
Firstly, one may well have noticed that there are two key terms involved in the argument 
which are in need of clarification. The first is ‘causal irrelevance’, and the second is 
‘overdetermination’. Let me explain, in a little more detail, what Merricks takes these terms 
to mean. The general notion of causal irrelevance should be fairly obvious and easy to grasp – 
in certain instances at least. My having sausages for breakfast, for example, is clearly 
causally irrelevant to whether it rains in the afternoon. It may not be so obvious, however, 
that an (alleged) entity is causally irrelevant to the actions/effects of its constituent parts 
acting in concert. Merricks attempts to clarify the issue, and defines causal irrelevance in the 
following way. An object, O, is causally irrelevant to whether some xs cause an effect, E, if 
and only if, none of the following four criteria are met: 
 
A) O is one of the xs. 
B) O is a partial cause of E alongside the xs. 
C) One or more of the xs causes O to cause E. 
D) O causes one or more of the xs to cause E.146 
 
Merricks then introduces the following general rule: 
 
Causal Principle. Suppose: O is an object. The xs are objects. O is causally irrelevant 
to whether the xs, acting in concert, cause a certain effect, E. The xs, acting in 
                                                 
146 Merricks (2001), 57 
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concert, do cause E, and E is not overdetermined. It therefore follows that O does 
not cause E.147  
 
It is on the basis of this causal principle that Merricks draws his conclusion, 4, from the 
premises 1 – 3. There are possible concerns one could have with Merricks’ causal principle, 
and his notion of causal irrelevance, but they are at least prima facie plausible, so for the time 
being I shall grant them as true.148 
 Secondly, we have the notion of ‘causal overdetermination’. Merricks claims that 
overdetermination should be understood in “the most literal, straightforward, and natural 
sense possible”.149 By this, then, we can take it that an event, E, is overdetermined if it has 
two (or more) distinct and independent causes, each of which would have been quite 
sufficient on its own to cause E. This is not to say, of course, that all events with more than 
one cause are overdetermined. In many cases more than one cause is required for an event 
to occur (e.g. the depression of the accelerator pedal and the spark of the sparkplug are both 
causes of the car’s moving), but in most cases, all the causes are necessary for the resulting 
effect to occur, even though they may not be individually sufficient (e.g. neither the 
sparkplug nor the depression of the accelerator pedal alone are sufficient to cause the car to 
move, but both are necessary). Overdetermination only occurs when there are multiple, 
individually sufficient, causes for an event. It is widely agreed that causal overdetermination 
is objectionable.150 That is to say, it is widely agreed that we shouldn’t posit entities or events 
that would imply, or result in, causal overdetermination unless absolutely necessary. 
Merricks shares this distaste for causal overdetermination. Indeed, it is a crucial step in his 
argument. For if one were happy to accept that there was widespread causal 
overdetermination, then the argument would simply not go through. Rather, one could 
accept that there are composite objects and their parts, and that the causal effects of both are 
systematically overdetermined. I share with Merricks the view that causal 
overdetermination is highly objectionable, particularly when on such a widespread and 
                                                 
147 Merricks (2001), 58 
148 In particular, see Thomasson (2006) for arguments to the contrary. I will address Thomasson’s responses 
below, in §4.6.  
149 Merricks (2001), 58 
150 Aside from Merricks, see Bunzl (1979); Loeb (1974); Kim (1993). 
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ubiquitous scale as is being suggested here. Thus I accept premise 3 of the argument as 
true.151  
 The final premise that requires some independent support is premise 6: the claim 
that baseballs, if they did exist, would have causal powers. This claim is most plausible, to the 
extent that I don’t see how one could reasonably reject it. Firstly, it has the weight of 
common sense on its side. After all, people talk as if composite objects have causal effects all 
the time. It’s common to hear things said such as “the dog knocked over the vase”, or “the 
bomb caused utter devastation”. These types of statements are clearly describing causal 
events. But if there were composite objects, like dogs and bombs, to which these utterances 
refer, then surely it would make sense to suppose that they did have the causal powers that 
are so often ascribed to them. Moreover, if a baseball, for instance, were to exist yet not have 
causal powers, it would not be able to cause light to deflect into one’s eyes, thus essentially, 
one would not be able to see it. But it would surely be absurd to suggest that in addition to 
the particles, there was a baseball which they compose, but that you couldn’t see the 
baseball, but only the particles!  
 But there is a much stronger reason to believe that 6 is true, and that reason is 
scientific. Firstly, if there were composite objects like baseballs, dogs, and bombs, then they 
surely must be physical objects. They would have physical properties after all, like shape, 
size, mass, and location. So I don’t see how anyone could possibly say that they were not 
physical objects. But if they are physical objects, then they must be subject to the laws of 
physics. That is, they must be capable of being acted upon by external forces, and likewise, 
they must act upon other objects. If x is a physical object, then it is always in principle 
possible to exert a force upon x, but Newton told us that for each and every action there is an 
equal and opposite reaction, so if we can, even in principle, exert a force upon x, then x must 
be able to exert a force back. But to exert a force is to interact causally. Causally inert objects 
cannot exert forces on physical objects. So it seems that composite objects, if they were to 
exist, could not possibly be causally inert. Premise 6, then, is true.  
 To conclude, therefore, Merricks’s COA represents a truly compelling case for 
nihilism, for it highlights some seemingly insurmountable problems with composite objects. 
                                                 
151 There have been attempts to claim that overdetermination is nothing to worry about. See Sider (2003) and 
Thomasson (2006). I will address, and reject, these claims in §4.8.  
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It just does not seem possible that a physical, composite object could be entirely causally 
inert. Yet if the first stage of the COA is right (and I hope to have shown that it is), then 
composite objects, were they to exist, must be causally inert. This is a worrying contradiction, 
and it is one that has to be dealt with by the believer in composite objects. For the nihilist, by 
contrast, the contradiction never arises, and that is why the COA represents such a strong 
case to believe that nihilism is true.  
 
 
§4.6. Potential Responses to COA 
 
§4.6.1 Presupposition Failure 
Amie Thomasson has argued that whilst Merrick’s overdetermination argument may be 
valid, it is not sound.152 Thomasson targets premise 3 of COA, which claims that the 
shattering of the window is not overdetermined, and suggests that there are good reasons to 
believe it is not true. Very roughly, she claims that the third premise involves a particular 
kind of presupposition failure that is significant enough to alter its truth-value. In what 
follows I will show how Thomasson reaches this conclusion, and also show why I think her 
conclusion should be resisted.  
 Thomasson agrees that premise 3 looks very plausible. The reason for this, she claims, 
is that if we were to admit that the shattering of the window was overdetermined, then we 
would have to accept the truth of the following conjunctive statement: 
 
(1) The atoms caused the window to shatter and the baseball caused the window to shatter. 
 
Thomasson claims that (1) just immediately strikes us as objectionable, and she admits that 
there is something “clearly amiss” with it.153 Moreover, she claims that it is our disinclination 
to accept (1) that inclines us to accept premise 3. However, and this is where her argument 
                                                 
152 Thomasson (2006). Later in the same paper, she actually goes on to suggest that it is not valid either. I will 
consider her reasons for this in the next section.  
153 Thomasson (2006), 344 
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springs into life, it is not because (1) is false that we are disinclined to accept it, she insists, 
but rather, it is because it conjoins items together in a list in a wholly inappropriate way.  
 Thomasson claims that when one conjoins items in a list with the term ‘and’, one 
presupposes that the items one is conjoining are “separate and independent entities”. This is 
why, we are told, some of Gilbert Ryle’s famous examples of category mistakes (such as ‘she 
bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove, and a pair of gloves’) strike us as strange, or 
even absurd.154 The reason why they seem strange, she claims, is that the presupposition of 
separateness and independence is violated. The pair of gloves is not a separate and 
independent entity from each of the gloves it consists of, and this is why it seems strange to 
say that you bought two gloves and a pair of gloves. The same is the case, it is supposed, 
with the baseball and its constituent atoms. They are not independent and separate entities, 
thus conjoining them in a list of causes can create strange, counter-intuitive, or even absurd, 
results.  
 Drawing on previous work on presupposition failure, by the likes of Strawson, Grice, 
and Stalnaker, Thomasson suggests that cases of presupposition failure like this can have a 
significant impact on the truth-value of the statements in which the presupposition has 
failed. Strawson, for instance, claimed that statements involving presupposition failure 
lacked a truth-value altogether.155 Grice has claimed that statements involving 
presupposition failure could actually be true, yet merely misleading.156 Thomasson points 
out that if either of these two views are right, then they will have a significant impact on the 
causal overdetermination argument. Recall, if you will, the key statement that is the object of 
our current concern: 
 
(1) The atoms caused the window to shatter and the baseball caused the window to shatter. 
 
Now it is the perceived falsity of this statement that is responsible for our inclination to 
accept premise 3 of COA. But say Strawson’s analysis of statements involving 
presupposition failure is correct. In that case, (1) would not be false, but rather, would lack a 
truth-value. Moreover, its negation would also lack a truth-value, since its negation would 
                                                 
154 Ryle (1949), 16-42 
155 Strawson (1950). Frege (1892) originally put forward this view.  
156 Grice (1989), 5-21 
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also involve the same presupposition failure. But if that were the case, then it looks like 
premise 3 would also lack a truth-value, in which case, COA would be rendered unsound. 
Likewise, if we took the Gricean view that statements involving presupposition were 
capable of being true, yet merely misleading, we would get a similar result. For if (1) were 
taken to be true, then even if it were misleading, it seems that premise 3 must be false. For if 
the shattering of the window was caused by the baseball and the atoms, then it surely was 
overdetermined, which would directly contradict premise 3. It is for these reasons that 
Thomasson suggests that COA may actually be unsound, since the truth of premise 3 is in 
doubt.157 
 I think there are a number of reasons why one might want to resist Thomasson’s 
argument. Firstly, I am not entirely convinced that when conjoining items in a list one does 
actually presuppose what Thomasson claims one does. She claims that when one conjoins 
items in a list, it is presupposed that those items are “separate and independent”.158 Let’s 
consider these terms one by one. I think it is fair to say that items on a list are commonly 
presupposed to be separate. And by separate I can only presume that Thomasson means 
distinct. For one cannot make a list of just one item. And if one has a list of multiple items, 
but those items are not distinct, then that is not a list either, but merely a repetition of one 
and the same thing. For example, it would be quite misleading, in fact it would surely be 
quite wrong, if you were to tell someone that you had just bought a new item of clothing and 
a mackintosh and an anorak, if in fact you had simply bought a new coat. So I am willing to 
accept that it is presupposed that conjoined items on a list are separate, i.e. distinct. But, of 
course, the baseball and the atoms are separate items. They are quite distinct – they have 
different properties.159 So no presupposition has failed there.  
 The other feature that Thomasson claims is presupposed is independence. Now it is 
not immediately clear to me, or at least, it is certainly not obvious, that we do in fact 
                                                 
157 It is perhaps quite revealing to note that Thomasson does not make any mention at all of what is maybe the 
most well-known analysis of statements involving presupposition failure – that of Bertrand Russell. Russell 
(1905) claimed that statements involving presupposition failure should normally be considered false. This 
analysis, of course, would not give Thomasson the result she requires – quite the opposite, in fact – as it would 
mean that (1) is indeed false. I won’t push this line of response, however, since I don’t think the falsity of (1) has 
anything to do with presupposition failure. Rather, I think it is false simply because things are not as it claims 
them to be.  
158 Thomasson (2006), 344 
159 Unless, of course, you endorse the thesis that Composition is Identity. However, that is a most controversial 
thesis, and I am pretty sure that Thomasson does not want to rely on its truth in order for her argument to go 
through.  
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presuppose that items on a list should be independent. In fact, the first thing to note is that it 
is not immediately clear what ‘independent’ is actually meant to mean. For there are lots of 
different ways in which one thing can depend upon another. A child can depend on her 
parents for instance; the course of action one chooses may depend on the circumstances; the 
colour that an object appears can depend on the lighting conditions; and so on. But I don’t 
think that Thomasson intends the word ‘independent’ to be taken in any of these contexts. I 
can only presume that she has some kind of existential dependence in mind. Specifically, the 
kind of dependence such that, if x depends on y, then x could not exist unless y exists, or 
something along those lines. For it is reasonable to suppose that this kind of dependence 
holds between baseballs and their constituent atoms, or indeed, between any whole and its 
parts. For if there was a baseball composed of atoms, then surely that baseball could not 
exist unless those composing atoms also exist. I.e. if you take away the atoms, you take away 
the baseball too. 
 The question is: is it really that obvious that we do presuppose that items on a 
conjoined list must not stand in the relation of existential dependence just described? I’m 
really not sure that it is. Firstly, it seems a bit of a stretch of the imagination to suppose that 
we regularly make presuppositions of quite technical dependence relations obtaining when 
we engage in the simple task of providing a list. Secondly, there are surely instances where it 
seems perfectly reasonable to conjoin items in a list that are existentially dependent in the 
way described, and moreover, that do stand in the relation of part and whole. If someone 
were to tell you that there were three trees in the field and thousands of leaves, for example, 
that doesn’t sound in the least bit peculiar or misleading, yet the leaves are surely parts of 
the trees, and they surely couldn’t have existed without the trees. Of course, one can just as 
easily come up with examples that do sound peculiar (e.g. “what an astounding catch! Not 
only did he catch the baseball, but he caught the atoms arranged baseball-wise as well!”), 
but I am merely trying to impress two important points: one is that it is not obvious that we 
do actually presuppose the things Thomasson claims we do, and the second is that even if 
we do make such presuppositions, it is not always clear that they fail in such a way as to 
make the statement misleading at all.  
 There is a more compelling reason to be suspicious of Thomasson’s argument, 
however. It is that the type of presupposition failure she highlights is very different to the 
99 | P a g e  
 
type of presupposition failure that was the concern of the likes of Strawson et al. Strawson, 
like Frege before him, was concerned specifically with existential presupposition failure. This 
occurs when a statement presupposes that something exists, when in fact it does not. More 
often than not, these types of statement take the form “the a is F”, where there is actually no 
referent of a. My concern is that this is a much more significant type of presupposition 
failure than that which is the concern of Thomasson, and as such, it may not be legitimate to 
suppose that any conclusions one draws about the former will automatically apply to the 
latter. The most famous example of a statement involving existential presupposition failure 
must be: 
 
(2) The present King of France is bald.  
 
Since it is the case that there is no present King of France, what are we to make of this 
statement? Is it true or False? This is where philosophers have been divided. Some think that 
the sentence is not apt for truth, and thus is neither true nor false.160 Others think that it is 
plain false.161 (I am unaware of anyone who believes sentences like (2) to be true). I am not 
overly concerned, at this juncture at least, to establish which of these views, if any, is correct. 
What I do want to emphasise, however, is what I see as a stark disanalogy between a 
sentence like (2) and a sentence like (1). The presupposition failure in (2) is clearly going to 
have a significant effect on the content, and thus the truth-value, of the sentence in which it 
occurs. As Stephen Yablo has said, this kind of presupposition has “failed 
catastrophically”.162 For in uttering a sentence like (2), one is presupposing the existence of 
something that is non-existent; one is trying to describe the qualitative features of an object 
that doesn’t exist. So it is no wonder that one runs into trouble! 
 But the presupposition failure that Thomasson highlights – if indeed there is any 
such failure at all – is not nearly so acute; it is far more subtle. For in uttering a sentence like 
(1), one is not presupposing the evident falsity that something non-existent exists, but rather, 
one is merely presupposing that the items referred to in each conjunct of the sentence are not 
linked by some specific relation of existential dependence. But what is the real effect of such 
                                                 
160 Frege (1892); Strawson (1950) 
161 Russell (1905) 
162 Yablo (2006, 165; 2009, 515) 
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presupposition failure? It is surely not catastrophic in the way that it is to presume that there 
is a present King of France and then go on to describe what he is like. Perhaps we need a 
clearer idea of what it is for a presupposition failure to be catastrophic or not in order to 
assess the full extent of the damage – if any – caused by the presupposition failure in (1). 
Stephen Yablo explains the distinction nicely:  
 
Failure is catastrophic if it puts a thing out of commission, renders it unable to 
perform its primary task. Non-catastrophic presupposition failure occurs 
when a sentence’s false presuppositions do not prevent it from performing its 
primary task. [...] The primary task of an indicative mood sentence is to make 
a claim [...] that is true or false according to whether matters are as 
described.163 
 
I think it is fairly clear that the kind of presupposition failure that Thomasson claims to be 
involved in (1) is not catastrophic. It does not render the sentence unable to perform its 
primary task. That is, (1) surely still makes an identifiable claim that one can evaluate. Even 
if one recognises that (1) presupposes a falsehood (i.e. the false claim that one can conjoin 
existentially dependent items in a list), it is just not plausible for one to insist, ‘I have no way 
of identifying what claim (1) is making about the world, and indeed, whether matters are as 
it claims them to be’. Such an assertion just doesn’t wash. Of course it makes a claim about 
the world! It claims that the baseball and the atoms caused the window to smash. And this is 
perfectly evaluable for truth or falsity. Just how one evaluates it will depend on whether one 
believes that the shattering of the window was caused by both the atoms and the baseball or 
not.  
 The upshot of these remarks is, I hope, that the presupposition failure that 
Thomasson highlights is really of very little significance. Firstly, it is questionable whether 
we do actually presuppose the things she claims we do. Secondly, if we do so presuppose, it 
is questionable as to whether what we presuppose is false. Lastly, and most importantly, 
even if it is accepted that (1) does involve a presupposition failure, it clearly isn’t a 
catastrophic failure, for it is still quite easy to identify the claim the sentence is making: that 
the baseball and the atoms cause the shattering of the window. At base, then, it seems that 
Thomasson has not really provided a counter-argument to COA, but rather, she just 
                                                 
163 Yablo (2006), 165 
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disagrees about the truth of premise (3). That, in itself, is fine. But in the absence of any 
reason to suppose that premise (3) is false, it is not going to convince the proponent of COA. 
For the very driving force behind COA is that the shattering of the window is not 
overdetermined, and thus that premise (3) is true. I hope to have shown that the 
presupposition failure that Thomasson highlights does not provide any such reason, and 
therefore, I think her argument should be resisted.  
 
 
§4.6.2 What’s So Bad About Overdetermination Anyway?  
A few philosophers have claimed that we should simply accept that macroscopic events like 
the shattering of windows are causally overdetermined by objects and their parts. Coupled 
with this claim, however, is the insistence that the type of overdetermination involved is 
really nothing to worry about.164 It is, in Thomasson’s words, not “real overdetermination”.165 
The reason for this claim appeals to the fact that there is some kind of inextricable link 
between objects (like baseballs) on one hand, and their parts (i.e. atoms arranged baseball-
wise) on the other. Sider, for instance, says there is an “intimate relationship” between the 
two.166 Thomasson, meanwhile, claims that there is a certain “independence [which] seems 
to be lacking between the causal claims of the baseball and the atoms arranged baseball-
wise”.167  
 Now I concede that there is, of course, a certain sense in which a baseball and its 
constituent atoms are not completely independent. One could not throw a baseball at a 
window, for instance, without also throwing its constituent atoms. The atoms and the 
baseball seem to follow one another around, so to speak.168 But one should not forget that 
they are still distinct entities. Or at least, providing composition is not identity, they are 
distinct entities, and given what I have said about that in the last chapter, I will assume that 
composition is not identity. So the question is, even if one concedes that there is a certain 
dependence that holds between objects and their parts, given that they are distinct objects, 
why should we be unconcerned if wholes and their parts systematically overdetermine 
                                                 
164 Thomasson (2006); Sider (2003) 
165 Thomasson (2006), 349 
166 Sider (2003), 1 
167 Thomasson (2006), 347 
168 Although see Saucedo (2011) for an alternative view. 
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events? Let me try and unravel the reasoning behind such a claim. In so doing, I hope to 
expose it as false.  
 Causal overdetermination, and here I mean real causal overdetermination, can be 
defined as follows: 
 
Causal Overdetermination: An event, E, is causally overdetermined iff it has two (or more) 
independently sufficient causes (or causal stories). 
 
This is, I think, a fairly standard definition. Moreover, it is a definition that Thomasson 
explicitly endorses, and one which Sider seems happy to accept. So in accepting this 
definition I cannot be accused of adopting a biased starting point against my opponents. 
Now we have a set definition in place, let us return to our example case of a baseball 
shattering a window. If we are to conclude that this event is not overdetermined (in the real 
sense), then we must accept that it does not have more than one independently sufficient cause 
(or causal story). So the thing we really need to establish is what the cause (or causes) of the 
shattering is. Both Thomasson and Sider seem willing to accept that both the baseball and the 
atoms arranged baseball wise do cause the shattering of the window. If this is right, then we 
have two causal stories to explain the shattering: 
 
(A): The baseball caused the window to shatter 
(B): The atoms arranged baseball-wise caused the window to shatter 
 
So, given our definition of real causal overdetermination, the only way that Thomasson and 
Sider can claim that the shattering of the window is not overdetermined (in the real sense), is 
for them to show that A and B are not both independently sufficient causal stories. But they 
surely are both independently sufficient! To see why, let us consider them one by one.  
 Firstly, take B. It is surely beyond doubt that atoms arranged baseball-wise are 
independently sufficient to cause a window to shatter. Let us suppose that nihilism was 
true, for instance. In that case, atoms arranged baseball-wise would not compose a baseball; 
there would be no baseballs. But one could not seriously claim that those atoms would be 
causally incapable of shattering a window. And one does not have to accept that nihilism is 
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true to accept this conclusion. Rather, one merely has to accept that if it were true, then 
atoms arranged baseball-wise, acting in concert, would be sufficient to cause a window to 
shatter. And since no baseballs would be involved in such an event, their causal sufficiency 
would be entirely independent.  
 So if Sider and Thomasson’s view is to be vindicated, it must be A that is taken to be 
not an independently sufficient causal story. But what could one mean by saying that a 
baseball is not independently sufficient to cause a window to shatter? One possibility would 
be to say that the baseball’s causing the window to shatter is the very same event as the 
atoms’s causing the window to shatter. But this seems to indicate that there are not two 
causal stories behind the event at all. Rather, there is a single causal story that has been 
described in two different ways. Perhaps this is what is being implied? But if it is, I don’t see 
how it would avoid the problems. Because it just immediately invites the question: but which 
causal story is the right one? I.e. what causes the window to shatter – the baseball or the atoms? Now 
if one endorses the existence of the baseball and the atoms, and one also takes both to be 
causally efficacious (as Thomasson and Sider do), then the answer here would surely have to 
be: both. (For to admit it was only the atoms which caused the shattering, or only the baseball, 
would be to admit that only one of them was causally efficacious). But then we are back to 
where we started! For if the baseball and its constituent atoms are distinct entities, and they 
both cause the window to shatter, then we do have two distinct causal stories behind the 
shattering. And this then re-invites the original question of why the baseball is not 
independently sufficient to cause the window to shatter. 
 The only way I can make sense of the response under consideration would be if one 
was taking composition to be identity. For if the baseball just is the atoms arranged baseball-
wise, then it is clear why it is not independently sufficient to cause the window to shatter. 
For it just is its constituent atoms, so it would make no sense of talking of the baseball apart 
from those atoms. But I am assuming that composition is not identity, and, moreover, that 
Thomasson and Sider would not want to rely on the fact that composition is identity in 
order for their argument to go through. But if composition is not identity, then the baseball 
is a distinct, physical object in its own right. It has physical properties. It has a shape, a size, 
a mass, and a density. In fact, it has all the right physical properties an object would need to 
be capable of shattering a window. But if such an object exists, then I need to be told why 
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such an object is not independently sufficient to shatter a window! But these arguments do 
not tell me why this is. Indeed they appear to have all the merits of theft as opposed to 
honest toil. For on the one hand I am told that atoms arranged baseball-wise really do 
compose a physical object; an object with just the right kind of physical properties required 
to smash windows. But on the other hand I am told that such an object is not independently 
capable of smashing windows! Something has gone wrong here, and that is why I do not 
accept the argument. If both the atoms and the baseball exist, and they are causally 
efficacious, then the shattering of the window is overdetermined in a very real sense. There 
is no other plausible option. 
 
 
 
§4.7. Dispensing with Age-Old Problems 
Ordinary objects are so called because they are taken to be just that: ordinary. What could be 
more ordinary than a tree or a rock, for instance, or a house or a sock? Natural or man-made, 
ordinary objects are instantly recognisable, easily describable, and seemingly unproblematic, 
or so it might seem reasonable to think. But a little bit of philosophical reflection casts doubt 
on all that. If one tries to establish precisely what makes an ordinary object an object, what 
its identity conditions are, or how it persists and changes through time, one will inevitably 
run into serious trouble. We have just seen how ordinary objects are causally problematic, in 
that they either force one into accepting widespread causal overdetermination, or they must 
be seen as being mysterious, epiphenomenal entities. But this is not the only way in which 
ordinary objects can be problematic. There are a number of long-standing puzzles about 
ordinary objects that, despite having been subjected to intense scrutiny over the years, 
remain unsolved. These puzzles, as I will explain below, make ordinary objects seem 
problematic to the point of being paradoxical. In fact, I think it is fair to say that the term 
‘ordinary object’ is a complete misnomer. A little reflection shows that such objects are 
anything but ordinary. Nihilism, however, avoids all these problems, since it denies that 
there are any ‘ordinary’ objects at all. This, I think, should count significantly in nihilism’s 
favour. 
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§4.7.1 The Statue and the Lump 
Let’s suppose that you decide to make a statue. First of all, you get yourself a lump of clay. 
Let’s call it ‘Lump’. Then you carefully go about sculpting the clay into your shape of choice, 
say, a horse-shape. Let’s call the finished statue ‘Horse’. Now suppose that on your way 
home, whilst clutching the statue, I was to ask you how many objects you were holding. 
What would the right response be? The natural response, I imagine, would be ‘one’ – you 
are holding the statue, Horse. But what about Lump? You are holding Lump as well. So are 
there not two objects you are holding – Horse and Lump? Now the natural response here 
would be, in addition to a certain exasperation, that they are not two different objects; Horse 
is Lump; they are one and the same thing. So you are only holding one object, but that object 
has two names – Horse and Lump. But herein lies the puzzle. We know that if Horse and 
Lump are the same thing (i.e. identical) then they must share all the same properties – 
Leibniz told us that. But on closer inspection, it seems that Horse and Lump do not share all 
the same properties. In fact, it seems as though they differ in a number of very important 
respects. For a start, Lump existed well before Horse existed. This immediately suggests that 
they can’t be the same object. For it is surely absurd to suggest that something could have 
existed long before it existed! Secondly, they differ in terms of their persistence conditions, 
for if you squashed the Statue into a shapeless ball, then it seems Horse would be destroyed, 
whereas Lump would survive.  
 So what, precisely, is the puzzle? It is that the story of Lump and Horse leaves one on 
the horns of a particularly prickly dilemma. On the one hand you could accept that Horse 
and Lump are distinct things, since they have different properties, but that would mean that 
you have two distinct physical objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same 
time, which sounds all wrong. On the other hand, however, you could maintain that they 
are one and the same object, only to then face the somewhat galling consequence of denying 
Leibniz’s Law, and asserting that a and b can be identical even though they do not share all 
the same properties. Neither option is attractive. In fact, both options are positively 
abhorrent. And that is precisely why the case of the statue and the lump presents such a 
problem.  
 The puzzle of the statue and the Lump is not insurmountable; there have been a 
number of different solutions proposed by a number of different philosophers. One popular 
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response, for instance, is to allow that distinct objects can, in fact, occupy the same space at 
the same time.169 Very roughly, on this view, the lump and the statue are said to stand in the 
relation of constitution. The lump constitutes the statue, but is not identical to it, and they both 
occupy the same space at the same time. Another common response is that objects are 
actually four-dimensional (i.e. extended through the three dimensions of space and the 
fourth dimension of time), and composed of temporal parts, as well as spatial parts.170 
According to this view, then, Lump and Horse are two distinct four-dimensional objects 
which share a certain temporal part. So once Lump has been sculpted into Horse, there are 
not two distinct physical objects in the same place at the same time, but rather, a single 
object – a temporal part – which belongs to two distinct four-dimensional objects: Lump and 
Horse. Lump and Horse temporally overlap, so to speak. Yet a third solution to the problem 
has been offered by Peter Geach, who claims that it is our (mistaken) notion of identity 
which is the cause of the puzzle.171 Geach claims that identity is never absolute, but rather, it 
is relative to a kind. So we can’t say that Horse and Lump are identical per se – in fact, we can’t 
say that any things are identical per se. But we can say that Horse is the same bit of clay as 
Lump, or the same statue as Lump, and so on.  
 So there are possible solutions to the puzzle. But they are all, I would suggest, 
theoretically costly. For whilst they may overcome the puzzle, they all represent significant 
crosses for their proponents to bear. The nihilist, however, has a much easier option. Indeed, 
for the nihilist, the puzzle never even arises. For according to the nihilist, there are no such 
objects as Lump or Horse.172 So it is wrong to say that there are two objects occupying the 
same space at the same time, and it is wrong to say that these objects have different, 
incompatible properties. There are no such objects in the first place. There may be simples 
arranged Lump-wise, for instance. And those simples may then be arranged Horse-wise, 
and then later re-arranged Lump-wise once more. Or there may be certain Lump-shaped 
‘thickenings’ in the fabric of the world, which become Horse-shaped and then revert to 
being Lump-shaped. But there is no problem in that; no new objects have come into, or gone 
                                                 
169 Perhaps the most well-known defender of this view is Wiggins (1968a; 1968b). But see also Shoemaker (1999); 
Simons (1987), 237-240; among many others. 
170 See, for instance, Lewis (1986a), 202-204; Heller (1990); Sider (2001); among others.   
171 Geach (1962; 1967) 
172 Unless, of course, you were a nihilist who took Lump and/or Horse to be mereological simples. But this would 
be a rather strange and unmotivated view, so I will ignore it here. 
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out of, existence. So the nihilist bypasses the whole problem easily and elegantly.173 She who 
endorses composite objects, however, must bear a significant cross. True, she has a choice of 
crosses to choose from – either the ubiquitous collocation of objects, the endorsement of 
temporal parts, or a relativised notion of identity – but she has to choose one all the same. 
This represents yet another reason to favour nihilism over universalism. 
 
 
§4.8. The Neutrality of Nihilism 
It is often assumed that if nihilism is true, and all material objects are mereological simples, 
then those simples must be very large in number, and very small in size. These tiny little 
simples are often identified with the sub-atomic particles of physics, or even extensionless 
points of spacetime.174 But nothing about the thesis of nihilism entails that this is the case. As 
I have already pointed out in §4.1., nihilism is a very broad thesis, and it is perfectly neutral 
over what size material objects are, so long as those objects are mereologically simple. Thus it 
is perfectly consistent with nihilism to suppose that simples are microscopic or point-sized, 
but it is also perfectly consistent to suppose that they are much bigger, say, 1km3. Indeed it is 
perfectly consistent with nihilism to say that there is only one, maximally large, simple in 
existence – the world itself. (This latter thesis is, of course, the thesis of monism which is the 
central topic of this dissertation). So there are many different variants of nihilism; there are 
many different ways that simples could be. But this is often ignored. Indeed, in the next 
chapter I introduce what I call the Nihilistic Fallacy, to expose the evident, and unjustified, 
bias in the literature towards those nihilisms which posit simples that are many and small. 
But for now I want to point out that nihilism, in its broadest sense, is quite neutral as to 
which of these variants is the correct one.  
What is also important to note is that all the arguments that have so far been given 
for nihilism argue only for nihilism in this broadest sense, and they lend no more 
                                                 
173 And the same goes for other puzzles of constitution. There is no puzzle as to which ship is the Ship of Theseus, 
for instance, if there are no ships at all. And there should be no concern as to whether Tib existed at the same 
time as Tibbles, for instance, if neither of them ever existed. And so on.  
174 Sider (forthcoming); Cameron (2010b); and Dorr (2005) all seem to favour the view according to which simples 
are numerous and tiny, although none explicitly state whether they take them to be point-sized or not. There 
seems to be a general gesture towards the view that simples are point-sized, but again, this is not made entirely 
explicit.   
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plausibility to one variant of nihilism than they do to another. In some cases this is quite 
obvious. The argument from elimination, for instance, says only that universalism and 
restrictivism should be rejected, thus leaving nihilism as the only option. It is quite clear that 
this argument gives no indication of what variant of nihilism should be endorsed, but only 
that some variant of nihilism should be. But it is not so clear in all cases. In particular, the 
main argument I have given for nihilism – the causal overdetermination argument – does 
seem to point towards a nihilism of microscopic particles. After all, it says that we should 
not posit baseballs because the particles arranged baseball-wise do all the causal work on 
their own. But that surely entails that the particles must exist in the first place! So it might 
reasonably be thought that the causal overdetermination argument does, in fact, indicate that 
a specific variant of nihilism is the correct one: a nihilism that posits a plurality of tiny little 
simples.  
I can see why someone might take this view, for the way in which the argument is 
set out seems to point towards it. Nonetheless, it is wrong. The causal overdetermination 
argument is an argument for nihilism in its broadest possible sense. It lends no more 
support to one variant of nihilism than it does to any other. In the next section I will show 
exactly why that is.  
 
 
§4.8.1 The Causal Overdetermination Argument Revisited 
The reason why the causal overdetermination argument seems to point towards a nihilistic 
ontology of microscopic, or point-sized, particles is solely down to the somewhat misleading 
way in which Merricks sets it out. His set up of the argument rests on a number of key 
assumptions that give it something of an unfair bias. At first glance, however, these 
assumptions seem perfectly reasonable, to the extent that one may not have even noticed 
that they were being made at all. If we restate the argument, however, and make these 
assumptions clear and explicit, the unjustified bias of the argument soon becomes apparent. 
To begin, reconsider the first premise of the argument: 
 
1) The baseball – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether its constituent atoms, 
acting in concert, cause the shattering of the window.  
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The implicit assumption in this premise is that it is the baseball whose existence is in doubt. 
The existence of the atoms-arranged-baseball-wise is simply taken for granted. As already 
mentioned, this assumption may seem perfectly reasonable at first glance, particularly in 
light of the alternatives. For the alternative would be to accept the converse: to take the 
baseball’s existence for granted and bring into question the existence of its (alleged) 
constituent atoms. I can anticipate a raised eyebrow at this point, for it would be unusual, to 
say the very least, to suggest that the baseball could exist whilst its (alleged) constituent 
atoms did not. However, the mere peculiarity of this supposition should not be reason 
enough to reject it out of hand. This is particularly so, since one should remember that 
Merricks presents his causal overdetermination argument as direct support for his thesis of 
eliminitavism. This thesis, let us not forget, states that inanimate, macrophysical objects (like 
baseballs) do not exist, and that the only things which do exist are microphysical simples.175 
Surely, then, we should be wary of any supporting argument whose premises seem so 
biased in favour of the microphysical and against the macrophysical. For any argument to be 
convincing, it must surely begin on neutral ground with regard to the central tenets of the 
theory it is trying to prove. In this case, the clear bias in favour of the microphysical would 
suggest that the starting ground is far from neutral. This bias continues in premise two: 
 
2) The shattering of the window is caused by those atoms, acting in concert. 
 
The assumption is no longer implicit here. It is baldly asserted that it is the microphysical 
atoms-arranged-baseball-wise which do all the causal work in shattering the window. Since 
it is the atoms which are causally responsible for the shattering of the window, we are told, 
then if there were a baseball as well, which also caused the shattering, then that shattering 
would be overdetermined.  As a result, we are invited to conclude that there must be no 
baseballs. The bias in favour of the microphysical over the macrophysical is plain to see. The 
question, then, is this: is such a bias justified? For if it is not, Merricks’ argument runs the risk 
                                                 
175 It should be noted that Merricks does accept that some composite entities exist, but not inanimate ones, only 
those which are not causally redundant. This acceptance has no impact on the point in question.  
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of begging the question. In order to answer this question, we should start by considering the 
alternatives.  
 Firstly, let’s consider the converse. Let us rebalance the scales in favour of the macro-
physical. In so doing, we could restate the argument as follows (let us call it COA*): 
 
1) The atoms-arranged-baseball-wise – if they exist – are causally irrelevant to whether 
the baseball causes the shattering of the window.  
2) The shattering of the window is caused by the baseball.  
3) The shattering of the window is not overdetermined.  
4) Therefore, if the atoms-arranged-baseball-wise exist, they do not cause the shattering 
of the window.  
 
We can then add Merricks’ subsequent reasoning, but in reversed form, and say that if the 
atoms-arranged-baseball-wise did exist, then they would have causal powers; they would, 
acting in concert, cause windows to shatter and cause visual and tactile sensations, and so 
on and so forth. Therefore, since we have shown that the shattering of the window is not 
caused by the atoms-arranged-baseball-wise, we can conclude that there are no such atoms.  
 What are we to make of this argument? Let us first put to one side any intuitions we 
may have about the truth of the conclusion, or indeed of any the premises. Instead let us 
consider the argument’s logical form. COA* is, clearly, of precisely the same form as 
Merricks’ original argument. Therefore if one accepts Merricks’ original argument as valid, 
then one must also accept that COA* is valid. So if one wants to raise concerns about COA*, 
which I presume Merricks would, one could not attack its validity; one must take an 
alternative critical route.  
 The obvious route, and indeed the one which Merricks (albeit briefly) explores, is to 
judge the arguments on the plausibility of their conclusions.176 The conclusion of COA is that 
only microphysical simples exist, and that baseballs and other inanimate composites do not. 
This may be seen as a somewhat implausible conclusion, particularly when contrasted with 
the dictates of common sense. The conclusion of COA*, however, is far more implausible. For 
COA* suggests that there are no microphysical atoms, and even more strangely, that 
                                                 
176 Merricks (2001), 63 
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baseballs have no proper parts. COA* would have us believe that baseballs are simples! 
Merricks claims that this conclusion is sufficiently absurd for it to be rejected out of hand: 
“The claim that atoms arranged baseball-wise fail to compose a baseball might be hard to 
swallow. But it goes down like draught Guinness compared to the claim that baseballs are 
simples”.177   
 At first glance, it seems that Merricks has a point. For it would be a brave 
philosopher indeed who was willing to reject the existence of atoms in favour of baseball-
sized simples. However, this seemingly absurd conclusion is somewhat superficial; it can be 
explained away. For the conclusion results, I would argue, not from giving equal existential 
credence to both the micro- and macro-physical, but rather, from the specific and arbitrary 
nature of this particular example. Let me explain. When we do ontology, we aim to 
determine what exists; we aim to discover the basic building blocks of reality; the 
fundamental existents of the world. Now microphysical atoms – the fundamental particles 
of physics – seem to be a quite plausible candidate for these existents. Baseballs, in contrast, 
do not. Philosophers have been known to argue for some peculiar theses, but none, to my 
knowledge, have ever claimed that baseballs are among the fundamental constituents of 
reality. And I have no intention of making such a claim here.  
 As shown above, Merricks’ argument is valid. But it has also been shown that it 
remains valid whether one’s bias is towards the microphysical or the macrophysical. That is 
to say, COA* and COA are both valid. Now of course, when the argument is framed in terms 
of baseballs and their constituent atoms, one will inevitably be drawn towards the 
conclusion of COA rather than COA*. That is because the very nature of the example leaves 
one with the choice of either atoms or baseballs as being mereological simples. And as I have 
already said, it would be a brave (or perhaps crazy) philosopher who opted for baseballs 
over atoms. But the point is that once the argument has been properly unpacked, it is clear 
that the baseballs and atoms are entirely irrelevant. What is important is the logical form of 
the argument, and the implications it has for mereology in general. For the argument to 
work, it needn’t necessarily be about baseballs, atoms and windows. To illustrate this, what 
follows is a restatement of the argument in general terms (let’s call it COAGEN): 
 
                                                 
177 Merricks (2001), 63 
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1) X – if it exists – is causally irrelevant to whether the ys, acting in concert, cause event, 
E. 
2) Event E is caused by those ys, acting in concert.  
3) Event E is not overdetermined.  
4) Therefore, if X exists, it does not cause event E. 
 
As far as I can see, these variables (X, y, E) can be substituted for any entities/events, and the 
argument would remain valid, provided we recognize one crucial stipulation. That 
stipulation is that the ys must represent the (alleged) constituent parts of X. If one were to 
substitute, for X and the ys, entities which did not stand in the part-whole relation, the 
argument would still be logically valid, but it would express only trivial platitudes and 
would shed no light whatsoever on the question of mereological composition.178 With that 
stipulation in mind, one can substitute the variables in any way one likes without affecting 
the argument’s force. For example, we could say: 
 
 X = the baseball 
 The ys = two arbitrary halves of the baseball (e.g. the left and the right half) 
 E = the smashing of the window 
 
This example would give the same result as before, in that it would have us conclude that 
the baseball is causally redundant. But it would seem a little odd, I would suggest, to eschew 
the existence of baseballs whilst allowing that baseball-halves exist. In fact, in a battle 
between baseballs and their halves, it is surely the baseball which is a more plausible 
candidate for doing the causal work. Either way, what I am meaning to impress here is that 
the nature of the specific example which one plugs in to the argument will have a big effect 
on the plausibility of the conclusions.   
 Now we have also seen that the validity and force of the argument remains 
unaffected if we reverse the position of X and the ys. That is to say, that if you accept COA 
                                                 
178 It is interesting to note that Merricks himself provides an example that does exactly that, whereby he 
substitutes himself for X, an unruly mob of vandals (of which he is no part) for the ys, and the vandalism of a 
park for E. See Merricks (2001), 57. 
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as valid, you must also accept COA* as valid. So just as we have done above, we can now 
restate COA* in more general terms (lets call it COA*GEN): 
 
1) The ys – if they exist – are causally irrelevant to whether X causes event E. 
2) Event E is caused by X. 
3) Event E is not overdetermined. 
4) Therefore, if the ys exist, they do not cause event E. 
 
Just as before, we can now substitute anything we like for those variables - provided that the 
substitutes for the ys and X stand in the part-whole relation – and the argument still goes 
through. The only difference being that it is now the ys, not X, which come out as being 
causally, thus existentially, redundant. And just as I noted above, I think one could come up 
with some specific variables to plug in to the argument that do not lend any more credence 
to the microphysical than they do to the macrophysical. For instance: 
 
 X = The world itself 
 The ys = The world’s microphysical parts 
 E = The evolution of the world 
 
If we were to plug these variables in to the argument we would be left with a choice. Either 
the world should be seen as causally redundant, and thus dismissed, or the microphysical 
particles should be seen as being causally redundant, and thus dismissed.  Which choice to 
make, however, is not at all obvious. Both the world itself and fundamental microphysical 
atoms, seem like fairly plausible candidates for being fundamental existents. In Merricks’ 
example, it is easy to eschew the existence of the baseball, but in this example it is not so 
easy to eschew the whole world, or so it seems to me. To choose between the world and its 
parts, one would surely need some further, independent arguments. But in the absence of 
such arguments, the wise move would surely be to reserve judgement.179 
                                                 
179 In the following chapter I will provide some arguments to show that we should favour the world over its 
parts, but that is for later.  
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So what does this all show? First and foremost, it shows that the argument has 
nothing to do with baseballs. The argument is, in fact, of much wider scope, and indeed 
much greater interest than that. It is an argument against parthood in general. It shows that if 
one accepts composite entities (i.e. entities with proper parts), then one has no choice but to 
accept widespread and systematic causal overdetermination. This is because the causal 
powers we ascribe to the object can be sufficiently accounted for by the causal powers of its 
parts, and vice-versa. Given the objectionable nature of such overdetermination, the argument 
gives us good reason to believe that there are no composite objects. What we have, then, is 
an argument for nihilism, and a compelling argument at that. However, once unpacked, and 
stated in general terms, it is clear that it is an argument for nihilism in its broadest sense. That 
is to say, the overdetermination argument gives us no reason to favour one variant of 
nihilism over another; it gives us no reason to favour a nihilistic ontology of microscopic 
particles over a monistic nihilism that posits only the world, or indeed any other form of 
nihilism. What it does do is give us good reason to reject the notion of parthood.  
 The only way one could use the overdetermination argument to support a nihilistic 
ontology of microphysical particles would be to take an initial bias towards the 
microphysical. I.e. to opt for COA rather than COA*. But this is to beg the question! One 
cannot just pick and choose one’s premises in order to arrive at one’s preferred conclusion. It 
must be left as an open question as to whether COA is preferable to COA* unless one can 
provide independent argument to support one over the other.   
Merricks does, albeit briefly, recognize this possible reading of his overdetermination 
argument. As a pre-emptive response he offers a reason why it should be rejected, and why 
the microphysical atoms should be given existential priority over the macrophysical objects 
they allegedly compose, i.e. why we should accept COA rather than COA*. He claims that 
“there will be some things that the atoms seem to cause for which the baseball cannot 
account”.180 To illustrate this, he asks us to consider the activity of the atoms before they were 
arranged baseball-wise. At one time, we are asked to presume, those very atoms were 
floating free in the early universe, independently and no doubt incontiguously. Yet they still 
would have had causal powers back then; they would, we can assume, have causally 
affected any other atoms they may have collided with. But these causal effects cannot be 
                                                 
180 Merricks (2001), 63 
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accounted for by the baseball! To suggest so would be absurd, Merricks continues. But the 
converse does not hold, however. According to Merricks, all effects that are allegedly caused 
by a baseball can be accounted for by the causal powers of the atoms which allegedly 
compose that baseball. Thus there is an asymmetry involved. The causal powers of the atoms 
(if they exist) can sufficiently account for all the effects of the baseball (if it exists), but the 
causal powers of the baseball cannot sufficiently account for all the effects of its constituent 
atoms. Thus Merricks concludes that “this asymmetry gives us strong reason, when forced 
to choose, to favour the causal powers of the atoms over those of the baseball”.181  
On the face of it, the ‘asymmetry argument’, if I may so label it, seems to provide 
quite a compelling reason to give existential priority to the microphysical over the 
macrophysical. For it would be rightly absurd to suggest that a baseball could sufficiently 
account for the causal efficacy of its constituent atoms long before it had even existed. But 
once more, I argue, the force of this argument is entirely superficial, and stems from the 
arbitrary nature of the specific example. If one were to consider the case of the world and its 
microphysical parts, rather than the case of a baseball and its microphysical parts, then the 
argument clearly doesn’t go through. For the atoms did not exist before the world existed! 
Thus it is equally plausible to say that the causal powers of the entire world can account for 
those of its alleged parts, as it is to say that the causal powers of the atoms can account for 
those of the alleged whole that they make up. And, moreover, it would be equally one-sided 
and biased if a monistically inclined thinker were to say that since the world existed long 
before any alleged baseball did, it is monism that must be true, because the causal powers of 
the world can fully account for those of the baseball, whereas the causal powers of the 
baseball cannot account for those of the whole world.  
In light of this, it should be clear that Merricks’ asymmetry argument just doesn’t 
wash - it is unjustifiably biased towards a microphysical nihilism. It assumes the existence of 
microphysical atoms, and then tells a story of how they existed long before someone (or, 
more correctly, some atoms arranged person-wise) arranged them baseball-wise. But this 
will do nothing to convince the monistic nihilist, for she could just as plausibly assume the 
existence of the entire world, and tell a story of how it existed long before it developed any 
baseball-shaped thickenings. So given this analysis, I claim that whilst the 
                                                 
181 Merricks (2001), 63 
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overdetermination argument is a strong and compelling argument in favour of nihilism in 
general, it lends no support whatsoever towards one variant of nihilism over another. 
Rather, it lends support to the more general claim that there is no mereological complexity 
to the world, i.e. that nihilism is true. To choose between variants of nihilism we will need 
further, independent arguments. But that is for the next chapter.   
 
 
§4.9. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I hope to have shown that there are a number of reasons to believe nihilism is 
true. The first crucial step was to overcome the perennial thorn in the nihilist’s side: the 
common sense objection. But I have shown that nihilism does not conflict with common 
sense, or at least, not in the objectionable way that it is often assumed. Since the nihilist has a 
number of ways to explain the appearance of composite objects, her assertion that there are 
no such objects is no longer at all difficult to swallow. The second step was to show that 
composite objects, were they to exist, would be hugely problematic entities. Either they 
would be mysterious epiphenomena, or they would be the source of systematic and 
widespread causal overdetermination. Nihilism, it was shown, avoids all these problems, 
which should count as a compelling reason to believe it is true. Finally, and importantly, I 
hope to have impressed that nihilism comes in many guises. At this stage in the dialectic, 
none of the arguments considered provided reason to favour any one of those guises over 
another. In what follows, however, I will show why it is monism that should prevail. 
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5. Why Monism? 
 
So far I have put together a case for believing that compositional nihilism is true; a case that I 
hope the reader has found compelling. But I have also shown that nihilism in its basic form 
is a very broad thesis. There are different variants of nihilism, with the only thing upon 
which they agree being that all material objects are mereologically simple. Specifically, I 
have identified a tripartite division between nihilisms. At one extreme there is punctal 
nihilism which supposes material objects to be minimally small (i.e. point-sized) and 
plentiful; and at the other there is monistic nihilism (or just ‘monism’) which takes there to 
be a single material object – maximally large yet lonely. In between lies a multitude of views 
which posit material simples which are neither maximally large nor minimally small. Any of 
these views will be subsumed under the heading ‘intermediate nihilism’. The arguments I 
have presented so far have been in support of nihilism in general, but have been quite neutral 
as to which variant of nihilism should be preferred. In this chapter I will present a number 
of arguments to show that of the three variants identified, it is monism which should emerge 
as the front runner.182 Monism, I claim, is the best form of nihilism.  
 
 
§5.1. The Nihilistic Fallacy 
I think it is fair to say that the overwhelmingly common assumption among contemporary 
philosophers is that if nihilism is true, then it is punctal nihilism that is true. It seems often to 
be simply assumed that if all material objects are mereologically simple, then they must also 
be minimally small. Markosian, for instance, says that on a “natural way of thinking [...] 
simples are point-sized objects”, and elsewhere McDaniel has called this “the traditional 
                                                 
182 I should note at this point that Jonathan Schaffer has, fairly recently, published a paper with the very same 
goal as this chapter – to show that “nihilism culminates in monism” (Schaffer (2007), 175). Shaffer’s paper is a 
very good one and has greatly inspired this chapter. In particular, the arguments I present in §5.3. and §5.5. both 
appear in Schaffer’s paper. In both cases, however, I think I have expanded upon, and hopefully improved, the 
arguments in question. Coupled with the other arguments I will present in this chapter, I hope to have produced 
an even more compelling case for monism than that presented by Schaffer. (To my knowledge, no-one else has 
argued from compositional nihilism to monism).  
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view of simples”.183 I should also note, however, that this assumption is not always made 
entirely explicit in the extant literature. Many defenders of nihilism are somewhat vague 
about the precise nature of the simples they posit, other than to maintain that they are 
material objects that lack proper parts. But the implication that material simples must be 
minimally small remains evident. For instance, most of those who defend nihilism explicitly 
employ the van Inwagen-style strategy of paraphrase. That is, they claim that talk of 
composite objects (like tables and chairs) can be paraphrased into talk of simples arranged in 
certain ways (table-wise and chair-wise).184 But, of course, implicit in the use of this strategy 
is the belief that there are many simples, and indeed that they are very small (or at the very 
least, that they are much smaller than the chairs and tables that they are alleged to be 
arranged like). It is true that this strategy does not entail that the simples being referred to 
are point-sized, but it does entail a nihilistic view on which simples are taken to be small and 
numerous; what one might call a generally Democritean nihilism.  
This assumption is common even among those who reject nihilism. Indeed, it is so 
common that the fact that there are other varieties of nihilism even available is often entirely 
overlooked. To illustrate this, consider the following quote: 
 
Nihilism is the view that there are no composite objects (i.e. objects with proper 
parts); there are only mereological simples (i.e. objects with no proper parts). The 
nihilist thus denies the existence of statues, ships, humans, and all other 
macroscopic material objects. On this view, there are only atoms and the void.185 
 
This quote is taken from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, an online resource 
designed to give unbiased and informative overviews of various important philosophical 
issues. But even here, the bias towards punctal nihilism is clear to see. We are told that 
nihilism denies the existence of all macroscopic material objects. That is simply not true! 
Monistic nihilism, for instance, states quite the opposite: it states that the only thing there is is 
a macroscopic material object, the world, and it denies the existence of any microscopic 
material objects. Intermediate variants of nihilism, too, need not deny the existence of 
macroscopic material objects, and may well deny the existence of microscopica. There is 
                                                 
183 Markosian (1998a), 216; McDaniel (2003), 266. I should point out that neither Markosian nor McDaniel actually 
endorse the view that all simples must be point-sized.  
184 Dorr (2005); Sider (forthcoming); and Cameron (2010b) all make use of this paraphrase strategy.  
185 Wasserman (2009) 
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nothing to stop a nihilist accepting the existence of statues, ships, humans, and so on, as long 
as he also maintains they are all mereologically simple. 
 The common assumption, then, seems to be that compositional nihilism somehow 
entails punctal nihilism. In other words, if nihilism is true and all material things are 
mereologically simple, then those material simples will be minimally small. This mistaken 
assumption is what I shall call the nihilistic fallacy. It is not clear to me why so many have 
succumbed to this fallacy. Philosophers are usually such a careful and rigorous breed, so it is 
most surprising that many have ignored what should really be quite obvious. The fact that 
punctal nihilism has assumed the default position is one thing, but the fact that the other 
options are rarely even recognised is little short of astonishing. But the fact remains that, a 
few rare exceptions apart, this is how nihilist landscape currently sits.186   
 My best guess as to why philosophers so often succumb to the nihilistic fallacy is that 
they have been duped, or perhaps they have duped themselves, into thinking that their 
position is somehow scientific. The kind of reasoning that might lie behind such a thought 
could be presented as follows:  
 Modern science tells us that the universe is composed, ultimately, of fundamental 
particles. Tiny little bits of matter, perhaps even dimensionless, believed to be 
fundamental (i.e. to not have any smaller parts). These particles are called quarks and 
leptons. Compositional nihilism states that the only material things are mereological 
simples. Therefore, it would make sense to identify the simples posited by nihilism 
with the simples posited by science (i.e. leptons and quarks). In that sense, modern 
science and compositional nihilism are mutually supportive – they both have the same 
posits.    
 
This kind of reasoning – what I will call naive scientism – is flawed. The claim that punctal 
nihilism concords with modern science is a mirage, and any suggestions that science points 
towards punctal nihilism are false. Punctal nihilism posits only microscopic simples, whereas 
science posits a whole lot more. The chemist, for instance, will tell us that there are atoms 
and molecules, ions and isotopes. The biologist will tell us that there are living organisms. 
The cosmologist will tell us that there are stars and galaxies. All of these are composite 
objects, and none of them have any place in a nihilistic ontology, punctal or otherwise. Try 
                                                 
186 Exceptions include Horgan & Potrč (2000; 2008); McDaniel (2007; 2009); Markosian (1998a); Parsons (2000). 
Note that of those listed, only Horgan & Potrč actually endorse compositional nihilism; the others merely 
endorse the possibility of spatially extended mereologically simple entities.  
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telling a biologist that your metaphysics is in concurrence with her science whilst insisting 
that there are no biological organisms – I guarantee she will think you quite mad.  
 I can envisage a response to this claim, however. The punctal nihilist will respond 
that whilst they do not admit many of the posits of science (indeed they will not admit any 
posits which are taken to be composite), their ontological picture is still perfectly compatible 
with science. Sure there are no molecules, or organisms, or galaxies, the punctal nihilist will 
say, but there are punctal simples arranged molecule-wise, organism-wise and galaxy-wise. 
The punctal nihilist can agree wholeheartedly with all the theories of modern science, it is 
just that she will have to substitute any quantification over composite objects with plural 
quantification over simples arranged composite-wise. So any objection that punctal nihilism 
contradicts modern science is unfounded.  
 This may well be so, but it is to miss the point entirely. Being compatible with science 
is a different thing entirely from being vindicated by science. And the fact that two theories 
are consistent does not entail that they are mutually supportive. For one should remember 
that the monist can tell a very similar story to that of the punctal nihilist. As we saw in the 
last chapter, the monistic strategy for dealing with talk about composite objects is to 
paraphrase it into talk of the world’s properties. So whilst the monist will also deny that 
there are molecules, organisms, and galaxies, she will say that the world is moleculey, 
organismish, and galactical, or something to that effect. The monist posits the entire 
universe, and explains the illusion of its having parts in terms of its properties, whereas the 
punctal nihilist posits the fundamental particles and explains the illusion of there being 
composite objects in terms of the arrangement of those particles. But science posits particles 
and the universe (not to mention everything in between). To say that science, with its sub-
atomic posits, points towards the truth of punctal nihilism would be objectionably one-sided. 
It could just as legitimately be said that with its positing of the entire universe, it points 
towards the truth of monism. Even an intermediate nihilist could claim parity on this score. 
An intermediate nihilist could say, for instance, that it is the atoms (and here I mean ‘atom’ 
in the scientific sense) which are mereologically simple. The illusion of larger composite 
objects would then be explained in terms of the arrangements of those atoms, and the 
illusion of smaller, sub-atomic objects would be explained in terms of the atoms’s properties 
(e.g. an atom might be quarky or leptonic). So it is a mistake to suggest that science points 
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towards a particular variant of nihilism. All variants of nihilism can be made compatible with 
science, but none of them are vindicated by science. The reasoning underlying naive 
scientism, then, is fallacious.  
 Having exposed the nihilistic fallacy, one should hopefully now recognise that the 
evident bias towards punctal nihilism (or towards some form of Democritean nihilism) in the 
extant literature is unfounded. The arguments that have been presented for nihilism in the 
last chapter are neutral with respect to which variant of nihilism they support, as are the 
arguments customarily presented in the literature. Thus in the absence of any further 
arguments that support one variant over another, one should view all three variants of 
nihilism (punctal, intermediate and monistic) as being on an equal footing. In what follows, I 
will present a number of just such arguments and show that of the three variants of nihilism 
it is actually monism that should be preferred. 
 
 
§5.2. The Argument from Elimination 
As has now been established, compositional nihilism must take one of three forms. There is 
punctal nihilism, which takes simples to be minimally small, i.e. point-sized. At the other 
end of the scale there is monistic nihilism (or just monism) which takes there to be just one 
simple, which is maximally large, i.e. world-sized. And there is intermediate nihilism, which 
covers any view in between the two, i.e. any view according to which simples are taken to be 
spatially extended, yet not maximally large. I think that there are some good prima facie 
reasons for rejecting both intermediate nihilism and punctal nihilism. If I am right, then this 
gives one a prima facie reason to endorse monism – since it is the only remaining option for 
the nihilist to take. Let me spell out these prima facie reasons below.  
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§5.2.1 Eliminating Intermediate Nihilism 
Intermediate nihilism, in almost any of its possible forms, should be rejected on grounds of 
arbitrariness.187 You may recall from chapter 2 that a big problem for restrictivist theories of 
composition was that it was seemingly impossible to draw a line between cases of 
composition and cases of non-composition that was not entirely arbitrary. A similar problem 
afflicts intermediate nihilism. For once you admit some spatial extension to the simples that 
make up your ontology, it is hard to justify why a particular extension should be preferred 
over another. As I noted in the last chapter, it would be a brave philosopher who posited 
baseball-sized simples, for it would be very hard to know how to defend such a position. I 
for one would not know where to start. But this is exactly the kind of position that the 
intermediate nihilist would have to defend. Admittedly, there may not be a knock-down 
argument to such a position. But it simply seems crazy!  Why are the simples baseball-sized? 
Why not golf-ball sized? Or indeed empire-state-building-sized, or even galaxy-sized? There 
is just no reason to suggest that any of these options are any better, or more likely, than any 
other, so to plump for one must be entirely arbitrary. Arbitrary assertions such as these, 
when there is no evidence whatsoever to support them, are truly objectionable, and thus 
should be avoided at all costs. Intermediate nihilism, then, should be rejected.  
 But perhaps that was a little hasty. For I can envisage one or two versions of 
intermediate nihilism that could lay claim to being somewhat less arbitrary and 
objectionable than others. So I will spend a little time here explaining what those versions of 
intermediate nihilism are, even though I will claim that, ultimately, they too should be 
rejected. Firstly, one could endorse a nihilistic view which admits objects of all sizes, yet 
maintains they are all simple. On this view, which I will call ‘omni-magnitudinous nihilism’, 
there will be point-sized simples and a world-sized simple, as well as myriad other-sized 
simples in between (e.g. table-size simples; earth-size simples; galaxy-size simples; and so 
on). This view avoids any accusations of arbitrariness, since it makes no arbitrary decisions 
concerning the size of material simples. Rather, it admits simples of all sizes. However, this 
theory will face a number of other problems; problems of arguably much greater severity. 
The main problem, I think, is that it would entail the ubiquitous co-location of objects. That is 
                                                 
187 I say ‘almost any’ because there are one or two formulations of intermediate nihilism which may not be so 
susceptible to accusations of arbitrariness. I will consider, and ultimately reject, these formulations below.  
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to say that since there is a world-sized simple on this view, then all the other simples the 
theory posits will be partially co-located with it. I.e. there will be a multiplicity of distinct 
material objects (all of which are mereologically simple) occupying the same place at the 
same time. But co-location is weird at the very best and incoherent at worst, so on such a 
grand scale as this it would appear to represent a weighty theoretical cost. It would also 
appear that this widespread co-location of objects would lead to widespread causal over-
determination. After all, if there are baseball-sized simples and much smaller simples 
arranged baseball-wise, then which of them is it that causes windows (and simples 
arranged-window-wise) to smash? For these reasons (coupled with the fact it is seemingly 
unmotivated, not to mention bizarre) I will rule out omni-magnitudinous nihilism as a 
serious possibility and not consider it any further.  
 But there is another, somewhat more plausible, option for the intermediate nihilist to 
pursue, which could be determined by one’s view of the nature of space itself. One fairly 
natural way of thinking about space is that it is continuous. By that I mean that, for all intents 
and purposes, it is infinitely divisible. According to the view that space is continuous, for any 
line in space that is of a non-zero extension, it can always be divided into two smaller lines. 
Another way of thinking about space being continuous is to say that its extension in all three 
dimensions can be accurately modelled on the real numbers; for any two real numbers you 
care to choose, there will always be a further number that belongs between them. The real 
numbers present a continuous series; there are, as it were, no gaps. The same can be said of a 
continuous space; it has no gaps.  
However, it is not universally accepted that that space is actually continuous; for 
there is a contrasting view that space is discrete. On this view, space is taken to be granular. It 
is said to consist of spatial atoms, regions of space with a non-zero extension which are 
nonetheless indivisible. (An intuitive way to think about discrete space is by analogy with 
your TV or computer screen. Just as your TV screen is made up of many small pixels, each of 
which is minimally small yet still extended, space is taken to be made up of many small 
spatial atoms). Now if one took space to be discrete, one may be in a position to adopt an 
intermediate nihilism that is not susceptible to the arbitrariness objection I raised above. For 
it is natural to suppose that if space is discrete then since material objects must be located in 
space, they could not occupy any region smaller than a single granule of space (for if they 
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did, then where, precisely, would they be?). Therefore, this view would have it that there is an 
absolute minimum size that any given material object can have – the size of a single spatial 
atom. Moreover, it would be natural to presume that these minimally small material objects 
must be mereologically simple, since if they were to have any proper parts those parts must 
be smaller than the object itself. But that is impossible, since the object itself is, by definition, 
minimally small. Thus contrary to my earlier assertion, it looks as if there is a version of 
intermediate nihilism which cannot be rejected on grounds of arbitrariness, and which, at 
the very least, deserves to be taken seriously.188  
Whilst I do take such a view seriously, I think that there are a number of costs 
associated with it that provide reason (at least prima facie reason) to reject it. The first cost is 
that it would seem to entail a substantive realism about space. By a substantive realism 
about space, I mean Substantivalism: the theory which takes space to be a substance, a real 
thing, in which material objects somehow reside.189 Substantivalism is often presented in 
opposition to a contrasting view: relationism190. Relationists deny that space is a substance, 
but instead claim that there are only distance relations which hold between material objects. 
Space is nothing over and above this network of distance relations. The debate between 
relationists and substantivalists is a long-standing and controversial one. But the version of 
intermediate nihilism currently being considered entails, I claim, a Substantivalist view 
about space. This should be considered a cost, not because Substantivalism is false (indeed, I 
want to remain neutral on that for the time being), but merely because it forces one to take 
sides on a debate on which the other versions of nihilism appear to be neutral.191 This is 
admittedly not an unacceptable cost – indeed, those who already lean towards 
Substantivalism will be quite untroubled by it – but it is a cost all the same.  
So why does the current view entail Substantivalism? For it is natural to think that 
one could believe in a discrete space (of sorts) and still be a relationist. In other words, one 
could be a relationist about space yet hold that there is a minimum magnitude across which 
                                                 
188 Braddon-Mitchell & Miller (2006) actually defend a view similar to the one currently being espoused. The 
view they defend is not explicitly nihilist, in fact it is quite neutral over the debate on mereological composition. 
However, they argue that modern science suggests that there are minimally small regions of space (specifically, 
“Planck squares”, two-dimensional regions with an area of 10–66cm2), which should be considered non-point-
sized, yet minimally small, simples.  
189 For a defence of substantivalism, see Graham Nerlich’s classic book The Shape of Space.   
190 Relationism’s most famous proponent is probably Leibniz. See, for instance, Alexander (1956), 25-26 
191 Later on, however, I will argue that the monist should reject substantivalism.  
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distance relations could obtain. This is true, and it is a coherent view.192 But it does not rule 
out the possibility of point-sized objects. For on this view, there is nothing to prevent there 
from being point-sized objects, but only to prevent them from being closer to one another 
than the minimal distance relation allows. So the discrete relationist view of space is not 
enough to support an intermediate nihilist view. It is only if one takes a discrete space to be 
composed of substantive minimal spatial regions, that one can reasonably uphold the 
intermediate nihilist view being considered, and to take space to be like that is to be a 
committed substantivalist. So that is the first cost associated with this particular variant of 
intermediate nihilism – it commits one to substantivalism about space.  
The second, and I think more damaging, cost to the current view is that there are a 
number of independently problematic consequences of supposing that space is discrete. One 
of these consequences is that certain metrical relationships that we would normally take to 
hold with necessity, appear to break down in a discrete model of space. In what has come to 
be known as ‘Weyl’s Tile Argument’, Hermann Weyl points out that Pythagoras’s theorem 
fails to hold if space is taken to be granular or discrete. He says: “If a square is built up of 
miniature tiles, then there are as many tiles along the diagonal as there are along the side; 
thus the diagonal should be equal in length to the side”.193 Of course we know that in a 
right-angled triangle the hypotenuse is not equal in length to either of the other sides, so 
something has clearly gone wrong. The discrete model of space, it seems, contradicts one of 
the most famous and long-standing mathematical proofs in human history – a significant 
cross for the model to bear! 
To show why this is, consider fig 2. Suppose space is discrete, and that the minimum 
unit of distance is represented by the length of the side of one of the sixteen squares, let’s call 
it m. Now since this space is discrete, then ex hypothesi, it is impossible to have any unit of 
length less than m. Moreover, all possible distances must be expressible in exact multiples of 
m. As one can see from fig. 2., then, if you create a right-angle triangle, then there will be the 
same amount of squares on the hypotenuse as on the other two sides. And since there is no 
way of measuring distances that is more fine-grained than in terms of m, it follows that this 
                                                 
192 Indeed, Forrest (1995) endorses such a view.  
193 Weyl, H. (1949), 43 
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right angle triangle has three sides of the same length (4m each). That is a violation of 
Pythagoras’s Theorem.  
 
Fig. 2.  
 
 
Now I should note that responses have been given to Weyl’s Tile Argument, but they either 
involve mathematics that is in tension with the discrete model of space, or they no longer 
support the variant of intermediate nihilism that is being proposed.194 So here we have our 
second cost associated with this particular variant of intermediate nihilism. From its base 
assumption that space is discrete, it suffers from all the significant problems that afflict that 
very model. This is not a completely insurmountable problem, for there are many reputable 
thinkers who do endorse a discrete model of space, but it represents a substantial theoretical 
cost. And when it is recognised that the other variants of nihilism under consideration 
appear neutral with regard to the nature of space, this cost gives us at the very least a prima 
facie reason to reject this version of intermediate nihilism.  
 There is perhaps one last line of response that I need to consider here before moving 
on. For it has been suggested to me that an intermediate nihilist could simply assert that 
there is an absolute minimum, yet non-zero, size that a physical object could be, and that 
                                                 
194 Van Bendegem (1987) shows that the tile argument can be overcome if we take lines to have a non-zero and 
finite width (thus essentially as rectangles). However, the construction of van Bendegem’s solution draws on 
classical Euclidian geometry as it operates in a continuous space. But of course, his solution is meant to apply to a 
non-continuous, discrete space. Specifically, there is no definition of a line in discrete geometry as there is in 
classical geometry. Van Bendegem has assumed that the definition of a line from classical geometry can simply 
be transferred to apply in discrete geometry, and this assumption is questionable to say the least. Forrest (1995) 
overcomes the tile argument by supposing that discrete space is not composed of some regularly-shaped spatial 
atoms, as is often supposed, but rather, composed of spatial points related to one another by minimally small 
distance relations. Whilst Forrest’s response may overcome the tile argument, it would seem to allow the 
existence of point-sized objects, and thus undercut the version of intermediate nihilism being currently proposed. 
See Dainton (2010), 297-8 for further discussion. 
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would be regardless of one’s view about space. The idea is, I think, that there are lots of 
natural limits, so to speak, in the world. The speed of light, for instance, marks the absolute 
maximum velocity at which an object can travel. And in a sense, this maximum speed limit 
is entirely arbitrary, since it surely could have been different. But at the same time, there is 
nothing intolerable about having such a limit. So by extension, why not just think that there 
is, as a matter of fact, some absolute minimum size that an object can be. We may not know 
exactly what that size is (although presumably it will be very small indeed), but that is not to 
say that there isn’t one at all.  
 I am unconvinced by such a response. Firstly, it should be noted that the speed of 
light was an empirical discovery, and, moreover, it was through an application of the laws of 
physics plus empirical data that we discovered that the speed of light represented a 
universal speed limit. The fact that the speed of light is what it is (approx 670 million mph) 
is in a sense arbitrary, but it has been corroborated by empirical data; it is just a standard 
contingent fact, and there is nothing at all objectionable about that. What would have been 
objectionable is if some philosophers, upon pondering the speeds at which objects could 
travel, had simply asserted that there must be a maximum limit, in the absence of any reason 
to so assert. That would be arbitrary and unjustified. But this, it seems to me, is what would 
be being done if an intermediate nihilist were to suppose that there were some absolute 
minimum size that an object could be. At the very least, the burden of proof would be on 
them to provide a reason as to why we should believe such a claim. But what could be the 
reason? 
 Think of the opposite end of the spectrum: large objects. There is, it seems, a perfectly 
good reason to suppose that there is a maximum size an object can be. Supposing that an 
object can only exist at a world, then the world at which it exists will set the limit for its size. 
The absolute maximum size for an object would be the same size as the world of which it is 
part. Moreover, this is an a priori reason; one can establish its truth from the comfort of one’s 
armchair, since it is logically incoherent to suggest that an object could be larger than the 
world in which it exists. But applying the same reason to the very small would surely 
indicate that the smallest an object could possibly be would be point-sized. Because for any 
non-zero size stipulated, it is always possible to suppose that an object could have been 
smaller, so to suggest that there is some non-zero minimum size limit looks objectionably 
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arbitrary. Just as it would do if one were to suppose that there was some maximum size 
limit for an object that is nonetheless smaller than world-size.   
 At this point, one may draw on the findings of contemporary science, and insist that 
there is a minimum size for objects; it is whatever the size is of the smallest objects known to 
science (quarks, or neutrinos, or whatever). But this argument doesn’t wash either. These 
tiny fundamental particles are merely the smallest particles known to man; they are not the 
smallest particles possible. There is no reason to suppose that in the future it won’t be 
discovered that what we currently take to be fundamental particles are in fact made of 
smaller parts, perhaps even point-sized parts. Or alternatively, there is no reason to suppose 
that entirely new particles will not be discovered that are even smaller than the fundamental 
particles of today. So whatever size science tells us that the smallest particles are is quite 
irrelevant. To infer that this is the smallest size possible would be unjustified.  
 To conclude, then, intermediate nihilism should be rejected. Most formulations of it 
are intolerably arbitrary, and those that are not arbitrary suffer from other significant 
problems, such as a commitment to substantive and controversial views about the nature of 
space, or the ubiquitous co-location of objects and widespread causal overdetermination. I 
will consider intermediate nihilism, therefore, eliminated. 
 
 
§5.2.2 Eliminating Punctal Nihilism 
If one puts intermediate nihilism out of the picture, and in light of the preceding comments 
it would seem prudent to do so, one has two options remaining: punctal nihilism or 
monism. In the extant literature, the former of these options is by far the most popular.195 But 
there are some serious problems with punctal nihilism. In particular, there are some serious 
problems involved with the supposition that all matter is point-sized. I think that these 
problems are serious enough to suggest that, other considerations notwithstanding, punctal 
nihilism should be rejected. By process of elimination, then, monism is vindicated as the 
only viable form (or at least, the most viable form) of compositional nihilism. For clarity’s 
sake, the argument could be presented formally as follows: 
                                                 
195 Sider (forthcoming), Cameron (2010b), Dorr (2005), for instance, are all punctal nihilists. Horgan & Potrč (2000; 
2008) are the only monistic nihilists I know of.  
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1. Only three varieties of compositional nihilism are available: punctal, intermediate, 
and monistic.  
2. Punctal and intermediate nihilism should be rejected.  
3. Therefore, if one is a compositional nihilist, one should be a monistic nihilist.  
I have hopefully already made a decent case for the claim that intermediate nihilism should 
be rejected. So now let me begin my case against punctal nihilism.  
 Punctal nihilism says that there are only simples, and moreover, that these simples 
are minimally small. I take minimally small to mean point-sized, where point-sized means 
having zero-extent in any spatial dimension. I think this is a fair assumption to make, purely 
because if they were not point-sized, they would not be minimally small. I.e. they could be 
smaller. (This is intended in the same sense as saying that any number greater than zero is 
not minimally small, since it could be smaller). Any nihilism which posits its simples as 
being larger than point-sized should not be classed as a punctal nihilism. But the very idea 
of point-sized objects raises immediate problems. These problems are long-standing, and 
can be traced right back to Ancient Greece. Zeno, in particular, is famous for his interest in, 
and rejection of, point-sized particles, as is demonstrated by the following passage: 
 
 If it [a point-sized thing] were added to another existent, it would not make 
it any larger. For if it is of no size but is added, there cannot be any increase 
at all in size. Thus what is added is therefore nothing. And if when it is 
subtracted the other thing is no smaller – and will not increase when it is 
added again – then clearly what was added and subtracted was nothing.196 
 
This kind of thought should be familiar to anyone who has ever taken an undergraduate 
metaphysics course.  The reasoning is simple yet powerful. To make things a little clearer, I 
think one could construct a more structured Zeno-esque argument as follows: 
1. Extended material objects are ultimately composed of point-sized atoms. 
(Assumption for reductio). 
2. Point-sized atoms have zero extension.  
3. No matter how many atoms of zero extension you may have, the total extension 
of their sum will always equal zero. (0 x n  0).  
                                                 
196 Taken from Barnes (2001), 102 
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4. Therefore, extended objects could not be composed purely of point-sized atoms.  
5. Thus we have a contradiction; 1 must be false. 
It is clear how this argument is supposed to affect the punctal nihilist. The punctal nihilist 
says that there are only point-sized simples. All illusions of extended objects are to be 
explained by the existence of point-sized simples arranged in particular ways. The Zeno-
esque objection, then, would be that there could not be any extended objects, or even the 
illusion of extended objects, if there are only point-sized simples. Non-extended objects have 
not the capacity to conjure even the illusion of extended ones.  
 Whilst this kind of reasoning can seem compelling, I think its attraction is superficial 
– for there are ways one could respond. Specifically, it should be noted that the Zeno-esque 
argument only works if extended matter is taken to be continuously dense. By that I mean that 
the simples which are taken to compose some extended object (or taken to be arranged 
object-wise) are taken to be directly contiguous, i.e. touching one another. If one makes this 
assumption, then the argument looks a threat, since the total extension of any number of 
directly contiguous non-extended simples will always be zero. But why should one make such 
an assumption? Why not just think that whilst there are only point-sized simples, they are 
spread out (as depicted in fig. 3)?  
 
Fig. 3.197  
 
We are already used to this kind of understanding of macroscopic objects. Modern science 
tells us that ordinary objects (and indeed the atoms that compose them) are mostly empty 
space. Thus it would be wrong to think of the atoms that compose your table (or that are 
arranged table-wise) as being packed together so tightly that they are directly contiguous. 
Rather, they are spaced out at intervals really quite huge relative to their microscopic size. 
                                                 
197 The diagram is not a truly accurate representation of the idea being proposed, of course, because the punctal 
simples (represented by the blue spheres) would not have any extension (as they clearly do in the diagram), and 
there would be no actual things (i.e. the white bars) connecting them together, but just empty space. However, 
the diagram gives a good flavour of what is being put forward.   
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So it seems that this kind of view is also available to the punctal nihilist, and it would avoid 
the force of the Zeno-esque argument. To be precise, this view would undermine premise 3 
of the argument, for whilst the simples themselves have no extension, the distance from one 
simple to another would not be zero so long as they are not directly contiguous. So it is 
simply not the case that for any amount, n, of point-sized simples that their total extension 
will be zero. If the n simples are arranged in a line, for instance, and are spaced with gaps of 
a non-zero magnitude, x, then their total extension will be x(n - 1). Punctal nihilism, it seems, 
can overcome the threat from Zeno. 
 However, a more modern take on this Zeno-esque argument has been offered by 
Peter Simons, and this argument is not so easily overcome.198 I will tweak his argument 
somewhat to target it more squarely in the direction of punctal nihilism, but the thrust of it 
will remain the same as the original: 
 
1. If punctal nihilism is true, then the only physical things there are are point-sized 
simples.199  
2. Therefore, whatever fundamental physical properties there are must be 
instantiated by those simples (since there are no other candidate objects to 
instantiate them).  
3. Mass is a fundamental property.200  
4. Therefore simples have mass.  
5. But if simples have mass, then they must be infinitely dense, since they have a 
non-zero mass in a zero volume.  
6. Physical objects cannot be infinitely dense. 
7. Therefore, either 1, 2, or 3, must be false (or a combination all three).  
 
                                                 
198 Simons (2004), 373 
199 I include the ‘physical’ qualification since nothing in the letter of punctal nihilism rules out the possibility of 
there being abstract objects. 
200 Peter Simons has suggested to me that mass may not be a fundamental property after all. Very roughly the 
idea is that if processes are taken to be more ontologically fundamental than objects, then fundamental properties 
would be those instantiated by processes rather than objects. On this view, mass would be instantiated by objects, 
and thus would be definable in terms of more fundamental properties of processes. Specifically, mass would be 
definable in terms of Planck seconds per square metre. Whilst this proposal is undoubtedly very interesting, it is 
most certainly controversial, and to discuss it further would take us too far afield, so I will not do so.  
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Premise 2 looks undeniable. Physical properties can only be instantiated by physical things, 
so if the only physical things are xs (whatever those xs might be), then xs are the only things 
that can instantiate physical properties. Premise 3 also looks unshakable, unless one wants 
to deny that the world is massive. So it is premise 1, then, which should be rejected. But of 
course, rejecting premise 1 is just to reject punctal nihilism. One should also note that the 
‘spacing out response’ that I laid out above, which overcame the original Zeno-esque 
argument, doesn’t look as though as it will be of any help here. For no matter how far apart 
material simples are taken to be, they are still the only candidate objects available to 
instantiate mass. Mass cannot be instantiated by ‘gaps’, unless we reify those gaps into 
material things, which would go against the central thesis of punctal nihilism. So the 
conclusion is undeniable; if punctal nihilism is true, then all matter must be infinitely dense.   
 Despite the clear force of these types of arguments that highlight the physical 
difficulties of admitting infinitely small, point-sized objects, they are summarily dismissed. 
It is routinely asserted that in the age of post-Cantorean mathematics, metaphysical 
problems stemming from considerations of the infinite are mere chimeras; they can be 
explained away. Sorensen confidently asserts that “all of Zeno’s paradoxes were solved by 
Cantor a hundred years ago”.201 While Dean Zimmerman, somewhat more reservedly, tells 
us that “these paradoxes are significantly diffused by Cantor’s discovery of the distinction 
between denumerably and non-denumerably infinite numbers”202 Elsewhere, Sider 
nonchalantly asserts that “traditional arguments” against point-sized objects “are 
unconvincing since we now know that theories of point-sized things are mathematically 
coherent”.203 But I think this is far too quick. For even if one concedes that such theories are 
mathematically coherent, does it necessarily follow that they are metaphysically coherent? It is 
one thing to demonstrate that within a certain abstract, idealized model that the numbers 
somehow add up, but it is quite another to suggest that this is what the world is really like. 
The fact that point-sized objects must be infinitely dense is referred to by Simons, somewhat 
politely, as a “minor embarrassment” of any theories which posit them. But I 
wholeheartedly agree with him when he says that whilst this may be acceptable for the 
physicist, or mathematician, whom are dealing with idealized models or theories, these 
                                                 
201 Sorensen (2003), 56-7 
202 Zimmerman (1996a), 1 
203 Sider (forthcoming), 29 
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“minor embarrassments” are simply not acceptable for the metaphysician. The 
metaphysician must take them “literally and seriously”.204 The difficulties with point-sized 
objects are very real. They cannot simply be ‘mathematised’ away.  
 In his 1951 paper, Max Black demonstrates how mathematical solutions to 
metaphysical problems are not always satisfactory.205 That is, he shows that whilst they may 
be mathematically satisfactory, they will not always satisfy the metaphysician, since they 
won’t always get to the metaphysical heart of the matter. Black’s particular target is Zeno’s 
paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. Zeno supposed that Achilles could never catch up with 
the tortoise, since before he could do so, he would first have to reach the point at which the 
tortoise started, from which the tortoise would then have moved. But this sequence would 
go on infinitely, since although the distance the tortoise moves decreases in each case, it will 
always have a non-zero value. Thus the thrust of the argument is that Achilles will never 
catch up because in order to do so he will have to travel an infinite number of non-zero 
distances. Black’s point is that the mathematical solution to this paradox, offered by 
Whitehead (among others), doesn’t really solve anything at all.206 He says of the solution: “It 
tells us, correctly, when and where Achilles and the Tortoise will meet, if they meet; but it 
fails to show that Zeno is wrong in claiming they could not meet”.207 It is as though the 
mathematics deals with only one side of the paradox and leaves the other side untouched. 
But therefore it remains a paradox; it is no good telling us when Achilles will catch the 
tortoise if at the same time it is supposed he can never catch the tortoise! It would be akin to 
claiming that one had solved Russell’s paradox by merely asserting that the barber actually 
shaves himself!  
 Similarly in this case, whilst mathematics can provide us with coherent models that 
posit point-sized particles, they fail to get to the metaphysical heart of the matter. The 
mathematical models employed by physicists will often take fundamental particles to be 
point-sized, but this is only for theoretical convenience. Physicists do not take the particles 
to actually be point-sized, but merely maintain that they are small enough for the difference 
to be theoretically negligible. This is why consequences like infinite density only represent 
                                                 
204 Simons (2004), 373 
205 Black, (1951) 
206 Whitehead (1929), 107 
207 Black (1951), 93 
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minor embarrassments for physicists since, as Simons points out, these consequences are 
merely a “product of idealization”.208 But the punctal nihilist does not claim simples to be 
point-sized purely for theoretical convenience. Rather, she claims that all matter actually is 
point-sized. Thus the punctal nihilist has to take the claim that point-sized simples must be 
infinitely dense at face value. But this, it seems to me, is no minor embarrassment; it is surely 
a much more serious consequence than that. But it is a consequence that the punctal nihilist 
must accept, all the same. Thus theories which posit only point-sized particles may well be, 
as Sider says, mathematically coherent. But that only tells one side of the story. Their 
metaphysical coherence is in serious doubt, since they postulate that all matter is infinitely 
dense.   
 At this point, one may reasonably ask what is so bad about infinite density. The 
punctal nihilist may well be happy to simply accept that point-sized simples, if massive, 
must be infinitely dense, and have done with it. That is, I suppose, a possible response. But it 
is surely a costly or counter-intuitive one. Admittedly, I cannot demonstrate that infinite 
density is impossible, but it is surely not something to be taken lightly. And remember that 
the punctal nihilist does not only have to accept that it is merely possible for an object to be 
infinitely dense, but rather, she has to accept the much more significant conclusion that all 
massive objects are infinitely dense. It is my view that such a conclusion is, at best, far-
fetched, and at worst, bordering on the absurd.  
 The monist, by contrast, can sidestep the whole issue. There is no room for point-
sized objects in the monist’s ontology, and because of this, there is no room for the problems 
that come with them. Simons’s concerns about infinite density certainly don’t apply to the 
monist, for the monist will simply assert that it is the world that instantiates fundamental 
properties like mass (because the world is the only candidate object available to instantiate 
properties), and yes, the world will have a non-zero mass, but since it also has a non-zero 
extension, no problems arise. Zeno-type concerns that extended objects cannot be broken 
down entirely into non-extended objects will also not apply to the monist, for the obvious 
reason that the monist takes there to be only one extended object, which cannot be broken 
down at all.  
                                                 
208 Simons (2004), 374 
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On the face of it, then, monism should be the default position for the compositional 
nihilist. Intermediate nihilism should be rejected since most versions of it are objectionably 
arbitrary, and those which are not entail significant and problematic views about the nature 
of space. Punctal nihilism should be rejected because it entails the undesirable consequence 
that all matter must be infinitely dense. Other considerations notwithstanding, then, 
monism should be the nihilism of choice.   
 
 
 
§5.3. Gunk 
It is a fairly common assumption, among both philosophers and scientists alike, that matter 
must ‘bottom out’ at some point, in the form of fundamental, or elementary, particles. In 
other words, the assumption is that, at base, matter is constituted by some very small, 
fundamental minima which are themselves indivisible: we can divide macroscopic objects 
into smaller and smaller bits, but there is a point at which that division must stop. The 
standard model of modern physics, for instance, says that the ultimate constituents of all 
matter are quarks and leptons, and that they are simple – they have no parts. Leptons and 
quarks, we are told, are the ultimate building blocks of reality.  
But what if this assumption is wrong? What if it turns out that these elementary 
particles do in fact have parts, and that moreover, those parts have parts, and so on ad 
infinitum? The question is: why should we assume that there is a fundamental layer, at 
which matter can no longer be divided, at all? The possibility of matter which is divisible ‘all 
the way down’ has been postulated by a number of philosophers throughout history. It has 
been said to go back even as far as Anaxagoras, who, according to one interpretation, 
thought that, “every stuff always contains a ‘portion’ or ‘share’, however small, of every 
other stuff”.209 But it was David Lewis who is largely responsible for the recent surge of 
interest in this intriguing conception of matter. He introduced the term “atomless gunk”, to 
apply to any substance “whose parts all have further proper parts”.210 This terminology 
seems to have stuck, and interest in gunk has increased ever since.211 
                                                 
209 Barnes (2001), 189 
210 Lewis (1991), 20.  
211 See Hudson (2007) for a useful introduction to some of the recent research into gunk. 
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 Gunk presents a problem for the compositional nihilist. For nihilism says that 
everything is mereologically simple, but gunk is, by definition, mereologically complex. So if 
any gunk were ever to be discovered, it would instantly sound the death knell for any type 
of compositional nihilism. But I don’t think many nihilists are particularly worried about 
that, because gunk is not really the type of thing that can be discovered. We saw in chapter 2 
how empirical research is seemingly incapable of revealing the mereological structure of 
material objects. So if one cannot empirically demonstrate that matter is mereologically 
complex, it seems to follow that one cannot demonstrate it to be infinitely complex either. 
Despite this, however, the threat of gunk remains. The believer in gunk does not have to 
produce any actual gunk to undermine the nihilist’s thesis, but rather, she has only to show 
that such stuff is possible. The threat of gunk hinges on the fact that nihilists usually take 
nihilism to be not only true, but necessarily true. With this modal assumption in place, the 
threat from the possibility of gunk can formalised in the following argument212: 
 
1. If compositional nihilism (CN) is true, then it is necessarily true.  
2. If CN is necessarily true, then all matter, at all possible worlds, is mereologically 
simple. 
3. If gunk is possible, then there is a possible world where matter is gunky (and thus 
mereologically complex).  
4. Therefore, if gunk is possible, CN is not necessarily true.  
5. Gunk is possible. 
6. Therefore CN is not necessarily true. 
7. Therefore, from 1, CN is not true. 
There are a number of ways in which a nihilist could respond to this argument, some of 
which show more promise than others. Importantly, though, the degree to which a nihilist 
response succeeds against this argument will depend, I claim, on the variety of nihilism one 
endorses. In particular, I think it can be shown that the responses available to the monist can 
be considered vastly more successful than those available to the punctal nihilist. The threat 
from the possibility of gunk can, somewhat ironically, strengthen the case for monism. 
                                                 
212 An argument of this type was first given by Sider (1993a), although the precise formulation is slightly 
different. 
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 The first way a nihilist could respond would be to renege on premise 1. In other 
words the nihilist could weaken her nihilism somewhat by claiming that whilst it is true, it is 
not necessarily true. On this view, the world would be seen as being a nihilistic one, 
compositionally speaking, but only as a matter of contingent fact; there would be nothing to 
preclude the fact that it might not have been so. This view would nullify the argument, for it 
is entirely compatible with the possibility of gunk. But its advantages come at a steep cost. 
The cost is that to endorse this view, one must also endorse the view that the facts about 
mereology are contingent. There is a vast array of conflicting views about mereology, as has 
been shown in the preceding chapters, but despite this, it is widely agreed that whatever the 
facts of mereology are, they hold with metaphysical necessity. And there is good reason for 
this. Mereology is a paradigmatically metaphysical subject matter. Its possibilities are to be 
explored with a priori reasoning, and thus the conclusions one reaches should be considered 
a priori truths. At least, this is the orthodox view on these matters. One or two contemporary 
thinkers are beginning to question this orthodoxy,213 but that is not a path I wish to pursue 
here. Moreover, many of the arguments given earlier in support of compositional nihilism 
are a priori arguments, and it strikes me that the very force of these arguments would be 
severely undermined were one to maintain that their conclusions were only contingently 
true. Thankfully, however, and as I shall presently show, one does not have to endorse this 
controversial claim about the modal status of mereology in order to overcome the argument 
from the possibility of gunk.214  
 A much more promising response to the argument from gunk is to deny premise 5. 
That is, to deny that gunk is possible at all. This response too would nullify the argument, 
but of course, it will need some independent support. For lots of philosophers think gunk is 
possible.215 There are, I suppose, reasons to think that gunk is possible. Inductive reasoning 
may be touted here, for instance, in that over the course of the last few centuries, science has 
continued to discover increasingly small particles of matter. It used to be thought that atoms 
were the ultimate constituents of matter (hence the name ‘atom’, presumably), until sub-
                                                 
213 See Cameron (2007). Peter Simons, too, suggests that the laws of mereology may not be knowable a priori. See 
Simons (2006), 597.  
214 I will revisit the issue of the contingency of mereology in the next chapter. 
215 See, for example, Zimmerman (1996a); Sider (1993); Forrest (2004); to name but a few contemporary thinkers. 
Going further back, Leibniz was an ardent defender of infinitely divisible matter. Van Cleve (2008) believes that 
gunk is not only possible, but that in actuality, “all is gunk” (p.9) 
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atomic structure was discovered, at which point it was presumed that sub-atomic particles 
(protons, and neutrons, and so on) were the bedrock. But then of course it was discovered 
that these too were made of smaller things – quarks and leptons. So the inductive argument 
appeals to this progressive sequence and suggests it will, or at least could, continue ad 
infinitum, such that for each smaller layer we uncover, there will be a further layer below at 
which objects are smaller still. But as has been noted elsewhere, this inductive argument 
should not be taken all that seriously.216 After all, to infer an infinite sequence from such a 
small number of cases is philosophically naive at best, and at worst, methodologically 
irresponsible.  
 Perhaps the most common reason for thinking that gunk is possible is that it is 
conceivable. Some thinkers consider this to be simply evident, and that this evident 
conceivability is a sure sign of possibility. Jonathan Schaffer, for instance, thinks the view 
that matter is gunky is not only conceivable, but that it is “if anything the more natural 
doctrine [as opposed to the atomistic view of matter]” and that the existence of opposing 
views merely “evidences brainwashing”.217 Likewise, Ted Sider says: “Surely, there are both 
atomistic possible worlds and gunk worlds”, before going on to assert: “I find the possibility 
of gunk so compelling that I am willing to reject any theory that rules it out”.218 And J.R.G. 
Williams unfalteringly states that “a world of infinite descent is conceivable [...] all parties 
will agree”.219 
 I remain unconvinced. Firstly, I am not convinced that gunk is as easily conceivable 
as is often suggested, to the point that I sometimes genuinely wonder exactly what it is that is 
being conceived of when it is stated that one is conceiving of atomless gunk. The definition of 
gunk is easy to understand, sure, in terms of the semantic content of the terms and concepts 
employed. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that gunk itself is easily conceivable. I have a 
good grasp of the terms ‘five’, ‘side’ and ‘square’, for instance, but that doesn’t mean I can 
conceive of a five-sided square. So just because I can understand what you mean when you 
tell me that gunk is matter whose parts all have further parts, that does not necessarily mean 
I can conceive of such stuff existing, let alone conceive what it would actually be like. 
                                                 
216 See Sider (forthcoming), 29-30 
217 Schaffer (2003), 502. For the record, I do not find Schaffer’s arguments for this view at all convincing. 
218 Sider (1993a), 288. Interestingly, Sider later recanted on this, and is now a committed punctal nihilist. See Sider 
(forthcoming). 
219 Williams (2006), 503 
141 | P a g e  
 
Perhaps this is just a sign of a limited imagination on my part (in the gunk case, of course, 
not the five-sided square case; I refuse to believe anyone who says they can conceive of one 
of those) – that I am willing to accept.220 But that is fortunately of little consequence, because 
importantly, even if it is conceded that gunk is perfectly conceivable, that does not entail 
that it should be considered a metaphysical possibility. Compositional nihilism rules out the 
possibility of lots of things that are easily conceivable. For if nihilism is a necessary truth, 
then it rules out the possibility of any composite objects whatsoever. But composite objects 
are not inconceivable! I can quite easily conceive that some simples arranged table-wise, say, 
may compose a table. But that does not pose any threat to my nihilism. It is simply a 
consequence of nihilism, which is argued for on entirely independent grounds, that there are 
no such things, necessarily, as tables. Tables and chairs and cats and dogs are ruled out as 
metaphysical impossibilities.221 And that is despite their evident conceivability.  
 It is fine for metaphysical theories to rule out certain types of entity, or certain types 
of possibilities. All metaphysical theories will do that to some extent. Metaphysical theories 
of all stripes are often in tension with other doctrines; they often deny the existence of the 
posits of common sense, for example, or the posits of science, or whatever. The important 
thing is, however, that if these theories want to be taken seriously whilst maintaining that 
much of what common sense or science states is false, they must be able to offer some kind 
of explanation as to why these falsities are so commonly believed. They must be able to be 
reconciled with one another. Punctal nihilism, for instance, denies that there are chairs. But it 
does not deny that we can sit down! For it comes ready furnished with a plausible 
explanation of why we ordinarily think that there are chairs. There are no chairs, says the 
punctal nihilist, but there are simples arranged chair-wise. And the sentence “there is a 
chair” is not strictly true, but you are excused for thinking it is true because there is a 
relevant paraphrase of that sentence (“there are simples arranged chair-wise”) that is true. 
The tension between common sense and nihilism is relieved, then, by the provision of these 
suitable explanations. The illusion of chairs is explained away by the existence, and 
arrangement, of simples. 
                                                 
220 Although, in the next chapter I will say a little more about one should be suspicious about the conceivability of 
gunk.  
221 At least, if they are considered composites. There is nothing to rule out a mereologically simple cat. 
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But what about the illusion of gunk? Many philosophers, as we have seen, think 
gunk is a genuine possibility. Certain scientists and philosophers of science, too, are positing 
gunk, or theories of gunky space-time.222 Schaffer even goes so far as to suggest that “the 
folk may be committed to atomless gunk”.223 So if nihilism is to maintain its plausibility in 
the face of such commitment to gunk, it must be able to explain away the illusion of gunk. Just 
as it denies tables and chairs but replaces them with simples arranged table-wise and chair-
wise, so if it denies gunk, it must replace it with some suitable explanation. But it is hard to 
see what this explanation could be. The sentence “there could be some gunk” cannot be 
paraphrased with “there could be some simples arranged gunk-wise”. It makes no sense to 
say that simples could be arranged gunk-wise, because to be arranged gunk-wise would 
involve, by definition, being arranged in such a way that there are no simples! The illusion of 
gunky objects cannot be explained away by the positing of punctal simples.  
Monism, by contrast, does not have the same problems when dealing with the 
possibility of gunk. Obviously, the monist, just like any nihilist, must deny that gunk is 
genuinely possible, since it would involve the instantiation of parthood relations (and 
multiple objects) which the nihilist eschews. But the monist, it seems, can deal with the 
illusion of gunk perfectly well. That is, the monist can explain why it might seem like gunk is 
a genuine possibility, whilst the punctal nihilist is left floundering. The monist maintains 
that the world is a single, mereologically simple object. She suggests that all illusions that 
the world has parts are to be explained in terms of the world’s properties. So it may seem 
like the world has table-like parts, but it doesn’t. Rather, it has the property of table-ness 
distributed in those areas we posit the tables. Likewise, it might seem like those alleged 
tables themselves have parts: legs, tops, molecules, or whatever. But, of course, they don’t. 
Rather, the world has various properties (table-leg-ness, and so on) that are responsible for 
the illusion of these things. The important thing is, that if this explanatory strategy is 
accepted, then it seems to explain the illusion of gunk just as well as it explains the illusion 
of more ordinary composites like tables and their legs. If the world can instantiate the 
property of table-ness, which explains the appearance of tables, then there is no reason why 
the world can’t instantiate the property of gunkiness, which would explain the appearance 
                                                 
222 See, for example, Artzenius (2008) 
223 Schaffer (2003), 502 
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of gunk. In more general terms, once it is recognised that the monist can explain the illusion 
that the world has parts at all, then there seems no reason why any particular parts should be 
more difficult to explain than others. If the world can instantiate properties that give rise to 
the illusion that it is composed of galaxies or molecules, then it could just as easily 
instantiate a property that gives rise to the illusion that it is composed of gunk. 
The key difference between the punctal nihilist and the monistic nihilist, in terms of 
their explanatory strategies, is the order of explanation. The punctal nihilist starts at the 
minimally small and explains upwards; whereas the monist starts with the maximally large 
and explains downwards. And this is why the punctal nihilist has a problem with gunk, 
because even if you start with minimally small entities, to explain gunk is to explain 
downwards even further. But the punctal nihilist cannot go any further down! By 
stipulation, the minimally small simples represent the ultimate bottom layer, so there is 
nowhere left to go. Since all the monist’s explanations of ordinary objects are already 
downwards, in the sense in which the term is currently being used, then there is no obstacle 
to letting those explanations go on infinitely. Gunk is perfectly explicable in monistic terms.  
Gunk, then, presents a problem for the compositional nihilist. The nihilist cannot 
allow that gunk is a genuine possibility (at least, not if she wants to hold that her nihilism is 
a necessary truth). But the punctal nihilist cannot even explain the illusion of gunk – why it 
is that it at least seems that gunk is conceivable, and thus possible. The monist has no such 
problems. So if the compositional nihilist takes the illusion of gunk seriously, then she has 
good reason to prefer monistic nihilism over punctal nihilism.   
 
 
§5.4. A Very Brief Word on Junk 
In the interests of balance, I feel that I should say a least a few words here on what has been 
called ‘Junk’.224 One can think of Junk as a kind of weird and wonderful alter ego of Gunk. 
For whilst a gunky world is one in which everything has proper parts, a junky world is one 
in which everything is a proper part. In a junky world, then, there is no maximal fusion 
(what one would ordinarily call ‘The Universe’) than contains everything else as proper 
                                                 
224 The term is from Schaffer (2010c), 64. 
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parts. Rather, a junky world is a world consisting of “an infinite plurality of objects such that 
each thing in the plurality is a proper part of something else in the plurality”.225  
 Junk has the potential to threaten Monism in the same way that Gunk threatens 
Punctal nihilism. Of course, all versions of nihilism will deny that Junk is a genuine 
possibility, because junk is, by definition, mereologically complex. However, if Junk is 
conceivable, then just as was the case with gunk, the nihilist needs to be able to explain the 
illusion of Junk. But this time around, it is the monist who is going to struggle. The punctal 
nihilist, by contrast, should have no trouble. For the punctal nihilist explains the illusion of 
complex objects from the bottom up, i.e. she starts off with minimally small simples, and 
explains how they can be arranged to give the illusion of larger, complex objects. If this 
strategy works at all, then there is no reason why it could not continue infinitely. I.e. if we 
can conceive of an infinite plurality of simples, then we should also be able to conceive how 
such a plurality could give rise to the illusion of an infinite hierarchy of ever increasing 
complex objects. Thus the illusion of junk is explained.  
 The monist, by contrast, starts from the top and explains downwards. That is, she 
begins with the world itself, a maximally large simple, and explains the illusion of its having 
parts in terms of its properties. But it is difficult to see how the world could instantiate a 
property that could give rise to the illusion that the world itself was a proper part of some 
other, bigger, object. That would be a strange property indeed. In fact, the whole top-down 
explanatory strategy that the monist employs looks doomed to failure when it comes to 
junk. Because if the world was junky there would be no top level at all – the monist’s 
explanation could never even get off the ground! Junk, therefore, has the potential to 
undermine monism. 
 I reject the threat from junk solely because I reject the claim that it is even 
conceivable. I have already expressed doubts that gunk is genuinely conceivable, but in 
comparison to Junk, gunk is veritably ordinary fare. For junk is plain weird. Too weird for me, 
it must be said. And I am not alone in thinking this. Einar Bohn is the only contemporary 
philosopher I know of who endorses the possibility of Junk.226 But, of course, weirdness is 
                                                 
225 Bohn (2009a), 29 
226 See Bohn (2009a; 2009b). Bohn claims, however, that Junk is backed with a little authority from philosophical 
history, since he claims that Leibniz and Whitehead believed the actual world to be junky. 
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not enough to simply reject something out of hand.227 To show why I think that junk is 
inconceivable, I invite you now to try to conceive of some. I think you will struggle. Firstly, 
one should note that you cannot conceive of a piece of junk that has a finite size. If that is 
what you were conceiving of (i.e. some medium-sized lump of junky stuff), then you were 
not, I’m afraid, conceiving of junk. To show why this is so, assume for reductio that you had 
a finite-sized piece of junk, J. Let’s say that J is one metre cubed. This would mean that 
within that J there is a maximally sized part, i.e. a part that is one metre cubed. But this piece 
cannot be a proper part of anything else, because by stipulation, it is the largest bit of junk 
there is in J, and for x to be a proper part of something entails that x is smaller than that 
something. So therefore we have a contradiction. I.e. J has a part that is not a proper part, yet 
J is meant to be junky, such that all of its parts are proper parts. Thus we have to conclude 
that if a junky object is possible at all, it must be infinitely large.  
 But this is not the main problem. The main problem I have is that in talking of a 
junky object at all, one is already in danger of descending into incoherence. For in conceiving 
of an object, any object, one seems to be conceiving of the whole object. But I don’t think it 
makes sense to talk about a whole piece of junk. Because talking of a whole implies that you 
are talking of all of the object. But if that’s right then what you are talking of can’t be a 
proper part of anything else, or you wouldn’t actually have been talking about all of it. So in 
fact, you can’t have been talking about junk at all. In short, then, I fail to see how one can 
conceive, and I mean genuinely conceive, of junk. Jonathan Schaffer seems to take a similar 
view. He says: “No world – providing that worlds are understood as possible concrete 
cosmoi – could contain worldless junk because a world that contained junk would be an 
entity not a proper part of another entity at that world. A world would top-off the junk”.228 It 
is for this reason that I reject the threat of gunk. I deny that it is either possible or 
conceivable. The monist cannot explain the illusion of junk, but neither can anyone else, 
because there is actually no illusion there to explain. 
 
 
 
                                                 
227 For I am sure that there are a number of philosophers who would dismiss the thesis of monism that I am 
presently defending as plain weird.  
228 Schaffer (2010c), 65 
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§5.5. The Problem of Emergence 
Emergence is a term applied to events or properties, or sometimes just phenomena in 
general. For clarity, I will restrict my focus to emergent properties, although not a great deal 
should hang on this restriction. An emergent property is a property of an object or system 
that cannot be explained or accounted for solely in terms of the properties of that object’s or 
system’s parts. These properties emerge at a certain level, and cannot be reduced to 
properties instantiated by objects at a lower level. Emergent properties are, in this sense, 
irreducible.  
Emergence is somewhat of a hot topic in contemporary discussion. Over the last few 
decades, interest in emergent phenomena has been rekindled thanks to the work of a 
number of notable philosophers.229 It would be fair to say that over recent years, there has 
been a resurgence of emergence. The most common forum in which emergence is discussed 
is within the philosophy of mind. For it is often thought that there are certain aspects of 
consciousness that are emergent, i.e. cannot be reduced purely to properties of cerebral cells. 
The thought is that intentional properties or mental states (things like qualia) are so entirely 
distinct in character from the neurological properties that are instantiated by parts of the 
brain, that they cannot be explicable purely in terms of those properties. They may well be 
caused by activity in the brain, yet they emerge holistically as being far greater than the sum 
of their causal beginnings. Another quite distinct field in which emergence plays a 
prominent role is quantum mechanics. Very roughly, the thought is that certain composite 
quantum objects or systems (often referred to as ‘entangled systems’) can exhibit properties 
that are quite inexplicable in terms of the object’s/system’s sub-atomic constituents alone.  
I will not be going into any great detail about either neuroscience or quantum 
mechanics in what follows, for I am an expert on neither and, moreover, it would lead us 
unnecessarily far astray from the point of the argument. But thankfully the argument can be 
made without having to plumb the depths of these densely technical areas of modern 
science. The basic thrust of the argument is that emergent properties seem to pose a serious 
problem for punctal nihilism. At base, the problem is that punctal nihilism is very much a 
reductive theory in spirit. It aims to reduce all purported macroscopic objects and events to 
                                                 
229 For an excellent collection of essays on emergence see Beckerman, Flohr, & Kim, (eds.) (1992). See also, 
Clayton & Davies (eds.) (2006).  
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objects and events at the microscopic scale.230 Indeed it says that the only things there are 
exist at the microscopic scale. But reductionism and emergence clash. This is because 
emergent properties resist reduction – that is part of the very nature of emergence. Emergent 
properties are properties that emerge only at specific levels of ontology (specifically, higher-
levels than the microscopic level). But punctal nihilism doesn’t admit different ‘levels’ of 
ontology. It posits a single level: there are punctal simples and nothing else. It seems that 
emergent properties and punctal nihilism are incompatible.  
The problem that emergent properties pose for punctal nihilism is quite 
straightforward. Punctal nihilists explain the alleged existence of composite objects and their 
alleged properties, purely in terms of punctal simples. But if certain properties of an alleged 
composite object are taken to be emergent, then they can’t be explained purely in terms of 
the simples that allegedly compose that object. So emergent properties have no place in a 
punctal nihilist ontology – for there are no candidate objects in that ontology to instantiate 
them.  
 The possibility of emergent properties, and the problem it causes for punctal 
nihilism, is analogous in many respects to the possibility of gunk, and the problem that 
follow from it. I.e. since punctal nihilism is (usually) taken to be necessarily true by its 
proponents, then the very possibility of emergent properties is enough to undermine it. 
Thus the punctal nihilist, it seems, will have to deny that emergent properties are even 
possible. Furthermore, just as in the gunk case, the monistic nihilist is not susceptible to the 
argument in the way the punctal nihilist is. Since the monist’s explanations of worldly 
phenomena are always ‘top-down’, then an alleged emergent sub-world property is no more 
difficult to explain than any alleged sub-world property.  
 Consider an example. Take an ordinary human being – let’s call him Roger. Roger 
has lots of ordinary human properties. He has brown hair and blue eyes; he is six feet tall; he 
weighs seventy-five kilos; and so on and so forth. Now both the punctal nihilist and the 
monist will take Roger’s alleged existence, and his alleged properties, with a good pinch of 
salt. Neither will actually accept that he exists, as a macroscopic composite object in his own 
right. But both will have their own explanations of why it at least appears that there is a 
                                                 
230 Indeed even this is generous. Strictly speaking, the nihilist does not reduce macroscopic entities to their 
microscopic constituents but, rather, she eliminates all macroscopic objects. But the argument is unaffected by this 
fact. 
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composite object – Roger – which has the properties described. The punctal nihilist will say 
that there are simples arranged Roger-wise, and that the arrangement of those simples, 
along with the fundamental properties they instantiate, make it such that it appears that the 
alleged object they compose – Roger – exists, and has the properties that are ascribed to him. 
In contrast, the monist will say that the world instantiates certain maximal properties that 
give rise to the appearance of a six foot tall, brown-haired, blue-eyed, seventy-five kilo man 
– Roger. The world is, in a certain spatio-temporally localised manner, Rogerish. These types 
of explanation should hopefully be quite familiar by now, and in this case are, so far at least, 
unproblematic.  
 But now let’s suppose that, as any ordinary human being would, Roger instantiates 
certain mental properties. Specifically, let’s say that Roger has the intentional property of 
believing it will rain tomorrow. Let’s call this property ‘X’. Now let’s suppose that the best 
current theories of neuroscience state that intentional mental states, like X are emergent. 
That is, they emerge when certain brain activity occurs, but crucially, they are not reducible 
to the properties and relations instantiated by the fundamental particles that (allegedly) 
compose the brain.  
 The monist can explain this situation perfectly well, whereas the punctal nihilist is 
going to struggle. The punctal nihilist, of course, can make reference only to the 
fundamental particles (punctal simples) and the properties and relations they instantiate, 
when providing an accurate and literally true explanation of this scenario. But ex hypothesi, 
describing the arrangement of the punctal simples, and the properties they instantiate will 
not be enough to describe the intentional mental state that is also present – since the 
arrangement of the punctal simples and their properties alone do not fix the intentional states 
that are also occurring. The monist, by contrast, has no problem. Let me demonstrate why 
this is so. Let’s call the property the world instantiates that gives rise to the appearance of a 
composite object, Roger, ‘world-property A’ (WPA). Let WPA include all the purely physical 
properties we would ascribe to Roger from his hair colour and height, right down to the 
atomic structure and electrical activity of his brain. Now let’s call the property that the 
world instantiates when Roger believes it will rain tomorrow ‘WPB’, and the property the 
world instantiates when Roger does not believe it rain tomorrow ‘WPC’. It seems evident 
that there is no logical obstruction to the world simultaneously instantiating either WPA and 
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WPB, or, WPA and WPC.231 And this shows that the monist’s explanation is perfectly 
consistent with the thought that certain intentional states (such as believing it will rain 
tomorrow) are emergent, i.e. are not reducible to the microphysical activity occurring in the 
brain.  
Overall, there is a strong conclusion and a weak conclusion that one can draw from 
these remarks. A strong conclusion would be that there are emergent properties, and thus 
since punctal nihilism is incompatible with such properties, it must be false. A weaker 
conclusion would be to say that emergent properties seem to be at the very least a genuine 
possibility. Since punctal nihilism is incompatible with the existence of such properties, it 
rules out even the possibility that there may be such things. This should count against it as a 
theory, particularly because it seems most plausible that emergent properties are at the very 
least possible. This is made even more apparent when contrasted with monism, which has 
no problems accommodating emergent properties. I think the weaker conclusion is probably 
the more prudent of the two, but either way, the moral seems clear. If you want to be a 
nihilist but you don’t want to rule out emergent properties, then you should be a monist.  
 
 
§5.5.1 A Potential Response 
There is, I think, a way in which the punctal nihilist could respond to the problem of 
emergence. Specifically, I think that the question the punctal nihilist should consider is this: 
why should the existence of emergent properties imply the existence of composite objects? 
Just because new properties emerge at certain levels, this doesn’t seem to entail that new 
objects emerge also. Why can the nihilist not say that when simples are arranged in particular 
ways they collectively instantiate new properties which are not reducible to the properties 
each simple instantiates individually?232 To return to our hypothetical character, Roger, for 
instance, the nihilist has no need to posit a new, composite entity (Roger’s Brain, say) to 
instantiate the emergent property X, but rather, she can just state that the particles arranged 
brain-wise collectively instantiate X. There is no logical obstruction to this proposal, as far as 
                                                 
231 There is, of course, a logical obstruction to the world instantiating WPB and WPC simultaneously, since even 
an illusory object cannot be both p and not-p, but this is by the by. 
232 This solution was mentioned to me in conversation by Ross Cameron. To my knowledge, it has not been 
explored (let alone defended) in print, apart from a few cursory remarks from Ted Sider. See Sider (forthcoming), 
27 
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I can see, so it is worthy of consideration. But it is certainly in need of a little clarification. In 
particular, the notion of collective instantiation needs some explanation, since it is this notion 
that is doing all the work which the nihilist requires.  
 The idea is essentially that instantiation need not be a one-one relation.233 That is to 
say, it needn’t always hold between a single object and a single property. Rather, we should 
view instantiation as a many-one relation, in that many objects can, collectively, instantiate a 
single property. One may say, for instance, that the xs collectively instantiate F-ness. Now it 
is important to note that in saying this I do not mean that the collection, or aggregate, or set, 
(or any other collective term) of xs instantiates F-ness. And neither do I mean that each of the 
xs instantiates F-ness individually. Rather, the xs collectively instantiate F-ness. To help 
explain, there is a potential analogy to be drawn here with the thesis that composition is 
identity. As we explored in chapter 3, those who endorse CAI endorse a somewhat different 
relation of identity than that which is classically recognised. They take identity to be a many-
one relation. So when one says that a composite object is identical to its parts, one is not 
saying that it is identical to the sum of its parts (for that is just a case of self-identity), nor that 
it is identical to each of its individual parts. Rather, one is saying that it is identical to its 
parts collectively. The same kind of idea is being employed here, but concerning the notion of 
instantiation, rather than identity.  
 One will also remember from chapter 3 that there are some significant concerns with 
the claim that identity can link many things to one thing. Most importantly, it was suggested 
that CAI was simply incoherent, since it would involve objects simultaneously instantiating 
incompatible properties. In contrast, however, many-one instantiation does not immediately 
appear incoherent. Intuitively, many-one instantiation is no way near as objectionable as 
many-one identity. To illustrate, consider an example. Suppose there was a large crowd of 
people, each of which were humming a single note at a fairly modest volume – a volume 
which on its own, no-one could reasonably call loud. Now if there were enough people 
engaged in this activity, it is reasonable to think that the resultant sound would be of a 
volume sufficient to be reasonably called loud. In such a situation one may think it 
appropriate to say that the crowd is being loud. Now of course, one may be a little suspicious 
                                                 
233 In fact, I don’t think instantiation is a relation at all. However, for present purposes I will call it a relation. It 
won’t affect the argument.  
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of admitting a new entity – a crowd – to which the property being loud is being attributed. It 
is not a single entity, after all, which is making the noise – it is the individual people, each 
making their own noise. But as was originally stipulated, no individual is being loud. In such 
a case, then, it may seem appropriate to say that the people collectively instantiate the 
property being loud, even though no single individual is being loud.  
 A few qualifications are needed. Firstly, I am not for a minute suggesting that the 
crowd’s being loud is an emergent property. For it is quite clear that the cumulative volume is 
reducible to the sum of the volumes of each individual hum. Neither am I suggesting that 
this is some kind of paradoxical situation which one can only avoid if one countenances 
many-one instantiation – it is clearly not. All I am aiming to show, however, is the much 
more modest conclusion that it is at least coherent (or perhaps even more timidly, it is at 
least not obviously incoherent) to suggest that many-one instantiation could be invoked to 
explain such a situation. The positing of many-one instantiation does not jar with us in the 
way that positing many-one identity does. The point is, then, that one should at least be 
open to accepting it as a possibility.  
 The nihilist, if equipped with a coherent notion of collective instantiation, has a clear 
route to solving the problem of emergent properties. Sure there are emergent properties at 
the macroscopic level, she will say, but that doesn’t mean that there must be some 
macroscopic entities there to instantiate them. Rather, they are instantiated collectively by 
microscopic simples. So a nihilist could admit that intentional mental states, say, are 
emergent properties, but merely maintain that they arise when simples arranged in a 
particular way collectively instantiate consciousness. No extra entity is needed. Nihilism and 
emergence are quite compatible.  
 I think that this response is worth taking seriously. Indeed I take it seriously enough 
to concede that it weakens the original argument significantly. But I maintain that it does 
only weaken it, not destroy it. For there are certain costs and concerns associated with this 
response that one can avoid entirely if one opts for monism over punctal nihilism, and that 
in turn gives one reason to favour monism over punctal nihilism. In particular, one has to 
endorse this new and unfamiliar notion of collective instantiation. And that is in addition to the 
standard notion of singular instantiation, since the punctal nihilist will still have to make use 
of that. So whilst the punctal nihilist may be able to admit the possibility of emergent 
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properties by employing this response, in so doing she is adding some extra ideological 
baggage to her theory – baggage that the monist has no need to take along.  
This extra baggage does represent a theoretical cost, although just how costly one 
takes it to be may vary. At one extreme, the proponent of collective instantiation may assert 
that she is not introducing a new relation at all, but merely using an existing relation 
(instantiation) in a new way (by relating many things to one property), in which case it does 
not look costly at all. But I don’t think this is very convincing. Proponents of CAI have tried 
to make a similar move by asserting that they are employing one and the same relation of 
identity, but just using it to link many things to one thing. But the same response is available 
in both cases: by employing the relation in this way you are twisting my very understanding 
of what the relation is, to an extent that it no longer looks like the same relation at all. At the 
other extreme, one may reject collective instantiation as incoherent (in the same way that 
CAI is often rejected as incoherent) on the grounds that one simply cannot understand how 
many disparate things could instantiate collectively one and the same property. I don’t think 
this view is very convincing either, however, as it just appears overly obtuse. For as I 
mentioned earlier, collective instantiation just doesn’t seem to be as obviously incoherent as 
CAI. Overall, however, collective instantiation (or any other notion that is invoked to do the 
same work) surely represents some kind of theoretical cost.  
I think that this notion of collective instantiation is a fairly revisionary one, and as 
such, should be considered a significant theoretical cost. To impress why this is, I want to 
draw a comparison between collective instantiation on the one hand, and collective (or 
plural) predication on the other. Collective predication is commonplace in ordinary 
language. We may say, for example, “the soldiers surrounded the building”. The predicate 
surrounded the building is collective and non-distributive, for it applies to all the soldiers 
taken together, but doesn’t apply to any of them individually. (A single soldier cannot 
surround a building). Because of this, then, the predicate is also irreducible, because it can’t 
simply be reduced to a conjunction of each soldier satisfying the predicate (none of them 
satisfy the predicate!). But there is nothing at all mysterious about such predication; we can 
make perfect sense of it.234 So a natural thought may be that collective instantiation is just the 
                                                 
234 Although it does raise certain logical issues, in that the standard logical apparatus of quantifiers and 
predicates struggles to deal with it. See McKay (2006) for an interesting study into this topic. 
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same. Just as we have no problem in understanding what it is for some soldiers to 
(collectively) surround a building, we should have no problem in understanding how some 
particles (collectively) instantiate a property.  
I think this analogy fails. Whilst one should accept that plural predication is 
irreducible in the sense espoused above, one should also note that plural predicates are 
satisfied in virtue of singular predicates being satisfied. That is, the reason the soldiers 
collectively satisfy the predicate surround the building is that each of the individual soldiers 
satisfies some normal singular predicate (e.g. is located here, is located there, etc.). So 
although the predicate is irreducibly plural, it’s obtaining holds in virtue of singular 
predicates and states of affairs. The same cannot be said for collective instantiation, 
however, or at least, not when the collectively instantiated property is emergent. If some xs 
collectively instantiate a property Y, and Y is taken to be emergent, then that instantiation 
does not obtain in virtue of the singular properties that each of the xs instantiate. This is 
because, by stipulation, Y is emergent, so cannot be explained solely in terms of the properties 
instantiated by the individual xs. It is irreducibly collective, and it resists further 
explanation. What this shows, therefore, is a stark disanalogy between collective predication 
and collective instantiation. Collective instantiation is much more revisionary than it might 
initially seem, thus its acceptance should not be taken lightly. It may be able to hand the 
punctal nihilist an escape route from the problem of emergence, but it certainly doesn’t 
come free of charge.  
 
  
§5.6. The Argument from Parsimony – Take I 
Parsimony is often touted as a theoretical virtue in metaphysics.  That is to say that when 
faced with a choice of theories, those which are more economical or simple in some regard 
are often preferred precisely because of that economy or simplicity. The number of entities a 
theory posits, or the number of kinds of entities it posits, or the number of primitive terms it 
employs, are all respects in which simplicity is often valued. Parsimony appeals to those 
philosophers who, like Quine, have a taste for desert landscapes. I should state from the 
outset that I am uncertain as to how much weight parsimony should be afforded when 
weighing up competing theories, and so I am somewhat sceptical of arguments which 
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appeal directly to it. This is not to say that I reject the principle of Occam’s Razor outright, 
but merely that I think it can be significantly blunted through the consideration of other 
significant factors.  
A fairly standard way of expressing Occam’s Razor could be with the following 
conditional: if all other things are equal, then the simpler of the competing theories should 
be preferred. This is a perfectly reasonable principle but it is one that, in practice, will 
seldom come into play. The reason for this is that very rarely are all things equal between 
two theories other than the number of things they posit. That is, the caveat in the antecedent 
of the conditional is crucial, yet often overlooked. My point here is that if there are other 
significant factors in play when weighing up competing theories, it is not at all clear how 
much weight we should give to concerns of parsimony.  
 However, the fact remains that parsimony is often touted as a theoretical advantage. 
So it should be worthwhile for the monist to point out that if one has a taste for desert 
landscapes, one will most likely have a taste for monism too, for when it comes to 
parsimony, monism is right at the front of the pack in a number of different regards.  
 The most obvious way in which monism is parsimonious is down to the number of 
concrete objects it posits. The monist posits only a single concrete object – far fewer than 
most metaphysical theories. Indeed the only way one could claim to be more parsimonious 
in this respect would be to posit no concrete objects at all, and adopt some kind of complete 
nihilism when it comes to material things.235 Of course, the vast majority of theories will 
posit more than a single concrete object, and indeed most of those will posit a great deal 
more.  
To re-concentrate our focus on the issues currently at hand, one will see that 
compositional nihilism, in any of its guises, will be much more parsimonious with respect to 
concrete objects than universalism. For in addition to the simples posited by the nihilist, the 
universalist will posit many more composite objects which those simples are said to 
compose.236 But of course these types of parsimony concerns can also be divisive within 
                                                 
235 See Turner (2011) for an interesting investigation into the possibility of such a theory. Ultimately, Turner 
concludes that it fails. See also Hawthorne & Cortens (1995). 
236 Note that a universalist who doesn’t countenance simples at all (i.e. who thinks matter is gunky) will posit an 
infinite number of concrete objects, making her theory score very poorly on the parsimony scale. At the other end 
of the scale, however, one could be both a monist and a universalist. I.e. accept the universalist principle that for 
any two or more objects there is a further object which they compose, but maintain that there is in fact only a 
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nihilism. The punctal nihilist, for instance, will (presumably) posit a vast quantity of point-
sized simples, whereas the monist posits only one (admittedly, much larger) simple. So one 
may be tempted to appeal to this fact in order to argue for monism over punctal nihilism. 
 As it happens, Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč, argue for monism in exactly this 
fashion.237 As a result of various theoretical considerations, Horgan & Potrč claim that there 
are only three viable theories which meet the criteria they set out for a satisfactory 
ontological view. Those three theories are punctal nihilism, monism and universalism.238 
Having narrowed down their options to three, they make the following claim:  
These three candidates can be ordered with respect to comparative 
ontological parsimony. The simplest is blobjectivism [monism]; it 
maximizes ontological parsimony by countenancing only one real concrete 
object, the blobject [the world].239 
 
Horgan and Potrč do recognise that arguments resting on claims of ontological parsimony 
such as this one will not be entirely decisive, because parsimony represents an issue on 
which “reasonable people can reasonably differ”.240 However, they claim to be persuaded 
that concerns about ontological parsimony clearly show nihilism to be favourable to 
universalism, and among competing nihilisms, swing the balance in favour of monism as 
opposed to punctal nihilism.  
 Despite the fact that Horgan & Potrč’s argument supports my own view, I think there 
are reasons to consider it dubious.  First of all, one could question the value of the type of 
parsimony they invoke. Focusing only on reducing the number of tokens of a particular type 
of entity is to focus on what David Lewis would have called quantitative parsimony. This is to 
be contrasted with qualitative parsimony, which is concerned with reducing the number of 
types of entity posited by a theory.241 Horgan and Potrč seem concerned solely with 
quantitative parsimony, since both monism and punctal nihilism posit the same type of 
objects (concrete simples), but the former posits fewer tokens (one) of that type than the 
                                                                                                                                                        
single object. This would make both theories equal with regard to parsimony, but it is hard to see why anyone 
would endorse such a view, so I will ignore it from here on.  
237 See Horgan & Potrč (2008), 182-9. Horgan & Potrč are the only contemporary philosophers of whom I am 
aware, that defend monism.  
238 Horgan & Potrč (2008) use different, and somewhat zany, terminology for these views (Snobjective 
noncompositionalism, Blobjectivism, and snobjective universalism, respectively), but their content is the same.  
239 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 183 
240 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 190 
241 Lewis (1973), 87 
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latter (many). According to Lewis, however, the value of quantitative parsimony is scant, 
and it is only qualitative parsimony that is to be considered a theoretical virtue. This view is 
shared by many contemporary metaphysicians, such that one could say it is the default view. 
If the default view is correct, then, Horgan & Potrč’s argument is not going to carry much 
weight, since it appeals only to quantitative parsimony.  
 I do not subscribe even to the default view. I think there are cases where quantitative 
parsimony does seem to be of at least some value. These cases tend to be those in which two 
(or more) theories are seemingly identical in all respects except the number of objects they 
posit. Daniel Nolan demonstrates this by asking us to consider some examples. The most 
vivid example he offers concerns the empirical data, and subsequent reasoning, that led 
scientists to posit the neutrino.242 To sum up very briefly, scientists noticed that during the 
process of beta-decay, whereby the nuclei of radioactive atoms emit electrons, the loss of 
energy of the nucleus was greater than the energy accounted for by the electrons emitted. It 
seemed as though some energy (albeit a truly miniscule amount) was literally evaporating 
into nothingness. The problem was, of course, that this would contravene the principle of the 
conservation of energy – the principle which states energy cannot be created or destroyed, 
but only transferred. The ultimate solution was to postulate an extra particle – the neutrino. 
The idea was that as well as emitting an electron during beta-decay, these radioactive nuclei 
must also emit a neutrino, and it is that which accounts for the discrepancy in energy. Thus 
even though it was never physically detected, the neutrino was borne.  
Nolan’s point is that whilst the theory postulates a single neutrino to account for the 
slight energy discrepancy for each electron emitted, it could just as well have postulated 
many more. Let us say that the discrepancy in energy for each electron emitted is x. There is 
nothing stopping the theory from stating that with each electron emitted there are twenty 
neutrinos emitted, each with energy of x/20. Or indeed any other number, n, of neutrinos, 
each with energy of x/n. But of course the theory does not state this – it postulates a single 
neutrino for each discrepancy of energy. Despite the fact that it would be perfectly coherent 
to posit 618 neutrinos for each electron emitted, it would be theoretically gross. And the 
same surely goes for any version of the theory other than the one which posits the minimum 
amount of neutrinos required to fill the explanatory gap – and that amount is one.  
                                                 
242 Nolan (1997), 332 
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 It is hard to know how to argue for such a claim, indeed I don’t claim to able to do so. 
Yet it strikes me as patently obvious that it is true. The postulation of a new particle to 
explain the discrepancy in energy is an ingenious one, but to posit more than one would be 
gratuitous and unacceptable. What this suggests is that quantitative parsimony is in fact a 
theoretical virtue, and that Occam’s Razor is in fact a sensible principle to adhere to. Nolan’s 
example is a rare case in which all other things are equal, and the only way to distinguish the 
possible theories is by the number of entities (in this case neutrinos) they posit. In such a case 
it just seems obvious that the most quantitatively parsimonious theory is the one which 
should be accepted. This in turn suggests that quantitative parsimony is to be valued.  
 So I disagree with Lewis and others who claim that quantitative parsimony is of no 
value. However, I still find Horgan & Potrč’s argument unconvincing. The reason for this is 
that the case over which Horgan & Potrč argue (the very same case that is the subject of this 
chapter) is markedly different from the case of the neutrino highlighted by Nolan. It is 
clearly not the case that punctal nihilism and monism are equal in all respects other than the 
number of simples they posit. The two theories are vastly different in a number of ways. An 
obvious way in which they differ lies in the nature of the simples each theory posits. The 
simples differ in size for a start, for on one account they are minimally small (point-sized) 
and on the other they are maximally large (world-sized). And they are surely going to differ 
in complexity. Since the monist claims there to be only a single concrete simple, it must 
surely exhibit enormous structural complexity if it is to give rise to the rich qualitative 
variation we experience in the world. The point-sized simples of the punctal nihilist, 
however, will presumably be bland and uncomplicated in comparison, or so it would seem 
reasonable to think. These differences alone suggest that there is a lot more to separate these 
two theories than merely the number of entities they posit. Indeed the clear difference in 
nature of the posited simples may even suggest that we are not even counting tokens of the 
same type of thing at all. Yes they are both subsumed under the categories of concrete object 
and mereological simple, but their evident differences may suggest that a more fine-grained 
method of distinction may be required to accurately categorise them. The simples posited by 
the two nihilisms look like very different beasts. In any case, it seems that when focusing on 
plain quantitative parsimony, Occam’s Razor just cannot be applied to separate punctal 
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nihilism and monism, because its crucial caveat is clearly not observed; all other things are 
not equal.  
 
 
§5.6.1 A Brief Digression on Quantitative Parsimony 
To digress slightly from the issue at hand, I think that there is a little more that could be said 
here about the value of quantitative parsimony in general. I previously claimed that certain 
examples, like that given by Nolan about the neutrino, can demonstrate that quantitative 
parsimony can be considered a theoretical virtue, albeit one that is easily outweighed by 
other factors. But this is not the only way to interpret the case. One could maintain (and 
indeed, on reflection, I think this is probably the more sensible option) that quantitative 
parsimony is not in fact a theoretical virtue in the sense that it has any independent, intrinsic 
value, but rather, that it can act as a tie-breaker in otherwise inseparable cases. In the 
example of the neutrino, as presented by Nolan, there was quite literally no difference at all 
between a theory which posited one neutrino and a theory that posited more, other than the 
number of neutrinos posited. And in such a case it seems entirely reasonable to invoke 
quantitative parsimony in favour of the former theory. But is this parsimony of any real 
theoretical value, or is it just an intuitive way of breaking the stalemate? I think perhaps it is 
the latter which is correct.  
To illustrate, imagine an example very similar to Nolan’s, in which the only 
difference is that the energy discrepancies noted during beta-decay varied in magnitude 
from time to time. (Let’s also say, just to keep the example simple that the discrepancies were 
always precise multiples of x, where x was the minimum energy discrepancy noted). Now 
there are various ways in which one could explain this example. On one hand, one could say 
that in each case the nucleus emits a single neutrino, but maintain that neutrinos must vary 
in energy levels from case to case. On the other hand, one could say that neutrinos have fixed 
energy levels (i.e. x), but different numbers of them are emitted from case to case.243 It’s not 
obvious which of these explanations would be better here, although my intuition pulls me 
towards the latter, but what does seem clear is that parsimony doesn’t seem of much 
                                                 
243 Alternatively, a third explanation would be that there are different types of particle being emitted from case to 
case, each of which have varying energy levels, but for simplicity, I will consider just the two possibilities.  
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importance. It would seem strange to opt for the former explanation purely because it posits 
fewer neutrinos than the latter, for it just doesn’t seem to hold any real advantage. And this 
suggests that quantitative parsimony is perhaps not of any intrinsic theoretical value in itself. 
Furthermore, on the face of it at least, neither theory looks obviously more likely to be true 
than the other, suggesting that quantitative parsimony provides no guide to truth. Indeed 
this is even the case in the original example by Nolan. For even if positing two neutrinos 
rather than one seems somewhat gratuitous, we have no reason to believe (from the data 
given) that it is less likely to be true.  
But I digress too much. These remarks hopefully emphasise some interesting issues 
that surround the notion of quantitative parsimony and what value, if any, it should be 
afforded. But I will not press the issue any further here. What remains the case though is that 
whichever way you look at it – i.e. whether you take QP to be a genuine theoretical virtue, 
yet one which is easily outweighed, or whether you deny it any intrinsic value at all and 
maintain its maximum application should be as some kind of theoretical tie-breaker – 
quantitative parsimony should have little effect on the debate between punctal nihilism and 
monism. For if you take the former view, you will see that there are all sorts of other factors 
in-play that will outweigh its importance, and if you take the latter view you will see that 
there is no tie which requires breaking. Quantitative parsimony, then, is of little use here.   
 
 
§5.7. The Argument from Parsimony – Take II 
Quantitative parsimony is not the only type of parsimony, of course. It has already been 
noted, for instance, how David Lewis distinguished between quantitative parsimony and 
qualitative parsimony; between reducing the number of tokens of things on the one hand, 
and the number of types of thing on the other. More recently, attention has been turned to 
what has been called ideological parsimony: the aim of reducing the number of primitive 
terms one’s theory employs.244  
 In what follows I will outline how parsimony can be invoked to support monism 
over any other rival version of compositional nihilism. I think that the type of parsimony I 
                                                 
244 See Sider (forthcoming), & Cowling (forthcoming).  
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will appeal to could fall under the head of ideological or qualitative parsimony, but either 
way, its results will be of far greater success than the appeals to quantitative parsimony 
considered in the previous section. Very broadly, I will argue that the monist can do away 
with all relations. Relations will not appear in a monistic ontology, and they will play no part 
in a monistic explanation of reality. This disposal of relations represents a significant 
theoretical saving, I claim, and thus makes monism a much more attractive view. As to 
whether this is an appeal to qualitative or ideological parsimony, I repeat that I am unsure. 
For relations may well be viewed as a type of entity, or perhaps a particular type of property, 
in which case dispensing with them would seem to represent a qualitative saving. But it also 
seems that theories which invoke relations will have to make use of irreducibly relational 
language in their fundamental descriptions of reality, which suggests that dispensing with 
them represents an ideological saving. Perhaps it would involve a saving of both types? And 
perhaps that, in turn, would increase the force of the argument? Once more, I am unsure. 
But what does seem clear is that however one wants to categorise it, dispensing with 
relations represents a significant and valuable theoretical saving. 
 My argument will proceed in two parts. In one part I will argue that on a monistic 
view, all and any relations there may be are internal. In the other, I will argue that internal 
relations are not real, since they represent nothing over and above the existence of their 
relata. As such, I will conclude that there are no (real) relations at all. But I will present the 
parts in what may seem like reverse order, firstly explaining why out of external and 
internal relations, only the former should be considered real things, and secondly by 
explaining why on a monistic picture there are no external relations.  
 Firstly, however, I should probably note, as the reader may well have done already, 
that there are many similarities that could be drawn between the argument I will be 
presenting here, and a famous argument (or perhaps more precisely, a famous family of 
arguments) presented by F. H. Bradley.245 Bradley articulated a number of problems 
concerning relations, most famously, the eponymously named Bradley’s Regress, to argue for 
his thesis of monism. However, whilst it would certainly be an oversight on my part were I 
not to mention these similarities at all, I would like to distance myself somewhat from 
Bradley. The main reason for this is that it is not precisely clear as to how Bradley’s 
                                                 
245 Bradley (1930) 
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arguments are meant to work, nor indeed what his thesis of monism actually consists in. His 
writing is notoriously obscure, and interpretations of his work vary widely. In fact it has 
been said of Bradley that “obscurity came to him naturally, and it is hard to resist the 
suspicion that he also exploited it as a weapon in argument”.246  
It is hard to be certain, for instance, whether the distinction he employs between 
internal and external relations is of exactly the same nature as that distinction which is 
commonly accepted.247 Moreover, it is not certain whether he was trying to claim that all 
relations are internal, as some interpreters suggest,248 or whether there are in fact no 
relations at all.249 Perhaps most significantly, it is not even clear whether the type of monism 
Bradley was arguing for was the same monistic thesis that I am arguing for here. It has 
recently been argued, and in my view quite plausibly so, that Bradley’s monism is not a 
mereologically nihilistic, Parmenidean monism, but rather, one that admits a multiplicity of 
things, but merely maintains that none of them are entirely distinct or separated from one 
another or from the whole in which they are said to inhere. If this interpretation is right, 
then Bradley’s monism is more in line with the thesis put forward by Jonathan Schaffer – 
Priority Monism – a thesis quite distinct from the one being proposed here.250 So whilst I 
recognise the Bradlean roots from which my argument stems, I will make no further 
mention of his work in what follows. This is for the sake of clarity. After all, the present goal 
is to argue for my thesis of monistic nihilism, not to become entrenched in a project of 
historical or philosophical interpretation. So let me get back to the argument. 
To begin, it should be worthwhile to get clear on the precise nature of the distinction 
between internal and external relations.251 Following the likes of G. E. Moore, I take the 
distinction to be best characterised as being modal in nature.252 That is, if R is an internal 
relation that relates a to b, then the very existence of a and b necessitates the fact that they 
stand in R. Or, to put it another way, it would not be possible for a and b to exist and not 
stand in R, if R is internal. To make this somewhat clearer, consider the following examples: 
                                                 
246 Wollheim (1959), 11 
247 Some have suggested that he didn’t even recognise that there was such a distinction at all.  See Vallicella 
(2002), 5  
248 See, for instance, van Inwagen (2002), 34 
249 See Vallicella (2002), 5 
250 See Schaffer (2010a; 2010b; 2010c)  
251 For an excellent recent discussion on relations, which includes a section dedicated to the internal-external 
distinction, see Heil (2009). 
252 See Moore (1919),  
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1) 3 is greater than 2 
2) Brian is sitting next to Freddie 
 
According to the modal characterisation of the distinction, then the relation referred to in 1 
should be considered internal, and the relation referred to in 2 should be considered external. 
The reason for this is that the very existence of 3 and 2 necessitates the fact that the former is 
greater than the latter. There is no possible world in which 3 is not greater than 2 (or so I will 
assume). Conversely, however, the mere existence of Brian and Freddie is not enough to 
necessitate the fact that they will be sitting next to one another. For it is perfectly possible 
that both Brian and Freddie could exist yet were not sitting next to one another. There may 
be someone sitting between them, for instance, or they may not even be sitting down at all. 
So this is what I take the distinction between internal and external relations to consist in. An 
internal relation is one whose obtaining depends solely on the existence of the entities it 
relates; if the relata exist, then the relation must obtain. 
 Having clarified the nature of the distinction, I should now explain why I will 
assume that out of internal and external relations (if indeed there are any such things at all), 
it is only external relations that should be considered real. I think the best way to proceed 
here is to frame the explanation in terms of truthmakers. There is a popular school of thought, 
largely Quinean in spirit, which claims that the only entities we need accept as existent are 
the truthmakers required to make true sentences true. For instance, take the following 
sentence  
(1) ‘Tables exist’ 
On this view, for sentence (1) to be true, there needs to be some existent thing (presumably a 
table)253 whose existence makes it true. And whatever it is that makes the sentence true, one is 
ontologically committed to, if it is true. But another common addition to this view is that one is 
only committed to the minimal truthmakers required to make a sentence true. For instance, 
say universalism was true, and there was some object composed of a table, a lion, and the 
                                                 
253 Although not necessarily. See Cameron (2010b). Cameron claims that sentences like ‘there are tables’ can be 
strictly and literally true even if there are, in fact, no tables. The truthmakers for sentences such as these, he 
claims, need not be direct referents of the nouns employed. If there are simples arranged table-wise, for instance, 
then this may be enough to make true the sentence ‘there are tables’.  
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top half of the moon. Now the existence of that object would be sufficient to make (1) true, 
since it includes the existence of a table. But the truth of (1) in no way commits one to the 
existence of such an object (that would be absurd!), for it is not the minimal truthmaker 
required to ensure (1)’s truth. This qualification on the requirement for truthmakers stops 
one from generating a gratuitously profligate ontology just from analysing what sentences 
are true. To see why, consider: 
 
 (2) ‘The average mother has 2.4 children’ 
 
Despite the somewhat unusual nouns that (2) employs, its truth does not commit one to the 
existence of some object to which those nouns (attempt to) refer, i.e. an average mother, or 
four tenths of a child. Rather, for the sentence to be true, it is required only that there are a 
certain number of mothers and a certain number of children, and that the latter number 
divided by the former number gives 2.4. These mothers and children alone are the minimal 
truthmakers required for (2) to be true, and therefore, they are the only entities that one is 
committed to believing in because (2) is true.  
 Getting back to internal and external relations, consider the following two sentences: 
 (3) ‘2 is greater than 1’ 
 (4) ‘Brian is sitting next to Freddie’ 
 
Let’s take (3) first. As I have already shown, it refers to an internal relation. (At least, it does 
so according to the modal characterisation of the distinction that I am endorsing). Moreover, 
it certainly expresses a truth, or so I will assume. But what makes it true? What are the 
minimal truthmakers required for such a sentence to be true? The obvious answer appears 
to be the numbers 1 and 2 themselves. As I have already stated, the mere existence of the 
two numbers alone is enough to guarantee the truth of (3). It would not be possible for them 
to exist and not be so related; if you have the numbers, you have the relation. Thus there is 
no need to posit any relation or relational property, or any other such thing, to make (3) true; 
the numbers alone do all the required work. So whilst it is correct to say that 2 is greater 
than 1, we are not committed to the existence of any relational entity in so doing. And it 
would appear that the same holds for any putative internal relation. Any true sentence that 
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purports to refer to an internal relation does not commit one to the existence of such a 
relation, but in fact, it commits one only to the existence of the relata.  
 By contrast, consider (4). For this sentence to be true, it would seem that we require 
more than the mere existence of Brian and Freddie. For as was noted earlier, they could exist 
yet have someone sitting between them. Indeed they may not be sitting down at all. Brian 
and Freddie alone are not sufficient to constitute the truthmakers for (4). So for (4) to be true, 
there needs to be something else, something external to Brian and Freddie, which will 
guarantee its truth. There are a number of candidates for what this thing could be. It could 
simply be the relation sitting next to, which obtains between the two men. It could be a fact 
or a state of affairs, i.e. the fact that Brian is sitting next to Freddie, or the state of affairs of 
Brian’s sitting next to Freddie.254 It could perhaps be a relational ‘moment’ or ‘trope’.255 But 
whatever candidate one plumps for, one will be ontologically committed to it. Whatever 
explanatory route one takes, if (4) is true then its ontological commitments are greater than 
just Brian and Freddie. And once again, it seems that this conclusion will apply to any 
putative external relation. For the very nature of what an external relation is entails that the 
existence of the relata alone is not enough to guarantee the existence of the relation. So 
external relations, if there are any such things, represent a very real ontological commitment. 
Therefore, any metaphysical theories in which external relations play a part will have to 
accept this commitment.  
 From this analysis we can conclude that out of internal and external relations, it is 
only external relations that can be considered real entities. Internal relations are, in the 
words of D. M. Armstrong, “not ontologically additional to their terms”.256 It is solely 
because of the existence of 1 and 2 that the latter is greater than the former, there is no extra 
entity, no extra thing involved in this being the case. We can talk of internal relations 
obtaining or not, but there are no things to which we refer when we so talk; there are but the 
things which we talk of them relating. External relations, by contrast, are ontologically 
additional to their terms. It is not just the existence of Brian and Freddie that makes it the 
case that one is sitting next to the other; some extra entity is needed (a relational entity of 
some sort) to make it the case. So if there are any relations – any real relations – they must be 
                                                 
254 See Armstrong (2004) for a defence of this response. 
255 See Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984) for a defence of this response. 
256 Armstrong (1997), 12. 
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external relations. And from this we can conclude that if it were the case that there were no 
external relations, then it would follow that there were no relations at all.257 In what follows, 
I will show why pluralists are committed to the existence of external relations, whereas 
monists are not. The monist can do away with relations entirely. 
 Before moving on, I would like to quickly pre-empt and dispense with a potential 
objection to the above reasoning. In the preceding comments I readily accepted the 
Armstrongian thesis that internal relations are ‘nothing over and above’ their relata. Yet the 
reader may remember that in Chapter 3, I rejected Armstrong’s claim that mereological 
fusions are ‘nothing over and above’ their parts. One may take this to create some tension in 
my views, so I would like to say a few words aimed at alleviating that tension. There is a 
crucial difference between the connection between internal relations and their relata on the 
one hand, and the connection between mereological fusions and their parts on the other. The 
difference is that the former are logically inseparable whereas the latter are not. What I mean 
by that can be summed up in the following two statements: 
1. If the numbers 1 and 2 exist, then the sentence ‘2 is greater than 1’ is true of logical 
necessity.  
2. If three simples (x, y, and z) exist, then the sentence ‘there is an object which x, y, and 
z compose’ is not true of logical necessity.  
Internal relations simply, and logically, ‘fall out’ from the existence of their relata; you 
cannot have the latter and not have the former. Mereological fusions do not simply ‘fall out’ 
from the existence of some particles. One needs to believe that there are such things as 
mereological fusions to begin with. That is why it is consistent for one to accept that internal 
relations are no addition to one’s ontology, yet reject the same claim about mereological 
fusions. So on with the argument. 
 I claim that positing multiple concrete objects commits one to the existence of 
external relations. To demonstrate this, consider a very simple world consisting of just three 
simple particles, a, b, and c. Let’s suppose that they are arranged in a line as depicted below: 
 
 
                                                 
257 Providing, of course, that the internal-external distinction is exhaustive, i.e. there can be no relations which are 
neither internal nor external. I will assume this to be true.  
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Fig. 4.  
 
Now in a world like this, where there are multiple concrete objects, there will always be 
spatial relations that hold between those objects. In this world, for instance, there will be 
distance relations between the particles. Furthermore, the distance ac is twice as great as the 
distance ab. But this is surely an external relation!258 The mere existence of a, b, and c is not 
enough to guarantee that this relation will obtain. After all, b and c could have been further 
apart (or closer together). External spatial relations like this will occur, I claim, in all worlds 
where there are multiple concrete objects. The only way around it I can see would be to 
suggest that all concrete objects at a world have their particular spatial locations of necessity. 
But that would be a quite bizarre view to hold – I cannot think of anything that would 
possibly motivate it. It is for this reason that I claim ontological pluralism, in any form, is 
committed to the existence of external relations. 
 The more difficult part of the argument is to show that the monist is not committed 
to external relations. In fact, I’m not sure that it can be shown, conclusively, to be true. 
However, my claim that the monist is not committed to external relations will take the form 
of a challenge rather than a demonstration; a challenge to any dissenters to provide an 
example of an external relation that the monist is committed to. I am not sure that such a 
challenge can be met – I cannot think of any suitable examples. I will say a little more in 
what follows to show why I don’t take the monist to be committed to external relations, but I 
will leave the challenge open for the reader to tackle at his or her leisure. 
 My argument begins with the following, and in my view, plausible, premise: for any 
external relation to obtain, there must be at the very minimum, two distinct relata.259 Since 
                                                 
258 Of course, there is a sense in which one may think it is an internal relation. Let’s say for instance that the 
distance between a and b and between b and c is 1 metre, thus the distance between a and c will of course be 2 
metres. Now I am not saying that the relation of 2 being twice as great as 1 is an external relation, for it is clearly 
not. What I am saying, however, is that it the spatial positioning of each of the particles is surely a contingent 
feature of this world. They could have been in different positions, and thus different spatial relations could have 
obtained between them. It is in this sense that I mean to say these relations are external. The mere existence of the 
three particles does not entail the fact that they will be equally spaced.  
259 Relations can, of course, obtain reflexively, i.e. between an object and itself, but all these reflexive relations will 
surely be internal. Examples of such relations might be: being identical to, or being the same shape as, or being in the 
same place as, and so on. These are all internal relations. 
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the monist only posits a single concrete object, it follows from this that there can, on a 
monistic view, be no external relations that obtain between purely concrete relata. Now 
presuming that the abstract-concrete distinction is exhaustive of all objects (and I will 
assume that such a presumption is true), then on a monistic view there remain only two 
combinations of objects which an external relation could relate: concrete object (i.e. the 
world) to abstract object or abstract object to abstract object. Both these combinations include 
abstracta, and thus the question I wish to pose is this: are there any external relations that 
could obtain in which at least one of the relata was abstract?  
 Initially, it looks plausible that the answer to this question is ‘no’. Consider, for 
instance, some paradigm examples of external relations. Spatial relations, for instance, will 
normally be external, since things tend not to have their spatial locations of necessity. But, of 
course, these are not the types of relation that can obtain between abstracta. There may not be 
a universally accepted and complete definition of what it takes for an object to be abstract, 
but it is commonly accepted that abstract objects are not spatially located. And this would 
appear to exclude them from participating in spatial relations.  
 There are, of course, other sorts of relations which could be external. There is, for 
instance, a whole host of what one could call ‘social’ or ‘human’ relations. ‘... is married to ...’ 
or ‘... loves ...’ are examples of social relations. Both are non-spatial and non-causal, yet both 
are certainly external. Now under normal circumstances, these sorts of relations would 
obtain between only concrete objects (e.g. Brian is married to Anita, or Freddie loves his 
piano), but, I suppose, there is nothing stopping them from relating abstracta, or at least, 
from relating a concrete object to an abstract object. Brian may love the number three, for 
instance, and, if the laws governing matrimony were changed in the relevant ways, he may 
even be permitted to marry it. But I don’t think any of this should worry the monist. For one 
should only be committed to the existence of external relations if they are indispensible to 
one's description of fundamental reality. And I doubt that social relations of the sorts 
mentioned will feature in any plausible description of fundamental reality – pluralistic, 
monistic, or otherwise. 
  I think it plausible to claim that spatial relations will be indispensible to any pluralist 
theory’s description of fundamental reality. Thus pluralism of any stripe will be committed 
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to spatial, thus external, relations.260 Monism, by contrast, will not be so committed. The 
monist’s description of fundamental reality will be given in terms of only a single concrete 
object (the world) which instantiates various monadic properties.261 Spatial relations will not 
be indispensible to the monist’s explanations, for they will simply not figure in those 
explanations, and thus she will not be committed to them. This represents a significant 
theoretical advantage for the monist.   
 
 
§5.8. Concluding Remarks 
I hope to have shown that there are a number of good reasons to believe that monism is the 
most plausible form of compositional nihilism. If one believes only in mereological atoms, 
then it is a single, maximally large atom that one should endorse, rather than a plurality of 
microscopica. We have seen how there are prima facie problems that afflict both punctal and 
intermediate nihilisms, which in turn, give prima facie reason to suppose that monism is to be 
preferred. We have seen that where the possibility of gunk spells trouble for the punctal 
nihilist, the monist emerges unscathed. And we have seen that where the monist can easily 
accommodate the possibility of emergent properties, the pluralist nihilist can do so only at 
the expense of inflating her ideology, and endorsing notions that seem, at the very best, 
controversial. Finally it was shown how the monist can boast the most parsimonious form of 
nihilism, whether it be quantitative, qualitative, or ideological parsimony that one is 
concerned with. So in the battle of the nihilisms, monism wins the day. In one corner we 
have the Parmenidean nihilist, promoting the existence of a single world-object, and in the 
other we have the Democritean nihilist, proposing a plurality of atoms in the void. In light of 
the preceding comments I hope there remains little doubt; Parmenides has emerged 
victorious. 
 
 
 
                                                 
260 I should note that there have been some recent attempts to defend the idea that even in a pluralist ontology, all 
relations are internal. See, for example, Mulligan (1998) or Wachter (1998). Needless to say, I think these attempts 
are unsuccessful.  
261 I recognise that at this stage, this seems quite vague. Much more detail will be provided in Chapters 6 & 7. 
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 §6. Extended Simples  
 
If monism is true, the world is simple: it has no proper parts. So given that the world is 
spatially extended (which I will take to be true), monism commits one to the existence of 
spatially extended simples. More precisely, monism commits one to the view that all there 
is, is one, large, spatially extended simple: the world itself. But to many, extended simples 
are complete anathema. So for a defence of monism to be thorough and robust, which I 
sincerely hope this defence to be, it should include some independent support for the claim 
that extended simples are (at the very least) possible. In what follows, I will provide that 
support.262 I will first identify two arguments that can be, and have been, presented against 
the possibility of there being extended simples.263 I will consider each argument in turn, and 
show it to be wanting, and thus conclude that there is no compelling evidence to suggest 
that extended simples are impossible. Finally, I shall go on to consider what views of matter 
remain for those who reject extended simples, and show that those views are subject to a 
number of difficulties. As a result, I shall conclude that extended simples should not be 
considered anathema after all. 
 
 
§6.1. The Cartesian Argument 
 
I believe that this argument, or at least some related form of it, provides the most common 
and widespread source of suspicion towards the possibility of extended simples. It is the 
most common, I suspect, because it is (or at least it seems) the most intuitive. Whilst 
                                                 
262 My use of the term ‘independent support’ perhaps requires a little qualification. It will be independent in the 
sense that I will not be invoking monism, or any theses committed to monism, in order to back up my arguments 
for the possibility of extended simples. Such a strategy would beg the question. However, I will be keeping the 
monistic project in mind throughout. As such, there are various lines of response to certain arguments that I will 
not be considering because they either conflict with, undermine, or are simply not relevant to, monism.  
263 These are not the only two arguments that have been given against extended simples but they are, in my 
opinion, the most significant. They are certainly the most prominent in the literature. Other arguments against 
extended simples can be found in Hudson (2006), 108-121 and Zimmerman (1996b). Space restrictions prevent 
me from addressing these arguments here, but needless to say, I think that they can also be overcome.  
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endorsed by many philosophers (although often only implicitly), the argument is perhaps 
most clearly and explicitly stated by Descartes, hence my naming of it. He says: 
 
There cannot exist any atoms or parts of matter that are of their own 
nature indivisible. For however small we suppose these parts to be, 
because they are necessarily extended, we are always able in thought to 
divide any one of them into two or more smaller parts, and may 
accordingly admit their divisibility. For there is nothing we can divide in 
thought which we do not thereby recognise to be divisible.264 
 
 
An uncharitable way to respond to this argument would be to reject it outright on the 
grounds that it is objectionably question-begging, in that it seems to simply assume the very 
thing that is up for debate: that all extended objects are divisible, and thus have proper 
parts. But it is generally good practice in philosophy to interpret the arguments of one’s 
opponents in the most charitable manner possible, in order to avoid accusations of merely 
knocking down straw men. Moreover, if one can defeat the most charitable interpretation of 
an argument, one should be able to defeat any interpretation of it. (Ironically, one can 
strengthen one’s own position this way, by first strengthening the arguments of one’s 
opponents). So that is what I shall do. I think the most charitable reconstruction of 
Descartes’s argument would be as follows: 
 
1) If an object is spatially extended, then one can always conceive that it may be divided 
into at least two smaller parts. 
2) If it is conceivable for an object to be so divided, then it is possible for that object to be 
so divided. 
3) It is not possible for any simple object to be divided.  
4) Therefore it is not possible for any simple object to be extended. 
                                                 
264 Descartes, R. (1934), 209. Interestingly, Descartes is not just arguing against the possibility of extended simples 
here, but against the possibility of material simples altogether. Thus he is arguing for the controversial view that 
all matter is gunky. This is a consequence of his view that all matter is necessarily extended; indeed that 
extension is the fundamental nature of matter. Since, for Descartes, all matter is necessarily extended, and since 
all extended objects are necessarily divisible, then it follows that all matter is, of necessity, divisible. The 
Cartesian world (or at least the Cartesian material world) is one made entirely of atomless gunk.  
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5) Therefore, there can be no extended simples.265 
 
There is a certain intuitive pull about the Cartesian Argument, but I think it can, and should, 
be resisted. I think there are a number of different ways one can go about responding to the 
argument, some of which are more plausible than others. Below I outline three possible 
responses, leaving my preferred response until last. 
 
 
§6.1.1 Response One: Simplicity is Contingent 
Central to the Cartesian Argument is a substantive modal claim about mereological 
simplicity. The claim is that simplicity is necessary. That is to say that if there are any 
mereological simples at all, then they are necessarily mereologically simple. This claim is 
crucial to the argument; without it, it would not go through. To illustrate why this is so, 
consider the following toy example. Firstly, let ‘groundpig’ mean any pig that is incapable of 
flight. (This is analogous to the assumption implicit in the Cartesian Argument that ‘Simple’ 
means any object that is incapable of being divided). Now consider the following argument: 
 
1. If an object is spatially extended, then one can always conceive that that object could 
fly.266 
2. If it is conceivable that an object may fly, then it is possible that object may fly.  
3. It is impossible for a groundpig to fly.  
4. Therefore, it is impossible for a groundpig to be extended. 
5. Therefore, there can be no extended groundpigs.  
 
The argument is clearly fallacious, for as we well know, there are such things as extended 
groundpigs. Indeed all actual pigs are extended groundpigs. So where has it gone wrong? It 
has gone wrong, I would suggest, at premise 3. By stating that it is impossible for a groundpig 
                                                 
265 A similar argument to this is considered, and rejected, in both McDaniel (2007), 137, and Markosian (1998a), 
223-224.  
266 Perhaps it is impossible to conceive that the entire world could fly? If one thought that what it took to fly was 
to move through the air relative to the ground, then it certainly seems impossible that the world could fly. For 
those gripped by this peculiar thought, however, just substitute the word “sub-world object”, or perhaps 
“earthly object” for “object” in premise 1. The argument will be unaffected. 
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to fly, one is stating not only that groundpigs are incapable of flight, but actually stating the 
much stronger claim that they are necessarily incapable of flight. Now as it happens, there is 
no good reason whatsoever to believe that this claim of necessity is true. On the contrary, 
there is good reason to believe it is false. It seems fairly obvious that the evident lack of 
porcine aviation is a purely contingent feature of the world. It surely could have been the 
case that the air was thick with flocks of pigs on the wing, it just so happens that it isn’t. But 
if this is so, premise 3 is false. And if premise 3 is false, then the argument is unsound. So it 
is here that we have identified the source of confusion in our clearly fallacious argument.  
 So according to this line of response, the thought is that perhaps a similar thing has 
gone wrong in the Cartesian Argument. Premise 3 of the argument assumes that 
mereological simplicity holds of necessity, and this leads to the conclusion that simple 
things, if there are any at all, cannot be extended. But perhaps this assumption is mistaken? 
Perhaps there are simple things that could have been complex? Perhaps there are complex 
things that could have been simple? More generally, perhaps the mereological facts that 
obtain are purely contingent? Here, then, we have the beginnings of a possible response to 
the Cartesian Argument. 
 First of all I should clarify exactly what sort of necessity we are talking about here. 
For types of necessity differ, and the plausibility of one’s claims will depend significantly on 
the type of necessity one invokes. For instance, if one were concerned only with de dicto 
necessity, then premise 3 (in both the Cartesian argument and the toy argument) would be 
true. Indeed, if we take the term ‘simple thing’ to mean ‘indivisible thing’, which is a 
plausible assumption to make, then on the de dicto reading, of course premise 3 is true; it is an 
analytic truth.  And the same goes for premise 3 in the toy argument if we take ‘groundpig’ 
to mean ‘pig incapable of flight’. But of course it is not the de dicto reading that is of our 
current concern here. This is not a dispute about what certain mereological terms mean; it is 
a dispute about what certain things are really like. Thus it is the de re reading that should be 
the subject of our focus. In the toy argument, premise 3 makes a de re modal claim about 
groundpigs, to the effect that it could not possibly have been the case that they could fly. 
This claim is false (or so it would plausibly seem), and it is the falsity of this claim that spoils 
the argument. Similarly, premise 3 in the Cartesian argument makes a de re modal claim 
about simples, to the effect that they are necessarily simple, and thus that it could not 
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possibly have been the case that they were not simple. So the line of response that is 
currently under consideration would have to reject this claim, and instead insist that if an 
object is mereologically simple, then it is only contingently so. 
 That this response overcomes the argument is undeniable. For if the mereological 
structure at a world is purely contingent, then premise 3 of the Cartesian Argument would 
be false, and thus the argument would be unsound. But the success of the response comes at 
a significant cost: admitting that mereological facts are contingent. This is a very 
controversial claim, for it is widely agreed amongst philosophers that the laws of mereology, 
whatever they may be, are necessary. Indeed, this is so widely agreed that it is very much 
the default view.267 To claim anything to the contrary is to go very much against the grain. 
But, of course, we shouldn’t care too much about going against the grain if we have good 
reason to do so. And as it happens, a small number of philosophers currently believe that, in 
the present case, we do have good reason for straying from the norm.268 Ross Cameron, for 
instance, argues that there is no reason to believe that mereological facts hold with necessity, 
despite the fact that they are a priori justifiable.269 I won’t go into Cameron’s arguments here, 
but I should point out that if they are successful, then they would affect much more than just 
claims about mereology. All manner of metaphysical truths would be at risk of having their 
modal status downgraded from necessary to merely contingent. 
 I must admit that Cameron’s arguments tend to leave me feeling somewhat 
disconcerted. For I find the arguments themselves really quite compelling, yet I find the 
conclusion they lead to utterly abhorrent. Fortunately, however, for present purposes I think 
it is safe to push the whole issue to one side. It merely remains to be said that if one is 
sympathetic to the position that mereology is contingent, then one has an easy way of 
overcoming the Cartesian argument. Quite simply: if the mereological facts are not 
necessary, then the argument fails. Fortunately, however, one does not have to endorse this 
view to overcome the argument, for there are other responses available, as I shall presently 
show. So for those who want to protect the modal status of their metaphysics, please read 
on. 
                                                 
267 Sider (1993a; 2001), Markosian (1998b; 2008), and Armstrong (1997), are just a few of the many thinkers who 
take mereological facts to be necessary.  
268 Specifically, see Cameron (2007). But also see Nolan (2005). 
269 Cameron (2007) 
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§6.1.2 Response Two: Physical Divisibility Does Not Entail Mereological Complexity 
 
There is a certain sense in which the Cartesian argument is undeniable. Of course one can 
conceive that any extended object could be divided into at least two smaller parts. Provided 
one can conceive of a knife sharp and strong enough, and a technician skilled and precise 
enough, there should be no conceptual barrier to stop one conceiving that any extended 
object could be physically bisected. But I think we ought to remember that the type of 
division we are conceiving of here is exactly that: physical. So the question I think we should 
consider is: why should this tell us anything about mereology? In other words, why should 
we suppose that just because something is capable of being physically divided, that it is 
therefore not mereologically simple? 
At first glance this may seem an outlandish proposal. The thought would be, I 
suppose, that if you physically divide an object into two separate halves, then of course that 
object has proper parts. It has the two halves you have just divided it into at the very least! 
For what else are the two distinct objects that remain after your act of division, other than 
proper parts of the original object? On this view, it may be seen to be an analytic truth that 
something which has been divided (or indeed something that could be divided) cannot be 
mereologically simple. However, I think that a lot hinges on what one takes the term 
‘physical division’ to mean. If one takes it to mean ‘physical division into parts’ (where ‘part’ 
is taken to mean ‘mereological part’), then it is an analytic truth that anything physically 
divisible cannot be mereologically simple. But this is not what I mean when I talk of physical 
divisibility. Perhaps my choice of terminology is a little misleading, so let me try to explain 
what I do mean without employing potentially ambiguous terms like ‘division’.  
To begin, imagine an extended simple, call it S, that is shaped like a rectangle.270 S 
would look something like the object depicted in fig. 5 below: 
 
Fig.5  
 
 
                                                 
270 You can think of S as a two- or three-dimensional object, it won’t affect the argument. 
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Now imagine that one were to apply a certain force to S with a sharp instrument of some 
kind, like a knife. Let’s call this act ‘slicing’. Now suppose that after our act of slicing, S were 
to look something like the object depicted in fig. 6 below, let’s call it S*: 
 
Fig. 6 
 
 
It would appear that after our initial slicing, S has certainly undergone some change. It has, 
for instance, changed shape; it was initially rectangular, whereas now it is not. It is also 
likely to have different properties after its slicing; presumably it would, for instance, have a 
higher density after the slicing than it had before. It may well have different aerodynamic 
properties were it to move through the air, and so on and so forth. However, there is no 
obvious reason to suppose that its mereological structure has changed in any way. That is to 
say that provided one accepted S as being mereologically simple initially, there is no reason 
that I can see that should cause one to think it is no longer mereologically simple after it has 
been sliced and becomes S*. It may have changed shape, or density, or whatever, but it 
seems that this should not have any bearing on its simplicity.  
 With that in mind, then, now imagine that we sliced S*. Suppose that the force and 
direction of this slicing was such that afterwards, S* looked like the object depicted in fig. 7 
below, call it S**: 
 
Fig. 7 
 
 
In other words, S** has been sliced right through. Now the question that I want the reader to 
consider is whether S** is a mereologically complex object or not. As we have seen above, 
when S was first sliced, and became S*, there seemed no apparent reason to suggest that S* 
was no longer a simple. The slicing it had undergone had merely changed its shape, along 
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with certain other of its properties, such as its density and so on. So perhaps we could say 
the same of S**? Perhaps we should conclude that S** is still a mereological simple, but it has 
simply changed shape from when it was S*? Now if this were the case, then the Cartesian 
argument against extended simples would be severely undermined. For when it is claimed 
that for any extended object, it is possible that it may be divided, I think it must be 
something like this (i.e. being sliced right through) that the Cartesian has in mind. In fact I 
can’t think of any other reasonable way to interpret what is meant. It can’t be supposed to 
mean that for any extended object it is possible that it is mereologically complex, for that 
would simply beg the question. Thus the only reasonable interpretation of premise one is 
that it claims that any extended object could conceivably be physically bisected, i.e. sliced 
right through. But, of course, if it transpires that an object could be sliced right through yet 
remain mereologically simple, then the mere fact that an extended object could be sliced 
right through would not warrant the inference that it must be mereologically complex. 
 To properly analyse this line of response, we need to investigate whether it is at all 
reasonable – indeed whether it is even coherent – to suggest that an object such as S** could 
be mereologically simple. The prima facie objection would be to simply assert that of course 
S** is not simple, for it is in two bits (read: “two parts”). But this is not to argue against the 
response being considered, but rather, it is to flat-footedly deny it. The advocate of the 
current view is unlikely to be worried about this response, for she will simply reaffirm her 
view, and say that S**, contrary to appearances, is not in two parts, but merely has an 
unusual shape. It is a single, simple object, which happens to occupy two disconnected 
regions of space. It is, one might say, a scattered simple.  
I am willing to concede that scattered simples are a little odd. They may even be 
considered radically odd. So for this response to be considered even as a possibility, the 
burden lies with me to provide reasons why we should entertain it at all. So let me try. 
Firstly, when considering mereology in metaphysics, we are considering the fundamental 
structure of physical objects. And there is a fairly obvious sense in which this should go 
beyond mere considerations of how we can physically manipulate those objects. Just as in 
most areas of metaphysical enquiry, when trying to uncover the real truth of the matter into 
which we are enquiring, we must remember that superficial considerations of how we 
perceive the world, and how we physically interact with it, may sometimes mislead us; they 
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may be just that – superficial. That is not to say, of course, that such considerations should be 
ignored, but merely that they should be treated with caution. And with that in mind, then, it 
may well seem a little naive to think we can uncover any real truths of mereology just by 
thinking about whether we could physically cut an object or not. Disputes over mereological 
complexity are not to be decided with a scalpel and a steady hand, I would suggest, but 
instead, through a process of rational and logical thought.  
To reinforce the point, I invite you to reconsider the earlier discussion of the Special 
Composition Question, and in particular, those potential solutions to it which van Inwagen 
called the “simple bonding answers”. Van Inwagen showed quite comprehensively the 
futility of attempting to answer the SCQ by considering different methods of physical 
bonding. Being thorough and methodical as he is, van Inwagen presented philosophical 
arguments to show that the simple bonding answers were not satisfactory. But I think it is 
evident that he never held out any genuine hope that they would be. By tackling them he 
was instead trying to show that those approaches to the SCQ which may immediately 
present themselves through common sense may not, in fact, be correct. And he is surely 
right! When trying to answer the metaphysical question of what it takes for two material 
objects to compose a further material object, it seems positively childlike to think the answer 
is to be found by considering various different methods of physical adhesion (“hmm” said 
one metaphysician to the other, “shall we fetch the spot-welder, or do you think a staple-gun 
will do the trick?”). It is akin to thinking we could answer metaphysical questions about the 
passage of time by finding a suitably accurate stopwatch.  
But if this is the case when considering mereological composition, then it seems quite 
reasonable to suppose it is also the case when it comes to decomposition. That is to say that if 
we shouldn’t let our approach to the SCQ be clouded by considerations of how objects can 
be physically bonded, then perhaps we shouldn’t let our views on extended simples be 
obscured by considerations of how objects can be physically cut. Consider the following 
quote from Hud Hudson: “It may be the physicist’s job, for example, to tell us whether the 
fundamental entities that physics appeals to are physically indivisible one-dimensional 
strings, but it is the job of the metaphysician to tell us whether those uncuttable things are 
composite”.271 I think Hudson is right to remind us that there is a clear distinction between 
                                                 
271 Hudson (2006), 107. Note that despite this quote, Hudson does not believe extended simples are possible.  
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the physical and the metaphysical.272 And it is on these grounds that the metaphysician 
could resist the Cartesian argument. Sure, we can conceive that any extended object could be 
sliced right through. But for that to have any bearing on the debate over extended simples, we 
would need the further premise that slicing entails mereological complexity. But in light of 
the above comments, there is no obvious reason to believe that such an entailment holds.  
Endorsing scattered simples, therefore, offers one line of response against the 
Cartesian Argument, although it is, admittedly, a fairly controversial view. For instance, 
there could, on this view, be a single, simple object located at some point in this very room 
in which I am writing, and also simultaneously located at some point in a distant galaxy, yet 
not located at any point or region connecting the two. Furthermore, this object’s ‘dual-
location’, if I may so call it, would not obtain in virtue of it having distinct parts - one in this 
room and one in the distant galaxy – for by definition it has no proper parts. It would be 
reasonable to consider such an object as a little peculiar. But for now, despite their 
peculiarity, I shall consider their existence as an open possibility, and thus consider this line 
of response as a live option (albeit a controversial one) for the anti-Cartesian to take.  
 
 
§6.1.3 From Conceivability to Possibility 
 
The Cartesian Argument is a classic example of a conceivability-to-possibility argument, in 
that Descartes argues from the fact that he can conceive of x being the case to the fact that x 
really could be the case. Of course, Descartes is no stranger to this method of argument; his 
argument for the distinctness between mind and body is one of the most famous examples 
of a conceivability-to-possibility argument in the entire history of philosophy.273 However, 
regardless of the success (or otherwise) of that particular argument, I remain unconvinced 
that in this case, the mere ability to conceive of any extended object being divided, is enough 
to justify the much stronger conclusion that all extended objects are of necessity divisible.   
 I think that the best way to respond to the Cartesian Argument is to simply deny 
that, in this case, conceivability entails possibility. That is, one can assent to the first premise 
                                                 
272 It may be more accurate to say it is clear that there is a distinction between the physical and the metaphysical, 
rather than that the distinction itself is clear.  
273 Descartes (1986), second meditation 
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in the argument, whilst denying the second. The proponent of extended simples can agree 
that there is nothing conceptually incoherent in supposing that an extended object could be 
divided. There is no logical contradiction involved in such a supposition. And that is 
because it is logically possible. But that is all it is: a mere logical possibility. But just because 
something is merely logically possible does not mean that it must be accepted as a genuine 
metaphysical possibility – Kripke taught us that.274 I mean, a nihilist can surely accept the 
logical possibility of there being composite objects like tables and chairs – she can conceive 
of such things – but it is simply a consequence of her theory that such things are genuinely 
metaphysically impossible. Conversely, the universalist can accept the logical possibility of 
two material objects failing to compose, but this does not undermine the necessity of her 
thesis. One could not argue against the universalist by merely saying: “but I can imagine a 
scenario where some objects fail to compose!” Well, one could argue in that way, of course, 
but it would be a poor argument indeed.  
 To press the point home, consider something that I pointed out in an earlier footnote: 
that Descartes’s reasoning about mereological complexity entails that the material world is, 
of necessity, gunky. For if all matter is, of necessity, extended, and extended things are, of 
necessity, divisible, then all matter is necessarily divisible, i.e. gunky. Let’s call this view 
‘The Gunk Hypothesis’. The Gunk Hypothesis is controversial but it is not nonsensical; it is 
a view that deserves to be taken seriously at the very least. James van Cleve, for instance, 
endorses the very same view.275 But imagine if an opponent of the view were to present the 
following argument against it: 
 
 1. It is conceivable that there are simples. 
 2. Therefore, it is possible that there are simples.  
 3. If the Gunk Hypothesis is true, it is impossible that there are simples. 
 4. Therefore, the Gunk Hypothesis is not true. 
 
This argument is of exactly the same type as the Cartesian Argument. And whilst it is valid, 
it is hardly convincing! It is certainly not going to convince the proponent of the Gunk 
                                                 
274 Kripke (1980) 
275 Van Cleve (2008). Note that van Cleve’s reasons for endorsing this view are different from those of Descartes. 
His conclusion is the same, however: “all is gunk”. 
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Hypothesis that their view is false. For they will simply deny premise 2. And they are well 
within their rights to do so; for it is simply a consequence of the Gunk Hypothesis that 
simples are impossible. A simple object may well be conceptually coherent. There may be no 
logical or epistemic barrier to conceiving of a thing with no proper parts. But the proponent 
of the Gunk Hypothesis can accept that. He will merely maintain that simples are 
metaphysically impossible. I think that the proponent of extended simples should respond to 
the Cartesian Argument in exactly the same way. The mere fact that one may be capable of 
imagining that any extended object could be divided is not enough to undermine the 
possibility of extended simples.  
 
§6.2. The Problem of Spatial Intrinsics 
 
Anyone who is at all familiar with contemporary metaphysics will, more likely than not, be 
familiar with what has come to be known as the problem of temporary intrinsics.276 Roughly, 
the problem arises when trying to explain the seemingly evident fact that an object can 
change its intrinsic properties over time yet still remain the same object. Over time, a banana 
will change from being yellow-all-over to being brown-all-over, yet still remain the same banana. 
But then nothing can be both yellow-all-over and brown-all-over, so what gives?277  
 It has been suggested that extended simples are at threat from a similar problem.278 
The problem is not how they can have different intrinsic properties at different times, but 
rather, how they can have different intrinsic properties at different spatial locations. Suppose, 
for example, you had an extended simple in the shape of a cube – call it ‘Cube’. And now 
suppose that each of Cube’s faces was a different colour. The question is: how are we to 
explain this qualitative variation across Cube? Since Cube is a single mereologically simple 
object, any properties it may have must be instantiated by it, the whole of it, and nothing 
other than it. But if that’s the case, then it seems that one and the same object – Cube – is 
instantiating multiple and incompatible properties (e.g. redness and blueness) at the same 
                                                 
276 This term was coined by Lewis (1986a), 202, but the problem itself dates back much further, probably all the 
way back to Parmenides.  
277 Of course, colour properties are unlikely to be considered intrinsic, but they serve to illustrate the problem 
nicely.  
278 See McDaniel (2003), 272 
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time. And that’s impossible. So the argument is that the only way we can explain the 
qualitative variation of Cube is to insist that it is made of parts. That way we can say that it 
has a part which is blue, a part which is red, and so on and so forth, and there is no resulting 
contradiction. If Cube is mereologically simple, we have no such explanation available.  
 Since this problem is the spatial analogue of that highlighted by Lewis, it has been 
called “the problem of spatial intrinsics”.279 The first thing to note is that it is not an argument 
against the possibility of extended simples per se. Rather it is an argument against the 
possibility of extended simples that exhibit any qualitative variation. Thus the argument 
would have us conclude that if there are any extended simple things at all, then they must 
be qualitatively homogenous. Not all friends of extended simples will feel the need to 
overcome this argument – they may just accept that extended simples are all qualitatively 
homogenous and have done with it.280 From a monist’s perspective, however, this doesn’t 
look like a live possibility. That the world is awash with qualitative variation is a fact so 
evident as to be indubitable. And since the monist claims the world to be a single 
mereological simple, the conjunction of these two claims entails the fact that extended 
simples are capable of exhibiting qualitative heterogeneity. So with the monistic project in 
mind, the problem of spatial intrinsics must be overcome. In what follows I will press this 
problem a little further and consider some possible responses to it. I will argue that most of 
these possible responses, whilst independently quite promising, should be considered quite 
unfit for purpose by the monist. I will conclude by presenting a rough outline of how I think 
the problem is best overcome. The outline will only be very rough at this stage, since I will 
be revisiting the problem in much more detail in the next chapter.  
 
 
§6.2.1 Response by Analogy 
The problem of temporary intrinsics has received a great deal of attention from 
metaphysicians since Lewis brought it into focus a few decades ago, and a number of 
interesting and innovative responses have been offered in reply. So those responses present 
a natural place to start looking when thinking about the analogous problem of spatial 
                                                 
279 McDaniel (2003), 272.  
280 McDaniel seems to have endorsed this view for a period, although he has now rejected it. See McDaniel (2009), 
325 
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intrinsics. If any responses are considered successful in the temporal case, then there may 
well be an analogous response in the spatial case that also proves successful. So let me spend 
a little time considering those responses, and seeing how they fare in the spatial case.  
 Lewis’s own solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics was to take the view 
that temporally persisting objects are composed of instantaneous temporal parts. Going back 
to our earlier example of the banana, then, Lewis would say that the banana has a temporal 
part that is yellow and a distinct temporal part that is brown. Since these temporal parts are 
distinct from one another, there is no contradiction involved in the fact that they instantiate 
incompatible properties. Lewis’s solution has enjoyed significant success, at least if success 
is to be gauged by popularity and endorsement among other philosophers.281 But it offers no 
help at all in the analogous spatial case. The spatial analogue of Lewis’s solution would be 
the view that all extended objects are made up of non-extended parts and that qualitative 
variation across extended objects was to be explained by appealing to the properties 
instantiated by those objects’ parts and the relations in which they stand. For the friend of 
extended simples, then, Lewis’s response is a non-starter. 
 Another response that can be quickly dismissed is derived from the Presentist.282 
According to Presentism, only the present time exists, and thus only present properties 
exist.283 Hence our banana is saved from contradiction since the only existing properties it 
instantiates are the ones it instantiates now. And it doesn’t instantiate being brown-all-over 
and being yellow-all-over right now, therefore there is no problem. Once again, however, it 
seems fairly clear that this response is not going to help in the spatial case. The spatial 
analogue of presentism would be the view that only the present location exists. This view 
seems plainly false - that is, if one can even make sense of it at all - so I will not consider it 
any further. 
 Perhaps the most common way of responding to the problem without resorting to 
temporal parts, is to take a relational view of properties or property instantiation. There are 
various ways in which this can be done. On one view, which I shall call ‘Property 
Relationism’, the idea is that properties that may seem to be monadic, such as being yellow, 
                                                 
281 Notable proponents of temporal parts, other than Lewis himself, include Armstrong (1980), Heller (1984; 
1990), Jubien (1993), Sider (2001), to name but a few. 
282 See Lewis (1986a), 203, for a discussion of the Presentist response. 
283 Defenders of Presentism include Bigelow (1996), Hinchliff (2000), Markosian (2004), and Zimmerman (2008). 
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are in fact dyadic relations linking an object to a time, such as being yellow at time t. Going 
back to our banana, then, the problem is overcome because the banana stands in the being 
yellow at relation to t1, and the being brown at relation to t2.284 On another view, which I shall 
call ‘Instantiation Relationism’, the idea is that there is a three-place relation of instantiation, 
which holds between objects, (monadic) properties, and times. Thus on this view our banana 
stands in the instantiation relation to the property being yellow and the time t1, and also 
stands in the same relation to the property being brown and the time t2. The final view I shall 
consider is known as ‘Adverbialism’. The idea here is similar to Instantiation Relationism, in 
that it is not the properties that are seen as relational, but the way in which those properties 
are instantiated. Thus one way of expressing the fact that a banana is yellow at a particular 
time, on this view, would be to say the banana instantiates-at-time-t the monadic property of 
being yellow. A more common, if somewhat less grammatical, way to express this claim is to 
say the banana instantiates being yellow t-ly.  
 All three of these views can be modified in such a way that they respond to the 
analogous problem of spatial intrinsics. Very roughly, the difference is that rather than 
relativising properties, or instantiation, to times, they relativise them to locations (i.e. points 
or regions of space). This can be fleshed out in a little more detail as follows. Firstly, recall 
our hypothetical extended simple, Cube, with its different coloured faces. The problem was 
how to explain the qualitative variation across Cube’s extension without resorting to 
positing its proper parts. Below is an explanation of how our three views, when suitably 
modified, would respond to that problem: 
 
A. Property Relationism 
On this view, putatively monadic properties, such as being red, are taken to be dyadic 
relational properties that link objects to locations, such as being red at region r. Thus 
on this view, Cube’s qualitative variation is to be explained by saying it instantiates 
the property being red at r1, and being blue at r2, and so on, where r1 and r2 are those 
regions which correspond to the different faces of Cube. 
 
 
                                                 
284 See Lewis (1986a), 202, for a discussion, and rejection, of this view.  
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B. Instantiation Relationism 
On this view, instantiation is a triadic relation that links objects, properties, and 
locations. Thus Cube’s qualitative variation is to be explained by saying that it stands 
in the instantiation relation to the property being red and the region r1, and also 
stands in the instantiation relation to being blue and region r2, and so on and so forth, 
where regions r1 to r6 correspond to the different faces of Cube. 
 
C. Adverbialism 
On this view, the problem of Cube’s qualitative variation is answered by pointing to 
the way in which Cube instantiates its properties. Just as in the temporal case, it is 
difficult here to express the view grammatically, since there are no existing adverbs 
fit for the precise purpose. One could follow the lead of Jonathan Schaffer, and say 
that an object can instantiate a property (such as being red) here-ishly or there-ishly.285 
One could instead try to be a little more precise, as Horgan & Potrč have, and say 
Cube, for example, instantiates the property being red r1-ly and the property being blue 
r2-ly, and so on, where r1 and r2 refer to the appropriate regions.286 But whatever 
locution one chooses, the difficulties in actually expressing the view should 
hopefully not obscure its content – that it is the fact that a single object can instantiate 
different (and incompatible) properties in different ways that is invoked to solve the 
problem of spatial intrinsics.  
 
In the temporal case, I think that a decent case can be made for all three views as alternatives 
to an endorsement of temporal parts. And this is in spite of the fact that all three have been 
subject to criticism in the extant literature.287 However, things are less straightforward in the 
analogous spatial case. When considering the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous 
extended simples per se, I think that the three views above may well offer genuine promise. 
For I can see no principled reason why putatively monadic properties should not actually be 
dyadic, or why the instantiation relation should be limited to just two places rather than 
                                                 
285 See Schaffer (2007), 179n 
286 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 177-178 
287 For a critique of Property Relationism, see Lewis (1986a), 202. For a critique of Adverbialism, and a more 
sympathetic view of Property Relationism, see Hawley (2001), 16-24. For a defence of Adverbialism, see Johnston 
(1987) or Haslanger (1989). 
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three. But things are very different when considering monism, and there are two main 
reasons for this. The first reason is that all three views seem unavoidably committed to a 
robust realism about substantival space. The first two views require either regions or points 
(or both) to act as relata for the relations they posit, and the third view requires regions or 
points in order that the adverbs it posits (such as r1-ly) have a discernible source of semantic 
content. (By that I mean that if one were an anti-realist about space, then it is not clear to me 
what one could possibly mean when saying that an object instantiates a property r1-ly).288 I 
cannot see any way in which any of the three views could be held, coherently, without also 
committing one to the view that spatial regions and/or points really exist.   
 The problem with this is that the monist should, in my view, reject Substantivalism 
about space. The reason for this should be fairly obvious. Monism states that there is only a 
single concrete object in existence – the world – whereas Substantivalism seems committed 
to the existence of multiple concrete objects – the many points and regions of substantival 
space. So by adopting a Substantivalist view in response to the problem of spatial intrinsics, 
the monist gives with one hand whilst taking away with the other. She gets to explain the 
qualitative variation exhibited by the world, but only at the expense of the very integrity of 
her monism – by admitting multiple concrete objects.289  
 The second reason I think these responses fail is that they all seem unavoidably 
committed to external relations. For instance, if one adopted Instantiation Relationism, then 
the instantiation relations one posits are surely external. Cube may stand in the instantiation 
relation to being red and r1, for instance. But it surely could have stood in that relation to being 
blue and r1. The existence of the properties alone do not entail that the relation in question 
will obtain, thus it must be an external relation. But in the last chapter, you may remember 
that I touted it as a major advantage of monism that one can do away with external relations 
entirely. That advantage would be lost, and indeed that argument would be nullified, if one 
                                                 
288 Interestingly, Horgan & Potrč (2008), 177-178, endorse Adverbialism in this exact way, i.e. endorse Monism, 
Adverbialism, and reject the existence of space-time points or regions. They say, for instance, that Mass could be 
instantiated R-ishly by the world, and even that relations can be instantiated (R1-R2)-ishly by the world, whilst 
they deny the reality of any spatial regions. I’m just not sure I can make sense of what R-ishly or (R1-R2)-ishly 
could possibly mean, if there are no regions to which R refers. It is because of this that I reject Adverbialism as a 
viable option for the monist.  
289 It may be objected that space is not really a concrete object at all, or at least, that it is of a different ontological 
category from the concrete objects that reside in it. Maybe such a response holds promise? I will just say that I 
think, from a monist’s point of view, it looks like a bit of a cheat. A region of space has physical properties. It has 
a size, a shape, and so on. So regardless of what you call it, to me, it will always be a physical object.  
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adopted one of the above solutions to the problem of spatial intrinsics. I conclude, therefore, 
that the monist should reject them all.  
 
 
§6.2.2 The Preferred Solution: Maximal Irreducible Properties  
Fortunately, the monist does not have to endorse any of the above responses in order to 
overcome the problem of spatial intrinsics. Instead, she needs only to endorse what I will 
call Maximal Irreducible Properties. This is a rather broad term, and how one characterises 
these properties could vary from case to case, but very roughly the idea is as follows. The 
properties are maximal in that they are instantiated by a whole object. (That is, if we are 
talking about extended simples per se, then it would be an entire extended simple that 
instantiated the property, and if we are talking specifically about monism, then it would be 
the entire world that instantiated the property). The properties are irreducible in that they 
cannot be reduced to more basic properties instantiated by an object’s parts.  
 Consider once more our hypothetical extended simple, Cube. The idea is that the 
colouration across Cube’s extension is to be accounted for by its instantiating a maximal 
irreducible property. Let’s call it the property of being multi-coloured. Roughly speaking, 
then, Cube, as a whole, instantiates the single irreducible property of being multi-coloured and 
it is this that gives rise to its appearance. This line of thought would overcome the problem 
of spatial intrinsics, since it would not be the case that Cube simultaneously instantiates 
incompatible properties, like blueness and redness. Cube does not, in fact, instantiate blueness 
or redness at all. Rather, Cube instantiates a maximal and irreducible colour property; Cube is 
irreducibly multi-coloured.  
 Once the idea is grasped, it should be relatively easy to see how such properties 
could be invoked to explain all manner of qualitative variation that an extended simple 
could exhibit. An object could be irreducibly textured, for instance, in that it could be, say, 
ridged, or perforated, or even perfectly smooth. But, importantly, its texture would be explained 
by its instantiating a maximal irreducible textural property. Alternatively, an object could 
have an irreducible heat property. It could be a perfectly regular heat property, such that the 
object was the same temperature throughout, or it could be an irregular heat property, in 
that it was hotter in some places and cooler in others. Crucially, however, it would be a 
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maximal irreducible heat property that was responsible for this temperature variation, not 
the individual temperature values of the object’s parts. Of course, the same idea could be 
applied to all sorts of qualities that an object could exhibit.  
 I hope, at this point, that the reader will at least agree that such properties are 
possible. For they are surely conceptually coherent, indeed, the idea of such properties is 
surely very easy to grasp. After all, if one can grasp what it is for an object to be blue, for 
instance, then one could surely grasp what it is for an object to be, say, perforated or 
multicoloured. Moreover, I hope that the reader will agree that if there are such properties, 
then they would overcome the problem of spatial intrinsics. For if an object can be 
irreducibly perforated or multi-coloured, say, then there is no need to appeal to the object’s 
parts in order to explain its variable texture or colour. Despite this, however, I envisage that 
the reader may still have their suspicions. In particular, I have not given any good reasons 
for believing that there are such properties in the first place. They may, at this stage, appear 
little more than a desperately post-hoc postulation serving merely to overcome the problem 
of spatial intrinsics. A natural thought, for instance, may be to question why we should 
accept that such properties are irreducible. Sure, we can accept that a cube could be multi-
coloured, the response may be, but the instantiation of that property only holds in virtue of 
the object’s having different parts which are different colours. Indeed, it may be claimed that 
all it is for an object to be multi-coloured is for it to have distinct parts that are different 
colours.  
 Such a response is entirely understandable. In fact, I would respond the very same 
way were there no good independent reasons to believe in this particular type of maximal 
irreducible property. Fortunately, however, there are some good independent reasons. In the 
next chapter, I will spell out those reasons, and make what I hope is a compelling case for 
the existence of this type of property. Moreover, I will go into much more depth as to how 
these properties are best characterised. But that is for the next chapter. For now, I hope to 
have shown only how maximal irreducible properties, if there were such things, would 
overcome the problem of spatial intrinsics.   
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§6.3. Alternatives to Extended Simples 
 
As a final note, it should be worth considering what alternative views remain if one rejects 
the possibility of extended simples. For when considering what the ultimate nature of matter 
may be, there is a limit to the number of options available. Firstly, one must determine 
whether matter is, at its ultimate base, mereologically simple or not. Of course, all of the 
matter that makes up the actual world could be a combination of both types, simple and 
complex, but the fact remains that the two types are themselves exhaustive. For any 
particular piece of matter, it either has proper parts or it does not. There is no other way. 
 But then, as we have just been discussing, if one opts for the simple view of matter, 
there is still the small issue to be settled as to whether simple things can be extended or not. 
Once more, the simples that there are (if any at all) may be a combination of both types, 
extended and point-sized, but again, the two types should surely be regarded as exhaustive. 
For any particular material simple, it must either have extension or not. There is no other 
way.  
 Conversely, one could reject the idea of material simples altogether. On this view, 
then, all matter is mereologically complex. For any piece of matter you choose, it will have 
proper parts, and moreover, those parts will have further proper parts and so on and so 
forth. It is matter such as this that David Lewis labelled “atomless gunk”.290 Of course, the 
matter that makes up the actual world could be a combination of all of the three types just 
considered, but needless to say, those three types themselves should be considered 
exhaustive. At base, matter must bottom out into either extended simples or point-sized 
simples, or not bottom out at all. There is no other way.  
 So we have an exhaustive triumvirate of candidate theories for the ultimate nature of 
matter. Matter could consist of spatially extended simples. Alternatively, it could consist of 
non-extended, point-sized simples. Finally, matter could be complex all the way down, that is, 
consist of atomless gunk. Therefore, if one rejects the possibility of extended simples, one 
has to plump for one of the other alternatives: points or gunk. But both of these alternatives 
come replete with problems. I have already highlighted some of these problems in the 
previous chapter, so I will not labour the point here, but it remains to be said they are very 
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real problems. Gunk, for instance, is just weird. It is often said that it is perfectly possible that 
there is such stuff, since it is perfectly conceivable. But as I intimated previously, I am not 
convinced that this is true. Try as I might, I just don’t think I can conceive of what a hunk of 
gunk would be like. To help us in this conceptual task, we are often provided with certain 
hypothetical scenarios that are claimed to contain gunk. Jonathan Schaffer, for instance, tries 
to spur us on with the following rhyme: 
  
 
Great fleas have little fleas upon their backs to bite ‘em, 
 And little fleas have lesser fleas and so ad infinitum.291 
 
Charming as the rhyme may be, it provides no help in conceiving of gunk. It helps merely 
with conceiving of a series of objects ever decreasing in size (indeed it doesn’t even suggest 
that these objects are parts of one another).  But conceiving of that is not conceiving of gunk. 
Indeed, as I have stated before, I wonder what it is, precisely, that people are conceiving of 
when they say they are conceiving of gunk. It is my suspicion that when one claims to 
conceive of gunk, one conceives of something along the following lines. First one thinks of 
an ordinary object of some kind – it doesn’t matter what – and then one thinks of cutting it 
in two. Then one thinks of cutting one of the remaining halves in two again, and then 
repeating this process over and over again. There is nothing troublesome about that; I have 
no difficulty in conceiving of such a scenario whatsoever. But I refuse to accept that it gets 
one any closer to conceiving of gunk. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, even if one 
imagines this cutting process to go on for a really long time, one can’t imagine it going on 
infinitely. To imagine an infinite number of cuts would take an infinite amount of time. It 
would be simply beyond us. Secondly, and more importantly, however, even if one could 
imagine such a process going on infinitely, it would not demonstrate that the object being 
cut was gunky. Such an object could still be composed, ultimately, of point-sized particles. 
For no matter how many times you cut an extended object in half, no matter how small it 
gets, you will never get to a stage where the remaining halves are point-sized. Half of an 
extended object will always be an extended object. So bisecting an object an infinite amount 
                                                 
291 Schaffer (2010c), 61. (Schaffer attributes the rhyme to Bohm (1957)) 
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of times does not show that object to be gunky; it does not rule out the possibility that it 
bottoms out in points.292 
Now if my suspicion is correct, and this is what people are imagining when they say 
they are conceiving of gunk, then it turns out that they are not conceiving of gunk after all. 
And if they insist that this is not what they are imagining, then it needs to be explained what 
they really are imagining. It will not suffice to merely say the words, “I am conceiving of an 
object whose parts all have further parts”, for whilst I understand the words, they don’t help 
me get a grip on what such an object would really be like. Until such an explanation is 
forthcoming, I am unwilling to accept that gunk really is conceivable. And if it’s not even 
conceivable, then there is little reason to suppose that it is possible. It is for this reason, then, 
that I refuse to accept that matter could really be gunky.  
So if gunk is out of the picture, and in light of what has just been said I will assume 
that it is, then he who rejects extended simples must accept that matter bottoms out in point-
sized simples, for that is the only available view that remains. But this view is not without its 
problems either. In fact, in the last chapter, I demonstrated that if all matter is ultimately 
composed of point-sized objects, then it follows that all matter must be infinitely dense. But 
this is surely a troubling consequence; even if one claims it is not impossible, it still smacks of 
the absurd. So the punctal view of matter hardly represents some kind of metaphysical safe 
haven that offers shelter from controversy and counter-intuitive consequences; far from it. 
So what does all this show? It shows, I think, that matter, however one conceives of 
it, is a lot more peculiar than we may ordinarily imagine.  But this fact significantly 
diminishes the force of some of the standard objections to extended simples. For extended 
simples are often objected to on the grounds that they are too weird; too counter-intuitive. 
Consider, for example, these remarks from Dean Zimmerman: 
 
Perhaps a miraculous substance or a universal may be partless yet spread 
throughout an extended region; but it is hard to imagine an extended solid 
[...] behaving in any way which would lead us to describe it as partless.293 
 
When one sees the top half of the thing [an extended simple], one thereby 
sees the bottom half as well; when one touches the left side, one touches the 
                                                 
292 I thank Mike Bench-Capon for pointing this out to me, and for much helpful discussion on this topic.  
293 Zimmerman (1996b), 154  
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right also. Perhaps this bizarre mode of space-filling is not absolutely 
impossible; but surely the more sensible kinds of extended objects ought 
not participate in it.294 
 
It is not uncommon to encounter this type of intuitive distaste for extended simples. And I 
suppose it is not that hard to see why; for I concede, extended simples are a bit odd. But what 
is seldom recognised, however, is that the alternatives to extended simples (i.e. gunk or 
points) are at least equally odd. Gunk is surely the most peculiar of the three. Indeed, as I have 
already made clear, I doubt that it is even possible; I certainly can’t imagine what it would be 
like. And the punctal view of matter is peculiar too. In addition to the intuitive problems with 
it (i.e. if an object has literally no size, then in what sense is it there at all?), it entails the even 
more damaging fact that all matter must be infinitely dense. But once these facts are 
recognised, it makes no sense to rule one option out on the grounds that it is counter-
intuitive and weird. They are all counter-intuitive and weird! In fact, what I hope to have 
impressed on the reader over the course of the present chapter is that, contrary to 
Zimmerman-esque views, extended simples actually represent the least weird conception of 
matter of the three.   
 
 
§6.4. Concluding Remarks 
I hope to have shown that the widely held distaste for spatially extended simples is little 
more than prejudice. The arguments that are often wielded against them are unconvincing, 
for there are all manner of ways in which they can be responded to and overcome. But 
perhaps even more importantly than that, I hope to have shown that contrary to popular 
belief, extended simples actually represent the least problematic metaphysical conception of 
matter. Yes, they are a little odd in certain respects. But these oddities pale into 
insignificance in comparison with those of their rivals: points and gunk. It is for these 
reasons combined that we should endorse the conclusion that extended simples are a very 
real possibility.  
                                                 
294 Zimmerman (1996b), 154. I actually think that Zimmerman’s remarks are in danger of begging the question 
against the proponent of extended simples. For he considers what would happen when one sees the top ‘half’ of 
an extended simple. But you never see the top half of an extended simple, because extended simples don’t have halves!  
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§7. A World of Properties 
 
So far, I have been quite vague in my explanations of what the monistic world is actually 
like. I have pushed to one side questions of how to explain this or that feature of the world, 
with little more than a wave of the hand. I have repeatedly suggested that monistic 
explanations will appeal to the world’s properties rather than the world’s parts, but I have 
refrained from going into any great detail about what those properties must be like, or how 
they can fulfil the explanatory role that the monist requires of them. This is because, up to 
this point, I have been arguing for monism; providing reasons and arguments to entertain it 
as a possibility in the first place. But now those arguments have been given, and hopefully 
the reader will have found them compelling, the time has come for the monist to do a bit of 
explaining.  
 The central task for the monist is to be able to sufficiently explain the appearances. In 
other words, the monist has to explain the appearance of plurality, given that there is, in 
fact, only singularity. For it is beyond doubt that it certainly seems as though there are many 
things. The world as it appears is populated by a vast number of distinct material objects: 
trees, rocks, cats, dogs, and so on and so forth. The monist needs to give us a story to explain 
how it is that it seems that there are such things, when in fact there are none. This is what I 
shall do in the present chapter. The problem is essentially the same as the problem of spatial 
intrinsics mentioned in the previous chapter, but on the grandest of scales. How is it that a 
single, maximally large yet mereologically simple object, can exhibit the kind of dazzlingly 
rich qualitative variation that we encounter in the world? The answer, as I have already 
alluded to, is through its instantiation of maximal irreducible properties. According to the 
monist, we live in a world of properties, not in a world of things. 
 
 
§7.1. Distributional Properties I: What They Are 
I believe that the monist should endorse distributional properties. A distributional property is 
a property which not only ascribes a particular quality to an object (e.g. redness), but one 
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which also specifies the way in which that quality is distributed across the extension of that 
object (e.g. red all over or red in the corners etc.). The idea of distributional properties was first 
introduced by Josh Parsons, who tells us that “a distributional property is like a way of 
painting, or filling in, a spatially extended object with some property”.295 Distributional 
properties are most intuitive – we talk as though there are such things all the time. Consider, 
for example, the following statements: 
 
1. The zebra is black and white striped 
2. The surface of the lake is rippled 
3. The Swiss cheese is holey 
These are all perfectly ordinary, everyday kind of statements, yet taken at face value, they all 
seem to refer to distributional properties, i.e. the properties of being black and white striped; 
being rippled; being holey. Now I do not expect the reader to be immediately convinced, on the 
back of these example statements, that there are distributional properties. Arguments will 
follow which aim to do that. However, these statements illustrate nicely what distributional 
properties are supposed to be like. The idea of a distributional property is, I would suggest, 
very easy to grasp. 
 However, I envisage that there will be much disagreement over how seriously we 
should take distributional properties. Another way of saying that may be that there are 
starkly different ontological conclusions one can draw from analysing statements such as 1 – 
3. One possible and fairly extreme view would be to reject distributional properties 
altogether. On this view, one would deny that there are any properties to which the 
predicates in 1 – 3 refer. The motivation for such a view would be, I suspect, some kind of 
appeal to ontological economy. For instance, one may think that there is only a sparse stock 
of objects and properties (presumably microphysical objects and properties), and that all 
features of the world can be explained fully and perspicuously in terms of these alone. On 
this view, there would simply be no need to posit objects like lakes or zebras, nor the 
distributional properties that they purportedly instantiate. I will call this view, the 
Eliminativist View.  
                                                 
295 Parsons (2004), 173 
195 | P a g e  
 
 A somewhat milder stance could be called the Reductive View. On this view, one 
would accept that there are distributional properties, but maintain that they are reducible to 
combinations or conjunctions of more fundamental, non-distributional properties. The 
reductionist, then, would deny distributional properties any ontological seriousness. The 
property of being black and white striped, say, would be considered on a par, ontologically 
speaking, with the property of being king or being tasty, for example. There are such 
properties, but they are ontologically lightweight; they would have no place in a complete 
and perspicuous description of what the world is really like.  On the reductive view, then, to 
say that an object has the property of being black and white striped, for example, is really just to 
say that that object has some parts which are black and some parts which are white, and that 
those parts stand in the appropriate spatial relations to give rise to stripy-ness.296 The 
distributional properties reduce to non-distributional ones.  
 There is nothing particularly unusual or revisionary about either of these views. 
Eliminativism and reductionism are commonplace in many areas of philosophy. Both, 
however, are incompatible with monism. The reason for this should, I think, be fairly clear. 
It is that both eliminitavism and reductionism about distributional properties seem 
necessarily committed to a pluralistic ontology, i.e. an ontology of multiple concrete objects. 
To see why this is so, consider an example. Let’s continue with the example of the zebra 
having the property of being black and white striped. It was suggested that the reductionist 
about distributional properties would say that for an object to have the property of being 
black and white striped is nothing more than its having parts which are black and parts which 
are white, and those parts standing in the appropriate spatial relations required for stripy-
ness. The eliminativist takes a similar view but simply rejects that there is any distributional 
property there at all; rather, all there is are the parts, and their properties, suitably arranged. 
In both cases, however, the appeal to parts looks essential. I fail to see how any reductionist 
or eliminativist strategy could work here without appealing to sub-portions (i.e. parts) of the 
extended objects purported to have distributional property. With regard to our hypothetical 
zebra, for instance, I just don’t see how the reductionist strategy would work without 
appealing to the zebra’s parts? It would have to reduce the property of being black and white 
                                                 
296 Of course, as Parsons himself notes, it is unlikely that any reductionist would appeal to colour properties 
simpliciter. More likely, they would appeal to the fundamental properties of the microphysical particles, or 
something like that. Colour properties serve merely as an illustrative heuristic device. 
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striped to properties that are non-distributional, yet that are nonetheless instantiated by the 
entire zebra. It is hard to see what these properties could possibly be.297 
 The monist, then, must take distributional properties to be irreducible. This is for the 
simple reason that if they were reducible, then they could not be reduced to properties of the 
world’s parts (because the world doesn’t have parts), so they would have to be reduced to 
other maximal, yet non-distributional properties of the world. But it is hard to see what 
these properties could be, and, moreover, if there were any suitable candidates for such 
properties, then their existence would surely undermine the requirement for positing 
distributional properties in the first place. In other words, why posit distributional 
properties at all, if there are other candidate properties that do the explanatory work just as 
well without them?  
 So the monist requires an ontology that contains fundamental, irreducible 
distributional properties. It is the instantiation of these properties that gives rise to the rich 
and diverse qualitative variation of the world. Of course, when pressed, I think it is unlikely 
that the monist will want to posit properties like being black and white striped in any 
description of fundamental reality – these properties were merely invoked for illustrative 
purposes. I think that the monist can, and should, allow that there are such properties, and 
that they are distributional properties, but that she should maintain that they are somehow 
derivative on more fundamental distributional properties of the world.298 When it comes to 
the world’s fundamental properties, the monist may want to piggyback on the theories of 
modern science, for instance, and suggest that the world’s fundamental distributional 
properties are things like mass distributions, charge distributions, spin distributions, and so on. 
More will be said about that later. 
 
 
 
                                                 
297 I should note here that Kris McDaniel (2008) has attempted a reduction of exactly that sort. He suggests that 
distributional properties are reducible to short-lived, localised tropes. Whilst McDaniel’s view is certainly 
interesting, I think the monist should reject it. For one thing, he takes distributional properties to be mereological 
sums of tropes. This directly conflicts with mereological nihilism, a central motivation for endorsing monism in 
the first place. I won’t be considering McDaniel’s view in what follows.  
298 Perhaps these types of ‘lightweight’ distributional properties should, then, be taken as being reducible. 
Importantly, however, they would only be reducible to other distributional properties.  
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§7.2. Distributional Properties II: Why believe in them?  
 
The monist could, of course, just assert that there are distributional properties and that they 
must be taken as irreducible; that this is a non-negotiable feature of monism. But it would 
make her position a whole lot stronger if she could argue for this claim on independent 
grounds. For if one were at all suspicious about distributional properties, one may use the 
monist’s reliance on them as a reason to object against monism itself. If the monist could 
provide independent arguments to support the existence of irreducible distributional 
properties, then she could undercut this line of objection. Fortunately, I think there are some 
good independent reasons to believe in irreducible distributional properties, which I will set 
out below. 
 
 
§7.2.1 Parsons’s Argument 
Parsons has provided a most compelling argument for the irreducibility of distributional 
properties.299 The argument aims to show that the reductionist view entails the claim that all 
extended objects must, of necessity, be composed of non-extended points. The reductionist 
view, then, rules out the possibility of both gunk and extended simples, or so Parsons would 
have us believe. This leads him to reject the reductionist view since gunk and/or extended 
simples should be thought of as, at the very least, possible. I think that Parsons’s argument 
works convincingly, and, moreover, that it can be put even more forcefully than he puts it. I 
will set out the argument below.  
 The argument works best when set out in terms of an example, so let’s return to our 
hypothetical zebra. The reductionist strategy would be to claim that the zebra’s 
distributional property of being black and white striped is reducible to the conjunction of 
various non-distributional properties instantiated by the zebra’s parts. But which parts? The 
obvious candidates are those parts which we can call the zebra’s ‘stripes’. Thus the claim 
may be that the zebra has some parts (i.e. stripes) that are black simpliciter and some which 
are white simpliciter, and that those parts stand in certain spatial relations appropriate for 
                                                 
299 Parsons (2004) 
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stripy-ness.300 But then the question is: what is it for an extended object to be black 
simpliciter? A natural response to this question would be that for an object to be black 
simpliciter is just for it to be plain black, i.e. uniformly black all over (I mean, how else could 
one respond?). But being uniformly black all over looks suspiciously like a distributional 
property, in that it describes not only the colour of the object, but the way in which the 
colour is distributed across the object (i.e. uniformly). But if this is right, then it looks like the 
parts that the reductionist must appeal in order for her reduction to work cannot be 
extended. For saying of any extended object that it is black simpliciter is merely to say that it 
has the uniform distributional property of being black all over. From this, then, it seems 
legitimate to infer that the only possible candidate parts that the reductionist can appeal to 
are non-extended parts, i.e. points. So the argument suggests that one can only reduce 
distributional properties to non-distributional ones if those non-distributional properties are 
instantiated by point-sized objects. Thus if there are no irreducible distributional properties at 
all, then all objects must be composed, ultimately, of point-sized particles.  
 The argument is compelling, particularly when it is set out with Parsons’s usual flair. 
But it requires further examination; for there are a number of key assumptions upon which 
the argument rests that could be brought into question. Drawing out these assumptions 
explicitly will serve to make the argument more formal, and will enable us to subject it to a 
more rigorous scrutiny. So that is what I will do. First, however, it will be necessary to 
highlight an important distinction. The distinction is between distributional properties on the 
one hand, and distributable properties on the other.301 Distributable properties are the 
qualities that distributional properties distribute. For example, the distributional property of 
being black all over ascribes a distribution of the distributable property blackness. Importantly, 
however, distributable properties like blackness are not distributional properties; they are 
non-distributional properties. What is also important, however, is that one should not take 
the terms ‘distributable property’ and ‘non-distributional property’ to be co-extensional. The 
reason for this being that there are, quite plausibly I think, non-distributional properties 
which are also non-distributable. To give a few examples, the property of being a brother, or 
                                                 
300 I am supposing, for the sake of argument, that colour properties are fundamental here. Again, this is purely 
because colour properties illustrate the argument vividly. However, one could substitute any distributional 
property they like. The argument is designed to show the irreducibility of distributional properties in principle.  
301 Parsons also notes this distinction, and the term ‘distributable property’ is his.  
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perhaps, the property of being located at, are almost certainly non-distributional properties. 
But they also appear to be non-distributable properties, or so I will assume. The upshot of 
this is that the distributable properties are merely a subset of the non-distributional 
properties.  
 Now this distinction has been made clear, I will return to the key assumptions upon 
which Parsons’s argument rests. Specifically, I think that three assumptions are required in 
order for the argument to go through. They are: 
 
a) For each and every distributional property, there will be at least one corresponding 
distributable property that it distributes.302 
b) An extended object cannot instantiate a distributable property without thereby also 
instantiating a distribution of that property. 
c) All extended objects must, of necessity, instantiate at least one distributional 
property. 
 
These assumptions are not made entirely explicit in Parsons’s formulation of the argument, 
but I think they are required for the argument to go through. In due course I will say a little 
bit about why I think these assumptions should be accepted, but first, let me show why they 
are required for the anti-reductionist argument to work. With these assumptions in place, I 
think the argument can be set out as follows: 
 
1. If reductionism is true, then all distributional properties are, of necessity, reducible to 
non-distributional properties. Specifically, they are reducible to their corresponding 
distributable properties (or conjunctions thereof). (E.g. the property of being black and 
white striped is reducible to the conjunction of instantiations of blackness and 
whiteness). 
                                                 
302 Simple distributional properties, like being black all over will have only a single corresponding distributable 
property, i.e. blackness. More complex distributional properties, like being black and white striped, will have more 
than one distributable property, i.e. blackness and whiteness. The more complex the distributional property, the 
more distributable properties will be associated with it. 
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2. Therefore, if reductionism is true, an object’s having a distributional property is 
necessarily reducible to its parts having only certain distributable properties (and 
standing in certain spatial relations). 
3. From assumption b, it follows that these parts cannot be extended. 
4. Therefore, if reductionism is true, all extended objects that instantiate at least one 
distributional property must be composed of point-sized parts.  
5. From assumption c, it follows that if reductionism is true, then all extended objects 
are, necessarily, composed of point-sized parts. 
6. From 5, it follows that if reductionism is true, then extended simples are 
impossible.303 
7. Extended simples are possible. 
8. Therefore, reductionism is false. 
The argument is valid, but in order for it to be convincing some of its premises and 
assumptions are in need of some independent support. Specifically, I think that it is the three 
initial assumptions (a, b, and c), and premise 1, that require a defence. Let me provide that 
defence now.  
 Assumption a looks fairly uncontroversial. The very definition of what a 
distributional property is seems to entail that there must be at least one corresponding 
distributable property for each distributional property. To revisit Parsons’s description: “a 
distributional property is like a way of painting, or filling in, a spatially extended object with 
some property”.304 What could be meant here by ‘some property’ other than a distributable 
property? If there were no distributable property corresponding to a particular 
distributional property, then what, exactly, would that property distribute? Nothing, seems 
to be the only answer, which suggests that there could not be any such distributional 
properties at all. Assumption a, then, looks fine.   
 Assumption b is also quite plausible, or so I would like to claim. For if b were false, 
then its falsity would entail the possibility of a scenario whereby an object instantiated a 
                                                 
303 Parsons also claims that if reductionism is true, then it rules out the possibility of gunk, as well as extended 
simples. This is not strictly true. For that to be the case, it would have to be impossible for a gunky object to be 
composed of point-sized parts. But this needn’t be impossible; at least, not if you accept that point-sized objects 
could have point-sized proper parts. Such a postulation would be strange, I think, but not impossible.  
304 Parsons (2004), 173 
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certain distributable property, yet at the same time, did not instantiate any distribution of 
that property. The problem is that I’m not convinced this is even a coherent possibility. How 
could an extended object instantiate blackness, for example, or heat, say, without having it 
distributed in some way or other across its extension? I just don’t see that it could. I’m not 
sure I could even understand what was meant if someone said something like, “this poker is 
hot, but the heat is not distributed across it in any way, it is simply hot”. They may mean, of 
course, that it is equally hot all over, but of course, this is still a distribution of heat; it is 
merely a uniform distribution. To suggest that something could be hot, but have no heat 
distribution at all is just nonsense, or so it seems to me. It is for this reason that I suggest 
assumption b is also true.305  
 Assumption c might initially strike one as a particularly bold claim. After all, I have 
only just introduced the very idea of distributional properties, yet I am now claiming that all 
extended objects have at least one distributional property of necessity. Perhaps it is a bold 
claim, but I think it is also a claim that has a great deal of plausibility. To see why, just think 
of an extended object – any extended object you like – and I am sure that you will find that it 
has at least some kind of property distributed across its extension. For surely, no matter how 
amorphous, bland or unremarkable an object may be, it will always have some kind of 
distributional property. Even a blank slate, for instance, will have a uniform distribution of 
blankness across its surface. Intuitively, then, it seems very difficult to conceive of an 
extended object that didn’t have some kind of property distributed across its extension. 
Intuition, therefore, points to the truth of c. 
But in fact, I think an even stronger case can be made for assumption c. For it is 
plausible to suggest that any extended object will always have a mass (even the fundamental 
particles of physics, tiny as they may be, are taken to have mass). But mass is surely a 
distributable property; for any extended object that has mass must have that mass 
distributed across it in some way or other. An object may have its mass uniformly 
distributed, in which case we would say it is uniformly dense, or alternatively it may have 
its mass non-uniformly distributed (e.g. have its mass concentrated in one corner, say), in 
which case we would say it has a non-uniform density. But either way, it seems that mass 
                                                 
305 However, I could imagine an opponent remaining unconvinced. In fact, I think that assumption b remains the 
one potential weak spot of the argument. I will revisit this assumption, and its potential weaknesses, in §7.2.3, 
but for now, I will accept the assumption as true. 
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must always be distributed in some way or other across the extension of massive objects. It 
may appear that I am begging the question somewhat here, but I just can’t see what the 
alternative would be? That an extended object could have a mass, yet not have that mass 
distributed across its extension in any way? That, to me at least, doesn’t even sound 
coherent. For it seems reasonable to suppose that if an extended object has mass, then it is a 
perfectly reasonable question to ask whether it is uniformly or non-uniformly dense. But 
these two options are exhaustive – it has to be one or the other. (It would make no sense to 
say ‘it is neither uniformly nor non-uniformly dense’). But to be either uniformly or non-
uniformly dense just is to have a mass distribution of some kind. So having mass, and 
having extension, entails having a mass distribution. If these thoughts about mass are true, 
then assumption c is true. But even if you have reservations about the mass example - even 
if you disagree with me that mass is a distributable property - assumption c surely still 
remains extremely plausible. It would be a challenge, I think, to come up with an example of 
an extended object that did not have any property distributed across its extension. I don’t 
think such a challenge could be met, and that is why I accept assumption c. And for anyone 
who does want to reject c, I think the onus is on them to meet the challenge set.  
 In addition to the three assumptions I listed at the outset, premise 1 might seem at 
least not obviously true, so I will say a little in defence of that too. The thought behind 
premise 1 is that one can only reduce distributional properties in terms of the distributable 
properties they distribute. For instance, if something has the distributional property of being 
black all over, then whatever it reduces to must be expressible in terms of the distributable 
property blackness, and no other distributable property. This claim has a certain intuitive pull 
about it. After all, it would be quite strange to suppose that one could reduce the property of 
being black all over in terms of any distributable properties other than blackness, say, whiteness 
or redness. However, I can imagine the following objection being raised: but colour 
properties do reduce to non-colour properties! The property of being red, for instance, is 
explainable in terms of much more fundamental properties like wavelength reflectance 
properties, say. But these are not colour properties! So why should I accept that distributional 
properties can only be reduced in terms of the distributable properties they distribute? Why 
not believe that distributional properties could be reduced to other types of property 
entirely? The objection makes a fair point, but it only arises due to the specific nature of the 
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example. I have been using colour properties to make my points because they provide 
particularly vivid examples with which to work. But I don’t, when it comes down to it, 
actually believe colour properties to be fundamental, thus I don’t expect them to be 
irreducible either. However, what I do maintain is that whatever properties colour 
distributional properties do reduce to must also be distributional properties. They may well 
reduce to wavelength reflectance distributions for instance.306 The import of premise 1, however, 
is that whatever fundamental distributional properties an extended object has could only 
reasonably be thought to reduce to instantiations of their corresponding fundamental 
distributable properties. If you take wavelength reflectance to be fundamental, for instance, 
then you could not reasonably expect to explain a wavelength reflectance distributional property 
in terms of anything other than instantiations of wavelength reflectance. If you thought mass 
was a fundamental property, then you could not explain a mass distributional property in 
terms of anything other than instantiations of mass. This is what is meant to be asserted by 
premise 1.  
  In conclusion, then, I think that the argument presents a convincing case for the 
irreducibility of distributional properties. If you accept the initial assumptions and the 
premises, you should also accept the conclusion that distributional properties do not reduce 
to non-distributional ones. And in light of the previous remarks, I hope the reader will now 
agree that there are good reasons to take those assumptions and premises to be most 
plausible.   
 
 
7.2.2 A Stronger Version of the Argument 
I think that Parsons’s argument is fairly compelling as it stands. But I think it can be 
strengthened further if it is combined with some observations I made in the last two 
chapters. In chapter 5 I proposed that point-sized particles could not have mass, since if they 
did, they would have to be infinitely dense. I think that this claim, if true, causes irreparable 
damage to the reductionist view of distributional properties. The argument could be set out 
as follows: 
 
                                                 
306 Cf. Parsons (2004), 177 
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1. If reductionism is true, then all distributional properties are reducible to conjunctions 
of non-distributional properties instantiated by point-sized objects.  
2. Fundamental properties are irreducible.  
3. Therefore, from 1 and 2, there can be no fundamental distributional properties.  
4. Mass is a fundamental property 
5. Therefore mass can only be instantiated by point-sized objects.  
6. Mass cannot be instantiated by point-sized objects, since it would result in them being 
infinitely dense.  
7. Thus we have a contradiction.  
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that premise 1 (i.e. reductionism) is true. If none of 
the following premises can be reasonably taken to be false, then we have an argument 
against reductionism. Premise 2 looks undeniable. Indeed it may be natural to suppose that 
the terms ‘irreducible’ and ‘fundamental’ are perfectly interchangeable.307 There are, of 
course, different interpretations of the precise meaning of that metaphysical buzzword 
‘fundamental’, but I think there is a generally agreed understanding of the term that will 
suffice for present purposes. Fundamentality is usually defined in terms of dependence, such 
that those things which are fundamental are those things which don’t depend on any other 
things in order to exist.308 A fundamental property, then, is one whose existence does not 
depend on the existence of any other properties. But if this is right, it is hard to see how one 
could maintain that a fundamental property could be reducible to other properties. The 
whole point of reduction is normally to reduce to a more fundamental level. Consider some 
often touted examples of reduction: 
 
 Mental properties reduce to physical properties 
 Colour properties of objects reduce to microphysical properties 
                                                 
307 One may, of course, argue that there are no fundamental properties whatsoever. See, for instance, McKenzie 
(2011) or Morganti (2009). But that is a different project. Perhaps premise 2 should be better thought of as a 
conditional, i.e. if there are fundamental properties, then those properties are irreducible. 
308 This is certainly the way Schaffer defines it, see Schaffer (2003; 2009). Also, see Cameron (2008b) or Fine (2001) 
for endorsements of fundamentality being cashed out in terms of dependence.  Although see Barnes (2012) for 
reasons to think that the two notions come apart. 
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In these kinds of case, it seems clear that what the reducible things are taken to reduce to, 
are assumed to be more fundamental. Moreover, it seems that the reducible things will 
always depend for their existence on the things they are taken to reduce to. If mental property 
X reduces to physical property Y, then X could not exist without Y. Reducible entities depend 
on their reductive grounds. On this understanding, then, it would not make sense to claim 
that a fundamental property could be reducible. For if it is reducible, there must be some 
other property (or set of properties) on which it depends. But if it depends on anything, then 
it is not, by this definition at least, fundamental. Thus on what I take to be the common 
understanding of fundamentality, premise 2 is true.  
So we are left with premises 4 and 6. On the basis of what was said on the matter in 
the previous two chapters, I will assume that 6 is true. It would take a brave (and perhaps 
foolhardy) philosopher to reject the argument by rejecting 6. For that would result in the 
consequence that all matter was infinitely dense; a consequence that is immensely 
implausible at the very best, and physically impossible at worst.309 So what about premise 4? 
Now I do not claim to be able to argue for the fact that mass is a fundamental property, but I 
will repeat what I stated in chapter 5: that if there are any fundamental properties at all, then 
mass is surely a prime candidate. It strikes me that it would be a far more radical move to 
accept reductionism at the cost of mass’s fundamentality, than to hold on to the latter and 
reject reductionism. I will assume that I have the weight of the informed majority behind me 
here, in that I am assuming that the majority would ascribe far more certainty to the claim 
that mass is fundamental, than they would to the claim that distributional properties are 
reducible to non-distributional ones. The weight of the majority may not count for all that 
much, of course, but what it does do, I think, is put the burden of proof on the reductionist 
to explain why we should believe that mass is not fundamental. And it would not be enough 
to simply point to the above argument and say ‘that’s why’. What I mean is that the 
reductionist needs to explain what mass is, in more fundamental terms. Until that can be 
done, one should reject reductionism in favour of holding on to the fundamentality of mass.  
 
 
 
                                                 
309 Simons (2004) certainly claims it to be physically impossible. 
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§7.2.3 A Potential Response 
Before moving on, there is a potential response to the argument that I have presented above, 
that needs to be pre-empted and dealt with. I gestured at this possible response above (see 
footnote 306), but will now expand upon it. The response would be to reject assumption b, 
the claim that extended objects cannot instantiate distributable properties without thereby 
instantiating specific distributions of those properties. As was shown above, this assumption 
is essential if the argument is to go through. But I can envisage a way in which it may be 
questioned, which I will elucidate below. 
 Let’s consider a particular distributable property: blackness. It may be claimed that, 
contrary to assumption b, an extended object can just instantiate blackness, plainly and 
simply, without having to instantiate a particular distribution of blackness. This would make 
the object wholly black. Now I may call that a uniform distributional property, but if the 
objector is not already sympathetic to distributional properties, she may not be convinced 
that my calling it so actually makes it so. She may just think that what I call “being 
uniformly black” is just “being black”, and that’s all there is to it. In essence, then, this line of 
response would deny that what I have called uniform distributional properties are 
distributional properties at all. If this view is correct, then the whole anti-reductionist 
argument looks at threat. For the reductionist can simply say that non-uniform 
distributional properties (e.g. being black and white striped) are reducible to uniform ones (e.g. 
extended parts being uniformly black and parts being uniformly white). But since the 
reductionist does not take uniform distributional properties to actually be distributional, it 
looks like non-uniform distributional properties can be reduced to non-distributional 
properties after all.  
 In fact, our hypothetical objector could press her response even further and concede 
that if an extended object instantiates some distributable property, then of course that 
property will be distributed across the object in some way or other. But she may deny that 
any distributional property is required in order to account for this fact. Yes, it is true that the 
object has a uniform distribution of F, but no distributional property is required to make this 
true; it is made true merely by the object instantiating F. Instantiating F simpliciter, on this 
view, results in a uniform distribution of F, but this doesn’t mean we need to recognise 
uniform distributional properties; we need only recognise F.  
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 I don’t think there is any knock-down response to this reductionist objection.310 In 
fact, I think that, at base, it is likely to come down to a clash of intuitions about whether 
uniform distributional properties are really distributional properties or not. However, I 
think there are a number of reasons to suppose that the intuition that they are distributional 
properties is much more reasonable than the reductionist intuition that they are not. The 
first reason is that if the reductionist is right, then the very possibility of there being 
qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples is ruled out. To see why this is so, just 
imagine a spatially extended object, O, that is qualitatively heterogeneous; let’s say it is black 
and white striped. We can say, therefore, O instantiates a non-uniform distributional 
property: the property of being black and white striped. But the reductionist’s view just is that 
properties like this reduce to conjunctions of non-distributional properties. But the only way 
to perform such a reduction is to say that O has parts which are plain black and parts which 
are plain white.311 More generally, then, the reductionist has to accept that her view entails 
the claim that all extended objects which exhibit qualitative heterogeneity must be 
composed of parts. Qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples are, on this view, 
impossible.  
 The reductionist may be happy to accept this consequence, but she must accept that 
it is a consequence of her view. The upshot is, then, that this reductionist response does not 
completely overcome the argument given above, but it does weaken it. For on this view, it 
does not follow from reductionism that all extended objects must be composed of points (i.e. 
that extended simples are impossible), as the initial argument suggests, but it does follow 
that extended simple objects cannot, of necessity, exhibit qualitative variation. And it is 
likely to be thought that the latter conclusion doesn’t sound nearly as objectionable as the 
former. However, the anti-reductionist should remind her opponent here that her view 
doesn’t entail either consequence. The view that non-uniform distributional properties are 
irreducible has no implications for the mereological structure of the objects that instantiate 
them; any extended object, regardless of its mereological structure, can in principle 
                                                 
310 Parsons (2004), 179, does actually provide a response that he believes sufficient to render the objection false. I 
don’t think his response works, however, so I won’t go into it here.  
311 Providing, of course, that we are taking blackness and whiteness to be fundamental properties, which we are, for 
the sake of argument. 
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instantiate a non-uniform distributional property, if they are taken to be irreducible. This 
fact must surely be regarded as a cost of reductionism. 
 But I think that there is an even stronger reason to resist the reductionist claim that 
uniform distributions of F are not distributional properties. That reason can be made explicit 
through a consideration of what the initial motivation might have been for taking a 
reductionist view of distributional properties in the first place. The only reason I can think of 
that might motivate a reductionist view of distributional properties is some kind of desire 
for simplicity. More specifically, irreducible distributional properties might at first appear to 
be a bit unusual; some strange and entirely new type of property. Admitting that there are 
such properties, therefore, would constitute a significant addition to one’s ontology. Thus 
the thought might be that if one can reduce distributional properties to mere conjunctions of 
more ‘normal’ properties, then one will have explained the phenomena, without having to 
inflate one’s ontology with a new and mysterious type of property. If one can reduce 
properties like being uniformly black or being black and white striped, for instance, to 
uncontroversial properties like blackness or whiteness, then one will have undertaken a 
successful piece of ontological cost-cutting, or so the thought may be.  
 I am entirely sympathetic to this kind of reasoning, for I, just like most 
metaphysicians, am always partial to an ontological saving here or there. But my worry is 
that this parsimony-driven motivation may evaporate entirely if the reductionist also adopts 
the response that is currently under consideration. For the response is that uniform 
distributional properties just are ‘normal’ properties normally instantiated. So an object’s 
being uniformly black, for instance, just is for that object to instantiate the property of blackness. 
The instantiation of this property results in the bearer being wholly black (or being black all 
over, or being uniformly black, or however you want to phrase it), but there is no 
distributional property involved at all. But my worry is, then, that this ‘normal’ property of 
blackness seems, after all, to be a very similar type of property to the distributional property 
being uniformly black. Both properties seem to play the same role, so to speak; both properties 
would give rise to the object being black all over, or wholly black, or whatever. But if that’s 
the case, then in what sense is blackness any more ‘normal’ than the distributional property 
of being uniformly black? Or conversely, what is it about distributional properties, like being 
uniformly black, that the reductionist found so mysterious in the first place? If the reductionist 
209 | P a g e  
 
is happy to accept that for an extended object, O, to instantiate F simpliciter entails that O has 
a uniform distribution of F, then I can’t see why she wouldn’t also be happy to simply accept 
the existence of the distributional property being uniformly F. On what grounds could 
someone reasonably reject the latter as unusual, mysterious, or metaphysically excessive, 
while accepting the former as quite unexceptional? This is not at all clear. 
 In light of all this, then, I think there is good reason to reject this reductionist 
response, and maintain the success of the original anti-reductionist argument. For the 
reductionist response only works on the proviso that standard (i.e. non-distributional) 
properties, instantiated simpliciter, can take the place of uniform distributional properties. 
But that proviso seems to undermine the very motivation for taking the reductionist view in 
the first place, because if non-distributional properties do all the same work that uniform 
distributional properties are taken to do, then there seems to be no gain in simplicity in 
endorsing the one and rejecting the latter. Moreover, because the reductionist view involves 
a cost that anti-reductionist view does not (i.e. it rules out the possibility of qualitatively 
heterogeneous extended simples), then in the absence of any motivation for endorsing it, 
one shouldn’t endorse it. The response, then, should be rejected, and irreducible 
distributional properties endorsed.  
 
  
§7.3. Distributional Properties III: Two Conceptions  
 
I have, hopefully, painted a reasonably rich picture of what distributional properties are, 
what they are like, and most importantly, why we should believe in them. But I think that 
there is actually scope for a lot more detail to be added to this picture. In particular, I think 
that there are two quite distinct ways in which one can conceive of distributional properties. 
I will call them The Structured Conception and The Unified Conception. (Whether these names 
are truly representative of what the views entail, I will leave for the reader to decide, but 
they are merely names after all). The two views trade on the distinction that has been made 
earlier, between distributional properties and distributable properties. Essentially, the views 
differ as to how substantive this distinction should be taken to be. In very rough outline, the 
structured conception takes the distinction to be metaphysically substantive, and as such, 
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takes distributional properties to be structured properties composed out of distributable 
properties and distribution patterns.312 In contrast, the unified conception denies any 
metaphysical weight to the distinction. Rather it takes distributional properties to be unified 
(i.e. unstructured) and that distributable properties, if we admit that there are such things at 
all, are mere abstractions from their distributional counterparts. These are, of course, very 
rough outlines; I will go into more detail in what follows. 
 To begin, however, I should make it clear that I take distributional properties to be 
universals, as opposed to tropes. And that is on either of the conceptions that I briefly 
outlined above. (In the one case they are taken to be structured universals, and in the other 
they are taken to be unstructured).313 The main reason for this is that I subscribe to the fairly 
common view that universals give us a better explanation of facts about resemblance, as 
opposed to tropes, whose proponents must accept that resemblance facts are primitive. 
Moreover, I think that universals are a whole lot less problematic when taken in conjunction 
with a monistic ontology than a pluralistic ontology. To see why this is, consider the 
objection that is most commonly presented against universals, and that is probably the main 
reason behind most trope theorist’s acceptance of tropes: the problem of their multiple 
location. How can two distinct objects (two pillar boxes, say) share one and the same 
universal (redness, say)? More generally, how can a single universal inhere in multiple and 
distinct objects? This presents a problem that some philosophers have considered 
insurmountable. However, one can see that it only really rears its head when taken against 
the backdrop of a pluralistic ontology: an ontology of multiple and distinct objects. For the 
monist, the problem never arises – because there are not many things! There is only a single 
concrete particular – the world – and it is that and that alone which instantiates universals. 
There is nothing at all peculiar or problematic in suggesting that a single object can 
instantiate one and the same universal. 
 These comments need a bit of qualification. For one might reasonably think that for 
the monist there is actually no substantive distinction to be made between universals and 
tropes at all. The central distinction between universals and tropes is that the latter are taken 
                                                 
312 The word ‘compose’ may be misleading here. I don’t mean compose in a mereological sense. More will be said 
about this in due course. 
313 When I say ‘structured universals’, here, I have a different kind of thing in mind than the structural universals 
that can be found in the extant literature that have been argued for by the likes of Armstrong (1978) 69-71 & 120-
127; (1986); (1997) and argued against by the likes of Lewis (1986b). Again, I will say more on this later. 
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to be particularised (i.e. each trope is unique and non-repeatable), whereas the former are 
taken to be repeatable (i.e. a single universal can have multiple instances; it can inhere in 
numerous distinct objects). But for the monist, there is only one object to instantiate 
properties, so neither tropes nor universals would be repeatable. Both could only have a 
single instance, by being instantiated by the world. Moreover, if the world is the only object 
there is, then there will be no facts about resemblance that need explaining, since there 
would be no other objects for the world to resemble, and thus that alleged advantage of 
universals would be lost. If this view is right, then the distinction between tropes and 
universals fades away, and it would seem a little pointless for the monist to choose between 
them.  
I can see why one might adopt such a view, but I think it is false. The reason for this 
is that even if you’re a monist, universals are still in principle repeatable, and this fact can 
help explain similarities between ways the world could have been. Consider, for example, a 
monistic world that is green and spherical. Presumably, this world could have been green 
and cubical. These two possible states of the world, although distinct, seem to bear some sort 
of resemblance to one another; they are both green after all. If the monist takes properties to 
be universals, she can explain this resemblance: both states share a universal – green-ness. If 
the monist endorses tropes, this explanation is not available.314 This is why I think that the 
monist should maintain that there is a significant distinction between universals and tropes, 
and why she should endorse the former rather than the latter. With that said, let me now go 
on to elaborate on the two distinct conceptions of distributional properties of which I gave 
only the roughest of outlines earlier. 
 
 
§7.3.1 The Structured Conception 
To begin, I should make it clear that when I talk of ‘structured universals’ here, I am not 
referring to the kind of structural universals that are perhaps best associated with David 
Armstrong.315 This is because Armstrong’s structural universals can only be instantiated by 
mereologically complex objects. As Armstrong states: “A property [universal], S, is 
                                                 
314 More will be said about this in §7.3.3 
315 See Armstrong (1978) pp.69-71 & 120-127; (1986); (1997) 
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structural if and only if proper parts of particulars having S have some property or 
properties, T ... not identical with S, and this state of affairs is, in part at least, constitutive of 
S”.316 This implies that structural universals can only be instantiated by mereologically 
complex objects, thus for obvious reasons, the monist will not want to appeal to properties 
of this sort.  
 When I talk of distributional properties being structured, all I mean is that they have 
some sort of ontologically significant, describable structure. That structure is describable in 
terms of two distinct components: distributable properties and distribution patterns. The 
structure is ontologically significant because its components are taken to be very real, yet 
distinct, entities. In fact, I think that distributable properties and distribution patterns should 
be taken as universals themselves. Thus distributional properties are structured universals 
since they consist of further universals: distributable properties and distribution patterns. To 
give an example, the distributional property of being black and white striped is, on this view, 
taken to be a structured universal consisting of the distributable universals blackness and 
whiteness and the distribution pattern stripey-ness.  
 One may think that this is a kind of reductionist view, in that distributional 
properties are being reduced to other types of property (i.e. distributable properties and 
distribution patterns). Moreover, one may think it a little strange that I am even entertaining 
such a view, considering that I spent the previous section arguing for the irreducibility of 
distributional properties. But I think this would be to misconstrue the thought being 
proposed. I am not attempting to reduce distributional properties, but rather, I am giving a 
more detailed description of what they are. A distributional property is what the world 
instantiates when it instantiates a particular distributable property in a particular pattern. 
But there is no sense in which any of these properties should be seen as being any more or 
less real than the others. In fact, I think that they should all be seen as being mutually 
dependent. That is, I am supposing, a la Armstrong, that universals cannot exist 
uninstantiated.317 Moreover, I claim that a distributable property cannot be instantiated 
without being instantiated in some pattern or other, and that a distribution pattern cannot be 
instantiated without there being some distributable property that it distributes. And since 
                                                 
316 Armstrong (1978), 69 
317 Armstrong (1989), 75-79. He claims that this is the Aristotelian view of properties. 
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distributional properties just are conjunctions of distributable properties and distribution 
patterns, all three types of property are mutually ontologically dependent. The world cannot 
have a distributable property without it also having a distribution pattern, and it cannot 
have a distribution pattern without it having a distributable property to distribute. And 
having the two of these entails having a distributional property. So if you have one, you must 
have all three. So there is no reduction going on here at all. Just a more detailed picture of 
what distributional properties are. 
 But, once more, one may think why bother with the distributional properties at all? If 
a distributional property just is the conjunction of a distributable property and a distribution 
pattern, then why need the distributional property, in any real or non-reducible sense, at all? 
The thought is, I suppose, that this would be a reductionist view of distributional properties, 
but it would not be a view that is at all objectionable to the monist, since it does not involve 
an appeal to parts of the objects which are taken to instantiate the distributional properties. It 
is a reductive strategy that sits perfectly well with monism. This is true, but it is not a view I 
am willing to endorse, because there is another independent reason why it is problematic. 
This reason can be exposed by the following example. Suppose you had an extended, 
mereologically simple object which was black and white striped and had pink spots. This 
object, then, has the distributional property of being black and white striped with pink spots. 
Let’s call this DPx. On the reductionist view of structured distributional properties that is 
currently under consideration, then, all it is for this object to have DPx is for it to co-
instantiate the distributable properties of blackness, whiteness, and pinkness, and the 
distribution patterns of stripy-ness and spotty-ness. But herein lies the problem: what is it 
about these properties that make it the case that the blackness and the whiteness come 
together (so to speak) with the stripy-ness, and that pinkness comes together with spotty-ness? 
In other words, why isn’t the object black and pink striped with white spots (or, indeed, any 
other possible combination)? The only possible answer to this question that I can see is that 
there is something that is binding together the distributable properties with the relevant 
distribution patterns. And whatever this something is, it looks suspiciously like an external 
relation. For it is surely a contingent fact that the object is black and white striped with pink 
spots. It surely could have been black and pink striped with white spots. But this represents a 
problem. For if you recall, I argued in chapter 5, that an advantage of monism is that it has 
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no need to posit external relations at all. So if it now turns out that I need to posit external 
relations to bind the world’s distributable properties with the relevant distribution patterns, 
then that advantage will have been lost, and that argument will have been rendered useless.  
 Fortunately, however, the monist does not have to posit these external relations. But 
this is only the case if the monist rejects the reductionist view of structured distributional 
properties that was being considered above. Instead, the monist should take the 
distributional properties themselves to be fundamental. Thus if an object instantiates the 
property of being black and white striped with pink spots, then that property is fundamental and 
irreducible. But instantiating that property necessarily involves the world’s instantiating of the 
distributable properties blackness, whiteness, and pinkness, and the distribution patterns of 
stripy-ness and spotty-ness, and also necessarily involves that those properties are bound 
together in the appropriate ways. That’s just what it is for the world to instantiate that 
distributional property. Of course, one may insist that there is still some kind of relation 
holding the distributable properties together with the relevant distribution patterns, but it is 
only an internal relation, for the existence of the distributional property necessarily involves 
that those particular constituent universals are instantiated and that they are related in that 
particular way. So on this view, distributional properties are structured out of other 
universals, but there is no sense in which they are posterior to, dependent upon, or reducible 
to, those structural components of which they consist.  
 A fairly natural question at this point may be: why endorse the structural conception 
of distributional properties? For they seem like quite complex things. What is the need for 
introducing this complexity? There are reasons why I think that the structural conception is 
attractive, but I can’t really make these reasons explicit until I consider the alternative view – 
the unified conception – in the next section. Very roughly, I think that the structural 
conception of distributional properties will help us answer some potentially troubling 
questions about resemblance between properties and between worlds. I also think that it 
gives us a better understanding of what distributional properties are. However, more will be 
said about this in §7.3.3. First, we must consider the other alternative: the unified 
conception. 
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§7.3.2 The Unified Conception  
In contrast to the structural conception of distributional properties, there is what I have 
called the unified conception. On this view, there is no underlying structure to distributional 
properties. They are, for want of a better word, simple. (I hesitate to use the term ‘simple’, 
since it has mereological connotations which might suggest that the structured properties I 
considered in the previous section are somehow mereologically complex. This is not the 
sense in which I intend the term to be taken). On this view, then, if something has the 
distributional property of, say, being black and white striped, then there is little more that can 
be said about it; there is little more that can be said by way of explanation about what it is to 
have such a property. Of course one could talk about properties such as blackness, whiteness, 
and stripy-ness, but these would be mere abstractions from the distributional property itself. 
There are no such properties as these, or at least, not in any real or fundamental sense. They 
would certainly not appear in any description of fundamental reality. So on this view, the 
distinction between distributional properties and distributable properties is eschewed. There 
are no distributable properties, and there are no distribution patterns. There are merely 
irreducible distributional properties. They are what they are and they resist any further 
explanation.  
 
 
§7.3.3 How to Choose 
Both conceptions have their attractions. The defender of the unified conception (UC from 
here on) may appeal to economy for a start. After all, it is clear that the character of 
distributional properties is quite easy to grasp. If we are told that something has the 
distributional property of being black and white striped, say, then we know what that thing is 
going to look like. So why complicate things by introducing distinct types of property (i.e. 
distributable properties and distribution patterns), when a simple distributional property 
does the required work on its own? Moreover, one might question exactly what a distribution 
pattern is. For the defender of the structured conception (SC from here on) will presumably 
have to take distribution patterns as being fundamental, i.e. irreducible. They certainly 
won’t be able to explain them in terms of an object’s parts/regions and the spatial relations in 
which they stand. So the defender of UC might reasonably think that if we can understand 
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what a brute stripy-ness is, for example, with no further explanation, then we can just as 
reasonably understand what a brute black and white stripy-ness is too. Thus the separation of 
distributional properties into distributable properties and distribution patterns is, on this 
view, an unnecessary piece of metaphysical excess. The simplicity of the UC should surely 
count in its favour.  
 The SC has advantages of its own, however. In particular, I think that the defender of 
the SC may be able to provide better explanations of certain features of the world. 
Specifically, she will be able to explain certain facts about resemblance between properties. 
To illustrate this, consider an example. Imagine three quite simple two-dimensional worlds 
that are represented by the pictures in fig. .  
 
Fig. 8 
 
 
Let’s further suppose that these worlds are monistic, i.e. they have no proper parts, and that 
they exhibit their qualitative variation by instantiating distributional properties. So we could 
say that w1 instantiates the property of being grey with red spots (let’s call it distributional 
property X, or DPX for short); w2 instantiates the property of being yellow with blue spots (let’s 
call it DPY); and w3 instantiates the property of being pink and green striped (let’s call it DPZ).  
 There seems to be an evident phenomenological fact that w1 and w2 are objectively 
more similar to one another than they are to w3. This fact is the kind of thing that needs 
explaining, or so it is reasonable to think. So how would our two conceptions of 
distributional properties go about explaining this fact of resemblance? The defender of SC 
would have a fairly obvious route. For her, the distributional properties instantiated by the 
three worlds are structured. Thus DPX, for instance, consists of the distributable properties 
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greyness and redness, and the distribution pattern spottiness. DPY consists of the same 
distribution pattern, but different distributable properties: yellowness and blueness. DPZ 
consists of the distributable properties light greenness, dark greenness, and pinkness, and the 
distribution pattern stripy-ness. (If one is concerned here that properties like spottiness or dark 
greenness look somewhat sloppy, then one should remember that they are only names. What 
we call these properties is fairly unimportant, it is what these names refer to that is of our 
genuine concern). So for the defender of SC, the reason why w1 resembles w2 but not w3, or 
more precisely, why DPX resembles DPY but not DPZ, is that the structured properties DPX 
and DPY share a constituent, the universal spottiness. DPZ shares no constituent universals 
with the other two distributional properties, and it is for that reason that it resembles neither 
of them.  
 For the defender of UC, the task looks a little more difficult. For her, there are no 
distributable properties or distribution patterns to appeal to; there are simply the three 
distributional properties. So on this view it looks as though the similarity between DPX and 
DPY will have to be admitted as a brute fact, which may be seen as a costly consequence of 
the view. One may be tempted at this point to remind us that DPX is the property of being 
grey with red spots, and DPY is the property of being yellow with blue spots, whilst DPZ is the 
property of being pink and green striped. Thus there is a similarity! DPX and DPY are both 
‘spotted’ properties, whilst DPZ is a ‘striped’ property. This, of course, would be a blatant 
cheat. The term ‘being grey with red spots’ is merely a name we have given to the property. 
We can’t just assign names to properties and then note similarities between the names to 
explain similarities between the properties! (Imagine, for instance, the absurdity of saying a 
square was more like a triangle than a circle, because ‘square’ and ‘triangle’ both contain an 
‘a’, whereas ‘circle’ doesn’t). So I think that the defender of UC has no option but to accept 
these resemblance facts as brute. Why do DPX and DPY resemble one another? Well, they 
just do.  
 I think that these observations about resemblance should definitely count in favour 
of the SC. But I am unsure as to how much. For it strikes me that there are many claims 
about resemblance which will ultimately bottom out in brute facts. For instance, why is a red 
patch more similar to an orange patch than it is to a blue patch, even though none of them 
share the same universal? Perhaps they just are? Alternatively, perhaps the wavelength 
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reflectance profile of the red patch is closer to that of the orange patch than it is to that of the 
blue patch? But then, why are wavelength reflectance profiles more similar just because they 
are closer? Perhaps they just are? It seems that in many cases of resemblance, there will have 
to be a point at which one has to admit some kind of brute resemblance fact. According to 
the UC, we may reach this point sooner than if we adopt the SC, but it is not immediately 
clear how much of a problem that represents.  
 All in all, I take these considerations to point towards the SC as being the preferable 
view and, therefore, it is the view of distributional properties that I will endorse. However, I 
still see the UC as being a perfectly viable option. There may well be good reasons that I 
have not thought of to consider the UC as a much better option than the SC. But for now I am 
willing to leave that as an open possibility. In what follows, I will endorse the structured 
conception of distributional properties. 
 
 
§7.4. Distributional Properties IV: Saving the Appearances 
 
Having established a suitably detailed conception of distributional properties, and having 
argued for why one should believe that there are such things, the final task for the monist is 
to explain, precisely, how they are best put to use. What I mean by that is that the monist has 
to explain how an ontology consisting of just a single concrete object (the world) and some 
irreducible structured distributional properties can sufficiently account for the 
phenomenological facts. The monist has to employ her metaphysical resources to give a 
satisfactory account of why the world appears as it does. 
Ted Sider has summed up this task nicely by saying that the monist needs to be able 
to ground, or explain, the “as-if-facts”.318 Monism, just like a number of revisionary 
metaphysical theses, clashes with many facts of common sense and science; facts like, there 
are tables and there are electrons. However, whilst the monist denies that these are genuine 
facts – she denies that there really are any tables or electrons – she must accept that the 
world is as if they are facts. It is as if there are tables, and it is as if there are electrons. These 
‘as-if-facts’ are not going to be considered fundamental facts, but they need to be grounded 
                                                 
318 Sider (2008), 132 
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in, and explainable in terms of, the worlds fundamental facts. Essentially, the monist must 
explain how it is that a monistic ontology gives rise to the fact that it is as if pluralism is true.  
Consider an analogy. If I hold up a fifty-pence piece to the night sky, from my 
perspective it may look as if the fifty-pence piece is bigger than the moon. This is an as-if-
fact. But it is not a fundamental fact. If you were to give a complete and accurate description 
of reality, it would surely not include the fact that it is as if a fifty-pence piece is larger than 
the moon when observed in the right conditions. That is because this as-if-fact is grounded 
in more fundamental facts, like the actual size of the coin and the moon, their relative 
distances from the observer, and so on and so forth. The fundamental facts are the ones that 
give a true and perspicuous account of the phenomena. The as-if-facts simply fall out from 
the fundamental facts.  
First of all, one may wonder why the monist should feel obliged to ground, or 
explain, the as-if-facts at all. Well, in truth, she doesn’t have to. But it would make her thesis 
a whole lot more plausible if she could. Because if the as-if-facts were ungrounded, or 
inexplicable, then it would seem to follow that the world of appearances is nothing more 
than a mere illusion that bears no relation to how the world really is. One would simply 
have to accept that the world is as if p, when in fact it is the case that not-p, with no 
explanation of why this is. It is not incoherent, of course, to suggest that the world is like 
this; it is perfectly possible that the world of appearances is an illusion. But it is not a 
particularly appealing possibility. But more importantly, the monist does not want it to be a 
consequence of her thesis that the world of appearances is an illusion, for that would 
severely diminish the plausibility of her position. Recall, if you will, the common sense 
objection to nihilism that I considered in Chapter Four. Essentially, the objection was that 
nihilism must be false because it clashes with common sense. E.g. it says there are no tables 
when it is a common sense truism that there are tables. In response, I claimed that the 
common sense objection would lose all of its bite if the nihilist could provide a satisfactory 
explanation of why it seems as though there are tables, even though there are actually none. 
But I also conceded that if there was no such explanation available, that the common sense 
objection should be taken seriously. The situation is exactly the same here. To allow the as-if-
facts to go ungrounded would be the same as if one were to reject the common sense 
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objection without giving any explanation of why it seems as though there are tables. It is for 
this reason that the monist must explain the as-if-facts.  
Most metaphysicians (and probably most scientists too) would probably agree that 
common sense facts are not fundamental facts. Facts such as there are tables or grass is green, 
would have no place in a fundamental description of reality. A natural reason for thinking 
this is that these common sense facts are grounded in more basic scientific facts. So facts 
about tables or the colour of grass are going to be grounded in more fundamental facts 
about sub-atomic particles, fundamental properties, and wavelength reflectance profiles, or 
something along those lines. (The precise nature of these scientific facts is not overly 
important for present purposes as long as one recognises that whatever the scientific facts 
are, they will not involve entities like tables or properties like green-ness). It is as if this table 
in front of me is solid, and it is as if it is brown, but really it is mostly empty space, sparsely 
populated with tiny colourless particles.  
 But what about the scientific facts themselves? What are we to say about these? Well, 
one could simply say that the fundamental scientific facts just are the fundamental facts. So if 
the fundamental scientific facts involve entities like quarks and leptons having properties 
like mass and charge, say, then the world will be taken to be, fundamentally, one consisting 
of quarks and leptons having properties like mass and charge. Or if the scientific facts 
involve points of spacetime having certain field values, then the world will be taken to 
consist, fundamentally, of points of spacetime having certain field values. But, as Sider 
rightly points out, this view is only available to the pluralist. For whatever the ultimate 
scientific facts are, it is pretty certain that they will involve multiple concrete objects 
(whether those objects are sub-atomic particles, points of spacetime, or whatever).319 The 
monist, then, cannot accept that the ultimate scientific facts are fundamental.  
 But that much is pretty obvious. Of course the monist will not accept that the ultimate 
scientific facts are fundamental – for monism conflicts with those very facts! For the monist, 
the scientific facts are just another set of as-if-facts, just like the facts of common sense. Sure, 
the world behaves as if our best scientific theories are true; that is, after all, why they are our 
best theories. But they are not true. And this is because the world is monistic, and the 
                                                 
319 As Sider also notes, however, not all pluralists can directly endorse science like this. Punctal nihilists, for 
instance, may have trouble accepting certain facts about entangled systems whose properties do not reduce to 
properties of their constituent parts. 
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entities that our best scientific theories posit do not exist. So the task facing the monist is 
now fairly clear. She has to satisfactorily ground the ultimate facts of science.  
 To show how the monist should undertake this task, let’s begin with a very rough 
outline. The monist will ground the as-if-facts of science by appealing to the world’s 
fundamental properties. She will say that the world instantiates certain distributional 
properties that make it such that it is as if the scientific facts obtain. The world’s 
distributional properties give rise to the empirical data that scientists collect, measure and 
analyse. But as it stands, this is very rough – it is not particularly informative. For whilst it 
tells us that the scientific as-if-facts are grounded in facts about the world and its properties, 
it doesn’t tell us how they are so grounded. To leave it here would be to provide only what 
Ted Sider has called a “sketchy grounding story”.320 To make the explanation satisfactory, 
we will need to provide a little more detail. 
 In order to provide that detail, let me start with an analogy. Think back to the 
hypothetical extended simple I introduced in the last chapter: Cube. Cube is a 
mereologically simple object that is cube-shaped and multi-coloured. Specifically, each of 
Cube’s faces is a different colour. Given the way that Cube appears, it would be fairly 
natural to describe it as having different parts (i.e. faces) that have different properties (i.e. 
colours). Of course, this description is false, strictly speaking, because Cube is, ex hypothesi, a 
mereological simple; it has no proper parts at all. But we must accept that it is as if Cube has 
parts – this is an evident as-if-fact. So how can the monist explain this as-if-fact? Well, armed 
with our new understanding of structured distributional properties, she has a fairly 
straightforward way of doing so. She will simply say that Cube instantiates six irreducible 
structured distributional properties. These properties give rise to, and thus ground, Cube’s 
appearance. So, let’s say that it is as if one of Cube’s faces is blue. The monistic explanation 
of this fact is that Cube instantiates an irreducible structured distributional property – let’s 
call it DPx – consisting of a distributable property, blue-ness, and a distribution pattern. The 
distribution pattern will be such that it appears as if Cube has a single face that is blue i.e. 
the blueness is distributed across the region which corresponds to Cube’s alleged blue face. 
Cube’s five other distributional properties will be similar, although they will consist of 
different distributable properties (i.e. different colour properties), and slightly different 
                                                 
320 Sider (2008), 132 
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distribution patterns (i.e. they will distribute the properties to those areas which correspond 
to each of Cube’s other faces).321  
 Now is this explanation still sketchy? I think not, or at least, not objectionably so. But 
I can envisage an objector thinking otherwise. In particular, I can imagine that one may be a 
little suspicious about the distribution patterns that I am invoking. For it may be thought that 
I have not really said much about what these distribution patterns are like. Rather, I have 
simply said that each distributional property involves a certain distribution pattern that 
distributes the appropriate properties in the appropriate ways. In order to allay such 
suspicions, my response would be that these distribution patterns are merely hard to 
describe, not hard to understand. It is hard for us to describe Cube’s purported distribution 
patterns. Or, at least, it is hard for us to describe them in terminology that is not overtly 
pluralistic. We may need to talk of Cube’s ‘faces’, for instance, or the regions of space that 
correspond with those faces. But this is, I repeat, merely a problem with description. For it is 
not difficult to conceive of an object like Cube, and it is not difficult to understand what the 
distribution patterns making up Cube’s distributional properties must be like in order for it 
to look as it does. The mere fact that we can’t accurately describe Cube’s distributional 
properties in English without a misleadingly pluralistic slant should not cloud our 
understanding of what these properties are like; and neither should it force us into believing 
that Cube is mereologically complex. I am inclined to believe that the difficulties involved in 
describing these distributional properties should serve only to remind us of the descriptive 
limitations of our language, rather than tell us anything about what the object being 
described is really like. Indeed, if the descriptive powers of language are taken to put such 
heavy restrictions on our ontological conclusions, then monism would never have even got 
off the ground.  
 If one accepts the monistic explanation of the as-if-facts concerning Cube, then it 
should only take a short leap of the imagination to see how the same explanatory method 
could be employed on a much grander scale: to explain the scientific as-if-facts of the actual 
world. Let us suppose, for instance, that the ultimate scientific facts (i.e. those that constitute 
our best current scientific theories) involve sub-atomic particles (like leptons and quarks) 
                                                 
321 In fact, one could say instead, that Cube instantiates only a single structured distributional property, 
consisting of the six distributable properties (i.e. the six different colours of Cube’s faces) and the six different 
distribution patterns. Not much will hang on this point, however. 
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instantiating certain fundamental properties (like mass and charge). Just as she did with 
Cube, the monist can then translate these facts into facts about the world and its 
distributional properties. Firstly, she will take the fundamental properties posited by science 
(i.e. mass, charge, etc.) as the world’s fundamental distributable properties. Then she will 
insist that rather than being instantiated by sub-world objects (like sub-atomic particles) they 
are instantiated by the entire world, in certain distribution patterns. These distribution 
patterns will correspond to the distribution of the alleged sub-world objects. Just like in the 
Cube case, this distribution pattern will be difficult, if not impossible, to describe in non-
pluralistic terms. But just like in the Cube case, this should be seen only as a linguistic 
difficulty, not an ontological one. 
 Perhaps the ultimate scientific facts will be cast in very different terms than those I 
have suggested? One thing is for sure, they are likely to be very complex. But I do not 
pretend for a minute to know what the ultimate facts of science are. I am not a scientist after 
all. But I don’t think that is too important, for it is the principle of the strategy that is the key 
thing. The monist has a general strategy for translating facts cast in pluralist terms into 
monist-friendly facts cast in terms of the world and its structured distributional properties. 
Take any fact that involves an alleged sub-world object having some property or other. Such 
a fact will have the general form, ‘a is F’. The monist will say that this is only an as-if-fact 
(because, of course, there are no sub-world objects), and it is more accurately expressed in 
terms of the world instantiating a structured distributional property. The distributable 
property component will be F-ness, and the distribution pattern will be such that it 
corresponds with the alleged location of a. I.e. the distribution of F-ness will overlap that, 
and only that, particular location. Once it is recognised that the monist has this strategy 
available, it should also be recognised that it doesn’t matter what the alleged sub-world 
objects are purported to be (i.e. faces of a cube, sub-atomic particles, or whatever), or what 
the properties ascribed to them are (colours, mass, charge, or whatever).322 It is the principle 
that is important. And if the principle is accepted, and I see no reason why it should not be, 
then it provides the monist with a satisfying way of grounding the as-if-facts. The world and 
                                                 
322 Although perhaps one should insist that they must be qualitative, intrinsic properties. But this isn’t too much 
of a problem, because I am assuming that facts involving extrinsic properties are reducible to facts involving only 
intrinsic properties.  
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its structured distributional properties are quite sufficient to explain the appearance of 
plurality.  
 
 
§7.5. How Did We Go So Wrong?  
 
Before concluding, there is a fairly natural response to the thesis of monism that I am 
proposing that needs to be anticipated and dealt with. The response I am envisaging would 
run something along the following lines:  
 
If monism is true and the world is, in fact, a single, part-less object, then how did we 
manage to go so catastrophically wrong? How could it possibly have come to be that 
we simply take it for granted that the world is populated by a multitude of objects, 
when in fact it is not? Sure, it would be foolish to think that we never get anything 
wrong about the way the world is, but the sheer magnitude of this error is surely so 
great as to render it entirely implausible. 
 
I sympathise with this response, but I also think it is flawed. One fairly obvious way to 
respond to this view is to appeal to the fact that we have got things drastically wrong about 
the nature of the world in the past, so there is good reason to suppose that there are a great 
many other features of the world that we are still wrong about today. To give an often used 
example, it was once taken to be obvious that the Earth is flat.323 Presumably, this was taken 
to be so obvious, that to suggest that the Earth was anything but flat, would have been met 
with ridicule and scorn. But this was, of course, not only wrong, but radically wrong. Yet 
despite the sheer magnitude of the error, it is quite easy to see why people believed it. From 
our perspective the Earth looks flat, for a start. But likewise, from our perspective, the world 
looks like it is populated by a multitude of distinct physical objects. So using the same line of 
thought, it is easy to see why we think that it actually is populated by such objects.  
 There is, however, what could be an important difference between these two 
examples. The postulation that the Earth is flat is empirically testable; it may look flat to the 
                                                 
323 There is, however, a debate amongst historians as to which peoples did and didn’t believe that the earth was 
flat. The often told story that it was only when Columbus sailed the Atlantic that people first discovered the 
Earth’s true shape is evidently a myth. Indeed it is generally thought that from about 300BC onwards the 
standard view in the west was that the Earth was spherical. Before this, however, it seems that a flat-earth view 
was the norm. For those interested, see Russell (1991) or Garwood (2007). 
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naked eye, but there is physical evidence, if one knows where to look, that shows that it must 
be curved.324 The postulation of the monist, by contrast, does not seem to be empirically 
testable in this way. For it is hard to know what empirical data could ever be sufficient to 
demonstrate, or to even indicate, the mereological structure of the world. In other words, it 
seems like there is no way to tell, just by looking, whether monism or pluralism is true. This is 
just another case of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Science is afflicted by this 
phenomenon all the time, and metaphysics even more so. In fact, one may think that this 
makes it all the more understandable that we’ve got it wrong. If there’s no way of telling, just 
by looking, whether the world is monistic or pluralistic, then how could we ever have even 
expected to get it right?  
But this reasoning might be a little naive; or, worse, it might just be the hopeful 
musings of an optimistic monist. For another line of thought might be that for any dispute in 
which one of two incompatible theses must be true, then if the empirical evidence fails to 
point towards the truth of one thesis over the other, it would be reasonable to expect there to 
be a fairly even split in opinion about which thesis actually is true. Just think of the existence 
of God. No empirical evidence can prove or disprove His existence, and as such there is the 
resultant split in opinion about His existence that one may expect. But the same is not the 
case when it comes to the monism-pluralism debate. There is no widespread disagreement 
over whether there are many things or only one! For most ordinary people the very thought 
that there might only be one object in existence would surely have never even crossed their 
minds. And even among philosophers – those thinkers who are far more amenable than 
most to the acceptance of unconventional ideas – the unerring conviction in pluralism is 
almost universally held.325 So perhaps this gives further weight to the initial objection. For if 
monism is correct, it means that our error-laden pluralistic tendencies are almost completely 
pervasive. But it is just not plausible that such a gross error could be so widespread, or so the 
thought may be.  
I am not convinced. I think it is perfectly plausible that we could be grossly wrong 
about the fundamental nature of the world of which we are part. Indeed I think it suggests a 
                                                 
324 Famously, Eratosthenes exploited this evidence over two millennia ago, to not only show that the earth was 
spherical, but to actually calculate its circumference.  
325 I say ‘almost’ universally held, because not all philosophers are pluralists. The only living philosophers I know 
of who defend monism in print, however, are Horgan and Potrč (2000; 2008). This represents an overwhelming 
majority of pluralists. 
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rather naive and misplaced confidence in our epistemic capabilities to be so unreceptive to 
the possibility that we could be so wrong about things. But at the same time, if we are 
radically mistaken about the nature of the world, it would be nice if we could at least trace 
the source of this mistaken view; if we could give some kind of explanation of how we have 
gone so far astray from the truth. I think that such an explanation can be given. Indeed, when 
trying to discern the source of the error of our pluralistic ways, I think that there is an 
obvious candidate: language. 
Quine once said that “our language shows a tiresome bias in its treatment of time”.326 
His point was that because our language contains all manner of tensed variants of verbs, it 
often leads us to presume that reality really is tensed when in fact (as far as Quine was 
concerned at least), it is not. I will remain neutral here about whether Quine was right or not 
about the reality of tense, but I think he was right in making the more general point that 
certain central features of our language often lead us to presume that there are 
corresponding features in reality, when there may not, in fact, be any such features at all. In 
this respect I think our language shows a number of tiresome biases in its treatment of all 
manner of things. But it shows no greater bias, I claim, than in its treatment of multiplicity.  
Our language is inherently pluralistic.327 It comes replete with a vast stock of nouns, 
each of which purports to pick out some thing; some object among many. Sentences are, in 
the vast majority of cases, structured in a subject-predicate form, whereby the subject is 
taken to be some object or other, and the predicate taken to refer to some characteristic of 
that object. Indeed the predication of such subjects often serves precisely to distinguish them 
from other subjects. But implicit in all this, of course, is the fact that there is a multiplicity of 
objects in the first place.  Nothing about this is particularly revelatory – it is just the way our 
language works. But given that the way we communicate is so inherently pluralistic, it is 
really quite unsurprising that the way we think is so inherently pluralistic too. Language 
plays such a central role in our lives that it is quite ingrained in the way we think and the 
way we act; it is entirely second nature to us. Thus, again, it is unsurprising that the 
pluralistic picture of the world that our language paints is also ingrained in the way we think 
                                                 
326 Quine (1960), 170 
327 When I talk of ‘our language’ I mean English, but I think that what I say will apply to most natural languages.  
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and act. The very structure of our language, a system which is so fundamental to our way of 
life, guides us inexorably towards pluralism.  
The obvious line of response to these thoughts would be to say that our language is 
inherently pluralistic precisely because the world is also pluralistic. In other words, our 
language paints a pluralistic picture of the world and it paints accurately. But whilst this 
response might be reasonable, it certainly doesn’t constitute a proof. Quine would surely 
have been unimpressed, for instance, if someone had objected: “but language is tensed, 
therefore reality must be too”. The whole point of the thought being expressed is that the 
nature of language may mislead us into taking a mistaken view of the world. Now one may 
think that this kind of thought is mere idle speculation, and sceptical speculation at that. That 
is, one may concede that it is possible that our language is misleadingly pluralistic, and that 
the development of such a language is perfectly consistent with a monistic ontology, but one 
may also insist that that the best explanation of why our language developed as it did is 
because the world really is pluralistic. But I think that such a response would be unfair; 
because at this stage in the dialectic, the suggestion that our language might be 
misrepresentative of the world’s true mereological structure is not mere speculation. I have 
spent the last six chapters of this thesis building a case for why we should believe that the 
world is, in fact, monistic; so to suppose that it is monistic can no longer be considered mere 
speculation. Rather, it is a serious metaphysical hypothesis backed by argument. And if this 
hypothesis is true, it will turn out that our language is misleadingly pluralistic after all.  
The question still remains, however, of why language developed as it did. That is, 
why did we develop a language so inherently pluralistic if the world which we use it to 
describe is really monistic? I can’t, of course, give a definitive answer to such a difficult 
question, but I can suggest some plausible candidates. Perhaps pluralistic languages such as 
English are just very effective means of communication? After all, it is beyond doubt that we 
do communicate very successfully. Perhaps we are simply hard-wired to think 
pluralistically, and this innate feature of human cognition is reflected in our language? 
Perhaps there is some evolutionary reason for why language has developed as it has? All of 
these explanations are perfectly plausible, I would suggest, and that is regardless of whether 
the world actually is pluralistic or monistic. Which of these explanations – if any – is right, 
however, is another question entirely. But hopefully the main point should be clear: it is not 
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unreasonable to suggest that our language could have developed in such a way that it 
grossly misrepresents the true nature of reality, and this could be the case regarding the 
reality (or not) of tense, or the world’s mereological structure, or any number of (alleged) 
features of the world. Therefore, if our philosophical reasoning leads us to a conclusion that 
is at odds with the picture of the world painted by ordinary language then we should accept 
that the error could just as well lie on the linguistic side of things as it could in our 
reasoning.  
 To help press the point home, I invite you to consider a thought experiment that I 
have taken from Horgan & Potrč’s book Austere Realism.328 Imagine a world at which there 
was only a single object, a large extended simple. Suppose that this simple was made 
entirely of a jelly-like substance that was physically continuous regardless of what degree of 
magnification one viewed it at. Finally, suppose that this object displayed qualitative 
variation across its extension, in terms of properties such as colour, temperature and density. 
Of course, since this object is, by stipulation, mereologically simple, its qualitative variation 
is not to be explained in terms of its having parts which instantiate various different 
properties. It has no parts. Rather, it is to be explained by its instantiating various irreducible 
distributional properties. Thus it will have a certain colour distribution, a certain mass 
distribution, and so on. Given what has gone before, I trust that the reader will allow that 
such a world is at least possible. Indeed, for the experiment to work, one need only admit 
that such a world is epistemically possible.  
 Now the question is: how would one go about describing such a world? A natural 
way of doing this would be to employ a descriptive framework that posits certain entities 
(such as regions or points) and then ascribes certain properties to those entities. One might 
say, for instance, that the world has ‘lumps’, in order to describe the various fluctuations in 
density throughout the object. Or one might say it has ‘stripes’, for instance, in order to 
describe the colour variation across the object. Such descriptions would get something right 
about the world; they would track the genuine qualitative variation that the object exhibits. 
There would, as Horgan & Potrč rightly point out, “be systematic correspondence between 
statements couched in this discourse, on the one hand, and how things are with the jello-
                                                 
328 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 168-171. I have modified the details of the thought experiment slightly, but the gist if it 
is very much the same.  
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world, on the other hand”.329 But these descriptions would not be entirely perspicuous. 
Indeed, they would be really quite misleading, in that they suggest that the world has parts 
(lumps, and stripes, and so on) when in fact it has none. The point is, however, that it would 
be perfectly natural for us to describe the world in this way and, moreover, it would be 
perfectly natural for us to suppose that, on the back of our descriptions, the world really did 
have parts (i.e. lumps and stripes and so on). But, of course, the world, ex hypothesi, does not 
have parts. But if this scenario is reasonable, and I will assume that it is, then it takes only a 
short leap of the imagination to see that a similar scenario could obtain at the actual world. 
We mistakenly describe the world pluralistically, and thus we mistakenly take it to be 
pluralistic.  
  It is very hard for us to even conceive of a way of describing such a world that is not 
pluralistic. At least, it is certainly very hard to see how we could describe such a world in a 
perspicuous manner, in English, that did not employ nouns that purport to refer to sub-
world objects or parts/regions of the world. Perhaps other types of languages are possible 
that would be perfectly suited to the job? If so, then I can only think that they would be very 
far removed from the ordinary languages we actually employ.330 I won’t be attempting to 
come up with such a language here; that would be a substantial project in itself. But whether 
such a language could be produced is really beside the point. If it turns out that a monistic 
world is difficult to describe (in English or any language), then that should have no bearing 
on whether such a world is possible. It simply means that it is hard to describe. Quantum 
Field Theory is, I am told, quite difficult to explain, but that doesn’t make it any less likely to 
be true. 
 To conclude, then, there are all sorts of plausible stories that one could tell in order to 
explain how it is that we have gone so drastically wrong in our understanding of reality. 
But, when providing such stories, one does have to tread with caution. For all manner of 
wild and wonderful stories can be told that are perfectly consistent with our experiences and 
our understanding. Russell’s teapot comes to mind here, for instance.331 But merely consistent 
                                                 
329 Horgan & Potrč (2008), 169 
330 Hawthorne & Cortens (1995) attempt to flesh out such a language by replacing talk of objects with suitable 
adverbs. E.g. “there is a white pebble” would be translated as “it is pebbling whitely there”. I think that their 
attempt is most admirable, but it only serves to reinforce the point: a language that doesn’t refer to multiple 
objects is going to be far-removed from the languages with which we are ordinarily acquainted.  
331 See Russell (1997), 543 
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stories are nothing more than idle speculation if there are no independent reasons to believe 
that they may be true. But the story told by the monist is not like this at all. There are many 
independent reasons to believe that monism is true, as I have elucidated over the past few 
chapters. So given that there is independent motivation for believing monism, and given 
that monism is at odds with ordinary understanding, it is the duty of the monist to provide a 
story of how it is that we have come to be so mistaken. I hope that the preceding few 
paragraphs have gone some way towards fulfilling that duty. 
 
 
§7.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
I hope that the reader now has a much better idea of what I take the monistic world to be 
like. The rich and diverse qualitative variation that we experience in the world is to be 
explained by its instantiating irreducible structured distributional properties. I hope to have 
shown that distributional properties are in fact most intuitive and easy to grasp. Moreover, 
by expanding on the arguments of Josh Parsons, I hope to have shown that there are some 
compelling reasons to believe that there are such things, and that these reasons hold 
independently of one’s views on the monism versus pluralism debate. I then provided a 
more detailed picture of how distributional properties are to be conceived. Specifically, I 
claimed that distributional properties should be taken to be structured universals, 
comprising at least one distributable property, and at least one distribution pattern. This 
structured conception gives the monist an easy and satisfying way of explaining the 
appearances; a method for explaining the appearance of plurality, given that there is, in fact, 
only singularity. As a final, but no less important, point, I hope to have impressed the 
importance of distinguishing mere linguistic difficulties from genuinely ontological 
difficulties. Given that our language and thought is so inherently pluralistic, it is no surprise 
that we struggle to provide accurate descriptions of the monistic world that don’t involve 
pluralistic terms. Indeed, since our language is unavoidably pluralistic, it should be expected 
that any descriptions couched in that language will also be unavoidably pluralistic. But it 
would be a mistake to infer from this that the world must be pluralistic too.   
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§8. Objections and Replies  
 
As the denouement to this thesis it remains for me to address, and respond to, some 
objections that have been presented against monism. By far and away the most commonly 
given objection is the common sense objection i.e. that which states that monism is obviously 
false because it denies the existence of ordinary objects. But I have tackled that objection in a 
number of places in the preceding chapters already (in a manner that I hope the reader will 
have found satisfactory), so I won’t be considering it again here. Instead, I will be 
considering objections of a somewhat more technical nature. Specifically, I will be 
responding to four objections that have been presented by Ted Sider.332 Unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Sider at least takes monism seriously; whilst he does not endorse it, he 
accepts that it is a coherent metaphysical thesis and that it cannot simply be dismissed out of 
hand. Because of this, his objections are much better thought out than most, and represent a 
serious challenge for the monist. In the present chapter I will show how that challenge is to 
be met. As well as addressing Sider’s objections, I will also spend a short time considering 
an alternative theory of monism: priority monism.333 It is sometimes claimed that priority 
monism is a variant of monism far superior to the variant I am defending here, and thus in 
the battle between the two, it is priority monism that should prevail. In §8.1 I will show why 
this claim is false.  
 It is not possible for me to address every objection that either has been, or could be, 
levelled against monism. So there are some objections in the literature that I am aware of, 
that I will not be considering in what follows, and there may well be other objections of 
which I am not even aware. However, the objections that I will respond to have been chosen 
because I take them to be the most significant, and because I take them to represent the most 
serious threat to my project. Those that I have decided to omit have been neglected because I 
take them either to have fairly obvious and easy solutions, or because I don’t take them to 
                                                 
332 Sider (2007) 
333 This is the thesis proposed and defended by Jonathan Schaffer. See Schaffer (2007; 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c) 
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pose much of a threat to monism.334 With that said, let me get on to addressing the 
objections. 
 
 
§8.1. Priority Monism  
 
In recent years, Jonathan Schaffer has brought monism very much into the limelight of 
contemporary metaphysics.335 He has, almost singlehandedly, revived interest in what had 
until recently become little more than a relic from deep within the annals of the history of 
philosophy.336 Indeed, it is rare that monism is even mentioned in contemporary 
philosophical literature without Schaffer’s name being mentioned too. So it would probably 
be amiss of me were I not to devote at least a brief amount of time to Schaffer’s work, given 
the topic of this dissertation. Schaffer has identified two very different forms of ontological 
monism. They are: 
 
Existence Monism: There is only one concrete object in existence – the world itself 
Priority Monism: There is only one fundamental concrete object in existence – the world itself 
 
The former of these doctrines is the one I am defending in this dissertation. It is the latter, 
however, that Schaffer himself endorses. The central difference between the two theses is 
that Priority Monism allows that the world has parts; it endorses a multiplicity of concrete 
objects. The Priority Monist can allow that there are cats and dogs, and trees and rocks, and 
so on. But she merely maintains that these objects are not fundamental. They are 
ontologically posterior to, and ontologically dependent upon, the only fundamental object 
there is: the world itself. Priority Monism, then, involves a “hierarchical view of reality”, 
                                                 
334 Goff (2012), for instance, has presented an argument against monism, but I think it amounts to little more than 
a formal reconstruction of the common sense argument, and therefore can be overcome in exactly the same way 
as that argument. Essentially, he argues: I exist; you exist; therefore there is more than one thing.  
335 See Schaffer (2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Also, for an interesting introduction and overview of varying forms of 
monism in ontology, see Schaffer (2007b). 
336 I say ‘almost’ singlehandedly because there have been a few other key contributions. In particular, I am 
referring to the work of Horgan & Potrč (2000; 2008) 
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where objects are ordered in terms of ontological priority, and where the world itself is 
ontologically prior to everything else.337  
 It is often suggested that Priority Monism is by far the more reasonable of these two 
monistic theses. Schaffer himself, for instance, claims Existence Monism to be a “crazy 
view”.338 Elsewhere it has been said that “Existence Monism is an obviously weaker thesis 
[than Priority Monism] that can only be considered little more than a caricature”.339 Indeed, 
it has often been suggested to me in conversation that, given the availability of Priority 
Monism, I should feel extra pressure to justify my persistent interest in Existence Monism. In 
essence, the question that is often put to me, and indeed that is implicit in this type of view, 
is: why be an Existence Monist when you could be a Priority Monist instead?  
  The answer to this question is really very simple. One of the central motivations for 
my endorsement of monism is a strong conviction in the truth of compositional nihilism. 
Indeed, I spent the first four chapters of this dissertation arguing that compositional nihilism 
is true. But Priority Monism is entirely incompatible with nihilism – it states that the world 
has parts! – and it is for that reason that I reject it.340 Furthermore, I think the question of 
why one would endorse Existence Monism when Priority Monism is available is somewhat 
misguided. The question implies that the two theories are somehow direct rivals, when they 
are in fact not. Of course, in a trivial sense they are rivals, in that they are both ontological 
views which differ from one another. But on that understanding of rivalry, all sorts of 
disparate and unrelated ontological theses would be considered direct rivals, and thus very 
little would be gained by so asserting. But Priority Monism and Existence Monism are often 
seen to be involved in a much closer rivalry than that, because they are both forms of monism. 
This, I claim, is where the central mistake lies, for one of these theses is an imposter; Priority 
Monism is monistic in name only.   
 This claim is not intended to discredit, or undermine, Priority Monism in any way. 
On the contrary, I think it is an independently very interesting thesis. But just because it has 
the term ‘monism’ in its title, does not mean it should be considered a direct rival of, or an 
                                                 
337 Schaffer (2009), 351 
338 Schaffer (2010a), 324  
339 Morganti (2009), 272 
340 Strictly speaking, this is not true; Priority Monism is not incompatible with nihilism. One could be a priority 
monist and a nihilist, by claiming that the world is the only object there is. Such a view would simply ‘collapse’ 
into Existence Monism, however. Moreover, the Priority Monism that Schaffer endorses is incompatible with 
nihilism, since he endorses the existence of multiple concrete objects that are taken to be parts of the world. 
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available alternative to, Existence Monism. Suppose, for instance, I postulated a thesis called 
‘Chromatic Monism’; the thesis which states that objects can only be a single colour. Even if I 
could provide a whole dossier of reasons to believe such a thesis plausible (which is 
unlikely), it would still not be right to consider it a direct rival of, or any sort of alternative to, 
Existence Monism, for its central focus is on something entirely different: the colour of 
objects, rather than the number of them and their mereological structure. It would be absurd, 
would it not, to ask: but why are you an Existence Monist when you could be a Chromatic 
Monist? Such a question would seem guilty of making a category mistake. And it is likewise 
between Priority Monism and Existence Monist; they focus on entirely different things. The 
former is concerned with the hierarchical dependence relations that obtain between objects, 
whereas the latter is concerned with the mereological structure of objects and their number. 
Indeed, as Ted Sider has noted, “priority monism isn’t really an ontology at all”.341 Sider is 
right; Priority Monism is only concerned with priority relations; it is not at all concerned 
with what exists. There may well be any number of independently compelling reasons to be 
attracted to Priority Monism, but none of this should affect the Existence Monist. For the 
Existence Monist, Priority Monism should be rejected for exactly the same reason as many 
other pluralistic ontologies: it admits that the world has parts.  
   
 
§8.2. Ted Sider’s Objections 
 
In a 2007 paper, Ted Sider presents four separate arguments against monism. Sider’s 
arguments are insightful and challenging, and they represent a pressing problem for the 
monist to deal with. Indeed the monist needs to be able to deal with these types of problem if 
her thesis is to remain plausible. In what follows I will show what Sider’s objections are, and 
how they are best overcome.342,343 
 
 
                                                 
341 Sider (2008), 130n 
342 The first two responses given (i.e. §82.1 & §8.2.2) are taken from Cornell (2013).  
343 It should also be noted that Sider himself has published his own responses to his own objections. See Sider 
(2008). I think Sider’s solutions work, to an extent, but they are markedly different and much more complex than 
the solutions I will offer here. 
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§8.2.1 Statespace Size 
Sider’s first objection is that a monistic view of a given world cannot provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the size of the statespace at that world.344 To illustrate his point, he asks us to 
consider a simple two-dimensional world (let’s call it a ‘Screenworld’) made up of sixteen 
pixels, arranged in a 4x4 grid, each of which can be either ‘on’ or ‘off’. The statespace at such 
a world would have 216 members, as illustrated below: 
 
Fig. 9 
 
 
Sider argues that only a pluralistic view of such a world can satisfactorily explain why the 
statespace size is 216. The Screenworld has 216 possible states precisely because it is made up of 
sixteen pixels, each of which has two possible states. More generally, the size of the 
statespace at any Screenworld will be derived combinatorially from more fundamental facts 
about the number of objects at that world (the pixels) and the number of properties those 
objects can instantiate: “the possibilities for the entire system are generated combinatorially 
from the number of entities within the system and the fundamental states those entities can 
inhabit”. 345 
Since the monist does not countenance the existence of the pixels, it is supposed that 
she will not be able to avail herself of this explanation. In fact, according to Sider, the monist 
has no option but to accept the statespace size as a brute fact. For the monist, every property 
at the Screenworld must be a property of the entire Screenworld. (This is the case since there 
are no other objects at the world available to instantiate properties). Therefore, each of the 216 
members of the statespace must involve a distinct and fundamental (i.e. irreducible) 
property of the entire world. So when asked why there are 216 members of the statespace, 
                                                 
344 ‘Statespace’ refers to the set of physical possibilities at a world. 
345 Sider (2007a), 3. One should of course remember here that we are using Screenworlds only as a model, due to 
their simplicity. It is assumed that any principles uncovered should also be applicable to more complex worlds, 
like the actual world.  
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according to Sider, the monist can do little more than shrug her shoulders in response. This 
is most unsatisfactory, especially when contrasted with the pluralist explanation, or so the 
argument goes.  
What makes it worse for the monist, or so Sider supposes, is the regularity in 
statespace size across all Screenworlds. He claims that his explanation generalises to cover 
all Screenworlds. For instance, if we were to consider Screenworlds with different numbers, 
n, of pixels, then the statespace size at these worlds will always be 2n. Sider claims that “no 
world of this sort will ever have a statespace with a cardinality that is not a power of 2”.346 
His point is that if one does not countenance the individual pixels, then one cannot explain 
this regularity, but rather, one must accept it as another (extraordinarily coincidental!) brute 
fact. For Sider, this is so wildly implausible that it constitutes a powerful objection against 
monism.  
By way of a response, I should first concede that much of what Sider claims is 
correct. He is right to suggest that the statespace size at a given world will be determined by 
more fundamental facts about how many objects there are at the world and what 
fundamental states they can inhabit. Furthermore, he is right to suggest that this explanation 
generalises. Where he goes wrong, however, is by suggesting that this fact undermines the 
monist’s position; it does no such thing. Let me explain. 
Calculating the statespace size at a given world is a simple matter of calculating 
permutations given certain constraints. When calculating the number of permutations of a 
given number series, for instance, one need know only how many variables are in the series, 
and how many possible values each variable can take. Given this information, the total 
number of permutations will be xn, where n = the number of variables in the series, and x = 
the number of values each variable can take.347 Exactly the same process applies when 
determining the statespace size for a given Screenworld. The series itself represents the 
entire statespace, with each possible permutation of the series corresponding to an 
individual member of the statespace (i.e. a particular state of the entire system). The 
variables in the series correspond with the objects posited, and the possible values of those 
                                                 
346 Sider (2007a), 3 
347 This is only the case for regular series, where each variable in the series has the same number of possible 
variables. For series whose variables have differing numbers of possible values, the formula to calculate the 
permutations will be more complex.  
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variables correspond with the possible states that those objects can inhabit. Thus the same 
formula that applies to number series will also apply to Screenworlds, such that we can say 
for any Screenworld: 
 
Statespace Size = xn 
 
Where n = the number of objects at the world, and x = the number of properties each object 
can instantiate.  
This formula vindicates Sider’s claim that the statespace size is determined by, or 
derived from, facts about how many objects are at a world and how many properties they 
can instantiate. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the explanation is generalisable such that 
it covers all Screenworlds; for it shows that, given any Screenworld, one only need know 
how many things there are at the world, and what properties those things can instantiate, 
and one will be able to calculate the size of the statespace. However, what is equally clear is 
that this explanation is also available to the monist. Take our previous example Screenworld, 
for instance. Given this statespace, the monist will posit one object, the world, (i.e. n = 1) and 
216 fundamental distributional properties (i.e. x =216), thus the statespace size = xn = (216)1 = 216. 
And this will be the case at any given Screenworld.  
 So contrary to Sider’s claim, the monist does not have to accept the statespace size as 
a brute fact, nor does she have to accept the regularity of statespace size as a brute fact. 
Instead, she can maintain that facts about the statespace size are derived directly from facts 
about how many objects there are at a world, and how many properties they can instantiate. 
Yes, it is a brute fact that on the Monistic picture there are 216 fundamental properties and 
one object, but on the pluralistic picture it is a brute fact that there are two fundamental 
properties and sixteen objects. But why should the acceptance of the latter brute facts be any 
more agreeable than the acceptance of the former? There seems no reason why it should be, 
and unless there were some such reason, Sider’s objection should carry no force at all.  
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§8.2.2 Statespace Structure 
According to Sider, it is not only facts about the size of the statespace which the monist is at a 
loss to explain. There are also important facts about the way in which the statespace is 
structured which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by a monistic view, or so it is claimed. 
In particular, Sider claims there to be natural groupings, or subsets, within the statespace, 
which can only be explained in terms of facts about how many pixels are ‘on’ in each case. 
For instance, all those members at which only one pixel is on “go together”, as do those 
members at which only two pixels are on, and so on and so forth. Sider claims that these 
‘natural’ groupings can only be explained if one countenances the existence of pixels: “they 
emerge from the natural groupings of the most fundamental facts, facts concerning which 
pixels are lit”.348 
 Once again, some of what Sider says is perfectly correct. There are certain members 
of the statespace that “go together” more naturally than others. This is because certain 
members of the statespace exhibit more objective similarity to one another than do others. 
But once again he is wrong to suggest that the monist cannot explain this phenomenon. The 
monist can explain these natural groupings perfectly well, and she has no need to posit sub-
world objects (pixels) in order to do so. The reason that there are certain natural subsets of 
the statespace can be explained by appealing to the world’s fundamental properties, and, 
crucially, by noting what those properties are like.  
 Sider’s objection can be met, and overcome, through a consideration of what 
distributional properties the world instantiates, and more precisely, what those properties 
are like. To explain, consider State 2 in fig. 9. The pluralist will describe this state in terms of 
which pixels are on and which are off (probably by saying that one pixel is on and the rest 
off). The monist, by contrast, will describe it in terms of what distributional property the 
world instantiates. In my view, she will say that the world instantiates a structured 
distributional property that comprises the distributable properties of off-ness and on-ness, 
and a particular distribution pattern. What we call the property is not of great importance, 
provided one grasps the idea: the world instantiates some irreducible distributional 
property that gives rise to the appearance depicted in state 2 in fig 9. But this is not the limit 
of what the monist can say; for she can also describe in detail what that property is like. For 
                                                 
348 Sider (2007a), 4 
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each of the world’s distributional properties will have their own particular features; they 
will have higher-order properties. For instance, let’s call the distributional property 
instantiated by the world in State 2, DP1. We can say of DP1 that it distributes more off-ness 
than on-ness. More precisely, we could say that the proportion of the world across which off-
ness is distributed is fifteen times greater than the proportion of the world across which on-
ness is distributed. I will call this feature of the world’s properties a distribution ratio. Thus 
DP1 has a distribution ratio of 15:1 of off-ness to on-ness. Indeed any particular state of the 
Screenworld which the pluralist would describe by saying one pixel is on and the rest off 
would, on the monist’s picture, be described as instantiating a distributional property with a 
distribution ratio of 15:1. Those states which the pluralist would describe as having only two 
pixels on would, in monistic terms, have distribution ratios of 7:1; those described 
pluralistically as having only three pixels on would have distribution ratios of 13:3; and so 
on and so forth.  
 It is because of this that the monist has a perfectly good way of explaining the natural 
groupings, or subsets, within the statespace. As Sider rightly says, the natural groupings 
emerge from the natural groupings of the world’s most fundamental facts. But these are not 
facts about what pixels are lit (there are no pixels!), rather, they are facts concerning what the 
world’s fundamental properties are like. And these will include those facts about the 
distribution ratios of each member of the statespace. There will be natural subsets of the 
statespace, then, consisting of all those states which share the same distribution ratio. Thus 
the monist can readily accept that there are facts about objective similarity between certain 
members of the statespace; she can readily accept that there are natural groupings, or 
subsets, within the statespace. But contrary to Sider’s claim, she does not need to posit sub-
world objects in order to account for them.  
 
 
§8.2.3 Haecceities and Probabilities 
 
Sider’s third objection is that the Monist cannot account for purely haecceitistic differences 
between members of statespace. Indeed he claims that the Monist cannot even accept that 
there are such differences. To illustrate his point, Sider once more asks us to consider a 
hypothetical Screenworld as an example. This time we are asked to imagine a Screenworld 
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made up of just two pixels (call them ‘A’ and ‘B’), both of which can be either on or off. Let’s 
call this world w1. Now according to Sider, if haecceitism is true, then there will be a 
difference between the state in which A is on and B is off, and the state in which A is off and 
B is on. Because of this, there will be four members of the statespace at this world: 
 
Fig. 10 
 
 
Furthermore, Sider suggests that it is quite important that there should be four members of 
the statespace at such a world. For it would play a part in explaining, for instance, why it is 
more likely that the world will be in a one-pixel-on-one-pixel-off state than in, say, a both-
pixels-off state. In other words, one needs to recognise the difference between state 2 and 
state 3 in order to explain certain probabilistic features of the world. And in order to do that, 
he claims, one must accept haecceities. The reason for this is that states 2 and 3 are 
qualitatively indistinguishable. That is to say, one cannot distinguish between the two states 
in terms of what qualitative properties are instantiated, but only in terms of what objects 
instantiate them – i.e. in state 2 it is that pixel (A) which is on, and in state 3 it is that pixel (B) 
that is on. If one views the world monistically, then one cannot even distinguish between the 
states on those grounds, for in both states, not only are the qualitative properties 
indistinguishable, but they are instantiated by the very same object (the entire world) in both 
instances. For the monist, then, states 2 and 3 are identical. Thus for the monist, there are 
only three members of the statespace (as depicted in fig. 11). But if there are only three 
members of the statespace, then how can one explain the probabilistic features of the world 
to which Sider alludes? The pluralist has an easy answer, the monist does not.  
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Fig. 11 
 
 
Sider’s argument rests on two important assumptions. They are: 
 
Assumption 1: The probabilities at w1 are as follows: 
 Both pixels off: 0.25 
 Both pixels on: 0.25 
 One pixel on one pixel off: 0.5 
 
Assumption 2: All members of the statespace at w1 are equi-probable.  
 
The conjunction of these two assumptions entails that there must be two distinct one-pixel-
on-one-pixel-off states, and thus four possible states in total. However, I think that both 
assumptions can be questioned, and therefore that there are (at least) two possible lines of 
response available to the monist.  
 The simplest line of response would be to deny assumption 2. On this view, then, the 
monist would accept that there are only three members of the statespace (as depicted in fig. 
11) but assert that they are not equi-probable. Instead, the probabilities would be stipulated 
thus: 
 
State 1: 0.25 
State 2: 0.5 
State 3: 0.25 
 
Whilst this response would overcome the objection, it is evidently problematic. The problem 
being that there doesn’t appear to be any good explanation of why state 2 has the probability 
it does. The monist will just have to accept it as a brute fact that state 2 has some kind of 
primitive bias associated with it such that it is twice as likely to crop up as either of the 
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others. Whilst this may not be a fatal concession for the monist to make, it looks suspiciously 
ad hoc, and thus would be something of an unsavoury pill to swallow.  
A much more promising, and indeed interesting, avenue of response, however, 
would be to challenge assumption 1. That is, to question whether the probabilities at w1 are 
in fact as Sider suggests they are. According to assumption 1, the probability of w1 being in a 
one-on-one-off state is twice as likely as it being in a both-off state (or a both-on state). The 
question I suggest that we should ask is why should we assume that this is the case?   
Here is a possible answer: consider flipping two coins, call them ‘A’ and ‘B’. This 
situation seems to be analogous to the situation described at w1, for the two coins represent 
the two pixels and each possible state of the coins (heads or tails) represents each possible 
state of the pixels (on or off). Now if we flip both coins once each, then the probabilities of 
the possible results will exactly match those probabilities stated by Sider above: 
 
Both heads: 0.25 
Both tails: 0.25 
One tail one head: 0.5 
 
That the probabilities for the coins are like this is beyond doubt. (One only needs to flip 
enough coins to see this for oneself). So the monist certainly won’t want to deny that. But she 
doesn’t have to. When speaking strictly, the monist will obviously not accept that there are 
such things as coins (or indeed people to flip them) for she does not accept the existence of 
multiple concrete objects, but she can explain the coin flipping scenario perfectly well, in 
terms of the world instantiating certain distributional properties. (Very roughly, she can say 
that there are certain distributions of coin-ness, or head-ness and tail-ness, instantiated by the 
world, or something to that effect. To repeat what was stated earlier, what we call these 
properties is not really that important). Now the pluralist will say that the one-head-one-tail 
result has a probability of 0.5 because there are two distinct ways in which it can obtain (i.e. 
‘A-heads & B-tails’ or ‘A-tails & B-heads’). Whilst the monist won’t actually posit the coins, 
her corresponding explanation will be very similar; there will be two different ways in 
which the result can obtain (i.e. there will be two distinct distributional properties, one 
corresponding to ‘A-heads & B-tails’ and the other corresponding to ‘A-tails & B-heads’). 
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 The important point to recognise, however, is that neither pluralist nor monist will 
have to appeal to haecceities in order to distinguish these states. And that is because they are 
qualitatively distinct in both cases. In the pluralist case, for instance, because the coins are 
sub-world objects, there will be a multitude of relational properties in play which suffice to 
make the two states qualitatively distinct. For instance, the pluralist can distinguish between 
coin A and B by pointing to the relations in which they stand to other objects and/or 
observers, e.g. ‘coin A is the one on the left’ or ‘coin B is the one closer to Roger’ or 
something like that. The monist too can make such distinctions. For the world’s 
distributional properties that correspond to the states ‘A-heads & B-tails’ or ‘A-tails & B-
heads’ will likewise be qualitatively distinct. The distribution patterns of head-ness and tail-
ness will be spatially, and thus qualitatively, different in each case. 
 In stark contrast, however, this is clearly not the case at w1. Because the pixels are the 
only things there, it would make no sense for the pluralist to start talking about things like 
‘the pixel on the left’ or ‘the pixel closest to Roger’. Likewise for the monist, there is no way 
to qualitatively distinguish between two half-on-half-off states at w1, because the 
distribution patterns will be perfect duplicates in both cases. Now what all this suggests, I 
propose, is that contrary to our initial presumption, the coin flipping scenario is not 
analogous to the situation described at w1 after all. And because the two scenarios are not 
analogous, or at least not as clearly analogous as they first seemed, then it seems 
questionable to infer that the probabilities in one scenario will be the same as in the other. 
Sider has made exactly that inference (at least, I am presuming he has made that inference, 
for I can see no other reason why he would assume the probabilities at w1 to be as he states), 
and then accused the monist of being unable to explain the results of it. But if the inference 
itself is unwarranted, then there is no pressure on the monist to provide the explanation that 
is being requested.  
 At this point, however, this response may still seem a little weak. For it just seems 
obvious, does it not, that the probabilities will be as Sider describes. If there are two pixels, 
both of which can be on or off, then surely, it is more likely that at any given time they will 
be in a one-on-one-off state that in, say, a both-off state! I sympathise with this intuition, but 
I think it may well be misguided. To show why, I would like to draw on an example from 
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contemporary physics.349 Suppose that instead of considering the flipping of two coins, we 
instead focused on two elementary particles (e.g. electrons) each of which could be in one of 
two possible states (call them ‘state X’ and ‘state Y’). One may think, that if the coin-flipping 
case is anything to go by, that the chance of both electrons being in state X at any given time 
would be 0.25 (as it would be for them both being in state Y), and the chance of them being 
in different states (i.e. one X and one Y) would be 0.5. Indeed if the intuition identified above 
is correct, then it is obvious that the probabilities should be like this. Interestingly, however, 
this is not the case. According to our current best theories, the probabilities of the electrons 
being in different states is actually 1/3, as is the probability of them both being in state X, and 
of them both being in state Y. That the probabilities are like this at the quantum level has 
been corroborated by empirical observation.350  
There are two conclusions one could draw from these results. One would be to 
maintain that while there are still four different overall states our electron pair could be in at 
any given time, there is nevertheless some reason that they are not all equi-probable. That is, 
for some reason, there are primitive biases associated with the various states such that the 
probabilities come out as they do. The other conclusion would be to maintain that all 
possible states of the electron pair are equi-probable, but that there are actually only three of 
them (i.e. both X, both Y or one X one Y). The former of these conclusions is, I think, no 
better off than the first monistic response I considered to Sider’s original objection. That is, it 
seems suspiciously ad hoc. The latter of the two conclusions seems much more reasonable, 
and furthermore, is the one favoured by experts in this field.351 In other words, at the 
quantum level, if two states are qualitatively indistinguishable, they are taken to be a single 
state.  
What all this shows is that we would have been wrong to infer from the probabilities 
that obtain in everyday cases (like the coin-flipping case), the probabilities that obtain in 
quantum cases (like the electron pair). Classical statistics just seem not to apply when 
considering the very very small. So the thought being proposed here, then, is perhaps they 
don’t apply when considering the very very big either? Now I should make something clear 
here. I am not for a minute suggesting that the probabilities that obtain at the quantum level 
                                                 
349 This example was brought to my attention when reading a recent paper by John Heil. See Heil (2012), 176-7. 
350 See French and Krausse (2006) 
351 See French & Krausse (2006), 83-84 
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give us any license whatsoever to infer what the probabilities may be at the maximal, 
worldly level. They do not. My argument is much more modest than that. I am merely 
highlighting a case where it would have been wrong for us to infer what probabilities obtain 
purely by observing the probabilities that obtain in ordinary circumstances (like the coin-
flipping case) which are supposedly analogous. The fact that classical statistics and 
probabilities do not apply at the quantum level entails the more general conclusion that they 
do not always apply. But if we know that they do not always apply, then it doesn’t seem too 
much of a problem for the monist to say that it is a consequence of monism that classical 
statistics do not always apply at a worldly level either.  
To conclude, then, what Sider has successfully done is demonstrate some interesting 
probabilistic facts about monistic statespace. At the maximal level, if monism is correct, it 
seems as though classical statistics and probabilities do not always apply. But one can only 
really view this as an argument against monism if one has some prior reason to believe that 
classical statistics should apply at the maximal level. I cannot see what such a reason could 
be, other than some kind of inference from what the probabilities are in ordinary sub-world 
cases like the flipping of two coins. But since it has been demonstrated that such an inference 
would produce the wrong results when moving to considering the very very small, why 
should we have any faith that it would not produce the wrong results when we move to 
consider the maximally large? Indeed one might even think that there would be a certain 
satisfying symmetry if the probabilities at a maximal level exactly mirrored those at the 
minimal level. But, of course, we are now in the realms of speculation. The overriding point 
should be, however, that if the monist has to accept that some unusual probabilistic facts 
obtain in monistic statespace, then so be it; that is simply a consequence of monism. But in 
light of the preceding comments, it doesn’t seem to be too costly a consequence. Indeed, I 
am inclined to believe that it isn’t really a cost at all. 
  
 
§8.2.4 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 
Sider’s final objection against monism is that only if one is a pluralist can one give a 
satisfactory definition of intrinsicality. But because we require a satisfactory definition of 
intrinsicality, pluralism should be preferred, or so the argument goes. Philosophers often 
248 | P a g e  
 
make claims about which of an object’s properties are intrinsic and which are extrinsic. 
Consider, for example, the following two statements: 
 
1. Being negatively charged is intrinsic  
2. Being ten feet from an electron is extrinsic 
Sider’s claim is that although the monist won’t take claims like this at face value (for 
according to monism there aren’t any electrons), she will still want to make some kind of 
sense of them. Specifically, the monist needs to be able to accept that they are, in some sense 
or other, correct. This is supposed to be analogous to the sense in which the monist will 
accept that common sense claims like ‘there are tables’ are in some sense correct, even 
though they are, strictly speaking, false. But in order to accept this, Sider continues, the 
monist will need to have some kind of satisfactory definition or analysis of intrinsicality. 
Sider himself endorses a broadly Lewisian definition of intrinsicality: 
 
INTRINSICALITY: A property is intrinsic iff it can never differ between a 
pair of possible duplicates. 
 
Where duplication is defined as follows: 
 
DUPLICATION: objects are duplicates iff their parts can be put in one-one 
correspondence preserving their perfectly natural properties and relations.352  
 
Sider’s argument is that these definitions are no good to the monist. And he is quite right. 
For the Lewisian account of intrinsicality, when coupled with monism, generates all sorts of 
counter-intuitive results when it comes to intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Take the 
property of being ten feet from an electron, for instance. According to the monist, nothing 
instantiates this property, because there are no electrons, of necessity.353 Therefore, no 
possible duplicates will differ with respect to this property – because no possible objects will 
have it. So according to the Lewisian account, the monist must take being ten feet from an 
electron to be an intrinsic property. But if that is the case, then how on earth can the monist 
                                                 
352 Sider (2007a), 5 
353 Presuming, of course, that monism is necessarily true. I will assume this to be the case.  
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account for the fact that statement 1 should be considered correct? It would seem that she 
can’t. The monist, Sider therefore claims, owes us a story.354 
 The first thing to point out in response to this argument is that it doesn’t show that 
the monist can’t make sense of intrinsicality per se, but rather, it shows merely that the 
monist can’t adopt Lewis’s account in order to do so. That may represent a problem if the 
monist were, for some reason or other, particularly wedded to Lewis’s account. But I can see 
no reason why she should be. For the Lewisian account is by no means the only way of 
understanding intrinsicality. (In fact, it would be fair to say that Lewis’s account is a fairly 
controversial one). There are plenty of other ways one can try to define intrinsicality.355 One 
fairly common way of doing so is to focus on the seemingly evident fact that most extrinsic 
properties tend to be relational in nature, and conversely, that most intrinsic properties tend 
to be non-relational.356 Specific relational accounts of intrinsicality that can be found in the 
literature can be quite technical and complex, but the general thought that seems to pervade 
them all is that if x’s being F obtains in virtue of x standing in some relation to a distinct 
object then F is extrinsic, and if it does not, then F is intrinsic.  
 I think that the monist should endorse a relational account of intrinsicality. This is for 
two main reasons. Firstly, relational accounts seem to accurately capture a central and 
important intuition about the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction. That intuition is that an object’s 
intrinsic properties are those it has in virtue of the way it is in itself, whereas its extrinsic 
properties are those it has in virtue of how it stands to its surroundings. This intuition seems 
to be accepted by all parties who engage in the debate over intrinsicality, regardless of how 
they choose to formally analyse the distinction.357 The fact that relational accounts seem to 
capture this intuition so clearly must surely count in their favour. Secondly, a broadly 
relational account will enable the monist to generate, for the main part, the required facts 
about intrinsicality, and thus overcome Sider’s objection.358 To return to our previous 
                                                 
354 Sider (2007a), 7 
355 See Cameron (2008c) for a good overview of the terrain. 
356 Relational accounts of intrinsicality have been given by Francescotti (1999) and Hoffmann-Kolss (2010), among 
others. 
357 Even Lewis agrees that much. See Lewis (1986), 61-2 
358 I say “for the main part”, because even most relational accounts will be subject to some troublesome counter-
examples. But I don’t think this should count for too much, because all extant analyses of intrinsicality seem to be 
subject to at least some counter-intuitive counter-examples. On Lewis’s account, for instance, the property of 
being married to a round square will come out as intrinsic, since no two possible duplicates will differ in respect to 
it.  
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examples, for instance, the property of being ten feet from an electron will, on a relational 
account, come out as extrinsic, just as it should do. And this is the case even for the monist. 
Sure, if you’re a monist there are no electrons, so nothing could actually instantiate the 
property of being ten feet from an electron, but the monist can still recognise it as an extrinsic 
property, for the simple reason that if it were to be instantiated, whatever did instantiate it 
would do so in virtue of standing in some relation to some distinct object (specifically, by 
standing in the ten feet away from relation to an electron). More generally, the property of 
being ten feet away from anything will always come out as being extrinsic, since its 
instantiation will always depend on its bearer standing in some relation or other to some 
distinct object in its surroundings. Moreover, the property of being negatively charged will, 
rightly, come out as intrinsic, because something’s having that property does not depend on 
that something standing in any relation to any distinct objects.  
 The specific way in which the monist should articulate her relational account of 
intrinsicality could vary. As I have already noted, there are a number of differing relational 
accounts already available in the extant literature. But I don’t think the monist needs to get 
too bogged down in the specifics in order to show merely how a generally relational account 
of intrinsicality can overcome Sider’s objection. Different relational accounts of intrinsicality 
will have differing pros and cons, for sure. Most likely, these pros and cons will be centred 
around the specific counter-examples that a particular analysis is (or is not) subject to. But 
this is to be expected in this particular debate. For I do not know of any account of 
intrinsicality (the Lewis-Sider account included) that is not subject to at least some counter-
intuitive counter-examples. So the monist will simply need to make a reasoned and 
informed decision as to how she should formalise her relational account of intrinsicality, and 
take the resultant counter-examples on the chin. The important point is, however, that for 
the main part at least, any broadly relational account of intrinsicality should enable the 
monist to generate the required facts about intrinsic and extrinsic properties.  
So here is the bottom line. If Sider’s claim is that the monist can’t make any sense at 
all of statements like 1 and 2 (and I think that it is), then I would suggest that he is just 
wrong. The monist can make perfect sense of them, at least, insofar as she can make sense of 
a generally relational account of intrinsicality, which she clearly can. But if, however, his 
complaint is the much stronger claim that the monist cannot give an adequate and formal 
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account of intrinsicality, then it is surely unjustified. Sure, it may be difficult for the monist 
to give a complete and satisfying account of intrinsicality that is entirely free from 
troublesome counter-examples. But that problem is not unique to the monist! Pluralists have 
been engaged in a similar struggle to analyse intrinsicality for years, and have yielded only 
limited success. It is an unfair request, therefore, to demand a complete and error-free 
account of intrinsicality from the monist, when one cannot provide one oneself. Overall, the 
monist has no more difficulty in defining intrinsicality than the pluralist. She is merely 
constrained by the fact that she cannot use Lewis’s account in order to do so.  
 
 
 
§8.3. Final Concluding Remarks 
I hope to have shown that none of the objections considered represent a serious threat to the 
monist, since all of them can be overcome. Priority Monism, despite its name, is not really a 
theory of monism, and should certainly not be seen as a straight alternative to the thesis of 
monism being considered here. Thus it presents no special threat to monism, at least, no 
more threat than any other ontological view with which monism is incompatible. Ted 
Sider’s objections certainly constitute more of a serious challenge. But I hope to have shown 
that they too can be overcome, and at relatively little cost.  
 And so it is that I must conclude this ontological thesis. I hope that the reader will 
have been at the very least compelled by my reasoning and that they will concede that 
monism is a coherent and plausible thesis. Indeed I live in hope that the more convivial 
reader may have been convinced that monism is true. It certainly seems clear to me, at least, 
that we live in a monistic world; rich in properties, yet sparse in concrete objects. But I must 
concede that it is not without something of a heavy heart and a certain degree of resignation 
that I accept this conclusion. For no matter how compelling I find the reasoning, and no 
matter how convinced I am in the truth of my conclusions, I simply cannot seem to shake 
my inherently pluralistic view of the world. When away from the philosophy room, I cannot 
help but think and talk about the world as though I were a committed pluralist; I cannot 
help but act as though multiple objects abound. And I would be lying if I were to say that 
this somewhat hypocritical behaviour, this seemingly irrevocable tension between my 
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rational beliefs and my instincts, did not cause me any anxiety at all, for it most certainly 
does. But, of course, I am in good company for suffering from this turmoil. For I feel a 
certain sympathy for David Hume, who was so famously afflicted with melancholy by the 
realisation that his philosophical conclusions about causation were in such irremediable 
conflict with his natural and instinctual beliefs. And I think I have no option but to accept a 
similarly Humean conclusion; that our belief in a multiplicity of objects (just like our belief 
in the relation of cause and effect) is an innate and incontrovertible feature of the human 
mind. We can entertain the idea that it is false, but we can never truly believe it to be so. 
When going about one’s daily life, one can never fail to act as though the ordinary objects of 
experience really and truly exist. And this is why I say that it is only with a certain degree of 
resignation that I conclude monism to be true. I am what one may call a reluctant monist. But 
I am a monist all the same.   
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